Gettysburg Magazine, no. 56 soldiering was not “all his fancy painted it,” tried to console the suff erer by the remark, “that now he would be entitled to his discharge.” Th e wrath of Monty at the idea that he would leave the service on such a pretext, was too great for words. He used none, but simply let fl y with his uninjured right, with such eff ect that his wouldbe consoler promptly measured his length on the ground amid a great applause.4
{"title":"Charles Fremont Wolcott’s Pocket Diary: Battery H, 1st Ohio Light Artillery","authors":"Edward C. Browne","doi":"10.1353/GET.2017.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Gettysburg Magazine, no. 56 soldiering was not “all his fancy painted it,” tried to console the suff erer by the remark, “that now he would be entitled to his discharge.” Th e wrath of Monty at the idea that he would leave the service on such a pretext, was too great for words. He used none, but simply let fl y with his uninjured right, with such eff ect that his wouldbe consoler promptly measured his length on the ground amid a great applause.4","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131474301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
with too much about too little. But now, thirty years later, I’m sure that I can assist those who still ask and who recognize me from my relationship with this magazine, without breaking their bank account or their spirit to be creative while they enjoy touring the fi eld. To that end, many people still stop to inquire about what I’m shooting and when it will appear in Gettysburg Magazine. Some with cameras have actually asked if they could make an image of the same scene just to say they were there when the cover photo was taken and to have their own photo by which to compare and remember the day. Th at actually bugs some photographers. I, on the other hand, couldn’t care less. So for those people who enjoy it, I’ve taken the time to make the process simpler for you— a list of things you can use to help make battlefi eld photography both fun and gratifying. Here’s how I think.
{"title":"If You Want to Go: The Essential Guide to Battlefield Photography","authors":"Sonny Fulks","doi":"10.1353/GET.2017.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0006","url":null,"abstract":"with too much about too little. But now, thirty years later, I’m sure that I can assist those who still ask and who recognize me from my relationship with this magazine, without breaking their bank account or their spirit to be creative while they enjoy touring the fi eld. To that end, many people still stop to inquire about what I’m shooting and when it will appear in Gettysburg Magazine. Some with cameras have actually asked if they could make an image of the same scene just to say they were there when the cover photo was taken and to have their own photo by which to compare and remember the day. Th at actually bugs some photographers. I, on the other hand, couldn’t care less. So for those people who enjoy it, I’ve taken the time to make the process simpler for you— a list of things you can use to help make battlefi eld photography both fun and gratifying. Here’s how I think.","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124246373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Only two months before the events of this letter, aft er the battle of Chancellorsville, Willis wrote to his father about “leaving the army if he could do so with honor to himself.”2 Samuel thought it best that Willis remain in the ranks, and so Willis stayed. Th e sad tidings received in Major Bradley’s letter refreshed Samuel’s apprehension about the advice he had so recently off ered to his son. He later recalled, “I felt some misgivings over it and wished I had told him to do what he thought best under the circumstances. But that like many other things has passed and cannot be recalled. I thought at the time I did right, but my heart aches now while I think of it.”3 As was the case for thousands of people across the North and South aft er every great battle of the war, the words written by Major Bradley on July 5 set in motion a macabre journey for Mr. Babcock. Th e fi -
{"title":"The Discovery of Babcock Rock","authors":"B. Isenberg, Richard Rigney","doi":"10.1353/GET.2017.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Only two months before the events of this letter, aft er the battle of Chancellorsville, Willis wrote to his father about “leaving the army if he could do so with honor to himself.”2 Samuel thought it best that Willis remain in the ranks, and so Willis stayed. Th e sad tidings received in Major Bradley’s letter refreshed Samuel’s apprehension about the advice he had so recently off ered to his son. He later recalled, “I felt some misgivings over it and wished I had told him to do what he thought best under the circumstances. But that like many other things has passed and cannot be recalled. I thought at the time I did right, but my heart aches now while I think of it.”3 As was the case for thousands of people across the North and South aft er every great battle of the war, the words written by Major Bradley on July 5 set in motion a macabre journey for Mr. Babcock. Th e fi -","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130934347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Evening of July 1 Missed Opportunities and Fresh Planning During the predawn sunrise hours of July 2, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, began considering changing the tactics they had already planned and set in motion— Lee, the previous evening and Meade, shortly aft er midnight. Lee’s inclination this cloudy Th ursday morning was to strike the enemy as early as possible, “if they were still there,” while Meade repositioned his defensive perimeter aft er a thorough examination along his westfacing front. It was nearly dawn when both army commanders reconsidered their initial general plans, this change of tactics coming aft er top subordinates presented diff erent ideas as to how to handle the imminent battle. Th ose senior offi cers trying to infl uence their respective leaders included Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding the Confederate First Army Corps, and Union Twelft h Corps commander Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Th eir disingenuous attitudes and problematic demeanors at this early hour proved questionable, with the latter’s demands somewhat more strategically practical than Longstreet’s. Th eir continuous disagreeing and prodding with their superiors would force Lee and Meade
{"title":"The Sunrise Hours at Gettysburg, July 2, 1863","authors":"D. Shultz, Scott L. Mingus","doi":"10.1353/GET.2017.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0001","url":null,"abstract":"The Evening of July 1 Missed Opportunities and Fresh Planning During the predawn sunrise hours of July 2, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, began considering changing the tactics they had already planned and set in motion— Lee, the previous evening and Meade, shortly aft er midnight. Lee’s inclination this cloudy Th ursday morning was to strike the enemy as early as possible, “if they were still there,” while Meade repositioned his defensive perimeter aft er a thorough examination along his westfacing front. It was nearly dawn when both army commanders reconsidered their initial general plans, this change of tactics coming aft er top subordinates presented diff erent ideas as to how to handle the imminent battle. Th ose senior offi cers trying to infl uence their respective leaders included Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding the Confederate First Army Corps, and Union Twelft h Corps commander Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Th eir disingenuous attitudes and problematic demeanors at this early hour proved questionable, with the latter’s demands somewhat more strategically practical than Longstreet’s. Th eir continuous disagreeing and prodding with their superiors would force Lee and Meade","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134236332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“I Cannot Think What Has Become of Stuart” spy, not from his trusted cavalry chief, Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Stuart had ridden off with three cavalry brigades on June 25 and had not been heard from since, leaving Lee to wonder where he was, what the Federals were up to, and why he had not heard from his cavalry. In the absence of detailed information concerning Union troop movements, Lee’s tactical options immediately narrowed, forcing him to radically change his plans and compelling him to operate in an information vacuum that would grow worse in the coming days. Entire volumes and countless articles have already minutely examined the question of the responsibility for Stuart’s absence.1 Rather than retreading that ground, this brief article examines the implications of Stuart’s absence on Lee’s decisionmaking process and how his tactical options were both limited and hindered during the critical period from June 25, when Stuart began his ride around the Union army, to July 2, when Stuart rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia, which was already engaged at Gettysburg.
{"title":"“I Cannot Think What Has Become of Stuart”: The Impact of Stuart’s Absence on Confederate Operations, June 25 to July 2, 1863","authors":"C. Norville","doi":"10.1353/GET.2017.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0002","url":null,"abstract":"“I Cannot Think What Has Become of Stuart” spy, not from his trusted cavalry chief, Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Stuart had ridden off with three cavalry brigades on June 25 and had not been heard from since, leaving Lee to wonder where he was, what the Federals were up to, and why he had not heard from his cavalry. In the absence of detailed information concerning Union troop movements, Lee’s tactical options immediately narrowed, forcing him to radically change his plans and compelling him to operate in an information vacuum that would grow worse in the coming days. Entire volumes and countless articles have already minutely examined the question of the responsibility for Stuart’s absence.1 Rather than retreading that ground, this brief article examines the implications of Stuart’s absence on Lee’s decisionmaking process and how his tactical options were both limited and hindered during the critical period from June 25, when Stuart began his ride around the Union army, to July 2, when Stuart rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia, which was already engaged at Gettysburg.","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127931029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
depicts a Confederate reenactor’s head splitting open, presumably at the moment it is struck by an artillery fragment. Undoubtedly, the author hoped these images would remind the reader of war’s baseness and cruelty; however, many readers will surely consider these images to be tasteless or even a glorifi cation of the violence that occurred on July 1– 3, 1863. Of course, judging the appropriateness of placing digitally eviscerated reenactors into a picture book belongs to the discretion of the individual reader, but prospective buyers should be encouraged to preview the images fi rst, as some will fi nd them disturbing, revolting, or off ensive. In short, Seething Hell is a lengthy anthology of wellknown fi rsthand accounts, speckled with computergenerated blood and gore. Timothy J. Orr Old Dominion University
这幅画描绘了一个南方邦联重演者的头裂开，大概是在被炮弹碎片击中的那一刻。毫无疑问，作者希望这些画面能提醒读者战争的卑劣和残酷;然而，许多读者肯定会认为这些图片毫无品味，甚至是对1863年7月1日至3日发生的暴力事件的美化。当然，判断将数字剔除的再现者放入图画书的适当性属于个人读者的自由裁量权，但应该鼓励潜在的买家首先预览这些图像，因为有些人会觉得它们令人不安，令人反感或令人反感。简而言之，《沸腾的地狱》是一部冗长的选集，收录了著名的第一手资料，点缀着电脑生成的血腥和血腥。Timothy J. Orr Old Dominion University
{"title":"The Second Day at Gettysburg: The Attack and Defense of Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863 by David L. Shultz and Scott L. Mingus (review)","authors":"Robert Grandchamp","doi":"10.1353/get.2017.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/get.2017.0008","url":null,"abstract":"depicts a Confederate reenactor’s head splitting open, presumably at the moment it is struck by an artillery fragment. Undoubtedly, the author hoped these images would remind the reader of war’s baseness and cruelty; however, many readers will surely consider these images to be tasteless or even a glorifi cation of the violence that occurred on July 1– 3, 1863. Of course, judging the appropriateness of placing digitally eviscerated reenactors into a picture book belongs to the discretion of the individual reader, but prospective buyers should be encouraged to preview the images fi rst, as some will fi nd them disturbing, revolting, or off ensive. In short, Seething Hell is a lengthy anthology of wellknown fi rsthand accounts, speckled with computergenerated blood and gore. Timothy J. Orr Old Dominion University","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132565450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fight like the Devil: The First Day at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863 by Chris Mackowski, Kristopher D. White, and Daniel T. Davis (review)","authors":"Robert M. Dunkerly","doi":"10.1353/get.2016.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/get.2016.0023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"346 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115690218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Gettysburg Cyclorama: The Turning Point of the Civil War on Canvas by Chris Brenneman and Sue Boardman (review)","authors":"Jonathan M. Steplyk","doi":"10.1353/GET.2016.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2016.0015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125546206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gettysburg Magazine, no. 55 the turning point of the war. Following three days of confl ict, the Confederate retreat on July 4, 1863, marked the beginning of the end for Lee’s army. Th e Army of Northern Virginia never regained the prowess, strength, and eff ectiveness that it possessed immediately following its victory at Chancellorsville. In fact, the army never again entered Union territory, and Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House in April 1865 disbanded his army and eff ectively ended the American Civil War. Lee’s army lost the battle for a number of reasons, perhaps. However, one particular aspect of Gettysburg that has fostered much debate is the timing of Gen. James Longstreet’s July 2 attack on the Federal left . Some say Lee ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise, while others argue Lee ordered Longstreet’s attack well into the morning. Underpinning this debate— which might otherwise appear a pedantic point devoid of practical consequence— is the historical inquiry concerning who remains responsible for the Confederate defeat on July 2. Th at is, the assignment of blame might shift from Longstreet to Lee, or vice versa, depending on the time at which Lee issued his attack orders to his subordinate, Longstreet. Many fi nd Longstreet at fault, while others blame Gen. J. E. B. Stuart and the absence of his cavalry as the primary reason. Moreover, some contend that General Lee’s wanting generalship was paramount to all other errors. Of course, it is also quite possible that there is plenty of blame to go around, with each candidate contributing, to diff erent degrees, to the Confederacy’s battlefi eld demise at Gettysburg. Upon review of offi cial records and numerous contemporaneous accounts, the historical record In the months leading to the Battle of Gettysburg, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia enjoyed considerable success on the battlefi eld. In December 1862 Lee repelled the Federal assault at Fredericksburg in decisive fashion. Of Fredericksburg, one participant wrote that the Federal soldiers melted “like snow coming down on warm ground” as they rushed the wellfortifi ed Confederate line.1 A few months later, in April and May 1863, Lee’s army defeated the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville. Here, considered his greatest victory, Lee, outnumbered by two to one, delivered a crushing defeat to the betterequipped and bettersupplied enemy.2 With these victories in mind, an optimistic Lee, believing his army nearly invincible, planned his invasion.3 Intending to transfer hostilities to the North, free Virginia from enemy presence, break up the Federal’s summer campaign plan, and achieve a decisive Confederate victory on Union soil, Lee’s army crossed the Potomac in early June 1863.4 Upon locating the Federal army, Lee crossed his troops into Pennsylvania, hoping similar results awaited him. However, the Battle of Gettysburg proved to be
{"title":"James Longstreet and the Famous “Order to Attack”","authors":"H. Florence","doi":"10.1353/GET.2016.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2016.0016","url":null,"abstract":"Gettysburg Magazine, no. 55 the turning point of the war. Following three days of confl ict, the Confederate retreat on July 4, 1863, marked the beginning of the end for Lee’s army. Th e Army of Northern Virginia never regained the prowess, strength, and eff ectiveness that it possessed immediately following its victory at Chancellorsville. In fact, the army never again entered Union territory, and Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House in April 1865 disbanded his army and eff ectively ended the American Civil War. Lee’s army lost the battle for a number of reasons, perhaps. However, one particular aspect of Gettysburg that has fostered much debate is the timing of Gen. James Longstreet’s July 2 attack on the Federal left . Some say Lee ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise, while others argue Lee ordered Longstreet’s attack well into the morning. Underpinning this debate— which might otherwise appear a pedantic point devoid of practical consequence— is the historical inquiry concerning who remains responsible for the Confederate defeat on July 2. Th at is, the assignment of blame might shift from Longstreet to Lee, or vice versa, depending on the time at which Lee issued his attack orders to his subordinate, Longstreet. Many fi nd Longstreet at fault, while others blame Gen. J. E. B. Stuart and the absence of his cavalry as the primary reason. Moreover, some contend that General Lee’s wanting generalship was paramount to all other errors. Of course, it is also quite possible that there is plenty of blame to go around, with each candidate contributing, to diff erent degrees, to the Confederacy’s battlefi eld demise at Gettysburg. Upon review of offi cial records and numerous contemporaneous accounts, the historical record In the months leading to the Battle of Gettysburg, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia enjoyed considerable success on the battlefi eld. In December 1862 Lee repelled the Federal assault at Fredericksburg in decisive fashion. Of Fredericksburg, one participant wrote that the Federal soldiers melted “like snow coming down on warm ground” as they rushed the wellfortifi ed Confederate line.1 A few months later, in April and May 1863, Lee’s army defeated the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville. Here, considered his greatest victory, Lee, outnumbered by two to one, delivered a crushing defeat to the betterequipped and bettersupplied enemy.2 With these victories in mind, an optimistic Lee, believing his army nearly invincible, planned his invasion.3 Intending to transfer hostilities to the North, free Virginia from enemy presence, break up the Federal’s summer campaign plan, and achieve a decisive Confederate victory on Union soil, Lee’s army crossed the Potomac in early June 1863.4 Upon locating the Federal army, Lee crossed his troops into Pennsylvania, hoping similar results awaited him. However, the Battle of Gettysburg proved to be","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121661375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：