Development of an effective vaccine that protects against COVID-19 is widely considered one of the best paths to ending the current health crisis While the ab
开发一种有效的预防COVID-19的疫苗被广泛认为是结束当前健康危机的最佳途径之一
{"title":"The Role of General Risk Preferences in Messaging About COVID-19 Vaccine Take-Up","authors":"J. Trueblood, Abigail B. Sussman, Daniel O’Leary","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3649654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3649654","url":null,"abstract":"Development of an effective vaccine that protects against COVID-19 is widely considered one of the best paths to ending the current health crisis While the ab","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"227 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114379847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We model how individuals and firms adapt beliefs, heuristics, mental frameworks and norms to changed circumstances. Adaptation competes with other work for limited mental resources. We apply our model to firms experiencing a technology shock. It is optimal for some firms to disband rather than adapt. Greater product homogeneity and greater divergences between traditional norms and new realities increase firms’ propensities to disband. Firms can lower adaptation costs by increasing adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity is the ability to manage the emotional and mental challenges of confronting change, but building such capacity also competes for limited mental resources.
{"title":"Towards a Theory of Adaptation: X-Efficiency and Adaptive Efficiency","authors":"J. Hauge, Laura Jamison, Mark A. Jamison","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3648563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3648563","url":null,"abstract":"We model how individuals and firms adapt beliefs, heuristics, mental frameworks and norms to changed circumstances. Adaptation competes with other work for limited mental resources. We apply our model to firms experiencing a technology shock. It is optimal for some firms to disband rather than adapt. Greater product homogeneity and greater divergences between traditional norms and new realities increase firms’ propensities to disband. Firms can lower adaptation costs by increasing adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity is the ability to manage the emotional and mental challenges of confronting change, but building such capacity also competes for limited mental resources.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114492073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that risk-taking originates in preindustrial ancestral population diversity. We use data on immigrants residing in the United States and show that controlling for all known determinants of portfolio decisions, diversity positively affects stock market participation and asset allocation but not the ownership of bonds or savings accounts. The diversity effect relates to the level of individualism and knowledge in the origin country. Nevertheless, diversity is significant in the presence of more than 100 control variables or when instrumenting diversity with plant variety. Overall, deep-rooted factors unrelated to contemporary social and economic conditions affect risk-taking.
{"title":"On the Origins of Financial Development: Ancestral Population Diversity and Financial Risk-Taking","authors":"M. Delis, E. Dioikitopoulos, S. Ongena","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3644950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644950","url":null,"abstract":"We show that risk-taking originates in preindustrial ancestral population diversity. We use data on immigrants residing in the United States and show that controlling for all known determinants of portfolio decisions, diversity positively affects stock market participation and asset allocation but not the ownership of bonds or savings accounts. The diversity effect relates to the level of individualism and knowledge in the origin country. Nevertheless, diversity is significant in the presence of more than 100 control variables or when instrumenting diversity with plant variety. Overall, deep-rooted factors unrelated to contemporary social and economic conditions affect risk-taking.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117221931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A very, very, very severe problem has been occurring repeatedly over the last 100 years in the social sciences and philosophy, when it comes to the question of understanding the meaning of Keynes ‘s logical theory of probability and his concept of rational degrees of belief. It is the failure of commentators on Keynes’s book to have actually read the A Treatise on Probability that is an ongoing problem.
Instead of reading the A Treatise on Probability, practically all social scientists and philosophers evaluate Keynes’s contribution based on a reading of F. P. Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 reviews ,which are combined with the introduction to the latest edition of the A Treatise on Probability, Volume 8 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, written by Richard B. Braithwaite, who claimed that he had read the A Treatise on Probability during the break between academic terms at Cambridge University in 1921, as reported in C. MIsak’s 2020 biography of Frank Ramsey.
Given that it took the French mathematician, Emile Borel, three years to cover Part I of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in preparation for his 1924 review and that it took the American mathematician, Edwin Bidwell Wilson, Paul Samuelson’s mentor, 13 years before he was able to write his review of Part II of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in the September, 1934 issue of the Journal of the American Statistical Society, I believe that the above facts provide overwhelming evidence that Richard B Braithwaite claim can’t be sustained. It is not possible, as he claimed, to be able to read the A Treatise on Probability in less than two month’s time.
This problem shows up again repeatedly on pages 278-284 in D. Courgeau’s 2012 research manual, Probability and Social Science, where evaluations of Keynes’s work are made that have nothing to do with Keynes’s book. Misak based her assessment on individuals, such as Clive Bell, who simply would have no idea about what Keynes was talking about. When one combines such empty speculations with the impossible claims made by Braithwaite and Ramsey’s juvenile book reviews of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, the result is simply nonsensical, given that the fundamental differences between Keynes and Ramsey are between imprecise views of probability versus precise views of probability, respectively.
一个非常，非常，非常严重的问题在过去的100年里，在社会科学和哲学中反复出现，当涉及到理解凯恩斯的逻辑概率论和他的理性信仰程度概念的意义的问题时。评论凯恩斯著作的人没有真正读过《概率论》(A Treatise on Probability)，这是一个持续存在的问题。几乎所有的社会科学家和哲学家都不去读《概率论》，而是根据拉姆齐1922年和1926年的评论来评价凯恩斯的贡献，这些评论与最新版《概率论》的介绍结合在一起，《概率论》是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯文集第8卷，由理查德·b·布雷斯韦特撰写。据C. MIsak在2020年出版的弗兰克·拉姆齐传记中报道，拉姆齐声称自己在1921年剑桥大学学期间隙读过《概率论》。考虑到法国数学家埃米尔·博雷尔花了三年时间为他1924年的评论撰写凯恩斯的《概率论》的第一部分，而美国数学家埃德温·比德韦尔·威尔逊，保罗·萨缪尔森的导师，花了13年才在1934年9月的《美国统计学会杂志》上撰写了他对凯恩斯的《概率论》的第二部分的评论，我认为，上述事实提供了压倒性的证据，Richard B . Braithwaite的说法是站不住脚的。他声称，要在不到两个月的时间内读完《概率论》是不可能的。在D. Courgeau 2012年出版的研究手册《概率与社会科学》(Probability and Social Science)的278-284页，这个问题再次反复出现，其中对凯恩斯工作的评价与凯恩斯的书毫无关系。米萨克的评估基于克莱夫•贝尔(Clive Bell)等个人，这些人根本不知道凯恩斯在说什么。当人们把这些空洞的推测与布雷斯韦特和拉姆齐对凯恩斯的《概率论》所做的不可能的评论结合在一起时，结果简直是荒谬的，因为凯恩斯和拉姆齐之间的根本区别分别是不精确的概率论和精确的概率论。
{"title":"Keynes Spelt Out Exactly What 'Degree of Rational Belief ' Meant in His a Treatise on Probability (1921): Correcting the Severe Errors in Courgeau (2012)","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3633589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3633589","url":null,"abstract":"A very, very, very severe problem has been occurring repeatedly over the last 100 years in the social sciences and philosophy, when it comes to the question of understanding the meaning of Keynes ‘s logical theory of probability and his concept of rational degrees of belief. It is the failure of commentators on Keynes’s book to have actually read the A Treatise on Probability that is an ongoing problem.<br><br>Instead of reading the A Treatise on Probability, practically all social scientists and philosophers evaluate Keynes’s contribution based on a reading of F. P. Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 reviews ,which are combined with the introduction to the latest edition of the A Treatise on Probability, Volume 8 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, written by Richard B. Braithwaite, who claimed that he had read the A Treatise on Probability during the break between academic terms at Cambridge University in 1921, as reported in C. MIsak’s 2020 biography of Frank Ramsey.<br><br>Given that it took the French mathematician, Emile Borel, three years to cover Part I of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in preparation for his 1924 review and that it took the American mathematician, Edwin Bidwell Wilson, Paul Samuelson’s mentor, 13 years before he was able to write his review of Part II of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in the September, 1934 issue of the Journal of the American Statistical Society, I believe that the above facts provide overwhelming evidence that Richard B Braithwaite claim can’t be sustained. It is not possible, as he claimed, to be able to read the A Treatise on Probability in less than two month’s time.<br><br>This problem shows up again repeatedly on pages 278-284 in D. Courgeau’s 2012 research manual, Probability and Social Science, where evaluations of Keynes’s work are made that have nothing to do with Keynes’s book. Misak based her assessment on individuals, such as Clive Bell, who simply would have no idea about what Keynes was talking about. When one combines such empty speculations with the impossible claims made by Braithwaite and Ramsey’s juvenile book reviews of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, the result is simply nonsensical, given that the fundamental differences between Keynes and Ramsey are between imprecise views of probability versus precise views of probability, respectively. <br><br>","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114919270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider whether participation in cooperative organizations known as Farm Bases correlates with a farmer’s risk attitudes in China. Specifically, we seek to determine if farmers see cooperative-like organizations as a means of reducing risk or as a way of accessing riskier opportunities. Using data from a risk experiment involving 348 apple farmers, we estimate risk attitudes and correlate those indicators with participation in Farm Bases and other controls. In the case of Chinese apple producers, we find that considerations of risk are an important feature of organizational forms that involve collective decision-making, although the correlation between risk and cooperative organizational participation is nuanced.
{"title":"Risk Attitudes within Farmer Cooperative Organizations: Evidence from China’s Fresh Apple Industry","authors":"Shaoze Jin, X. Jia, Harvey S. James, Jr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3625236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3625236","url":null,"abstract":"We consider whether participation in cooperative organizations known as Farm Bases correlates with a farmer’s risk attitudes in China. Specifically, we seek to determine if farmers see cooperative-like organizations as a means of reducing risk or as a way of accessing riskier opportunities. Using data from a risk experiment involving 348 apple farmers, we estimate risk attitudes and correlate those indicators with participation in Farm Bases and other controls. In the case of Chinese apple producers, we find that considerations of risk are an important feature of organizational forms that involve collective decision-making, although the correlation between risk and cooperative organizational participation is nuanced.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116944986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Keynes, as he had done in all of his major works either directly or indirectly, from the 1913 Indian Currency and Finance through the General Theory in 1936, always used his A Treatise on Probability method and methodology of inexact measurement and approximation when performing a technical analysis. This involves Keynes’s use of interval valued probability to deal with the problem of uncertainty. Uncertainty involves non(sub ) additive probability that introduces the immense complications of non additivity and non linearity into an analysis of decision making. Uncertainty, U, itself is a function only of the Evidential weight of the argument,w,or U=g(w). It occurs if Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument,V(a/h) =w ,where 0≤w≤1,is less than 1.A w<1 automatically creates some degree of uncertainty. In Keynes’s system of logical probability, there is no other way of modelling uncertainty except as an a)interval estimate or a b) decision weight, like his conventional coefficient of risk and weight,c.In the Keynes -Townshend correspondence on 1937-1938 in Vol. 29 of the CWJMK,Keynes emphasizes that Townshend was correct in his conclusion that the entire concept of the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest rested on his weight of the evidence analysis. Keynes told Townshend ,who was intellectually lost, to reread pages 148 and 240 of the General Theory. Of course, it is on these two pages that Keynes’s makes the connection between uncertainty and weight as an inverse function. Only in chapter 26 of the A treatise on probability, however,is V(a/h), from chapter 6, set equal to w,where 0≤w≤1,in chapter 26. However,after some 84 years,it is now clear to me that this was not enough.Keynes also needed to have told Townshend to read page 160 of the A treatise on probability and pp.39-40 and 43 of chapter 4 of the General Theory, since no economist in the 20th century has been able to connect Keynes’s condition for uncertainty to exist,w<1, with interval valued or imprecise probability.
从1913年的《印度货币与金融》到1936年的《通论》，凯恩斯在他所有直接或间接的主要著作中，在进行技术分析时，总是使用他的《概率论》方法和不精确测量和近似的方法。这涉及到凯恩斯使用区间值概率来处理不确定性问题。不确定性涉及非(次)可加性概率，在决策分析中引入了非可加性和非线性的巨大复杂性。不确定性，U，本身只是论证的证据权重w的函数，或者U=g(w)。如果凯恩斯论证的证据权重V(a/h) =w(其中0≤w≤1)小于1，就会出现这种情况。w<1会自动产生一定程度的不确定性。在凯恩斯的逻辑概率系统中，除了a)区间估计或b)决策权重之外，没有其他方法来模拟不确定性，就像他的传统风险和权重系数c一样。在《CWJMK》第29卷1937-1938年的凯恩斯-汤森通信中，凯恩斯强调汤森的结论是正确的，即利率的流动性偏好理论的整个概念取决于他对证据分析的权重。凯恩斯让汤森德重新阅读《通论》的148页和240页，汤森德当时已经神志不清了。当然，正是在这两页上，凯恩斯把不确定性和权重作为反函数联系起来。然而，只有在A论概率的第26章中，第6章的V(A /h)在第26章中被设为等于w，其中0≤w≤1。然而，在大约84年之后，我现在清楚地认识到，这还不够。凯恩斯也需要告诉汤森去读《概率论》(A treatise on probability)第160页和《通论》(General Theory)第4章第39-40页和43页，因为在20世纪，没有一个经济学家能够把凯恩斯的不确定性条件w<1与区间值或不精确概率联系起来。
{"title":"On the Explicit Connections Between Keynes’s Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability(1921) and Chapter Four of the General Theory(1936):Keynes’s Method in the General Theory is Inexact Measurement and Approximation using Imprecise Probability from the A Treatise on Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3614429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3614429","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes, as he had done in all of his major works either directly or indirectly, from the 1913 Indian Currency and Finance through the General Theory in 1936, always used his A Treatise on Probability method and methodology of inexact measurement and approximation when performing a technical analysis. This involves Keynes’s use of interval valued probability to deal with the problem of uncertainty. \u0000 \u0000Uncertainty involves non(sub ) additive probability that introduces the immense complications of non additivity and non linearity into an analysis of decision making. Uncertainty, U, itself is a function only of the Evidential weight of the argument,w,or U=g(w). It occurs if Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument,V(a/h) =w ,where 0≤w≤1,is less than 1.A w<1 automatically creates some degree of uncertainty. In Keynes’s system of logical probability, there is no other way of modelling uncertainty except as an a)interval estimate or a b) decision weight, like his conventional coefficient of risk and weight,c.In the Keynes -Townshend correspondence on 1937-1938 in Vol. 29 of the CWJMK,Keynes emphasizes that Townshend was correct in his conclusion that the entire concept of the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest rested on his weight of the evidence analysis. \u0000 \u0000Keynes told Townshend ,who was intellectually lost, to reread pages 148 and 240 of the General Theory. Of course, it is on these two pages that Keynes’s makes the connection between uncertainty and weight as an inverse function. Only in chapter 26 of the A treatise on probability, however,is V(a/h), from chapter 6, set equal to w,where 0≤w≤1,in chapter 26. \u0000 \u0000However,after some 84 years,it is now clear to me that this was not enough.Keynes also needed to have told Townshend to read page 160 of the A treatise on probability and pp.39-40 and 43 of chapter 4 of the General Theory, since no economist in the 20th century has been able to connect Keynes’s condition for uncertainty to exist,w<1, with interval valued or imprecise probability.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132867542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The severity of adverse selection depends, to a great extent, on the underlying distribution of the asset. This distribution is commonly modeled as exogenous; however, in many real-world applications, it is determined endogenously. A natural question in this context is whether one can predict the severity of the adverse selection problem in such environments. In this paper, we study a bilateral trade model in which the distribution of the asset is affected by pre-trade unobservable actions of the seller. Analyzing general trade mechanisms, we show that the seller’s actions are characterized by a risk-seeking disposition. In addition, we show that (location-independent) riskier underlying distributions of the asset induce lower social welfare. That is, “lemon markets” arise endogenously in these environments.
{"title":"Endogenous Lemon Markets: Risky Choices and Adverse Selection","authors":"Avi Lichtig, R. Weksler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3594356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3594356","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The severity of adverse selection depends, to a great extent, on the underlying distribution of the asset. This distribution is commonly modeled as exogenous; however, in many real-world applications, it is determined endogenously. A natural question in this context is whether one can predict the severity of the adverse selection problem in such environments. In this paper, we study a bilateral trade model in which the distribution of the asset is affected by pre-trade unobservable actions of the seller. Analyzing general trade mechanisms, we show that the seller’s actions are characterized by a risk-seeking disposition. In addition, we show that (location-independent) riskier underlying distributions of the asset induce lower social welfare. That is, “lemon markets” arise endogenously in these environments.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129569169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to build an algorithm of network dynamics with decision-making under incomplete information. Accordingly, it tries to identify if a social planner reduces the influence of individual biases, such as confirmation bias or assimilation bias on agents actions, and solve a coordination problem. The research questions are the following: " Can the social planner increase social welfare, by manipulating the set of possible invitations and annoyances, without directly changing a network structure?", " What are the main drivers of increasing social-planner utility functions?" "How do the results change if the social planner has incomplete information or wrong priors about the fundamental variable?" For this research, a "Liberal Social Planner" was created; a process through which network members get suggestions depending on its utility function. The results have potential applications for the management of social media platforms by the owners of these platforms. Platforms can develop robots that can help their users be more informed and more satisfied. As we live in a world of virtual connectedness, people seem to obtain more information from online network peers than from experts.
{"title":"Can A Social Planner Manipulate Network Dynamics And Solve Coordination Problems?","authors":"Z. Hakobyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3587024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3587024","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to build an algorithm of network dynamics with decision-making under incomplete information. Accordingly, it tries to identify if a social planner reduces the influence of individual biases, such as confirmation bias or assimilation bias on agents actions, and solve a coordination problem. The research questions are the following: \" Can the social planner increase social welfare, by manipulating the set of possible invitations and annoyances, without directly changing a network structure?\", \" What are the main drivers of increasing social-planner utility functions?\" \"How do the results change if the social planner has incomplete information or wrong priors about the fundamental variable?\" For this research, a \"Liberal Social Planner\" was created; a process through which network members get suggestions depending on its utility function. The results have potential applications for the management of social media platforms by the owners of these platforms. Platforms can develop robots that can help their users be more informed and more satisfied. As we live in a world of virtual connectedness, people seem to obtain more information from online network peers than from experts.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133274895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, many published findings in science could not be reproduced. These publications turned out to be low quality despite having good p-values. Several measures to replace p-values have been proposed, including an incredibility index (Schimmack, 2012), meta-regression (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). However, the real root cause of the souring of p-values is publication pressure. In that case, the newer measures will also eventually also go sour under publicaiton pressure. The problem of measuring science quality is actually just a specific case of a more general observation: Measures of behavior go sour (seem to work but actually not work) once pressure is placed on them to control people. So how do we fix science publication? There are two choices:
1. Reduce the pressure on scientists to publish. Produce fewer social science PhDs and make alternatives to tenure-track work more palatable (not adjunct hell).
2. Learn more about other systems with escape from measures. I discuss co-evolutionary hotspots and how spammers escape spam detectors.
{"title":"Escape From Models: How Science Publishing Went Sour (Presentation Slides)","authors":"J. Whitmore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3554480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554480","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, many published findings in science could not be reproduced. These publications turned out to be low quality despite having good p-values. Several measures to replace p-values have been proposed, including an incredibility index (Schimmack, 2012), meta-regression (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). However, the real root cause of the souring of p-values is publication pressure. In that case, the newer measures will also eventually also go sour under publicaiton pressure. The problem of measuring science quality is actually just a specific case of a more general observation: Measures of behavior go sour (seem to work but actually not work) once pressure is placed on them to control people. So how do we fix science publication? There are two choices:<br><br>1. Reduce the pressure on scientists to publish. Produce fewer social science PhDs and make alternatives to tenure-track work more palatable (not adjunct hell).<br><br>2. Learn more about other systems with escape from measures. I discuss co-evolutionary hotspots and how spammers escape spam detectors.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125623013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nearly one hundred years after Keynes published his A Treatise on Probability in 1921,it appears that practically no philosophers have read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in either the 20th or 21st centuries. This simply means that no modern day philosopher is in any position to recognize that Keynes’s work on his interval valued approach to imprecise probability in 1907,1908 and 1921 makes him the founder, along with G Boole’s contributions in his 1854 The Laws of Thought ,of the imprecise theory of probability long before Koopman’s work in 1940 or the work of I. J. Good, C. Smith ,or H.E. Kyburg in the early 1960’s.
凯恩斯在1921年发表了他的《概率论》(A Treatise on Probability)将近100年后，在20世纪或21世纪，似乎几乎没有哲学家读过《概率论》的第二部分。这仅仅意味着，没有任何现代哲学家能够认识到，凯恩斯在1907年、1908年和1921年对不精确概率的间隔值方法的研究，使他与G布尔在1854年的《思想法则》(the Laws of Thought)中的贡献一起，成为不精确概率理论的创始人，远远早于库普曼在1940年的研究，也早于I. J. Good、C. Smith或H.E. Kyburg在60年代初的研究。
{"title":"Some Examples of 21st Century Philosophers Who Have Written About Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability, but Have Skipped Part II of the A Treatise on Probability, Where Keynes Presented His Interval – Valued Approach to Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3534557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3534557","url":null,"abstract":"Nearly one hundred years after Keynes published his A Treatise on Probability in 1921,it appears that practically no philosophers have read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in either the 20th or 21st centuries. This simply means that no modern day philosopher is in any position to recognize that Keynes’s work on his interval valued approach to imprecise probability in 1907,1908 and 1921 makes him the founder, along with G Boole’s contributions in his 1854 The Laws of Thought ,of the imprecise theory of probability long before Koopman’s work in 1940 or the work of I. J. Good, C. Smith ,or H.E. Kyburg in the early 1960’s.","PeriodicalId":281936,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133573823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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