In this paper, An Assessment of the Role of Forensic Accountants in Litigation Support Services, the evolution of forensic accounting was explained while the need for forensic accounting in an organisation vis a vis the possible litigation services was assessed. Content analysis method was used in getting some information and eliciting responses from professionals in related filed. The limitation of the study was in the area of the population of study as it was based on a professional line of endeavour.It was revealed that the professional accountancy training alone is not sufficient to tackle the control deficiency and risk of fraudulent activities in an organisation and to be a good expert witness. It was recommended that there is a need for advance training in the area of forensic accounting for any professional performing internal audit/control functions and for sound litigation support.
{"title":"An Assessment of the Role of Forensic Accountants in Litigation Support Services (An Explanatory Approach)","authors":"G. Oyedokun","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2410664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2410664","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, An Assessment of the Role of Forensic Accountants in Litigation Support Services, the evolution of forensic accounting was explained while the need for forensic accounting in an organisation vis a vis the possible litigation services was assessed. Content analysis method was used in getting some information and eliciting responses from professionals in related filed. The limitation of the study was in the area of the population of study as it was based on a professional line of endeavour.It was revealed that the professional accountancy training alone is not sufficient to tackle the control deficiency and risk of fraudulent activities in an organisation and to be a good expert witness. It was recommended that there is a need for advance training in the area of forensic accounting for any professional performing internal audit/control functions and for sound litigation support.","PeriodicalId":240153,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Reporting (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127318577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The environmental reporting process needed to obtain government permission has evolved into private sustainability reporting, but no clear regulations exist to mandate the structure and guidelines for these corporate sustainability initiatives. This chapter explores how sustainability reporting in concert with other disclosure mechanisms can be controlled by more precise metrics through the use of meta-regulation. Corporate sustainability reports are similarly situated with corporate securities and financial statements in terms of their intended audience; shareholders, but unlike those reporting requirements sustainability reporting has typically suffered from a lack of standardization. This lack of any cohesive regulatory framework minimizes the effectiveness of corporate environmental reporting.
{"title":"Meta-Regulation for Environmental Monitoring and Corporate Sustainability Reporting","authors":"Nadia B. Ahmad","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2252293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2252293","url":null,"abstract":"The environmental reporting process needed to obtain government permission has evolved into private sustainability reporting, but no clear regulations exist to mandate the structure and guidelines for these corporate sustainability initiatives. This chapter explores how sustainability reporting in concert with other disclosure mechanisms can be controlled by more precise metrics through the use of meta-regulation. Corporate sustainability reports are similarly situated with corporate securities and financial statements in terms of their intended audience; shareholders, but unlike those reporting requirements sustainability reporting has typically suffered from a lack of standardization. This lack of any cohesive regulatory framework minimizes the effectiveness of corporate environmental reporting.","PeriodicalId":240153,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Reporting (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115597474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The performance appraisal measures developed and applied at companies allow them to carry out self-assessments and to seek improvement plans, among others. One of the ways of seeking refinement is through the use of benchmarking, in which companies become involved in a learning system, comparing organizations or even sectors. One of the tools for applying benchmarking is the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which identifies those, among several productive units, that are efficient and inefficient. An attempt was made to ascertain whether there is a relation between operationally efficient x financially efficient companies. The preliminary results did not allow the corroboration of the hypothesis of a relation with statistical significance between operational efficiency and financial efficiency.
{"title":"Public Bus Passenger Transportation Company Efficiency Assessment Using the Data Envelopment Analysis","authors":"L. C. Basso, Urbano Bueno Hernandes Júnior","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2286215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2286215","url":null,"abstract":"The performance appraisal measures developed and applied at companies allow them to carry out self-assessments and to seek improvement plans, among others. One of the ways of seeking refinement is through the use of benchmarking, in which companies become involved in a learning system, comparing organizations or even sectors. One of the tools for applying benchmarking is the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which identifies those, among several productive units, that are efficient and inefficient. An attempt was made to ascertain whether there is a relation between operationally efficient x financially efficient companies. The preliminary results did not allow the corroboration of the hypothesis of a relation with statistical significance between operational efficiency and financial efficiency.","PeriodicalId":240153,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Reporting (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128597903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-09-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00413.x
Robyn A. Moroney, C. Windsor, Yong Ting Aw
In response to investor and public concerns about harm to the environment, companies are increasingly disclosing environmental information. To enhance the quality of corporate environmental disclosures in a largely voluntary context, various stakeholders are also demanding independent assurance. This study uses a stakeholder‐agency theoretical perspective to examine whether the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures is enhanced when assured. This study also examines the difference in the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures when assurance is provided by either professional accountant assurers or private consultants. Our sample comprises listed companies voluntarily disclosing environmental information in stand‐alone reports, annual reports, and websites. We use an index based upon the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) to measure the quality of company environmental reporting. Results of this matched pairs study show that the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures scores significantly higher for assured companies than unassured companies. For assured companies, the quality is no different when assured by accountants or consultants. Additional analysis provides preliminary evidence that experience improves the quality of environmental disclosures.
{"title":"Evidence of Assurance Enhancing the Quality of Voluntary Environmental Disclosures: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"Robyn A. Moroney, C. Windsor, Yong Ting Aw","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00413.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00413.x","url":null,"abstract":"In response to investor and public concerns about harm to the environment, companies are increasingly disclosing environmental information. To enhance the quality of corporate environmental disclosures in a largely voluntary context, various stakeholders are also demanding independent assurance. This study uses a stakeholder‐agency theoretical perspective to examine whether the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures is enhanced when assured. This study also examines the difference in the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures when assurance is provided by either professional accountant assurers or private consultants. Our sample comprises listed companies voluntarily disclosing environmental information in stand‐alone reports, annual reports, and websites. We use an index based upon the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) to measure the quality of company environmental reporting. Results of this matched pairs study show that the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures scores significantly higher for assured companies than unassured companies. For assured companies, the quality is no different when assured by accountants or consultants. Additional analysis provides preliminary evidence that experience improves the quality of environmental disclosures.","PeriodicalId":240153,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Reporting (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134647749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I formulate a model to emphasize the fraud detection role of auditors in the financial market and relate the role to audit and financial reporting delays. In the model, an auditor considers whether to perform extended audit procedures after observing a red flag generated from regular audit procedures. An audit delay is represented by the event of extending audit procedures and manifested as a financial reporting delay observed by the market. I derive a simple closed-form condition characterizing when a positive market reaction to a delay is possible. The condition provides a theoretical basis for formulating empirically testable hypotheses. I discuss why the fundamental logic behind the counter-intuitive positive-reaction result also applies to other contexts such as internal control weakness disclosure. Documented evidence in the literature suggests that “positive reactions to bad news” (PR2BN) is a general phenomenon. I also discuss other empirical implications of the model, with suggestions for regression equation specifications.
{"title":"Are Positive Reactions to Bad News Plausible? The Consideration of Fraud in Audit and Reporting Delays","authors":"Andrew Yim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1551414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1551414","url":null,"abstract":"I formulate a model to emphasize the fraud detection role of auditors in the financial market and relate the role to audit and financial reporting delays. In the model, an auditor considers whether to perform extended audit procedures after observing a red flag generated from regular audit procedures. An audit delay is represented by the event of extending audit procedures and manifested as a financial reporting delay observed by the market. I derive a simple closed-form condition characterizing when a positive market reaction to a delay is possible. The condition provides a theoretical basis for formulating empirically testable hypotheses. I discuss why the fundamental logic behind the counter-intuitive positive-reaction result also applies to other contexts such as internal control weakness disclosure. Documented evidence in the literature suggests that “positive reactions to bad news” (PR2BN) is a general phenomenon. I also discuss other empirical implications of the model, with suggestions for regression equation specifications.","PeriodicalId":240153,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Corporate Reporting (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129923869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}