“Every power comes through crisis” has long been a motif of European integration. The financial and sovereign debt crises, which have shaken the European Union (EU) in recent years, are at first glance no different. Treaty reforms, intergovernmental treaties such as the Fiscal Compact and the Treaty Establishing a European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) have significantly altered the constitutional landscape of the EU and its Member States. The crisis has also inspired many European legal scholars to critically analyse the EU’s system of economic governance, as have other events throughout the history of the European Union, from the Empty Chair Crisis to the referenda in the aftermath of the Treaty of Maastricht and the failure of the Constitution for the European Union. What does seem to be different is the way in which scholars approach the issue of the Eurozone crisis. Instead of a purely legal perspective on economic governance, European legal scholars have realised that in order to understand and analyse the euro crisis, interdisciplinarity is the word of the moment.
“任何大国都要经历危机”一直是欧洲一体化的主题。近年来撼动欧盟(EU)的金融和主权债务危机，乍一看也没有什么不同。条约改革、《财政契约》和《建立欧洲稳定机制条约》(ESM条约)等政府间条约显著改变了欧盟及其成员国的宪法格局。这场危机也激发了许多欧洲法律学者批判性地分析欧盟的经济治理体系，就像欧盟历史上的其他事件一样，从“空椅子危机”到《马斯特里赫特条约》(Treaty of Maastricht)后的全民公决以及欧盟宪法的失败。似乎有所不同的是学者们处理欧元区危机问题的方式。欧洲法律学者已经意识到，为了理解和分析欧元危机，当前流行的词是跨学科，而不是单纯从法律角度来看待经济治理。
{"title":"The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis","authors":"A. Sting","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DC","url":null,"abstract":"“Every power comes through crisis” has long been a motif of European integration. The financial and sovereign debt crises, which have shaken the European Union (EU) in recent years, are at first glance no different. Treaty reforms, intergovernmental treaties such as the Fiscal Compact and the Treaty Establishing a European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) have significantly altered the constitutional landscape of the EU and its Member States. The crisis has also inspired many European legal scholars to critically analyse the EU’s system of economic governance, as have other events throughout the history of the European Union, from the Empty Chair Crisis to the referenda in the aftermath of the Treaty of Maastricht and the failure of the Constitution for the European Union. What does seem to be different is the way in which scholars approach the issue of the Eurozone crisis. Instead of a purely legal perspective on economic governance, European legal scholars have realised that in order to understand and analyse the euro crisis, interdisciplinarity is the word of the moment.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"97-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a former editor of the predecessor to this journal, namely Merkourios, it gives me great pleasure to write the editorial for the 81st issue of the Utrecht Journal of International and European Law (“UJIEL”) on ‘General Issues in International and European Law’. After first providing a general overview of the materials contained in this issue, I will briefly highlight some of the main points made in, the five articles, the case note, two book reviews, and the interview.
{"title":"General Issues in International and European Law","authors":"Gentian Zyberi","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DJ","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DJ","url":null,"abstract":"As a former editor of the predecessor to this journal, namely Merkourios, it gives me great pleasure to write the editorial for the 81st issue of the Utrecht Journal of International and European Law (“UJIEL”) on ‘General Issues in International and European Law’. After first providing a general overview of the materials contained in this issue, I will briefly highlight some of the main points made in, the five articles, the case note, two book reviews, and the interview.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"1-4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70728113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Several papers have been written on the contribution of domestic courts to the interpretation of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, also known as the Oviedo Convention) and its Additional Protocols (the ‘Oviedo Convention system’) or to the development of new rules of international bio law. Nevertheless very few papers have thus far focused on the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) to the enforcement of the Oviedo Convention’s provisions. This is notwithstanding the very close relationship of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with the Oviedo Convention and its Additional Protocols, namely the fact that the Oviedo Convention: “elaborates some of the principles enshrined in the ECHR” as elucidated by the Explanatory Report of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the ‘Explanatory Report’). The purpose of this paper is to fill this major gap and to focus on the use of the Oviedo Convention when a specifi c biomedical issue is submitted to the ECtHR. The paper will briefly address, through some relevant examples, the ECtHR’s main contributions to implementation of the bio-law rights encompassed in the Oviedo Convention’s system. It also charts the evolution from the ECtHR’s original position, which tended to apply the Oviedo Convention directly, to its later less radical position, adopted in some of its most recent judgments, in which the Oviedo Convention is implemented exclusively: a) when the content of its provisions coincide with rights explicitly protected in the ECHR and b) when it helps to elucidate or understand better the ECHR. A correction article relating to the authorship of this publication can be found here: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.dk
{"title":"The Experience of the European Court of Human Rights with the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine","authors":"F. Seatzu","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DA","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DA","url":null,"abstract":"Several papers have been written on the contribution of domestic courts to the interpretation of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, also known as the Oviedo Convention) and its Additional Protocols (the ‘Oviedo Convention system’) or to the development of new rules of international bio law. Nevertheless very few papers have thus far focused on the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) to the enforcement of the Oviedo Convention’s provisions. This is notwithstanding the very close relationship of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with the Oviedo Convention and its Additional Protocols, namely the fact that the Oviedo Convention: “elaborates some of the principles enshrined in the ECHR” as elucidated by the Explanatory Report of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the ‘Explanatory Report’). The purpose of this paper is to fill this major gap and to focus on the use of the Oviedo Convention when a specifi c biomedical issue is submitted to the ECtHR. The paper will briefly address, through some relevant examples, the ECtHR’s main contributions to implementation of the bio-law rights encompassed in the Oviedo Convention’s system. It also charts the evolution from the ECtHR’s original position, which tended to apply the Oviedo Convention directly, to its later less radical position, adopted in some of its most recent judgments, in which the Oviedo Convention is implemented exclusively: a) when the content of its provisions coincide with rights explicitly protected in the ECHR and b) when it helps to elucidate or understand better the ECHR. A correction article relating to the authorship of this publication can be found here: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.dk","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"5-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70726758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Hassan v United Kingdom , the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reviewed the deprivation of liberty of a young male by British armed forces during the phase of active hostilities in Iraq, which had raised issues relating to extraterritoriality, the right to liberty and security in times of armed conflict and the relationship between international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL).1 In its judgment of 16 September 2014, the Court ruled that by reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by IHL and by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty found in both bodies of law should, as far as possible, be accommodated and applied concomitantly. The greatest merit of the judgment is that for the first time it explicitly offered its view on the interaction between IHL and HRL and did not rely on the lex specialis principle, the traditional but flawed method for explaining the relationship between these spheres of law. However, the judgment is also a missed opportunity as the Court limited its analysis to the case at hand and provided limited guidance for the future, leaving a number of questions unaddressed.
{"title":"Hassan v United Kingdom: The Interaction of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed Conflicts","authors":"Cedric De Koker","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DB","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DB","url":null,"abstract":"In Hassan v United Kingdom , the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reviewed the deprivation of liberty of a young male by British armed forces during the phase of active hostilities in Iraq, which had raised issues relating to extraterritoriality, the right to liberty and security in times of armed conflict and the relationship between international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL).1 In its judgment of 16 September 2014, the Court ruled that by reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by IHL and by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty found in both bodies of law should, as far as possible, be accommodated and applied concomitantly. The greatest merit of the judgment is that for the first time it explicitly offered its view on the interaction between IHL and HRL and did not rely on the lex specialis principle, the traditional but flawed method for explaining the relationship between these spheres of law. However, the judgment is also a missed opportunity as the Court limited its analysis to the case at hand and provided limited guidance for the future, leaving a number of questions unaddressed.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"90-96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By ratifying the Aarhus Convention in 2005 the EU committed itself to guaranteeing broad access to justice in environmental matters both at the national and the EU level. Yet, in spite of the clear-cut obligations incumbent upon the EU, EU courts have consistently rebuked pleas for a softening of the standing requirements in the context of direct actions against EU acts that might have an impact on the environment and/or public health. In addition, the internal review procedure set out by the 2006 Aarhus Regulation has been interpreted so restrictively by the EU institutions that that its added value in the stride toward better access to courts in environmental matters remains ephemeral at best. This led the General Court to finding that the Aarhus Regulation, by excluding general EU acts from the scope of internal review, was in breach of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In its recent rulings of 13 January 2015, however, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overruled the General Court by holding that the Aarhus Regulation could not be reviewed in light of the Aarhus Convention. With its refusal to use Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as a reference criterion for the purpose of reviewing the EU’s compliance with the Aarhus Convention’s obligations, the CJEU avoided tackling the unsatisfactory level of judicial protection in environmental cases at the EU level. This paper argues that the rulings of the CJEU are to be qualified as a significant step backwards for judicial protection in environmental matters at the EU level. It is established that, instead of addressing the current failings of the EU with respect to access to justice in environmental cases, the CJEU’s hands-off approach paves the way for yet another decade of non-compliance by the EU in the realm of access to justice in environmental cases.
{"title":"Access to Justice in Environmental Cases after the Rulings of the Court of Justice of 13 January 2015: Kafka Revisited?","authors":"Hendrik Schoukens","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DI","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DI","url":null,"abstract":"By ratifying the Aarhus Convention in 2005 the EU committed itself to guaranteeing broad access to justice in environmental matters both at the national and the EU level. Yet, in spite of the clear-cut obligations incumbent upon the EU, EU courts have consistently rebuked pleas for a softening of the standing requirements in the context of direct actions against EU acts that might have an impact on the environment and/or public health. In addition, the internal review procedure set out by the 2006 Aarhus Regulation has been interpreted so restrictively by the EU institutions that that its added value in the stride toward better access to courts in environmental matters remains ephemeral at best. This led the General Court to finding that the Aarhus Regulation, by excluding general EU acts from the scope of internal review, was in breach of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In its recent rulings of 13 January 2015, however, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overruled the General Court by holding that the Aarhus Regulation could not be reviewed in light of the Aarhus Convention. With its refusal to use Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as a reference criterion for the purpose of reviewing the EU’s compliance with the Aarhus Convention’s obligations, the CJEU avoided tackling the unsatisfactory level of judicial protection in environmental cases at the EU level. This paper argues that the rulings of the CJEU are to be qualified as a significant step backwards for judicial protection in environmental matters at the EU level. It is established that, instead of addressing the current failings of the EU with respect to access to justice in environmental cases, the CJEU’s hands-off approach paves the way for yet another decade of non-compliance by the EU in the realm of access to justice in environmental cases.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"46-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper begins by briefly outlining private law’s evolution alongside the emergence of the Nation States; it then aims to set out the mutual influence of these concepts on national culture, tradition and identity in order to highlight the significance of the political, economic and legal as well as social and cultural contexts in which the processes of integration and Europeanisation occur. Against this background, the scope for European private law to emerge as a plural, multi-level construct and a dynamic endeavour is recognised. Building on this analysis of the significance of the diversity and commonality of cultures, traditions and identities in national private law development, institutionalised at the Union level in the principle of unitas in diversitate, the paper explores the need for a single, common European notion of culture, tradition or identity. This examination is undertaken with reference to an example, namely the evolution of the concept of consumer, from its national foundations to its engagement in Union legislation and CJEU jurisprudence. Drawing conclusions as to the need for such a common, European concept, the paper advances a plea for the recognition of a shift in the perspective of legal development, to one which acknowledges the dynamic evolution of private law within a pluralist, multi-level regulatory construct.
{"title":"From Multiple Legal Cultures to One Legal Culture? Thinking About Culture, Tradition and Identity in European Private Law Development","authors":"S. Law","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DG","url":null,"abstract":"This paper begins by briefly outlining private law’s evolution alongside the emergence of the Nation States; it then aims to set out the mutual influence of these concepts on national culture, tradition and identity in order to highlight the significance of the political, economic and legal as well as social and cultural contexts in which the processes of integration and Europeanisation occur. Against this background, the scope for European private law to emerge as a plural, multi-level construct and a dynamic endeavour is recognised. Building on this analysis of the significance of the diversity and commonality of cultures, traditions and identities in national private law development, institutionalised at the Union level in the principle of unitas in diversitate, the paper explores the need for a single, common European notion of culture, tradition or identity. This examination is undertaken with reference to an example, namely the evolution of the concept of consumer, from its national foundations to its engagement in Union legislation and CJEU jurisprudence. Drawing conclusions as to the need for such a common, European concept, the paper advances a plea for the recognition of a shift in the perspective of legal development, to one which acknowledges the dynamic evolution of private law within a pluralist, multi-level regulatory construct.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"68-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This submission traces the scope of the religious exemptions for religious organisation both under the Irish Employment Equality Acts 1998–2011 at national level and under the EU Framework Directive on Employment and Occupation, Directive 2000/78/EC of November 2000, at EU level. It will be demonstrated that the Irish religious exemptions are broader in scope than those at EU level and therefore constitute a severe limitation on the equality rights of Irish citizens falling within protected grounds of non-discrimination other than religion or belief under the EU Employment Equality Directive. Special regard is had to the limitation of the rights of Irish citizens falling within the protected ground of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It is considered whether, by allowing overly broad exemptions to subsist beyond the exigencies of a strict proportionality test, the Irish State is in effect giving efficacy to the typified intolerance between religions organisations and the LGBT community and in so doing, contributing to the perpetuation of these intolerances in Irish society rather than their erosion.
{"title":"Tracing the Scope of Religious Exemptions under National and EU Law: Section 37(1) of the Irish Employment Equality Acts 1998–2011 and Ireland’s Obligations Under the EU Framework Directive on Employment and Occupation, Directive 2000/78/EC","authors":"Amy Dunne","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DH","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DH","url":null,"abstract":"This submission traces the scope of the religious exemptions for religious organisation both under the Irish Employment Equality Acts 1998–2011 at national level and under the EU Framework Directive on Employment and Occupation, Directive 2000/78/EC of November 2000, at EU level. It will be demonstrated that the Irish religious exemptions are broader in scope than those at EU level and therefore constitute a severe limitation on the equality rights of Irish citizens falling within protected grounds of non-discrimination other than religion or belief under the EU Employment Equality Directive. Special regard is had to the limitation of the rights of Irish citizens falling within the protected ground of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It is considered whether, by allowing overly broad exemptions to subsist beyond the exigencies of a strict proportionality test, the Irish State is in effect giving efficacy to the typified intolerance between religions organisations and the LGBT community and in so doing, contributing to the perpetuation of these intolerances in Irish society rather than their erosion.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"33-45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Thor Bjorgvinsson was a judge of the European Court of Human Rights between 2004 and 2013. During this period, he was involved in many important judgments, including Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) , [1] Eweida and others v United Kingdom , [2] and Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom , [3] amongst others, and went on to serve as Vice-President of the Fourth Section. He has degrees from the University of Iceland, Duke University School of Law, and the University of Strasbourg, and is currently a Professor of Law at the Centre of Excellence for International Courts (iCourts) at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. In this interview, carried out in June 2015 for the Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, David Thor Bjorgvinsson outlined his views to Graham Butler on Opinion 2/13 from the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, [4] the workings of the European Court of Human Rights, and what the future may have in store for this Court. [1] Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) (2013) 56 EHRR 19. [2] Eweida and others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8. [3] Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23. [4] Opinion 2/13 (2014) Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (not yet reported).
{"title":"A Political Decision Disguised as Legal Argument? Opinion 2/13 and European Union Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights","authors":"G. Butler","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DF","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DF","url":null,"abstract":"David Thor Bjorgvinsson was a judge of the European Court of Human Rights between 2004 and 2013. During this period, he was involved in many important judgments, including Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) , [1] Eweida and others v United Kingdom , [2] and Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom , [3] amongst others, and went on to serve as Vice-President of the Fourth Section. He has degrees from the University of Iceland, Duke University School of Law, and the University of Strasbourg, and is currently a Professor of Law at the Centre of Excellence for International Courts (iCourts) at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. In this interview, carried out in June 2015 for the Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, David Thor Bjorgvinsson outlined his views to Graham Butler on Opinion 2/13 from the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, [4] the workings of the European Court of Human Rights, and what the future may have in store for this Court. [1] Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) (2013) 56 EHRR 19. [2] Eweida and others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8. [3] Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23. [4] Opinion 2/13 (2014) Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (not yet reported).","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"104-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to shed some light on the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union on transparency and access to documents. It uses case law as a method to investigate the potential of the Court of Justice jurisprudence for the protection of transparency as a general principle and access to documents as a fundamental right in the European Union. The article employs the concepts of Eurolegalism and the constitutionalisation of rights as a framework to examine the case law of the EU’s highest court. It focuses on the trends established by the Court on access rights by looking at some of the most influential cases that had made history through the years and analyzing their potential to create a body of a reformed administrative law in the EU pertaining transparency. While the Court of Justice may not be the ultimate solution to the problems of transparency in the Union, it has established itself as a driving force in the development of transparency and access rights regime in the EU and may affect their future trajectories in the face of legislative challenges.
{"title":"Courts: An Effective Venue to Promote Government Transparency? The Case of the Court of Justice of the European Union","authors":"Irma Spahiu","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.CT","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.CT","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to shed some light on the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union on transparency and access to documents. It uses case law as a method to investigate the potential of the Court of Justice jurisprudence for the protection of transparency as a general principle and access to documents as a fundamental right in the European Union. The article employs the concepts of Eurolegalism and the constitutionalisation of rights as a framework to examine the case law of the EU’s highest court. It focuses on the trends established by the Court on access rights by looking at some of the most influential cases that had made history through the years and analyzing their potential to create a body of a reformed administrative law in the EU pertaining transparency. While the Court of Justice may not be the ultimate solution to the problems of transparency in the Union, it has established itself as a driving force in the development of transparency and access rights regime in the EU and may affect their future trajectories in the face of legislative challenges.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"5-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past few years an overhaul of the European data protection edifice has been under way. Practically all basic data protection regulating documents in effect until today have either already been replaced or are in the process of being thoroughly amended. This is probably a development that was long overdue, given that all of them have an age of several decades while none of them has been released taking the internet into account. The OECD is the first international organisation that issued any data protection regulations at all: it did so in 1980, and its Guidelines remained unchanged until 2013, when their amendment process was completed. The Council of Europe released its own data protection regulations, formulated in Convention 108, only a few weeks after the OECD; they too remained in effect unchanged over the decades that passed, admittedly complemented by rich secondary legislation, and are now in the process of being amended. However, most of the data protection work undoubtedly takes place within the EU which chose to dominate the international field since it became involved in it, through the EU Data Protection Directive in 1994. The Directive set the EU and international, through its “adequacy” criterion, data protection standard. However, it remained hopelessly outdated, because it was released before the advent of the Internet (although the Court of Justice through its recent Google Spain case showed that there is still some life left in it). The European Commission seized the opportunity presented by the Treaty of Lisbon, and its Article 16 TFEU, and took upon itself the herculean task of reconstructing the whole EU data protection edifice, both from an architectural and from a substantive law point of view
在过去的几年里，对欧洲数据保护体系的彻底改革一直在进行。实际上，迄今为止所有有效的基本数据保护规范文件要么已经被取代，要么正在被彻底修改。考虑到所有这些都有几十年的历史，而没有一个是考虑到互联网而发布的，这可能是一个早就应该出现的发展。经合组织(OECD)是第一个发布数据保护法规的国际组织:它在1980年发布了数据保护法规，其《指导方针》(Guidelines)一直保持不变，直到2013年修订过程完成。欧洲委员会(Council of Europe)发布了自己的数据保护条例，即108号公约(Convention 108)，仅比经合组织晚了几周;在过去的几十年里，它们实际上也没有改变，不可否认的是，它们得到了丰富的次级立法的补充，现在正在被修改。然而，大多数数据保护工作无疑是在欧盟内部进行的，自1994年通过《欧盟数据保护指令》参与进来以来，欧盟选择了主导国际领域。该指令通过其“充分性”标准设定了欧盟和国际上的数据保护标准。然而，它仍然无可救药地过时了，因为它是在互联网出现之前发布的(尽管法院通过最近的谷歌西班牙案表明它仍然有一些生命力)。欧盟委员会抓住了《里斯本条约》及其第16条TFEU所带来的机会，从建筑和实体法的角度出发，承担起了重建整个欧盟数据保护大厦的艰巨任务
{"title":"The Right to Protection of Personal Data. Incapable of Autonomous Standing in the Basic EU Constituting Documents","authors":"P. Hert","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.CZ","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.CZ","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past few years an overhaul of the European data protection edifice has been under way. Practically all basic data protection regulating documents in effect until today have either already been replaced or are in the process of being thoroughly amended. This is probably a development that was long overdue, given that all of them have an age of several decades while none of them has been released taking the internet into account. The OECD is the first international organisation that issued any data protection regulations at all: it did so in 1980, and its Guidelines remained unchanged until 2013, when their amendment process was completed. The Council of Europe released its own data protection regulations, formulated in Convention 108, only a few weeks after the OECD; they too remained in effect unchanged over the decades that passed, admittedly complemented by rich secondary legislation, and are now in the process of being amended. However, most of the data protection work undoubtedly takes place within the EU which chose to dominate the international field since it became involved in it, through the EU Data Protection Directive in 1994. The Directive set the EU and international, through its “adequacy” criterion, data protection standard. However, it remained hopelessly outdated, because it was released before the advent of the Internet (although the Court of Justice through its recent Google Spain case showed that there is still some life left in it). The European Commission seized the opportunity presented by the Treaty of Lisbon, and its Article 16 TFEU, and took upon itself the herculean task of reconstructing the whole EU data protection edifice, both from an architectural and from a substantive law point of view","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":"31 1","pages":"1-4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：