We investigate the statistical and economic effect of positive and negative sentiment on daily excess returns and volatility in the FTSE 100 index, using business news articles published by the Guardian Media Group between 01/01/2000 and 01/06/2016. The analysis indicates that while business news sentiment derived from articles aimed at retail traders does not influence excess returns in the FTSE 100 index, it does affect volatility, with negative sentiment increasing volatility and positive sentiment reducing it. Further, an ETF‐based trading strategy based on these findings is found to outperform the naive buy‐and‐hold approach.
{"title":"Predicting FTSE 100 Returns and Volatility Using Sentiment Analysis","authors":"Mark Johnman, B. Vanstone, A. Gepp","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12373","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the statistical and economic effect of positive and negative sentiment on daily excess returns and volatility in the FTSE 100 index, using business news articles published by the Guardian Media Group between 01/01/2000 and 01/06/2016. The analysis indicates that while business news sentiment derived from articles aimed at retail traders does not influence excess returns in the FTSE 100 index, it does affect volatility, with negative sentiment increasing volatility and positive sentiment reducing it. Further, an ETF‐based trading strategy based on these findings is found to outperform the naive buy‐and‐hold approach.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80467233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Earnouts are contractual agreements in merger and acquisition (M&A) deals that link part of the acquisition price to the future performance of the target company. These contracts seem to be a panacea for adverse selection and valuation risk issues in M&As. However, earnouts are not very popular. A likely reason for their limited diffusion is that earnouts have their origin in disagreement and in disagreement they may end: given the complexity of the verification of their outcome and the risk of moral hazard by the bidder, litigation at the time of their payout is far from uncommon. Absent effective legal protection for earnout holders, the potential benefits of these contracts could turn out to be empty promises, thus limiting incentives to include them in acquisition deals. Using an international sample of 37,228 deals completed between 2000 and 2015, we show that the inclusion of these contracts in M&As is significantly related to a country's enforcement quality. Furthermore, we show that a similar relation holds for the proportion of earnout payments with respect to total consideration. Our results hold after controlling for other determinants of earnout suggested by prior literature and for other institutional factors that could affect the use of earnouts.
{"title":"Enforcement Quality and the Use of Earnouts in M&A Transactions: International Evidence","authors":"Luca Viarengo, S. Gatti, A. Prencipe","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12314","url":null,"abstract":"Earnouts are contractual agreements in merger and acquisition (M&A) deals that link part of the acquisition price to the future performance of the target company. These contracts seem to be a panacea for adverse selection and valuation risk issues in M&As. However, earnouts are not very popular. A likely reason for their limited diffusion is that earnouts have their origin in disagreement and in disagreement they may end: given the complexity of the verification of their outcome and the risk of moral hazard by the bidder, litigation at the time of their payout is far from uncommon. Absent effective legal protection for earnout holders, the potential benefits of these contracts could turn out to be empty promises, thus limiting incentives to include them in acquisition deals. Using an international sample of 37,228 deals completed between 2000 and 2015, we show that the inclusion of these contracts in M&As is significantly related to a country's enforcement quality. Furthermore, we show that a similar relation holds for the proportion of earnout payments with respect to total consideration. Our results hold after controlling for other determinants of earnout suggested by prior literature and for other institutional factors that could affect the use of earnouts.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82470766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We discuss the background to integrated reporting, a new reporting framework focused on firms’ future value creation narrative. We consider why integrated reporting is an area of interest for the accounting profession, accountants, investors, regulators and managers. We provide an overview of the integrated reporting literature, discuss measurement and research design issues to take into account when designing studies on integrated reporting and identify approaches and set an agenda for future research.
{"title":"Integrated Reporting: Background, Measurement Issues, Approaches and an Agenda for Future Research","authors":"C. de Villiers, E. Venter, P. Hsiao","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12246","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the background to integrated reporting, a new reporting framework focused on firms’ future value creation narrative. We consider why integrated reporting is an area of interest for the accounting profession, accountants, investors, regulators and managers. We provide an overview of the integrated reporting literature, discuss measurement and research design issues to take into account when designing studies on integrated reporting and identify approaches and set an agenda for future research.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77154604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates whether discretion in reporting pension expenses mitigates research and development (R&D) manipulation. Using a sample of Japanese manufacturing firms during the fiscal years 2001–2011 where both pension costs and R&D expenditures have large impacts on the bottom-line earnings, I find that higher discount rates are associated with higher R&D investment among firms in which pension expenses could have large impacts on reported earnings. I also find that this relationship is found only among firms in high-tech industries. These results suggest that pension accrual management substitutes costly R&D manipulation that may hurt future competitive edge.
{"title":"Pension Accrual Management and Research and Development Investment","authors":"Takafumi Sasaki","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12185","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates whether discretion in reporting pension expenses mitigates research and development (R&D) manipulation. Using a sample of Japanese manufacturing firms during the fiscal years 2001–2011 where both pension costs and R&D expenditures have large impacts on the bottom-line earnings, I find that higher discount rates are associated with higher R&D investment among firms in which pension expenses could have large impacts on reported earnings. I also find that this relationship is found only among firms in high-tech industries. These results suggest that pension accrual management substitutes costly R&D manipulation that may hurt future competitive edge.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80453218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation-building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low-cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
{"title":"Reputation as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from Payout Policy of Insider‐Controlled Firms in Taiwan","authors":"Liang-wei Kuo","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12261","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation-building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low-cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing. \u0000 \u0000This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85006173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual-based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.
{"title":"Earnings Quality and Short Selling: Evidence from Real Earnings Management in the United States","authors":"Koeun Park","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12264","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual-based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82238466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the role of January in the relation between expected losses/profits and future stock returns. We predict and find that the relation between expected losses/profits and future returns reverses from the usual positive relation in non-January months to a negative one in January. The reverse January relation is consistent across sample years, is observed for domestic and international markets, and is incremental to other variables associated with January returns. At least part of the reverse January relation is explained by tax-loss selling. Further analysis shows that the reverse January relation results in a temporary price drift away from fundamental value. In other words, we find that abnormal positive (negative) future returns do not always indicate under(over)valuation. Finally, we show that January has a similar effect on the relation between future returns and several other commonly used accounting performance measures. Overall, our results illustrate the importance of controlling for the effect of January in several areas of capital market research in accounting.
{"title":"The Pricing of Firms with Expected Losses/Profits: The Role of January","authors":"Peng-Chia Chiu, Alexander Nekrasov, T. Shevlin","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12296","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of January in the relation between expected losses/profits and future stock returns. We predict and find that the relation between expected losses/profits and future returns reverses from the usual positive relation in non-January months to a negative one in January. The reverse January relation is consistent across sample years, is observed for domestic and international markets, and is incremental to other variables associated with January returns. At least part of the reverse January relation is explained by tax-loss selling. Further analysis shows that the reverse January relation results in a temporary price drift away from fundamental value. In other words, we find that abnormal positive (negative) future returns do not always indicate under(over)valuation. Finally, we show that January has a similar effect on the relation between future returns and several other commonly used accounting performance measures. Overall, our results illustrate the importance of controlling for the effect of January in several areas of capital market research in accounting.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79898505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.
{"title":"Shareholder Say on Pay and CEO Compensation: Three Strikes and the Board is Out","authors":"Matthew Grosse, Stephen Kean, T. Scott","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12176","url":null,"abstract":"From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"157 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85415585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mónica LópezPuertas‐Lamy, Kurt A. Desender, Mircea Epure
This paper investigates whether, and how, firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance influences the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, at the financial statement level by analysing their pricing decision (i.e., audit fees). Using a panel data set of 12,330 firms from 28 countries over the period 2003–2012 and different measures of CSR performance, we find a U-shaped relationship between firms’ CSR performance and audit fees. This result suggests that there is an optimal level of CSR performance that minimizes the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, which in turn lowers the need for greater auditor effort; that is why auditors charge firms significantly less when their CSR performance is at the optimal level. Finally, we also show that the optimal level of CSR performance varies with the degree of environmental dynamism, ownership concentration and leverage.
{"title":"Corporate Social Responsibility and the Assessment by Auditors of the Risk of Material Misstatement","authors":"Mónica LópezPuertas‐Lamy, Kurt A. Desender, Mircea Epure","doi":"10.1111/jbfa.12268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12268","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether, and how, firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance influences the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, at the financial statement level by analysing their pricing decision (i.e., audit fees). Using a panel data set of 12,330 firms from 28 countries over the period 2003–2012 and different measures of CSR performance, we find a U-shaped relationship between firms’ CSR performance and audit fees. This result suggests that there is an optimal level of CSR performance that minimizes the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, which in turn lowers the need for greater auditor effort; that is why auditors charge firms significantly less when their CSR performance is at the optimal level. Finally, we also show that the optimal level of CSR performance varies with the degree of environmental dynamism, ownership concentration and leverage.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89545092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate governance and thus overall investor protection in China improved after the Split Share Structure Reform and the release of the new company law in 2005. This study examines the impact of improved corporate governance and investor protection on the market's reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements in China. The market reacts to post-2005 SEOs positively, while it reacts to pre-2005 SEOs negatively. The different market reactions are attributed to the market's different perceptions of firms' intentions behind SEO decisions – that is, investors are more optimistic and have more trust in SEO issuers when they believe they are better protected.
{"title":"Improved Corporate Governance and Chinese Seasoned Equity Offering Announcement Effects","authors":"Xiaoyan Chen","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12152","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance and thus overall investor protection in China improved after the Split Share Structure Reform and the release of the new company law in 2005. This study examines the impact of improved corporate governance and investor protection on the market's reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements in China. The market reacts to post-2005 SEOs positively, while it reacts to pre-2005 SEOs negatively. The different market reactions are attributed to the market's different perceptions of firms' intentions behind SEO decisions – that is, investors are more optimistic and have more trust in SEO issuers when they believe they are better protected.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77376960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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