Many successful open-source projects have been developed by programmers who were employed by firms but worked on open-source projects on the side because of economic incentives like career improvement benefits. Such side work may be a good thing for the employing firms, too, if they get some strategic value from the open-source software and if the productivity of the programmers on these projects improves through learning-by-doing effects. However, the programmers may work more or less on these projects than what is best for the firms. To manage the programmers' efforts, the firms set appropriate employment policies and incentives. These policies and career concerns then together govern the programmers' effort allocation between the open-source and proprietary projects. We examine this relationship using a variant of the principal/agent model. We derive and characterize optimal employment contracts and show that firms either offer a bonus for only one of the two projects or do not offer any bonuses. However, if attractive alternate employment opportunities are available, they change their strategy and may offer bonuses for both projects simultaneously.
{"title":"Firms as Incubators of Open Source Software","authors":"Amit Mehra, R. M. Dewan, M. Freimer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1121582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121582","url":null,"abstract":"Many successful open-source projects have been developed by programmers who were employed by firms but worked on open-source projects on the side because of economic incentives like career improvement benefits. Such side work may be a good thing for the employing firms, too, if they get some strategic value from the open-source software and if the productivity of the programmers on these projects improves through learning-by-doing effects. However, the programmers may work more or less on these projects than what is best for the firms. To manage the programmers' efforts, the firms set appropriate employment policies and incentives. These policies and career concerns then together govern the programmers' effort allocation between the open-source and proprietary projects. We examine this relationship using a variant of the principal/agent model. We derive and characterize optimal employment contracts and show that firms either offer a bonus for only one of the two projects or do not offer any bonuses. However, if attractive alternate employment opportunities are available, they change their strategy and may offer bonuses for both projects simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131292949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-10-26DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2007.00484.x
Won-Chen Chang, Sheng-Tun Li
In recent years, R&D institutes have encountered various intensified challenges. New instruments are needed to manage knowledge-related activities more effectively and efficiently. This paper presents and discusses the lessons learned from a case study in fostering knowledge management (KM) initiatives and systems in a research-oriented institute serving the metal industry, specifically the Metal Industries Research and Development Center (MIRDC) in Taiwan. We perform a comparative review of the experience of embarking on KM among Taiwanese R&D institutes, a very rarely performed job. Following this, we investigate, by conducting the primary and secondary researches, how MIRDC has adopted a five-stage approach to develop a deliberate framework of KM deployment in order to manipulate the KM operations in the context of a Chinese R&D institute. The MIRDC case demonstrates a sophisticated KM process that provides an activity-based perspective of the plan, control, coordination and evaluation framework in an R&D workspace. This paper argues that well-defined deployment frameworks embody qualities of goal pursuing that are important to KM activities and compel managers to examine more closely how to realize the KM initiatives. This paper also reveals that a rigid hierarchical R&D structure inhibits the dynamics of the knowledge cycle due to technology segmentation. A parallel R&D structure supported by mission offices and a pioneer and innovation program that is cross-departmental and industry-focused can positively motivate horizontal co-opertition networking so as to better exploit and leverage knowledge assets. The practices applied in these elemental KM activities are useful to other R&D organizations by suggesting how each of the KM activities can be configured and implemented.
{"title":"Fostering Knowledge Management Deployment in R&D Workspaces: A Five-Stage Approach","authors":"Won-Chen Chang, Sheng-Tun Li","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2007.00484.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2007.00484.x","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, R&D institutes have encountered various intensified challenges. New instruments are needed to manage knowledge-related activities more effectively and efficiently. This paper presents and discusses the lessons learned from a case study in fostering knowledge management (KM) initiatives and systems in a research-oriented institute serving the metal industry, specifically the Metal Industries Research and Development Center (MIRDC) in Taiwan. We perform a comparative review of the experience of embarking on KM among Taiwanese R&D institutes, a very rarely performed job. Following this, we investigate, by conducting the primary and secondary researches, how MIRDC has adopted a five-stage approach to develop a deliberate framework of KM deployment in order to manipulate the KM operations in the context of a Chinese R&D institute. The MIRDC case demonstrates a sophisticated KM process that provides an activity-based perspective of the plan, control, coordination and evaluation framework in an R&D workspace. This paper argues that well-defined deployment frameworks embody qualities of goal pursuing that are important to KM activities and compel managers to examine more closely how to realize the KM initiatives. This paper also reveals that a rigid hierarchical R&D structure inhibits the dynamics of the knowledge cycle due to technology segmentation. A parallel R&D structure supported by mission offices and a pioneer and innovation program that is cross-departmental and industry-focused can positively motivate horizontal co-opertition networking so as to better exploit and leverage knowledge assets. The practices applied in these elemental KM activities are useful to other R&D organizations by suggesting how each of the KM activities can be configured and implemented.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114800013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Availability of financial capital and location decisions are variables that influence regional manufacturing output. This study maintains that a region’s manufacturing growth depends upon the region’s firm-type dominance. That is, the type of firms that dominate the region’s manufacturing output can be classified as non-local (national or foreign - NF) vs. local and large vs. small. Accordingly, for policy analysis, regions can be classified by firm-type dominance. This distinction is important since, invariably, location decision options and availability of financial capital are more favourable for the larger NF firms than for local firms. In an attempt to assess the impact of firm-type dominance, this study draws upon the dominant industry model which has established that, in any given region, there is a dominant industry (the driving force of the region) to which a region’s manufacturing growth is linked. The information on the impact of firm-type dominance on a region's manufacturing output may enable policy-makers to design workable (or revise existing) manufacturing diversification policies.
{"title":"The Impact of Firm-Type Dominance on Regional Manufacturing Growth","authors":"Stanley C. W. Salvary","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1009331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1009331","url":null,"abstract":"Availability of financial capital and location decisions are variables that influence regional manufacturing output. This study maintains that a region’s manufacturing growth depends upon the region’s firm-type dominance. That is, the type of firms that dominate the region’s manufacturing output can be classified as non-local (national or foreign - NF) vs. local and large vs. small. Accordingly, for policy analysis, regions can be classified by firm-type dominance. This distinction is important since, invariably, location decision options and availability of financial capital are more favourable for the larger NF firms than for local firms. In an attempt to assess the impact of firm-type dominance, this study draws upon the dominant industry model which has established that, in any given region, there is a dominant industry (the driving force of the region) to which a region’s manufacturing growth is linked. The information on the impact of firm-type dominance on a region's manufacturing output may enable policy-makers to design workable (or revise existing) manufacturing diversification policies.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125117527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.
{"title":"Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiment","authors":"W. Güth, M. Levati, Torsten Weiland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1022036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1022036","url":null,"abstract":"In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130325150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research surveys of establishments such as new businesses face significant challenges. Cooperation rates are generally lower than household surveys because of lack of interest, lack of time, or confidentiality concerns. The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), sponsored by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, used various techniques to achieve a response rate of 43 percent. The KFS used a multi-mode approach to encourage Web response and reduce telephone interviewing costs. In training telephone interviewers, refusal avoidance was emphasized, including quick response to initial reluctance to participate, and identifying and quickly responding to common reasons for refusal. We also emphasized completing the survey screener quickly to identify eligible businesses, which were about 35 percent of the sample. This paper describes these training methods, outlines other steps to improve response rates, and compares survey results of cases with an initial refusal with results from cases that completed without an initial refusal.
{"title":"Minimizing Non-Response in a Survey of New Businesses (Presentation)","authors":"Tom Barton, David DesRoches","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1026412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1026412","url":null,"abstract":"Research surveys of establishments such as new businesses face significant challenges. Cooperation rates are generally lower than household surveys because of lack of interest, lack of time, or confidentiality concerns. The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), sponsored by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, used various techniques to achieve a response rate of 43 percent. The KFS used a multi-mode approach to encourage Web response and reduce telephone interviewing costs. In training telephone interviewers, refusal avoidance was emphasized, including quick response to initial reluctance to participate, and identifying and quickly responding to common reasons for refusal. We also emphasized completing the survey screener quickly to identify eligible businesses, which were about 35 percent of the sample. This paper describes these training methods, outlines other steps to improve response rates, and compares survey results of cases with an initial refusal with results from cases that completed without an initial refusal.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116015167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this survey, we describe the current state of corporate governance in Russia and discuss its dynamics and prospects. We review the main mechanisms of corporate governance in the country and relate them to firms’ ownership structures, financial market development and government influence. Finally, we discuss the current trends in Russian corporate governance and its prospects.
{"title":"A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia","authors":"Olga V. Lazareva, A. Rachinsky, S. Stepanov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.997965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.997965","url":null,"abstract":"In this survey, we describe the current state of corporate governance in Russia and discuss its dynamics and prospects. We review the main mechanisms of corporate governance in the country and relate them to firms’ ownership structures, financial market development and government influence. Finally, we discuss the current trends in Russian corporate governance and its prospects.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134427062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a new measure of competition: the elasticity of a firm's profits with respect to its cost level. A higher value of this profit elasticity (PE) signals more intense competition. Using firm-level data we compare PE with the most popular competition measures such as the price cost margin (PCM). We show that PE and PCM are highly correlated on average. However, PCM tends to misrepresent the development of competition over time in markets with few firms and high concentration, i.e. in markets with high policy relevance. So, just when it is needed the most PCM fails whereas PE does not. From this we conclude that PE is a more reliable measure of competition.
{"title":"How (Not) to Measure Competition","authors":"J. Boone, J. van Ours, H. V. D. Wiel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.985270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985270","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new measure of competition: the elasticity of a firm's profits with respect to its cost level. A higher value of this profit elasticity (PE) signals more intense competition. Using firm-level data we compare PE with the most popular competition measures such as the price cost margin (PCM). We show that PE and PCM are highly correlated on average. However, PCM tends to misrepresent the development of competition over time in markets with few firms and high concentration, i.e. in markets with high policy relevance. So, just when it is needed the most PCM fails whereas PE does not. From this we conclude that PE is a more reliable measure of competition.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124120976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate governance challenges in emerging market public sectors are leading to innovations in organizational form, such as corporatization, which separates ownership from management. In seeking to better understand the role of governance and incentive design in corporatized hospitals, this paper focuses on their board structure - the institutional lynchpin of such systems. It shows how principal-agent theory, in particular the multitasking and common agency approach as developed by Dixit (1996), can provide a useful analytical lens in understanding hospital board design. Implications for hospital governance will be shown. There are three potential levels of governmental activity in health: regulation, finance and service provision. Political constraints for hospital privatization and the lack of private entrepreneurial activities are the two main factors that contribute to government involvement in providing health services. This paper focuses on the provision side. It describes corporatization as an institutional design for public hospitals that seeks to improve efficiency and reduce transfers in a publicly owned, decentralized health system. The analysis considers decentralization as a reallocation of decision rights to lower levels of the public sector. It seeks to show how such a strategy creates new needs for monitoring and control of decentralized units, and how the multi-tasking common agency model can shed light on the design of governance mechanisms in corporatized hospitals.
{"title":"Governance and Incentives in Corporatized Hospitals","authors":"F. Eid","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.683724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.683724","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance challenges in emerging market public sectors are leading to innovations in organizational form, such as corporatization, which separates ownership from management. In seeking to better understand the role of governance and incentive design in corporatized hospitals, this paper focuses on their board structure - the institutional lynchpin of such systems. It shows how principal-agent theory, in particular the multitasking and common agency approach as developed by Dixit (1996), can provide a useful analytical lens in understanding hospital board design. Implications for hospital governance will be shown. There are three potential levels of governmental activity in health: regulation, finance and service provision. Political constraints for hospital privatization and the lack of private entrepreneurial activities are the two main factors that contribute to government involvement in providing health services. This paper focuses on the provision side. It describes corporatization as an institutional design for public hospitals that seeks to improve efficiency and reduce transfers in a publicly owned, decentralized health system. The analysis considers decentralization as a reallocation of decision rights to lower levels of the public sector. It seeks to show how such a strategy creates new needs for monitoring and control of decentralized units, and how the multi-tasking common agency model can shed light on the design of governance mechanisms in corporatized hospitals.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126519355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides systematic research-based evidence on the usage of the BSC concept in German-speaking countries. We develop three primary types of BSC usage reflecting the successive phases in the evolution of the BSC concept and of its implementation in practice. This typology ranges from the BSC's origin as a multidimensional framework for strategic performance measurement that combines financial and non-financial measures to its advanced usage as an integrated strategic management system that describes strategy by a cause-and-effect logic and that is linked to the reward system. We use this theoretical framework to analyze the spread, implementation and benefits of the different types of Balanced Scorecards. Moreover, the impact of size and industry on BSC usage is analyzed. Our sample consists of a clearly defined segment of the most important publicly traded firms in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and we achieved an overall response rate of 87%.
{"title":"A Descriptive Analysis on the Implementation of Balanced Scorecards in German-Speaking Countries","authors":"G. Speckbacher, J. Bischof, T. Pfeiffer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1027060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027060","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides systematic research-based evidence on the usage of the BSC concept in German-speaking countries. We develop three primary types of BSC usage reflecting the successive phases in the evolution of the BSC concept and of its implementation in practice. This typology ranges from the BSC's origin as a multidimensional framework for strategic performance measurement that combines financial and non-financial measures to its advanced usage as an integrated strategic management system that describes strategy by a cause-and-effect logic and that is linked to the reward system. We use this theoretical framework to analyze the spread, implementation and benefits of the different types of Balanced Scorecards. Moreover, the impact of size and industry on BSC usage is analyzed. Our sample consists of a clearly defined segment of the most important publicly traded firms in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and we achieved an overall response rate of 87%.","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115085275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a tremendous boom in the private equity industry. The pool of U.S. private equity funds (partnerships specializing in venture capital, leveraged buyouts, mezzanine investments, build-ups, and distressed debt) has grown from $5 billion in 1980 to about $150 billion in 1997. Private equity's recent growth has outstripped that of almost every class of financial product. While some of this growth was driven by the easing of federal regulations, it also reflects investors' growing appreciation of the effectiveness of the organizational structures and control mechanisms employed by private equity funds. This document describes a course exploring this industry, "Venture Capital and Private Equity." This course was introduced by the author of this working paper at Harvard Business School in the 1993-1994 academic year. In recent years, two full sections, each of approximately 100 MBAs and other students have signed up for the course, with a significant waiting list. The cases in this course have also been used in a variety of other settings, including an annual executive education course on private equity organized by Paul Gompers and the author at Harvard Business School, and in entrepreneurship and private equity courses at a variety of other major business schools. Three primary pedagogical objectives motivate the design and structure of the course. First, and most fundamentally, the course seeks to deepen students' understanding of corporate finance. This course differs from some academic programs in entrepreneurship, which emphasize the uniqueness of private equity finance and the limited applicability of academic theory. For instance, one leading entrepreneurship text [Timmons, 1994] states, "there are both stark and subtle differences, both in theory and practice, between entrepreneurial finance as practiced in higher potential ventures and corporate or administrative finance, which usually occurs in larger publicly traded companies. Further, there are important limits to some financial theories as applied to new ventures." By way of contrast, this course emphasizes the relevance of the intellectual frameworks used to analyze corporate finance problems (incomplete contracting theory, agency problems, etc.) for the private equity industry. Wherever possible, the links to other finance courses are emphasized. Thus, one goal is to review and apply the key concepts and tools of corporate finance in an environment that the students perceive as very interesting. Second, the course seeks to build familiarity with the key institutional features of the private equity industry. Whether discussing fund structures, potential investments, or returns, participants in the private equity industry often describe phenomena in language that is somewhat different from other financial investors. Understanding the key frameworks employed by private equity investors, and relating them to traditional finance practice, is thus a
{"title":"Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Course Overview","authors":"J. Lerner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.79148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.79148","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past fifteen years, there has been a tremendous boom in the private equity industry. The pool of U.S. private equity funds (partnerships specializing in venture capital, leveraged buyouts, mezzanine investments, build-ups, and distressed debt) has grown from $5 billion in 1980 to about $150 billion in 1997. Private equity's recent growth has outstripped that of almost every class of financial product. While some of this growth was driven by the easing of federal regulations, it also reflects investors' growing appreciation of the effectiveness of the organizational structures and control mechanisms employed by private equity funds. This document describes a course exploring this industry, \"Venture Capital and Private Equity.\" This course was introduced by the author of this working paper at Harvard Business School in the 1993-1994 academic year. In recent years, two full sections, each of approximately 100 MBAs and other students have signed up for the course, with a significant waiting list. The cases in this course have also been used in a variety of other settings, including an annual executive education course on private equity organized by Paul Gompers and the author at Harvard Business School, and in entrepreneurship and private equity courses at a variety of other major business schools. Three primary pedagogical objectives motivate the design and structure of the course. First, and most fundamentally, the course seeks to deepen students' understanding of corporate finance. This course differs from some academic programs in entrepreneurship, which emphasize the uniqueness of private equity finance and the limited applicability of academic theory. For instance, one leading entrepreneurship text [Timmons, 1994] states, \"there are both stark and subtle differences, both in theory and practice, between entrepreneurial finance as practiced in higher potential ventures and corporate or administrative finance, which usually occurs in larger publicly traded companies. Further, there are important limits to some financial theories as applied to new ventures.\" By way of contrast, this course emphasizes the relevance of the intellectual frameworks used to analyze corporate finance problems (incomplete contracting theory, agency problems, etc.) for the private equity industry. Wherever possible, the links to other finance courses are emphasized. Thus, one goal is to review and apply the key concepts and tools of corporate finance in an environment that the students perceive as very interesting. Second, the course seeks to build familiarity with the key institutional features of the private equity industry. Whether discussing fund structures, potential investments, or returns, participants in the private equity industry often describe phenomena in language that is somewhat different from other financial investors. Understanding the key frameworks employed by private equity investors, and relating them to traditional finance practice, is thus a","PeriodicalId":281108,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"8 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120906527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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