Abstract In Final Offer Arbitration, both parties submit a proposal to an arbitrator. In the event the parties cannot reach a negotiated settlement, the arbitrator chooses the submitted proposal that is closest to her preferred settlement. In such a model, asymmetric information can lead to costly bargaining failure. Voluntary disclosure of private information has the potential to eliminate disputes which would otherwise arise. However, the timing of this information transmission is crucial, because information can be used by the previously uninformed party to submit a superior proposal to the arbitrator. Thus, there is an incentive to conceal information if it is to be revealed prior to the submission of proposals to the arbitrator. However, information transmission should occur if it takes place after the submission of these proposals. In this paper, we test this theory experimentally and find individuals with a strong case reveal their private information in 40% of negotiations when revelation comes prior to the submission of proposals and in 60% of negotiations when revelation comes after the submission of these proposals. Moreover, information disclosure by a party with favorable information increases the rate of settlement as predicted by the theory.
{"title":"Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: An Experimental Analysis of Final Offer Arbitration","authors":"Paul Pecorino, Michael Solomon, Mark van Boening","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3635742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3635742","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Final Offer Arbitration, both parties submit a proposal to an arbitrator. In the event the parties cannot reach a negotiated settlement, the arbitrator chooses the submitted proposal that is closest to her preferred settlement. In such a model, asymmetric information can lead to costly bargaining failure. Voluntary disclosure of private information has the potential to eliminate disputes which would otherwise arise. However, the timing of this information transmission is crucial, because information can be used by the previously uninformed party to submit a superior proposal to the arbitrator. Thus, there is an incentive to conceal information if it is to be revealed prior to the submission of proposals to the arbitrator. However, information transmission should occur if it takes place after the submission of these proposals. In this paper, we test this theory experimentally and find individuals with a strong case reveal their private information in 40% of negotiations when revelation comes prior to the submission of proposals and in 60% of negotiations when revelation comes after the submission of these proposals. Moreover, information disclosure by a party with favorable information increases the rate of settlement as predicted by the theory.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124425524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we discuss the role of moral character in negotiation and identify open questions and promising directions for future scholars to explore. We advance research in this area by introducing a dyadic model of moral character in negotiation, which highlights the joint influence of each party’s moral character on negotiation attitudes, motives, and behaviors. We discuss the implications of our model and conclude that personality science, and especially the study of moral character, has great potential to enhance research and practice in negotiations. Our hope is that this work will accelerate theoretical development and empirical studies that address the question of how moral character influences negotiation processes and outcomes—from pre-negotiation (e.g., planning, selecting negotiating partners) to actual bargaining (e.g., bargaining tactics, concessions) and finally, post-negotiation (e.g., deal implementation, long-term consequences, relationship building and maintenance, reputations)—and provide a springboard for future studies on this topic.
{"title":"Moral Character in Negotiation","authors":"Lily Morse, T. Cohen","doi":"10.5465/AMP.2017.0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMP.2017.0051","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we discuss the role of moral character in negotiation and identify open questions and promising directions for future scholars to explore. We advance research in this area by introducing a dyadic model of moral character in negotiation, which highlights the joint influence of each party’s moral character on negotiation attitudes, motives, and behaviors. We discuss the implications of our model and conclude that personality science, and especially the study of moral character, has great potential to enhance research and practice in negotiations. Our hope is that this work will accelerate theoretical development and empirical studies that address the question of how moral character influences negotiation processes and outcomes—from pre-negotiation (e.g., planning, selecting negotiating partners) to actual bargaining (e.g., bargaining tactics, concessions) and finally, post-negotiation (e.g., deal implementation, long-term consequences, relationship building and maintenance, reputations)—and provide a springboard for future studies on this topic.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134106042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Assume in a 2-person game that one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p—but not P’s prediction—and that P will act according to his prediction. In all 2 2 strict ordinal games in which there is a unique Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium (Class I) or no pure-strategy equilibrium (Class II), and which also has a Pareto-optimal non-Nash “cooperative outcome,” P can induce this outcome if p is sufficiently high. This scenario helps to explain the observed outcomes of a Class I game modeling the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a Class II game modeling the 2015 conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons.
{"title":"Stabilizing Unstable Outcomes in Prediction Games","authors":"S. Brams, D. Kilgour","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2937290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937290","url":null,"abstract":"Assume in a 2-person game that one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p—but not P’s prediction—and that P will act according to his prediction. In all 2 2 strict ordinal games in which there is a unique Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium (Class I) or no pure-strategy equilibrium (Class II), and which also has a Pareto-optimal non-Nash “cooperative outcome,” P can induce this outcome if p is sufficiently high. This scenario helps to explain the observed outcomes of a Class I game modeling the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a Class II game modeling the 2015 conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114344811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conflict is a common theme that occurs on a constant basis in all aspects of life and can have negative and positive implications based on the situation. Organizational conflict has been studied throughout the past century and has rendered insight and models to help foster environments to help shift behaviors towards positive outcomes. The following paper examines the case of Dynamic Displays, where the difference of perspective impacted the misuse of power to create an unstable work environment. Additionally, the paper provides suggestion for change through the use of power mechanics to foster more effective interactions.
{"title":"Calming the Waves of Tension: An Assessment and Suggestion to Dynamic Displays Case Study","authors":"Aeron Zentner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2689368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2689368","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict is a common theme that occurs on a constant basis in all aspects of life and can have negative and positive implications based on the situation. Organizational conflict has been studied throughout the past century and has rendered insight and models to help foster environments to help shift behaviors towards positive outcomes. The following paper examines the case of Dynamic Displays, where the difference of perspective impacted the misuse of power to create an unstable work environment. Additionally, the paper provides suggestion for change through the use of power mechanics to foster more effective interactions.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133120148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in which any item named by both players in the same round goes into a “contested pile", AL may reduce, or even eliminate the contested pile, allocating additional or more preferred items to the players. The allocation(s) that AL yields are Pareto-optimal, envy-free, and maximal; as the number of items (assumed even) increases, the probability that AL allocates all the items appears to approach infinity if all possible rankings are equi-probable. Although AL is potentially manipulable, strategizing under it would be difficult in practice.
{"title":"Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm","authors":"S. Brams, D. Kilgour, Christian Klamler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2274167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274167","url":null,"abstract":"Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in which any item named by both players in the same round goes into a “contested pile\", AL may reduce, or even eliminate the contested pile, allocating additional or more preferred items to the players. The allocation(s) that AL yields are Pareto-optimal, envy-free, and maximal; as the number of items (assumed even) increases, the probability that AL allocates all the items appears to approach infinity if all possible rankings are equi-probable. Although AL is potentially manipulable, strategizing under it would be difficult in practice.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127972159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-07-28DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-005X.2008.00205.x
J. Richards
Employee resistance has traditionally been analysed as an activity that occurs in the work organisation. In recent years, new Internet communication technologies, such as blogs, have expanded the possibilities for employees to express conflict. This paper explores how these developments can add to our understandings of employee resistance to the labour process.
{"title":"Because I Need Somewhere to Vent: The Expression of Conflict through Work Blogs","authors":"J. Richards","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-005X.2008.00205.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-005X.2008.00205.x","url":null,"abstract":"Employee resistance has traditionally been analysed as an activity that occurs in the work organisation. In recent years, new Internet communication technologies, such as blogs, have expanded the possibilities for employees to express conflict. This paper explores how these developments can add to our understandings of employee resistance to the labour process.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"252 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132814468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the operation and accomplishments of two under-studied aspects of the WTO dispute settlement system - the consultation process and the implementation results. After a brief summary of the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system - focusing on consultations and the implementation process - the paper examines in detail the results of consultations and the record on implementation. As part of that examination, it examines various proposals on consultations and implementation that have been made over the years in the ongoing dispute settlement reform negotiations.
{"title":"Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been Achieved Through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?","authors":"W. Davey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.863865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.863865","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the operation and accomplishments of two under-studied aspects of the WTO dispute settlement system - the consultation process and the implementation results. After a brief summary of the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system - focusing on consultations and the implementation process - the paper examines in detail the results of consultations and the record on implementation. As part of that examination, it examines various proposals on consultations and implementation that have been made over the years in the ongoing dispute settlement reform negotiations.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120967819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Herminia Munoz-Flores, Lourdes Munduate Jaca, F. Medina, J. Guerra
This study's objective is to approach bullying as an asymmetric and relational conflict. In other words, a conflict where there is a great power imbalance between the affected parties, and where emotional and relational problems exist. First, we analyse the link between relational conflict and bullying, and secondly we try to verify whether the strategies that have shown their worth for handling relational conflict may also be used to cope with bullying. Results show that the presence of high relational conflicts and high positional power are related with the presence of bullying practices. In a similar way to what occurs with management strategies in intractable conflicts, integrating behaviours with the opponent increase practices of workplace bullying, while avoiding behaviours are related to a lower presence of these practices. Findings also confirm that a climate of support within the group is related with a lower presence of bullying practices. The study analyses the implications of these findings for coping with bullying in the organisational setting.
{"title":"Copying with Bullying as an Intractable Organizational Conflict","authors":"Herminia Munoz-Flores, Lourdes Munduate Jaca, F. Medina, J. Guerra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1111625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1111625","url":null,"abstract":"This study's objective is to approach bullying as an asymmetric and relational conflict. In other words, a conflict where there is a great power imbalance between the affected parties, and where emotional and relational problems exist. First, we analyse the link between relational conflict and bullying, and secondly we try to verify whether the strategies that have shown their worth for handling relational conflict may also be used to cope with bullying. Results show that the presence of high relational conflicts and high positional power are related with the presence of bullying practices. In a similar way to what occurs with management strategies in intractable conflicts, integrating behaviours with the opponent increase practices of workplace bullying, while avoiding behaviours are related to a lower presence of these practices. Findings also confirm that a climate of support within the group is related with a lower presence of bullying practices. The study analyses the implications of these findings for coping with bullying in the organisational setting.","PeriodicalId":302912,"journal":{"name":"Conflict & Dispute Resolution eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122239593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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