Pablo Simón-Cosano, Santiago Lago‐Peñas, A. Vaquero
This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.
{"title":"On the Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries: The Case of Spain","authors":"Pablo Simón-Cosano, Santiago Lago‐Peñas, A. Vaquero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2149706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2149706","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"63 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123688900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The economic history of Panama during the 19th century is generally unknown in Colombia and its financial accounts present a puzzle which is difficult to unravel. This investigation contributes to the elucidation of both problems; taking into account demography, geography and fiscal accounts as they appear in the budges of the State of Panama. The subsidiary hypothesis is that the federalist system that Colombia chose between 1855 and 1886 constituted an acceptable modus vivendi between the Panamanian elites and the Colombian political center. The strategic interests of Panama, however, were growingly compromised by the centralist political system that was put in place through the 1886 Constitution. The failure of the French initiative to build the Canal, the Colombian civil war of 1899-1902 won by the conservatives and the rejection of the Herran-Hey treaty (which would have allowed the U.S. to build the canal) all combined to convince the Panamanian elite to abandon Colombia at the hands of the American Empire.
{"title":"El Federalismo y la Fiscalidad del Estado Soberano de Panamá, 1850-1886 (Federalism and Taxation in the Sovereign State of Panama, 1850-1886)","authors":"S. Kalmanovitz","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1k03qf7.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1k03qf7.11","url":null,"abstract":"The economic history of Panama during the 19th century is generally unknown in Colombia and its financial accounts present a puzzle which is difficult to unravel. This investigation contributes to the elucidation of both problems; taking into account demography, geography and fiscal accounts as they appear in the budges of the State of Panama. The subsidiary hypothesis is that the federalist system that Colombia chose between 1855 and 1886 constituted an acceptable modus vivendi between the Panamanian elites and the Colombian political center. The strategic interests of Panama, however, were growingly compromised by the centralist political system that was put in place through the 1886 Constitution. The failure of the French initiative to build the Canal, the Colombian civil war of 1899-1902 won by the conservatives and the rejection of the Herran-Hey treaty (which would have allowed the U.S. to build the canal) all combined to convince the Panamanian elite to abandon Colombia at the hands of the American Empire.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127908867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.
{"title":"Scotland: A New Fiscal Settlement","authors":"A. Hughes Hallett, A. Scott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1585209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1585209","url":null,"abstract":"Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115429945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the election of 1994, the Republican party gained control of both houses of the U.S. Congress for the first time since 1954. In this paper, we analyze whether this change in party control had significant effects on the determinants of federal spending at the state level. To perform this analysis, we utilize panel data on federal spending, at the state level, over the years 1983-2004. We allow for a break in the sample to analyze whether the political determinants of state level spending differed after the election of 1994. There is little evidence that a presence in the house or senate majority yields positive spending effects prior to the election of 1994, but a positive spending effect does emerge after the Republican takeover. Surprisingly, there is evidence that spending became more redistributive (measured at the state level) in the later period.
{"title":"Federal Spending and the Revolution of '94","authors":"G. Hoover, Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1016768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1016768","url":null,"abstract":"With the election of 1994, the Republican party gained control of both houses of the U.S. Congress for the first time since 1954. In this paper, we analyze whether this change in party control had significant effects on the determinants of federal spending at the state level. To perform this analysis, we utilize panel data on federal spending, at the state level, over the years 1983-2004. We allow for a break in the sample to analyze whether the political determinants of state level spending differed after the election of 1994. There is little evidence that a presence in the house or senate majority yields positive spending effects prior to the election of 1994, but a positive spending effect does emerge after the Republican takeover. Surprisingly, there is evidence that spending became more redistributive (measured at the state level) in the later period.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128494567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the Nigerian constitution, main public sector responsibilities are split across various government levels. Thus, no sole government could deliver radical improvements in service delivery on its own, which means that coordination and cooperation are pre-requisites. However, the existing mechanisms and institutions for inter-governmental policy coordination are weak and need strengthening. This paper suggests the following priority directions for reforming inter-governmental financing arrangements in Nigeria: a. more attention to the equity dimension of revenue sharing b. strengthening government accountability for utilization of public money in general, and for use of a common pool of funds such as the Federation Account in particular, and c. introduction of specific grant schemes directly linked to expansion of sub-national government financing in key sectors
{"title":"Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: Improving Service Delivery in Core Sectors","authors":"L. Freinkman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2401715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401715","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Nigerian constitution, main public sector responsibilities are split across various government levels. Thus, no sole government could deliver radical improvements in service delivery on its own, which means that coordination and cooperation are pre-requisites. However, the existing mechanisms and institutions for inter-governmental policy coordination are weak and need strengthening. This paper suggests the following priority directions for reforming inter-governmental financing arrangements in Nigeria: a. more attention to the equity dimension of revenue sharing b. strengthening government accountability for utilization of public money in general, and for use of a common pool of funds such as the Federation Account in particular, and c. introduction of specific grant schemes directly linked to expansion of sub-national government financing in key sectors","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123507988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Balassone and Franco note that while the budget rules that frame EMU apply to national States, several EMU member nations are already organised on a federal basis and others, pressed by political and economic needs, have started to enact reforms aimed at increasing the degree of decentralisation. They highlight several critical areas in the interaction of fiscal decentralisation and the Stability and Growth Pact. Balassone and Franco point to the reduced flexibility of the European approach compared with solutions adopted in federally structured countries and to the asymmetry between the responsibilities laid on national and local governments by European rules (compliance with the rules depends on the conduct of all levels of government, but de facto it is the central government that is answerable to the EU and that must pay the price for non-compliance). This calls for strict controls over local governments to prevent free-riding. The authors examine alternative solutions to deal with these problems, such as the mechanical extension of the Stability and Growth Pact, the introduction of a golden rule for decentralised governments, also in the form of a market for deficit permits, and the use of reserve funds. Finally, Balassone and Franco analyse how the issue has been addressed in Italy through the introduction of the Domestic Stability Pact and stress the need for further significant refinements of these domestic rules.
Balassone和Franco指出，虽然欧洲货币联盟的预算规则适用于各个国家，但一些欧洲货币联盟成员国已经在联邦基础上组织起来，而其他国家迫于政治和经济需求，已经开始实施旨在提高权力下放程度的改革。他们强调了财政分权与《稳定与增长公约》相互作用中的几个关键领域。Balassone和Franco指出，与联邦制国家采取的解决方案相比，欧洲方法的灵活性降低了，而且欧洲规则赋予国家和地方政府的责任不对称(遵守规则取决于各级政府的行为，但事实上是中央政府对欧盟负责，必须为不遵守规则付出代价)。这就要求对地方政府进行严格控制，防止搭便车。两位作者研究了应对这些问题的替代解决方案，例如机械地延长《稳定与增长公约》(Stability and Growth Pact)，为分权政府引入黄金法则(同样以赤字许可市场的形式)，以及使用储备基金。最后，Balassone和Franco分析了意大利是如何通过引入《国内稳定公约》(Domestic Stability Pact)来解决这一问题的，并强调有必要进一步大幅完善这些国内规则。
{"title":"Fiscal Federalism and the Stability and Growth Pact: A Difficult Union","authors":"Fabrizio Balassone, D. Franco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2095225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2095225","url":null,"abstract":"Balassone and Franco note that while the budget rules that frame EMU apply to national States, several EMU member nations are already organised on a federal basis and others, pressed by political and economic needs, have started to enact reforms aimed at increasing the degree of decentralisation. They highlight several critical areas in the interaction of fiscal decentralisation and the Stability and Growth Pact. Balassone and Franco point to the reduced flexibility of the European approach compared with solutions adopted in federally structured countries and to the asymmetry between the responsibilities laid on national and local governments by European rules (compliance with the rules depends on the conduct of all levels of government, but de facto it is the central government that is answerable to the EU and that must pay the price for non-compliance). This calls for strict controls over local governments to prevent free-riding. The authors examine alternative solutions to deal with these problems, such as the mechanical extension of the Stability and Growth Pact, the introduction of a golden rule for decentralised governments, also in the form of a market for deficit permits, and the use of reserve funds. Finally, Balassone and Franco analyse how the issue has been addressed in Italy through the introduction of the Domestic Stability Pact and stress the need for further significant refinements of these domestic rules.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124472048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.22394/1996-0522-2019-6-46-56
N. Korotina
Russian Abstract: В статье рассматривается проблема пространственной асимметрии в отношениях федерального центра с различными регионами России.
Цель. Оценить асимметрию отношений бюджетного федерализма между федеральным центом и регионами России на основе авторской методики.
English Abstract: The article considers the problem of spatial asymmetry in the relations of the federal center with Russia’s regions. The aim of this article is to assess the asymmetry of the fiscal federalism relations between the federal center and Russia’s regions on the basis of the author’s methodology.
{"title":"Региональная пространственная асимметрия отношений бюджетного федерализма (Regional Spatial Asymmetry of Fiscal Federalism Relations)","authors":"N. Korotina","doi":"10.22394/1996-0522-2019-6-46-56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/1996-0522-2019-6-46-56","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В статье рассматривается проблема пространственной асимметрии в отношениях федерального центра с различными регионами России.<br><br>Цель. Оценить асимметрию отношений бюджетного федерализма между федеральным центом и регионами России на основе авторской методики.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The article considers the problem of spatial asymmetry in the relations of the federal center with Russia’s regions. The aim of this article is to assess the asymmetry of the fiscal federalism relations between the federal center and Russia’s regions on the basis of the author’s methodology.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133159108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this Article, I am arguing that one of the reasons animating the Court’s move away from Justice Marshall’s exceptionalism is its fear that under traditional foundational principles of federal Indian law, Indian tribes may gain what the court subjectively perceives to be “unfair” advantages over non-Indians. Therefore, the Court has been looking for limiting principles tending to achieve level playing fields between tribal and non-tribal actors. This Article also argues, however, that while looking for a level playing field may sound like a worthwhile goal, there are many pitfalls involved in this process that may end up hurting tribal sovereign interests.
{"title":"From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law","authors":"A. Skibine","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3272355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3272355","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, I am arguing that one of the reasons animating the Court’s move away from Justice Marshall’s exceptionalism is its fear that under traditional foundational principles of federal Indian law, Indian tribes may gain what the court subjectively perceives to be “unfair” advantages over non-Indians. Therefore, the Court has been looking for limiting principles tending to achieve level playing fields between tribal and non-tribal actors. This Article also argues, however, that while looking for a level playing field may sound like a worthwhile goal, there are many pitfalls involved in this process that may end up hurting tribal sovereign interests.","PeriodicalId":265694,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Intergovernmental Relations & Federalism (Topic)","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127418994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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