This article argues that there is a distinctive populist approach to the built environment. Populists claim that they alone represent what they often call “the real people.” Hence, there is a need for them to specify who “the real people” are. If they have sufficient power (and time) while in government, they will reshape the built environment – architecture, no less than urban and rural environments more broadly -- in line with their understanding of “the real people.” In particular, they will create spaces (some obviously political, some not so obvious, such as football stadiums) that can serve as sites for the collective affirmation of a particular understanding of peoplehood. The article also asks how post-populist governments should relate to a built environment reshaped by populists.
{"title":"Populism’s Building Complex; or: Is there such a thing as Populist Architecture?","authors":"Jan-Werner Müller","doi":"10.55271/jps000120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000120","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that there is a distinctive populist approach to the built environment. Populists claim that they alone represent what they often call “the real people.” Hence, there is a need for them to specify who “the real people” are. If they have sufficient power (and time) while in government, they will reshape the built environment – architecture, no less than urban and rural environments more broadly -- in line with their understanding of “the real people.” In particular, they will create spaces (some obviously political, some not so obvious, such as football stadiums) that can serve as sites for the collective affirmation of a particular understanding of peoplehood. The article also asks how post-populist governments should relate to a built environment reshaped by populists.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125174878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines how the government participation within an EU country can affect the discourse of the left-wing and right-wing populist parties. We analyzed this question by tracing two Greek populist parties' discourse, the left-wing Syriza and the right-wing Independent Greeks (Anel), during the 2012-2019 period. We have split the examined period into two subperiods (2012 to July 2015, and August 2015 to 2019). The turning point was the Syriza-Anel government’s signature of the third EU bailout program in August 2015. The first hypothesis was that the government accession within the EU context would slightly decrease the populist logic of the two parties. The next two hypotheses referred that the EU leverage emerged by the signing of the bailout agreement will decrease the populist rhetoric of the two parties towards the external elites (mainly the EU). However, the right-wing populists (Anel)- even after this decrease- will target the external elites to a larger extent than the left-wing populists. To examine the hypotheses in-depth, we applied a combination of quantitative content analysis with qualitative discourse analysis. The findings have corroborated our three initial hypotheses. Simultaneously, the qualitative discourse analysis offered us some additional findings concerning the two parties' use of topos of “History” to increase their populist appeal within the electorate.
{"title":"Government participation and populist discourse transformation of radical left Syriza and radical right Anel","authors":"Alexandros Ntaflos","doi":"10.55271/jps000119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000119","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how the government participation within an EU country can affect the discourse of the left-wing and right-wing populist parties. We analyzed this question by tracing two Greek populist parties' discourse, the left-wing Syriza and the right-wing Independent Greeks (Anel), during the 2012-2019 period. We have split the examined period into two subperiods (2012 to July 2015, and August 2015 to 2019). The turning point was the Syriza-Anel government’s signature of the third EU bailout program in August 2015. The first hypothesis was that the government accession within the EU context would slightly decrease the populist logic of the two parties. The next two hypotheses referred that the EU leverage emerged by the signing of the bailout agreement will decrease the populist rhetoric of the two parties towards the external elites (mainly the EU). However, the right-wing populists (Anel)- even after this decrease- will target the external elites to a larger extent than the left-wing populists. To examine the hypotheses in-depth, we applied a combination of quantitative content analysis with qualitative discourse analysis. The findings have corroborated our three initial hypotheses. Simultaneously, the qualitative discourse analysis offered us some additional findings concerning the two parties' use of topos of “History” to increase their populist appeal within the electorate.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133862635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crisis and Populism: The role of crisis exploitation","authors":"V. Tsagkroni","doi":"10.55271/jps000114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000114","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122449827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to give insight into discursive means used by rulers in Poland to claim the right to rule during a public health emergency. Grounded in Johannes Gerschewski’s, Christian von Soest’s and Julia Grauvogel’s theory of legitimacy claims and Gideon Lasco’s theory of medical populism, the study identifies the evolution and characteristics of legitimacy claims at pandemic junctures critical to political regime stability. By using content and thematic analysis of news distributed by partisan media and tweets published by the most influential politicians of the ruling party, the study uncovers justifications for autocratic rule in Poland aimed at shaping elite cohesion, opposition activity, and the potential political support of the ruled. Legitimacy claims rested upon medical populism to a large extent since the latter provided semantic structures useful to account for the unprecedented extension of the ruling party’s power competencies and limitation of personal and civic freedoms. Moreover, while claims of dramatic restrictions and lockdowns marked the pandemic’s beginning, its further stages brought out a “vaccine messianism” and optimism related to crisis management performance.
{"title":"The Use of Medical Populism to Claim the Right to Rule in Poland during a Public Health Emergency","authors":"J. Rak","doi":"10.55271/jps000111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000111","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to give insight into discursive means used by rulers in Poland to claim the right to rule during a public health emergency. Grounded in Johannes Gerschewski’s, Christian von Soest’s and Julia Grauvogel’s theory of legitimacy claims and Gideon Lasco’s theory of medical populism, the study identifies the evolution and characteristics of legitimacy claims at pandemic junctures critical to political regime stability. By using content and thematic analysis of news distributed by partisan media and tweets published by the most influential politicians of the ruling party, the study uncovers justifications for autocratic rule in Poland aimed at shaping elite cohesion, opposition activity, and the potential political support of the ruled. Legitimacy claims rested upon medical populism to a large extent since the latter provided semantic structures useful to account for the unprecedented extension of the ruling party’s power competencies and limitation of personal and civic freedoms. Moreover, while claims of dramatic restrictions and lockdowns marked the pandemic’s beginning, its further stages brought out a “vaccine messianism” and optimism related to crisis management performance.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121220844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, populism has been used to explain the actions of politicians around the globe, from Jair Bolsonaro to Boris Johnson. This presents a problem for scholars who are seeking to understand present-day political trends. Essentially, the populist school does not have a coherent definition of its subject matter, cannot accurately identify who should get this label, and is unable to correctly explain the behaviors of those leaders who acquire the moniker. Since elite theory stands on stronger ground when it comes to these dimensions, it should be used instead to evaluate the events and actors that are currently explored using the populist model. After providing evidence to support this argument, a concluding section proposes future research projects that can strengthen the claim that elite theory is a better way to understand politics.
{"title":"Time for a change: replacing the populist model with elite theory","authors":"Scott G. Cole","doi":"10.55271/jps000113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000113","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, populism has been used to explain the actions of politicians around the globe, from Jair Bolsonaro to Boris Johnson. This presents a problem for scholars who are seeking to understand present-day political trends. Essentially, the populist school does not have a coherent definition of its subject matter, cannot accurately identify who should get this label, and is unable to correctly explain the behaviors of those leaders who acquire the moniker. Since elite theory stands on stronger ground when it comes to these dimensions, it should be used instead to evaluate the events and actors that are currently explored using the populist model. After providing evidence to support this argument, a concluding section proposes future research projects that can strengthen the claim that elite theory is a better way to understand politics.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121993278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ongoing environmental crisis has prompted various groups, organizations, and political parties to develop new strategies for addressing this global challenge. In this context, eco-populist actors, organizations, and parties are playing a key role in challenging the current exploitative capitalist system. However, it is important to note that eco-populist movements can differ significantly from one another. This article aims to distinguish between two contemporary but distinct movements: eco-populism and eco-fascism. To accomplish this, the terms "populism" and "eco-populism" will be conceptualized and analyzed, and the ideological deviations that eco-populism has undergone will be explained. The article will then provide brief case studies that showcase both eco-populist and eco-fascist events. By examining these examples, we will strive to identify the main similarities and differences between these two movements. Our conclusion will be that, despite sharing some features, eco-fascist movements tend to be more violent and nativist than eco-populist movements.
{"title":"What’s under green? Eco-populism and eco-fascism in the climate crisis","authors":"Iván Escobar Fernández, Heidi Hart","doi":"10.55271/jps000117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000117","url":null,"abstract":"The ongoing environmental crisis has prompted various groups, organizations, and political parties to develop new strategies for addressing this global challenge. In this context, eco-populist actors, organizations, and parties are playing a key role in challenging the current exploitative capitalist system. However, it is important to note that eco-populist movements can differ significantly from one another. This article aims to distinguish between two contemporary but distinct movements: eco-populism and eco-fascism. To accomplish this, the terms \"populism\" and \"eco-populism\" will be conceptualized and analyzed, and the ideological deviations that eco-populism has undergone will be explained. The article will then provide brief case studies that showcase both eco-populist and eco-fascist events. By examining these examples, we will strive to identify the main similarities and differences between these two movements. Our conclusion will be that, despite sharing some features, eco-fascist movements tend to be more violent and nativist than eco-populist movements.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134040310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past four decades, Portuguese voters have imprinted a solid resistance to the emergence of far-right parties in the political setting. However, this time ended in the 2019 legislative elections when the CHEGA, a self-located party on the far-right spectrum, with a posture assumed as anti-system and unconcerned with the accusations of racism and hate exhilaration, elected André Ventura to the national parliament. Moreover, in the 2021 presidential elections, he got 497,746 votes, a scant point to be the second most-voted candidate. The 2022 legislative elections placed CHEGA as the third most-voted party, and the number of members in parliament has climbed to twelve. This article critically examines the political constraints and opportunities for the rise of the CHEGA party in the Portuguese political setting. It argues that CHEGA emerges from the disintegration of centre-moderate right parties and the interruption of the emancipatory function of the leftist parties coupled with a ubiquitous traditional media landscape, which has proved favourable to the CHEGA propensity towards the Portuguese electorate and without scrutinise its narratives opposing the dominant ruling system. Beyond news media and cumulatively, social networks have also increased party exposure by recruiting affiliates and strengthening support bases.
{"title":"CHEGA! A sceptre of the mainstream Portuguese parties' disaggregation or a spectre of fascism?","authors":"Carlos Morgado Braz","doi":"10.55271/jps000118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000118","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past four decades, Portuguese voters have imprinted a solid resistance to the emergence of far-right parties in the political setting. However, this time ended in the 2019 legislative elections when the CHEGA, a self-located party on the far-right spectrum, with a posture assumed as anti-system and unconcerned with the accusations of racism and hate exhilaration, elected André Ventura to the national parliament. Moreover, in the 2021 presidential elections, he got 497,746 votes, a scant point to be the second most-voted candidate. The 2022 legislative elections placed CHEGA as the third most-voted party, and the number of members in parliament has climbed to twelve. This article critically examines the political constraints and opportunities for the rise of the CHEGA party in the Portuguese political setting. It argues that CHEGA emerges from the disintegration of centre-moderate right parties and the interruption of the emancipatory function of the leftist parties coupled with a ubiquitous traditional media landscape, which has proved favourable to the CHEGA propensity towards the Portuguese electorate and without scrutinise its narratives opposing the dominant ruling system. Beyond news media and cumulatively, social networks have also increased party exposure by recruiting affiliates and strengthening support bases.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"9 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129087107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relevant literature shows that populists come to power through various rhetorics by exploiting the incumbent orders and the problems they have caused. However, failures and disappointments in fulfilling their promises push them to employ increasingly authoritarian measures to silence society to stay in power by gradually changing the system, manipulating citizens through controlling media, and undermining fundamental institutions.By emphasizing the overall performance of populist governments during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, this article explores the future course of populist politics and governments after the pandemic. The paper concludes that although the pandemic has clearly shown the limits and capacity of many populist governments, the political and economic conjuncture in the post-pandemic era, coupled with the high tension of power transition, might bring new “opportunities” for the use of populists. With several defects and structural weaknesses of the existing liberal multilateral order, populism is here to stay with different implications for the multilateral liberal order and globalization.
{"title":"The economics of pandemics and the future course of populism","authors":"İ. Öztürk","doi":"10.55271/jps000116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55271/jps000116","url":null,"abstract":"The relevant literature shows that populists come to power through various rhetorics by exploiting the incumbent orders and the problems they have caused. However, failures and disappointments in fulfilling their promises push them to employ increasingly authoritarian measures to silence society to stay in power by gradually changing the system, manipulating citizens through controlling media, and undermining fundamental institutions.By emphasizing the overall performance of populist governments during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, this article explores the future course of populist politics and governments after the pandemic. The paper concludes that although the pandemic has clearly shown the limits and capacity of many populist governments, the political and economic conjuncture in the post-pandemic era, coupled with the high tension of power transition, might bring new “opportunities” for the use of populists. With several defects and structural weaknesses of the existing liberal multilateral order, populism is here to stay with different implications for the multilateral liberal order and globalization.","PeriodicalId":250217,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Populism Studies","volume":"813 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131827105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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