In an economy with both inter- and intra-region inequality and inconsistency between the objectives of local and central governments, this paper studies optimal non-linear federal (central) income tax under non-linear regional income taxes. Starting with a benchmark model without labor mobility, it uses the variation approach to derive a statistic-based optimal federal income tax formula, which turns out to be a function of social welfare weights, regional income distributions and labor income elasticities. Unlike the traditional Mirrleesian tax, the optimal federal income tax depends on the inter-government gap of preference instead of the central government's own preference. In particular, the optimal tax rate is non-negative (non-positive) when the central government has a relatively higher (lower) preference for equality. While in an economy without labor mobility the federal income tax is limited to remedy the inconsistency of objectives, introducing labor mobility activates federal income tax's role as a Pigovian tax which internalizes the horizontal revenue externality. The numerical analysis suggests that even if the decentralized redistribution is undesirable compared to the fully centralized redistribution, it is generally desirable when combined with the central redistribution.
{"title":"Optimal Central Redistribution with Decentralized Redistribution","authors":"Chunyang Fu, L. Gong, Wenjian Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3840793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3840793","url":null,"abstract":"In an economy with both inter- and intra-region inequality and inconsistency between the objectives of local and central governments, this paper studies optimal non-linear federal (central) income tax under non-linear regional income taxes. Starting with a benchmark model without labor mobility, it uses the variation approach to derive a statistic-based optimal federal income tax formula, which turns out to be a function of social welfare weights, regional income distributions and labor income elasticities. Unlike the traditional Mirrleesian tax, the optimal federal income tax depends on the inter-government gap of preference instead of the central government's own preference. In particular, the optimal tax rate is non-negative (non-positive) when the central government has a relatively higher (lower) preference for equality. While in an economy without labor mobility the federal income tax is limited to remedy the inconsistency of objectives, introducing labor mobility activates federal income tax's role as a Pigovian tax which internalizes the horizontal revenue externality. The numerical analysis suggests that even if the decentralized redistribution is undesirable compared to the fully centralized redistribution, it is generally desirable when combined with the central redistribution.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117088306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В исследовании были сформулированы ключевые принципы и особенности межрегионального сотрудничества в России, а также формы и особенности горизонтального взаимодействия с целью разработки рекомендаций для органов исполнительной власти.
English Abstract: The study formulated the key principles and features of interregional cooperation in Russia, as well as the forms and features of horizontal interaction in order to develop recommendations for executive authorities.
{"title":"ОСОБЕННОСТИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ РАЗВИТИЯ МЕЖРЕГИОНАЛЬНОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА В РОССИИ (Features and Prospects for Development of Interregional Cooperation in Russia)","authors":"V. Klimanov, S. Kazakova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3860801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3860801","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В исследовании были сформулированы ключевые принципы и особенности межрегионального сотрудничества в России, а также формы и особенности горизонтального взаимодействия с целью разработки рекомендаций для органов исполнительной власти. <br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The study formulated the key principles and features of interregional cooperation in Russia, as well as the forms and features of horizontal interaction in order to develop recommendations for executive authorities.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127287324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-27DOI: 10.1101/2020.10.28.20221952
Jean-Paul Renne, Guillaume Roussellet, G. Schwenkler
Are policies implemented in individual states to prevent pandemic deaths effective when there is no policy coordination by the federal government? We answer this question by developing a stochastic extension of a SIRD epidemiological model for a country composed of multiple states. Our model allows for interstate mobility. We consider three policies: mask mandates, stay-at-home orders, and interstate travel bans. We fit our model to daily U.S. state-level COVID-19 death counts and exploit our estimates to produce various policy counterfactuals. While the restrictions imposed by some states inhibited a significant number of virus deaths, we find that more than two-thirds of U.S. COVID-19 deaths could have been prevented by late September 2020 had the federal government imposed federal mandates as early as some of the earliest states did. Our results highlight the need for a coordination-aimed approach by a federal government for the successful containment of a pandemic.
{"title":"Preventing COVID-19 Fatalities: State versus Federal Policies","authors":"Jean-Paul Renne, Guillaume Roussellet, G. Schwenkler","doi":"10.1101/2020.10.28.20221952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.10.28.20221952","url":null,"abstract":"Are policies implemented in individual states to prevent pandemic deaths effective when there is no policy coordination by the federal government? We answer this question by developing a stochastic extension of a SIRD epidemiological model for a country composed of multiple states. Our model allows for interstate mobility. We consider three policies: mask mandates, stay-at-home orders, and interstate travel bans. We fit our model to daily U.S. state-level COVID-19 death counts and exploit our estimates to produce various policy counterfactuals. While the restrictions imposed by some states inhibited a significant number of virus deaths, we find that more than two-thirds of U.S. COVID-19 deaths could have been prevented by late September 2020 had the federal government imposed federal mandates as early as some of the earliest states did. Our results highlight the need for a coordination-aimed approach by a federal government for the successful containment of a pandemic.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133176262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper quantifies the economic benefits of joining the United States. Adapting extant static synthetic control models into a dynamic model similar to Arellano and Bond (1991), we are able to construct the counterfactual growth paths of Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and Nevada had they not joined the USA. We show that the real growth path outperforms the counterfactuals substantially in all cases. In the same way, we construct counterfactual growth paths of Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines and Greenland in the scenario where they joined the USA at times in history where this might have been a (remote) possibility. We find counterfactual growth to be substantially higher than the actual growth. Having established the positive economic effects of US membership, we subsequently assess the sources of this added growth, distinguishing between a class of explanations related to internal market access and a class of explanations related to institutional quality. Using a large number of determinants of institutional quality, we find that the institutional quality of the USA as a whole matches the quality predicted for New England most closely. This suggests that upon accession, states imported the institutional quality of New England, which was typically superior to what they would have likely developed by themselves. We show that this institutional bonus accounts for the bulk of the growth benefits of US accession.
{"title":"American Exceptionalism and the Benefits of Statehood: An Analysis of the Growth Effects of Joining the United States of America","authors":"Robbert Maseland, R. Spruk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3526844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3526844","url":null,"abstract":"This paper quantifies the economic benefits of joining the United States. Adapting extant static synthetic control models into a dynamic model similar to Arellano and Bond (1991), we are able to construct the counterfactual growth paths of Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and Nevada had they not joined the USA. We show that the real growth path outperforms the counterfactuals substantially in all cases. In the same way, we construct counterfactual growth paths of Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines and Greenland in the scenario where they joined the USA at times in history where this might have been a (remote) possibility. We find counterfactual growth to be substantially higher than the actual growth. Having established the positive economic effects of US membership, we subsequently assess the sources of this added growth, distinguishing between a class of explanations related to internal market access and a class of explanations related to institutional quality. Using a large number of determinants of institutional quality, we find that the institutional quality of the USA as a whole matches the quality predicted for New England most closely. This suggests that upon accession, states imported the institutional quality of New England, which was typically superior to what they would have likely developed by themselves. We show that this institutional bonus accounts for the bulk of the growth benefits of US accession.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"474 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131794614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Proposals for the Philippine government to shift to a federal form of government appear to imply that such form of government is ‘better’ than unitary governments and that all federal governments operate the same. The study sheds light on this misguided idea by examining the similarities and differences of 15 federal governments around the world. Various data on different indicators concerning a federal government’s history, sociopolitical and cultural context, their form of government and fiscal federal features were utilized. Comparison-and-contrast is done on these federal governments against a set of indicators and assessed if they follow the theoretical features of federalism. Federal governments were then grouped according to income and equality to check if a pattern may be observed in terms of federal characteristics. The results reiterate existing literature that similarities between federal governments are only limited to their foundational elements — constitutions and an outline of expenditure and revenue responsibilities. Apart from this, there is no one-size-fits-all form of government as presented by the wide differences in the indicators. Also, even when federal governments were grouped according to income or according to equality, no distinct pattern can be observed between the groupings. Further, numerous examples of divergence between theoretical principles and actual practice (through the constitution) have been outlined. Finally, federal governments are constantly evolving organizations, frequently experiencing constitutional amendments and experiencing amendments according to political desirability.
{"title":"Federal Governments Around the World: A Comparative Perspective","authors":"R. A. C. Caliso, S. R. Flores","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3256110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3256110","url":null,"abstract":"Proposals for the Philippine government to shift to a federal form of government appear to imply that such form of government is ‘better’ than unitary governments and that all federal governments operate the same. The study sheds light on this misguided idea by examining the similarities and differences of 15 federal governments around the world. Various data on different indicators concerning a federal government’s history, sociopolitical and cultural context, their form of government and fiscal federal features were utilized. Comparison-and-contrast is done on these federal governments against a set of indicators and assessed if they follow the theoretical features of federalism. Federal governments were then grouped according to income and equality to check if a pattern may be observed in terms of federal characteristics. The results reiterate existing literature that similarities between federal governments are only limited to their foundational elements — constitutions and an outline of expenditure and revenue responsibilities. Apart from this, there is no one-size-fits-all form of government as presented by the wide differences in the indicators. Also, even when federal governments were grouped according to income or according to equality, no distinct pattern can be observed between the groupings. Further, numerous examples of divergence between theoretical principles and actual practice (through the constitution) have been outlined. Finally, federal governments are constantly evolving organizations, frequently experiencing constitutional amendments and experiencing amendments according to political desirability.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121386207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article addresses long-standing challenges in conceptualizing and measuring de/centralization in unitary and federal systems. It first outlines a novel conceptualization of de/centralization and its relation to the unitary/federal distinction and a/symmetry, from which it derives static and dynamic typologies of state structures. Building on a critical review of the Regional Authority Index, the article develops a scheme for measuring de/centralization and applies it to map state structures in Western Europe from 1950 to 2015. This mapping exercise shows that the proposed scheme yields more accurate measures of de/centralization than existing indices and that de/centralization differs in kind, rather than merely in degree, between unitary and federal states. By enabling a more effective classification of cases in comparative analysis, the article offers a tool on which theoretical and empirical advances in understanding the causes and effects of state structures can be built.
{"title":"Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Mapping State Structures — With an Application To Western Europe, 1950 – 2015","authors":"Paolo Dardanelli","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJY019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJY019","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses long-standing challenges in conceptualizing and measuring de/centralization in unitary and federal systems. It first outlines a novel conceptualization of de/centralization and its relation to the unitary/federal distinction and a/symmetry, from which it derives static and dynamic typologies of state structures. Building on a critical review of the Regional Authority Index, the article develops a scheme for measuring de/centralization and applies it to map state structures in Western Europe from 1950 to 2015. This mapping exercise shows that the proposed scheme yields more accurate measures of de/centralization than existing indices and that de/centralization differs in kind, rather than merely in degree, between unitary and federal states. By enabling a more effective classification of cases in comparative analysis, the article offers a tool on which theoretical and empirical advances in understanding the causes and effects of state structures can be built.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127824160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. (JEL D72, D74, J15, O15, O17, O18)
{"title":"The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions","authors":"Samuel Bazzi, Matthew Gudgeon","doi":"10.1257/APP.20190309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/APP.20190309","url":null,"abstract":"We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. (JEL D72, D74, J15, O15, O17, O18)","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124968704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ehsan H. Feroz, R. Raab, J. Schultz, Gerald T. Ulleberg
Abstract This paper examines the health performance rankings of the 50U.S.state governments (SGs), and addresses the relationship between SG performance rankings and SG environmental health, economic prosperity, and state health-care policy. We use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate and compare the relative performance of the 50 SGs in a single measure. Our analyses indicate that new federal mandates, such as, universal or nearly universal health care coverage, and timely resources or lack of them from the federal government, may lead to very different state health performance outcomes. Our analyses also highlight the tradeoffs between given inputs and desired outputs involved in attaining a certain level of health performance efficiency. In particular, they show that limiting harmful exposures by timely investments in prevention is far more cost-effective than subsequent incurrence of health care expenditures in treatment of the affected population. Finally, our findings indicate that a fixed amount of federal funding per capita could lead to different health performance outcomes in different states, depending on the level of efficiency with which the SG operates during the funding period.
{"title":"Obamacare and Environmental Production Efficiency Rankings for the 50 U.S. State Governments: A Data Envelopment Analysis of Health Outcomes from Environmental Factors and State Health Care Expenditures","authors":"Ehsan H. Feroz, R. Raab, J. Schultz, Gerald T. Ulleberg","doi":"10.18103/JEB.V3I1.822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18103/JEB.V3I1.822","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the health performance rankings of the 50U.S.state governments (SGs), and addresses the relationship between SG performance rankings and SG environmental health, economic prosperity, and state health-care policy. We use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate and compare the relative performance of the 50 SGs in a single measure. Our analyses indicate that new federal mandates, such as, universal or nearly universal health care coverage, and timely resources or lack of them from the federal government, may lead to very different state health performance outcomes. Our analyses also highlight the tradeoffs between given inputs and desired outputs involved in attaining a certain level of health performance efficiency. In particular, they show that limiting harmful exposures by timely investments in prevention is far more cost-effective than subsequent incurrence of health care expenditures in treatment of the affected population. Finally, our findings indicate that a fixed amount of federal funding per capita could lead to different health performance outcomes in different states, depending on the level of efficiency with which the SG operates during the funding period.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115090962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations reform have become nearly ubiquitous in developing countries. Performance, however, has often been disappointing in terms of both policy formulation and outcomes. The dynamics underlying these results have been poorly researched. Available literature focuses heavily on policy and institutional design concerns framed by public finance, fiscal federalism, and public management principles. The literature tends to explain unsatisfactory outcomes largely as a result of some combination of flawed design and management of intergovernmental fiscal systems, insufficient capacity, and lack of political will. These factors are important, but there is room to broaden the analysis in at least two potentially valuable ways. First, much can be learned by more robustly examining how national and local political and bureaucratic forces shape the policy space, providing opportunities for and placing constraints on effective and sustainable reform. Second, the analysis would benefit from moving beyond design to considering how to implement reform more strategically.
{"title":"Looking Beyond Conventional Intergovernmental Fiscal Frameworks: Principles, Realities, and Neglected Issues","authors":"P. Smoke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2892924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2892924","url":null,"abstract":"Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations reform have become nearly ubiquitous in developing countries. Performance, however, has often been disappointing in terms of both policy formulation and outcomes. The dynamics underlying these results have been poorly researched. Available literature focuses heavily on policy and institutional design concerns framed by public finance, fiscal federalism, and public management principles. The literature tends to explain unsatisfactory outcomes largely as a result of some combination of flawed design and management of intergovernmental fiscal systems, insufficient capacity, and lack of political will. These factors are important, but there is room to broaden the analysis in at least two potentially valuable ways. First, much can be learned by more robustly examining how national and local political and bureaucratic forces shape the policy space, providing opportunities for and placing constraints on effective and sustainable reform. Second, the analysis would benefit from moving beyond design to considering how to implement reform more strategically.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125080262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The primary objective of rule-based fiscal legislation at the subnational level in India is to achieve debt sustainability by placing a ceiling on borrowing and the use of borrowed resources for public capital investment by phasing out deficits in the budget revenue account. This paper examines whether the application of fiscal rules has contributed to an increase in fiscal space for public capital investment spending in major Indian states. Our analysis shows that, controlling for other factors, there is a negative relationship between fiscal rules and public capital investment spending at the state level under the rule-based fiscal regime.
{"title":"Federalism, Fiscal Space, and Public Investment Spending: Do Fiscal Rules Impose Hard Budget Constraints?","authors":"P. Chakraborty","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2830566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2830566","url":null,"abstract":"The primary objective of rule-based fiscal legislation at the subnational level in India is to achieve debt sustainability by placing a ceiling on borrowing and the use of borrowed resources for public capital investment by phasing out deficits in the budget revenue account. This paper examines whether the application of fiscal rules has contributed to an increase in fiscal space for public capital investment spending in major Indian states. Our analysis shows that, controlling for other factors, there is a negative relationship between fiscal rules and public capital investment spending at the state level under the rule-based fiscal regime.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129368081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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