The financial crisis of 2008/09 has many roots and remedies will have to be multipronged. However, there seems no doubt that corporate governance mechanisms failed with regard to risk management across the board. In this presentation, we show the systemic shortcomings of a unitary board which will allow future crises to happen if not remedied. Many directors argued, that 1) they did not know about the risk, 2) they did not think the information was relevant, 3) there was simply too much information, and 4) they could not do anything about it. We argue that they are probably correct with all four explanation, because the structure of a unitary board supports such fundamental flaws in risk management. We also propose alternatives based on the science of governance (cybernetics) and decision theory.
{"title":"Can Network Governance Reduce the Risk of Future Financial Failures?","authors":"S. Turnbull, M. Pirson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1683528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1683528","url":null,"abstract":"The financial crisis of 2008/09 has many roots and remedies will have to be multipronged. However, there seems no doubt that corporate governance mechanisms failed with regard to risk management across the board. In this presentation, we show the systemic shortcomings of a unitary board which will allow future crises to happen if not remedied. Many directors argued, that 1) they did not know about the risk, 2) they did not think the information was relevant, 3) there was simply too much information, and 4) they could not do anything about it. We argue that they are probably correct with all four explanation, because the structure of a unitary board supports such fundamental flaws in risk management. We also propose alternatives based on the science of governance (cybernetics) and decision theory.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115157143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-30DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6281.2010.00321.x
D. Cormier, W. Aerts, Marie-Josée Ledoux, M. Magnan
Adopting a monitoring perspective, this study aims to explain how and why firms provide web-based disclosure about their value creation and its underlying processes. We rely on the balanced scoreboard approach to measure disclosure. Our results suggest that costs incurred by capital markets' participants as well as monitoring by the board and the media drive disclosure. Moreover, we argue and document that a firm's disclosure is actually a part of its governance configuration and influences some board processes.
{"title":"Web-Based Disclosure About Value Creation Processes: A Monitoring Perspective","authors":"D. Cormier, W. Aerts, Marie-Josée Ledoux, M. Magnan","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6281.2010.00321.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.2010.00321.x","url":null,"abstract":"Adopting a monitoring perspective, this study aims to explain how and why firms provide web-based disclosure about their value creation and its underlying processes. We rely on the balanced scoreboard approach to measure disclosure. Our results suggest that costs incurred by capital markets' participants as well as monitoring by the board and the media drive disclosure. Moreover, we argue and document that a firm's disclosure is actually a part of its governance configuration and influences some board processes.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127155417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debtholders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995-2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at BHC-affiliated banks, where subordinated debtholders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.
{"title":"Market Discipline of Bank Risk and the Too-Big-To-Fail Protection: Evidence from Risk Management Decisions","authors":"M. Belkhir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1657836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1657836","url":null,"abstract":"I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debtholders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995-2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at BHC-affiliated banks, where subordinated debtholders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122277815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider a hypothetical company that is assumed to have just manufactured and sold a number of copies of a product. It is known that, with a small probability, the company has committed a manufacturing fault that will require a recall. The company is able to observe the expiration times of the sold items whose distribution depends on whether the fault is present or absent. At the expiration of each item, a public inspection takes place that may reveal the fault, if it exists. Based on this information, the company can recall the product at any moment and pay back each customer the price of the product. If the company is not able to recall before an inspection reveals the fault, it pays a fine per item sold, which is assumed to be much larger than the price of the product. We compute the optimal recall time that minimizes the expected cost of recall of this company. We then derive and solve a stationary limit recall problem and show that the original problem converges to it as the number of items initially sold increases to ∞. Finally, we propose two extensions of the original model and compute the optimal recall times for these. In the first extension, the expired items are inspected only if they expire earlier than expected; in the second extension, the company is able to conduct internal/private inspections on the expired items. We provide numerical examples and simulation results for all three models.
{"title":"Optimal Decision Rules for Product Recalls","authors":"A. Sezer, Ç. Haksöz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1612327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612327","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a hypothetical company that is assumed to have just manufactured and sold a number of copies of a product. It is known that, with a small probability, the company has committed a manufacturing fault that will require a recall. The company is able to observe the expiration times of the sold items whose distribution depends on whether the fault is present or absent. At the expiration of each item, a public inspection takes place that may reveal the fault, if it exists. Based on this information, the company can recall the product at any moment and pay back each customer the price of the product. If the company is not able to recall before an inspection reveals the fault, it pays a fine per item sold, which is assumed to be much larger than the price of the product. We compute the optimal recall time that minimizes the expected cost of recall of this company. We then derive and solve a stationary limit recall problem and show that the original problem converges to it as the number of items initially sold increases to ∞. Finally, we propose two extensions of the original model and compute the optimal recall times for these. In the first extension, the expired items are inspected only if they expire earlier than expected; in the second extension, the company is able to conduct internal/private inspections on the expired items. We provide numerical examples and simulation results for all three models.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"25 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114028744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies internal organization of a firm using an incomplete contracting approach `a la Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole. The two key ingredients of our model are externalities among tasks that require coordination, and investment in task-specific human capital. We compare three types of organizational structures: centralization where the decision authority for all tasks is given to the party without task-specific human capital, decentralization where the decision authority for each task is given to the party with necessary human capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority is allocated in a hierarchical fashion. Centralization is optimal when externalities and the requisite coordination are the main issue in organization design. Decentralization is optimal if the investment in human capital is more important. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical delegation as well as several directions extending the basic model.
{"title":"On the Optimality of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation","authors":"Chongwoo Choe, Shingo Ishiguro","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWR022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWR022","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies internal organization of a firm using an incomplete contracting approach `a la Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole. The two key ingredients of our model are externalities among tasks that require coordination, and investment in task-specific human capital. We compare three types of organizational structures: centralization where the decision authority for all tasks is given to the party without task-specific human capital, decentralization where the decision authority for each task is given to the party with necessary human capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority is allocated in a hierarchical fashion. Centralization is optimal when externalities and the requisite coordination are the main issue in organization design. Decentralization is optimal if the investment in human capital is more important. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical delegation as well as several directions extending the basic model.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"366 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116055574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This proposal is an incipient attempt at the consolidation of what Axelsson (1992) calls the ‘missing’ perspective in the Strategic Management field. By building upon the basic and realistic premise of a ‘co-opetitive’ business world wherein competition and cooperation coexist alongside (even within the same interfirm relationship), such a perspective ought to advocate the view of strategy as a pattern of converging decisions and actions of the firm with a twofold purpose: (i) the (mostly passive and/or reactive) fit to a slowly changing, largely faceless and intractable environment and (ii) the (primarily proactive) interrelation with and shaping of a full-face, rapidly changing context.
{"title":"The (Still Missing) Relational View of Strategy","authors":"Filipe J. Sousa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1595284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1595284","url":null,"abstract":"This proposal is an incipient attempt at the consolidation of what Axelsson (1992) calls the ‘missing’ perspective in the Strategic Management field. By building upon the basic and realistic premise of a ‘co-opetitive’ business world wherein competition and cooperation coexist alongside (even within the same interfirm relationship), such a perspective ought to advocate the view of strategy as a pattern of converging decisions and actions of the firm with a twofold purpose: (i) the (mostly passive and/or reactive) fit to a slowly changing, largely faceless and intractable environment and (ii) the (primarily proactive) interrelation with and shaping of a full-face, rapidly changing context.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"212 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117312195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-09-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00561.x
U. Lichtenthaler
Firms may open up their innovation processes on two dimensions. While inbound open innovation refers to the acquisition of external technology in open exploration processes, outbound open innovation describes the outward transfer of technology in open exploitation processes. Prior open innovation research has focused on the inbound dimension, whereas the outbound dimension has been relatively neglected. Therefore, this article addresses the relationship between outbound open R&D strategies and firm performance. We use data from 136 industrial firms to test four hypotheses on the moderating effects of environmental factors in the relationship between open innovation strategies and firm performance. The results show that the degree of technological turbulence, the transaction rate in technology markets, and the competitive intensity in technology markets strengthen the positive effects of outbound open innovation on firm performance. By contrast, the degree of patent protection does not facilitate successful open innovation. The results are crucially important to managers because they show under what environmental conditions open innovation strategies enhance performance.
{"title":"Outbound Open Innovation and its Effect on Firm Performance: Examining Environmental Influences","authors":"U. Lichtenthaler","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00561.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00561.x","url":null,"abstract":"Firms may open up their innovation processes on two dimensions. While inbound open innovation refers to the acquisition of external technology in open exploration processes, outbound open innovation describes the outward transfer of technology in open exploitation processes. Prior open innovation research has focused on the inbound dimension, whereas the outbound dimension has been relatively neglected. Therefore, this article addresses the relationship between outbound open R&D strategies and firm performance. We use data from 136 industrial firms to test four hypotheses on the moderating effects of environmental factors in the relationship between open innovation strategies and firm performance. The results show that the degree of technological turbulence, the transaction rate in technology markets, and the competitive intensity in technology markets strengthen the positive effects of outbound open innovation on firm performance. By contrast, the degree of patent protection does not facilitate successful open innovation. The results are crucially important to managers because they show under what environmental conditions open innovation strategies enhance performance.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127306008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Van Nieuwenhuyse, L. De Boeck, M. Lambrecht, N. Vandaele
In this paper, we show that the planning and decision-support capabilities of the MPC (Manufacturing Planning and Control) system, which forms the core of any ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) package, may be substantively enhanced by including a Decision Support Module (DSM) as an add-on at the midterm planning level. This DSM, called Advanced Resource Planning (ARP), serves as parameter setting process as well as tool for improving the structure of the ERP system itself. The ultimate goal of the DSM is to yield realistic information both for scheduling, sales and marketing, strategic and operational decision making and suppliers and customers.
{"title":"Advanced Resource Planning as Decision Support Module to ERP","authors":"I. Van Nieuwenhuyse, L. De Boeck, M. Lambrecht, N. Vandaele","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1369117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1369117","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we show that the planning and decision-support capabilities of the MPC (Manufacturing Planning and Control) system, which forms the core of any ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) package, may be substantively enhanced by including a Decision Support Module (DSM) as an add-on at the midterm planning level. This DSM, called Advanced Resource Planning (ARP), serves as parameter setting process as well as tool for improving the structure of the ERP system itself. The ultimate goal of the DSM is to yield realistic information both for scheduling, sales and marketing, strategic and operational decision making and suppliers and customers.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132314701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the viable alternatives for a suitable institutional and governance framework for the policymaking body presiding over the GMU. The authors review a series of alternatives, from the simplest one (i.e. a governors’ council formed by the governors of the national central banks and monetary authorities, each endowed with a single equal vote), to the more elaborate ones, involving the set-up of a supranational institution, a Gulf Central Bank (GCB) with permanent staff, an appointed president and an executive board, which together with the national governors would form a monetary policy council (MPC) responsible for the setting of monetary policy instruments and taking decisions in all the main areas of monetary policy. The members of the MPC could be given equal voting rights, or voting power weighted according to the economic and financial size of each country, with some corrective counterweight mechanisms, such as a specific voting weight for the president and/or the executive board to provide checks and balances. The solution the authors feel markets (and the public) would find more credible and suitable would be one involving the creation of a new GCB with its own staff and an independent executive board, because it would strengthen the authority and sustainability of the institutional arrangement, and create an organisation that is an effective counterpart of the other major international central banks and financial markets.
{"title":"The Institutional Framework of the Gulf Central Bank","authors":"Nasser H. Saidi, F. Scacciavillani","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1528889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1528889","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the viable alternatives for a suitable institutional and governance framework for the policymaking body presiding over the GMU. The authors review a series of alternatives, from the simplest one (i.e. a governors’ council formed by the governors of the national central banks and monetary authorities, each endowed with a single equal vote), to the more elaborate ones, involving the set-up of a supranational institution, a Gulf Central Bank (GCB) with permanent staff, an appointed president and an executive board, which together with the national governors would form a monetary policy council (MPC) responsible for the setting of monetary policy instruments and taking decisions in all the main areas of monetary policy. The members of the MPC could be given equal voting rights, or voting power weighted according to the economic and financial size of each country, with some corrective counterweight mechanisms, such as a specific voting weight for the president and/or the executive board to provide checks and balances. The solution the authors feel markets (and the public) would find more credible and suitable would be one involving the creation of a new GCB with its own staff and an independent executive board, because it would strengthen the authority and sustainability of the institutional arrangement, and create an organisation that is an effective counterpart of the other major international central banks and financial markets.","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116954160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As one of the important components of strategic planning process, environmental scanning has received importance to explore new opportunities and to identify threats for making important strategic decision. The present study indicates between owner-manager's environmental awareness on business performance of the Small Business. Bollinger (1994) found that scanning is positively correlated with the firm's financial performance. Similar results were also found by Orpen (1993) reported that small firm which posses more information about themselves and their environment engage in formal strategic planning and they perform better financially than their counter parts. Authors in the area of small business and entrepreneurship have recognized the need for conscious and continuous study of the environment and integrate the environmental information into their strategic planning. Finally, Environmental awareness contributed significantly to the relationship with overall performance of small business under the study
{"title":"A Relationship between Owner-Manager's Environmental Awareness and Small Business Performance","authors":"N. Balasundaram","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1728645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1728645","url":null,"abstract":"As one of the important components of strategic planning process, environmental scanning has received importance to explore new opportunities and to identify threats for making important strategic decision. The present study indicates between owner-manager's environmental awareness on business performance of the Small Business. Bollinger (1994) found that scanning is positively correlated with the firm's financial performance. Similar results were also found by Orpen (1993) reported that small firm which posses more information about themselves and their environment engage in formal strategic planning and they perform better financially than their counter parts. Authors in the area of small business and entrepreneurship have recognized the need for conscious and continuous study of the environment and integrate the environmental information into their strategic planning. Finally, Environmental awareness contributed significantly to the relationship with overall performance of small business under the study","PeriodicalId":235827,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Decision-Making in Organizations (Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132302144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：