An unforeseen fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked to prompt the termination of a treaty, under the customary rule rebus sic stantibus , which is codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The fundamental change must affect the essential basis of the treaty and radically transform obligations still to be performed. Maritime boundaries are agreed upon in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and they delimit overlapping maritime entitlements, which are generated by coastal features. Natural occurrences can cause significant and unexpected changes in coastal geography which can affect circumstances essential to a maritime boundary treaty’s conclusion and radically alter the extent of on-going obligations. Treaties establishing boundaries cannot be subject to unilateral termination by virtue of a fundamental change of circumstances because they are excluded under Article 62(2)(a) VCLT. However, the travaux preparatoires of the International Law Commission and relevant case law suggests that the exclusion only covers treaties delimiting territorial boundaries and full sovereignty. Consequently, treaties establishing boundaries to the exclusive economic zone, exclusive fisheries zone and the continental shelf can be subject to termination due to a fundamental change of circumstances.
{"title":"Termination of Maritime Boundaries Due to a Fundamental Change of Circumstances","authors":"Snjólaug Árnadóttir","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.335","url":null,"abstract":"An unforeseen fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked to prompt the termination of a treaty, under the customary rule rebus sic stantibus , which is codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The fundamental change must affect the essential basis of the treaty and radically transform obligations still to be performed. Maritime boundaries are agreed upon in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and they delimit overlapping maritime entitlements, which are generated by coastal features. Natural occurrences can cause significant and unexpected changes in coastal geography which can affect circumstances essential to a maritime boundary treaty’s conclusion and radically alter the extent of on-going obligations. Treaties establishing boundaries cannot be subject to unilateral termination by virtue of a fundamental change of circumstances because they are excluded under Article 62(2)(a) VCLT. However, the travaux preparatoires of the International Law Commission and relevant case law suggests that the exclusion only covers treaties delimiting territorial boundaries and full sovereignty. Consequently, treaties establishing boundaries to the exclusive economic zone, exclusive fisheries zone and the continental shelf can be subject to termination due to a fundamental change of circumstances.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70723797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this case, the CJEU answers the question whether Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant must be interpreted as meaning that when there are strong indications that detention conditions in the issuing Member State infringe Article 4 of the Charter, the executing judicial authority must refuse surrender of the person against whom a European arrest warrant is issued. The CJEU rules that if, after a two-stage assessment, the executing judicial authority finds that there is a real risk of an Article 4 violation for the requested person once surrendered, the execution of the arrest warrant must initially be deferred and, where such a risk cannot be discounted, the executing judicial authority must decide whether or not to terminate the surrender procedure. This conclusion shakes the system of mutual trust upon which the principle of mutual recognition is built.
{"title":"The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru : A New Limit to the Mutual Trust Presumption in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice?","authors":"K. Bovend'Eerdt","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.337","url":null,"abstract":"In this case, the CJEU answers the question whether Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant must be interpreted as meaning that when there are strong indications that detention conditions in the issuing Member State infringe Article 4 of the Charter, the executing judicial authority must refuse surrender of the person against whom a European arrest warrant is issued. The CJEU rules that if, after a two-stage assessment, the executing judicial authority finds that there is a real risk of an Article 4 violation for the requested person once surrendered, the execution of the arrest warrant must initially be deferred and, where such a risk cannot be discounted, the executing judicial authority must decide whether or not to terminate the surrender procedure. This conclusion shakes the system of mutual trust upon which the principle of mutual recognition is built.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70723916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the scope of activities children may engage in for a defendant to be convicted for using them to participate in hostilities under the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It analyses the relevant international law provisions and the ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga matter. It finds that a broad scope of activities more effectively assists the protection of children from use in hostilities. It also identifies inconsistencies in the relevant international law provisions and proposes a number of factors future ICC Chambers can use to consistently characterise activities in future prosecutions.
{"title":"When Does a Child 'Participate Actively in Hostilities' under the Rome Statute? Protecting Children from Use in Hostilities after Lubanga","authors":"J. Yuvaraj","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.321","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the scope of activities children may engage in for a defendant to be convicted for using them to participate in hostilities under the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It analyses the relevant international law provisions and the ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga matter. It finds that a broad scope of activities more effectively assists the protection of children from use in hostilities. It also identifies inconsistencies in the relevant international law provisions and proposes a number of factors future ICC Chambers can use to consistently characterise activities in future prosecutions.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70724080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) has made the upholding of human rights an integral part of its external trade relations and requires that all trade, cooperation, partnership and association agreements with third countries, including unilateral trade instruments, contain with varying modalities and intensity a commitment to the respect for human rights. The paper discusses selected aspects of the EU’s promotion and integration of human rights in its external trade relations and assesses the impact of the changes introduced by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) on EU practice.
{"title":"The Promotion and Integration of Human Rights in EU External Trade Relations","authors":"Samantha Velluti","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.342","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) has made the upholding of human rights an integral part of its external trade relations and requires that all trade, cooperation, partnership and association agreements with third countries, including unilateral trade instruments, contain with varying modalities and intensity a commitment to the respect for human rights. The paper discusses selected aspects of the EU’s promotion and integration of human rights in its external trade relations and assesses the impact of the changes introduced by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) on EU practice.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70724137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In view of the recent negotiations on the highly anticipated Free Trade Agreements to which the EU shall be party ( e.g. CETA and TTIP), assessing the extent to which the EU can regulate intellectual property rights in its external relations seems relevant. Two recent cases of the Court of Justice of the EU have reversed its landmark decision in Opinion 1/94, in which intellectual property regulation was almost entirely excluded from the EU’s exclusive competence in trade matters. Firstly, in the Daiichi Sankyo case, the Court elaborated upon the EU’s explicit external competence in the field of intellectual property. This explicit competence is provided for by Article 207 TFEU on the common commercial policy, which allows the EU to conclude agreements concerning the ‘commercial aspects of intellectual property’. In the Broadcasting Rights case, the Court founded its decision on the EU’s implied competence to conclude international agreements, as provided for by Article 3(2) TFEU. Considering the outcome of these two judgments, the Court seems to grant the EU a wide scope of action with regard to intellectual property rights. As a consequence, questions arise with regard to the post - Lisbon era role that is left for the Member States in the field of intellectual property. Therefore, the aim of this article is to outline the scope of the EU’s exclusivity in IP matters and to highlight the borders.
{"title":"The Borders of EU Competences with Regard to the International Regulation of Intellectual Property Rights: Constructing a Dam to Resist a River Bursting Its Banks","authors":"Yole Tanghe","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.235","url":null,"abstract":"In view of the recent negotiations on the highly anticipated Free Trade Agreements to which the EU shall be party ( e.g. CETA and TTIP), assessing the extent to which the EU can regulate intellectual property rights in its external relations seems relevant. Two recent cases of the Court of Justice of the EU have reversed its landmark decision in Opinion 1/94, in which intellectual property regulation was almost entirely excluded from the EU’s exclusive competence in trade matters. Firstly, in the Daiichi Sankyo case, the Court elaborated upon the EU’s explicit external competence in the field of intellectual property. This explicit competence is provided for by Article 207 TFEU on the common commercial policy, which allows the EU to conclude agreements concerning the ‘commercial aspects of intellectual property’. In the Broadcasting Rights case, the Court founded its decision on the EU’s implied competence to conclude international agreements, as provided for by Article 3(2) TFEU. Considering the outcome of these two judgments, the Court seems to grant the EU a wide scope of action with regard to intellectual property rights. As a consequence, questions arise with regard to the post - Lisbon era role that is left for the Member States in the field of intellectual property. Therefore, the aim of this article is to outline the scope of the EU’s exclusivity in IP matters and to highlight the borders.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70723232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
States parties to international copyright instruments are required to give effect to their obligations under international copyright law and fulfil their international human rights obligations with respect to striking a balance between the human rights of the authors of intellectual works and human rights of the users of those same works. The High Commissioner of Human Rights has concluded that such balance ‘is one familiar to intellectual property law’. This conclusion assumes that international copyright law is already compliant with international human rights law. However, international copyright law instruments are not clear about how to reach an appropriate balance between these rights and, as a result, different stakeholders in the international copyright community seek and defend varied versions of balance which are not necessarily consistent. Concurrently, international human rights law bodies and scholars have examined the human rights of authors and users of intellectual works through a copyright law lens, missing a chance to articulate a clear human rights principle of balance. A proper human rights balance between authors’ and users’ human rights recognises the limited nature of both sets of human rights, rejects any hierarchy between them, and interprets them in conformity with the notion of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights.
{"title":"Toward a Human Rights Method for Measuring International Copyright Law’s Compliance with International Human Rights Law","authors":"S. Al-Sharieh","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.233","url":null,"abstract":"States parties to international copyright instruments are required to give effect to their obligations under international copyright law and fulfil their international human rights obligations with respect to striking a balance between the human rights of the authors of intellectual works and human rights of the users of those same works. The High Commissioner of Human Rights has concluded that such balance ‘is one familiar to intellectual property law’. This conclusion assumes that international copyright law is already compliant with international human rights law. However, international copyright law instruments are not clear about how to reach an appropriate balance between these rights and, as a result, different stakeholders in the international copyright community seek and defend varied versions of balance which are not necessarily consistent. Concurrently, international human rights law bodies and scholars have examined the human rights of authors and users of intellectual works through a copyright law lens, missing a chance to articulate a clear human rights principle of balance. A proper human rights balance between authors’ and users’ human rights recognises the limited nature of both sets of human rights, rejects any hierarchy between them, and interprets them in conformity with the notion of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70723602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This special issue on ‘Intellectual Property’ in the Utrecht Journal of International and European law is well positioned with the information age coming to its peak. It is the era in which digital copying and distribution through the internet has a profound transformative effect on the markets for copyright in music, games and video, where services such as Spotify and iTunes are greatly suppressing DVD sales, and where illegal downloading continues to impact industry daily. It is the era where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is being presented with, among others, various questions about which acts on the internet (e.g. hyperlinking) are to be considered distribution of copyrighted materials under the scope of the Directive Copyright in the Information Society.1 It so too is having to answer numerous preliminary references of national courts on the harmonisation of trademarks, as well as on the scope of the Audiovisual Media Service Directive 2010/13/EU on Internet platforms.2 At the same time, the European Commission (DG Connect) is currently in the middle of revising both the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society,3 and the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.4 These efforts have proven to be quite a challenge considering the European informational sector operates within the contours of an extremely rapidly changing landscape. On the internet, almost all information is available at arm’s length, and is shared and is reused in a split second, largely ignoring possible copyright claims. Passive television viewing is increasingly being substituted by the individual use of new services. Millions of European citizens watch video on demand through websites like YouTube and Netflix, or catch up with their favourite television series on a computer, tablet device or smartphone. In the meantime, such users can put either their own user-generated content online, or that of others, making copyright protection redundant. Traditional boundaries between consumers, broadcast media and the internet are diminishing, and the lines between the familiar 20th century consumption patterns are blurring. Moreover, with smartphones, tablets, and converged production, as well as an increasing consumption of information content, there will be a further shift from ‘lean-back’ consumption to active participation. This progressive merger of traditional services and the internet is known as ‘convergence’.5 This trend towards digitisation and convergence has long been forecast, but is now indeed becoming a reality.6 Technology already allows users to create, distribute and access all types of content irrespective of the time, place or device. The shift in the use of media by consumers, including the growing use of on-demand services on the internet is significant. Children are increasingly adding on-demand services to their media consumption through the internet. Although technological developments may offer many
{"title":"Intellectual Property is the 21st Century's most compelling legal domain","authors":"M. D. C. Buning","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.300","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue on ‘Intellectual Property’ in the Utrecht Journal of International and European law is well positioned with the information age coming to its peak. It is the era in which digital copying and distribution through the internet has a profound transformative effect on the markets for copyright in music, games and video, where services such as Spotify and iTunes are greatly suppressing DVD sales, and where illegal downloading continues to impact industry daily. It is the era where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is being presented with, among others, various questions about which acts on the internet (e.g. hyperlinking) are to be considered distribution of copyrighted materials under the scope of the Directive Copyright in the Information Society.1 It so too is having to answer numerous preliminary references of national courts on the harmonisation of trademarks, as well as on the scope of the Audiovisual Media Service Directive 2010/13/EU on Internet platforms.2 At the same time, the European Commission (DG Connect) is currently in the middle of revising both the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society,3 and the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.4 These efforts have proven to be quite a challenge considering the European informational sector operates within the contours of an extremely rapidly changing landscape. On the internet, almost all information is available at arm’s length, and is shared and is reused in a split second, largely ignoring possible copyright claims. Passive television viewing is increasingly being substituted by the individual use of new services. Millions of European citizens watch video on demand through websites like YouTube and Netflix, or catch up with their favourite television series on a computer, tablet device or smartphone. In the meantime, such users can put either their own user-generated content online, or that of others, making copyright protection redundant. Traditional boundaries between consumers, broadcast media and the internet are diminishing, and the lines between the familiar 20th century consumption patterns are blurring. Moreover, with smartphones, tablets, and converged production, as well as an increasing consumption of information content, there will be a further shift from ‘lean-back’ consumption to active participation. This progressive merger of traditional services and the internet is known as ‘convergence’.5 This trend towards digitisation and convergence has long been forecast, but is now indeed becoming a reality.6 Technology already allows users to create, distribute and access all types of content irrespective of the time, place or device. The shift in the use of media by consumers, including the growing use of on-demand services on the internet is significant. Children are increasingly adding on-demand services to their media consumption through the internet. Although technological developments may offer many","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70724029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Currently, the enforcement of a patent that is registered in several countries involves the risk of getting different and conflicting decisions from the national courts. In 2013, 25 European countries entered in an agreement that aims to homogenise the patent system by creating the European patent with unitary effect and a Unified Patent Court (UPC). This article focuses on the UPC, which aims to have a single court proceeding for cross-border patent conflicts. Does the UPC system represent an advantage compared to the current litigation system? The paper argues that it does and explores what it considers to be the two main advantages of a UPC over the current system of cross-border litigation of patents: the ability to drag several conflicts to a single procedure and the neutrality of the decision makers. These advantages are consequently compared to the characteristics of arbitration. Then, an explanation is provided with regards to how the UPC system is going to work in terms of jurisdiction, preliminary injunctions, the choice of law and enforcement of decisions, comparing those same procedural aspects to arbitration. The article finds that arbitration involves many of the same advantages (as compared to the UPC) and that the procedural issues studied in both means are, so too, similar. Therefore, arbitration represents a viable alternative to the UPC when it comes to reducing the risks in solving cross-border patent conflicts.
{"title":"Cross-Border Patent Disputes: Unified Patent Court or International Commercial Arbitration?","authors":"Ana Georgina Alba Betancourt","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.262","url":null,"abstract":"Currently, the enforcement of a patent that is registered in several countries involves the risk of getting different and conflicting decisions from the national courts. In 2013, 25 European countries entered in an agreement that aims to homogenise the patent system by creating the European patent with unitary effect and a Unified Patent Court (UPC). This article focuses on the UPC, which aims to have a single court proceeding for cross-border patent conflicts. Does the UPC system represent an advantage compared to the current litigation system? The paper argues that it does and explores what it considers to be the two main advantages of a UPC over the current system of cross-border litigation of patents: the ability to drag several conflicts to a single procedure and the neutrality of the decision makers. These advantages are consequently compared to the characteristics of arbitration. Then, an explanation is provided with regards to how the UPC system is going to work in terms of jurisdiction, preliminary injunctions, the choice of law and enforcement of decisions, comparing those same procedural aspects to arbitration. The article finds that arbitration involves many of the same advantages (as compared to the UPC) and that the procedural issues studied in both means are, so too, similar. Therefore, arbitration represents a viable alternative to the UPC when it comes to reducing the risks in solving cross-border patent conflicts.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70723360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article develops the notion that a government has a public responsibility to prevent electoral fraud in a way that extends beyond the protections conferred by an electorate’s directly correlative right to voting freedom. Focusing on electoral freedom and voter fraud in electoral systems, it presents theoretical arguments for holding governments responsible arising from the incomplete or unclear nature of juristic rights, powers, and duties. It holds that such public responsibilities are functionally necessary, in the interests of a truly inclusive participatory democracy. The article uses illustrations of fair elections globally, and in the United States in particular, including the divided 2014 US Supreme Court decision, US v. Texas, in which the majority denied the right to vote to prisoners and parolees who are disproportionately represented by ethnic minorities.
{"title":"Public Responsibilities for Electoral Fraud Beyond Correlative Rights and Duties","authors":"L. Trakman","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DE","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DE","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops the notion that a government has a public responsibility to prevent electoral fraud in a way that extends beyond the protections conferred by an electorate’s directly correlative right to voting freedom. Focusing on electoral freedom and voter fraud in electoral systems, it presents theoretical arguments for holding governments responsible arising from the incomplete or unclear nature of juristic rights, powers, and duties. It holds that such public responsibilities are functionally necessary, in the interests of a truly inclusive participatory democracy. The article uses illustrations of fair elections globally, and in the United States in particular, including the divided 2014 US Supreme Court decision, US v. Texas, in which the majority denied the right to vote to prisoners and parolees who are disproportionately represented by ethnic minorities.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this well-timed revision to the first edition published in 2009, the authors allow the reader to benefit from their unique yet balanced perspectives as they address some of the most pressing issues in the enduring campaign to defeat terrorism insofar as they concern the laws of war. The six authors, all of whom served in some capacity in the Armed Forces of the United States of America (USA), confess not to provide a critical analysis of the official characterisation of the ‘War on Terror’ as a genuine armed conflict under international humanitarian law. A reader expecting such an approach should invest their time and attention elsewhere. Whilst acknowledging that ‘it is clear that the term “war on terror” is legally and operationally overbroad and misleading’,1 the authors choose to ground their contributions on the basis that the USA has operated, and continues to operate, as if it were in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its associated groups. According to the authors, this stance is justified by the argument that the three branches of government of the USA have repeatedly and consistently reached decisions to this effect. As a result, many readers might be inclined to approach the book with caution at first. This fundamental stance is however well-noted, emphasised, and indeed reasonable as the authors approach the controversial subjects from a factual, and most importantly, a military perspective.
{"title":"The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective","authors":"Ben Stanford","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.DD","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.DD","url":null,"abstract":"In this well-timed revision to the first edition published in 2009, the authors allow the reader to benefit from their unique yet balanced perspectives as they address some of the most pressing issues in the enduring campaign to defeat terrorism insofar as they concern the laws of war. The six authors, all of whom served in some capacity in the Armed Forces of the United States of America (USA), confess not to provide a critical analysis of the official characterisation of the ‘War on Terror’ as a genuine armed conflict under international humanitarian law. A reader expecting such an approach should invest their time and attention elsewhere. Whilst acknowledging that ‘it is clear that the term “war on terror” is legally and operationally overbroad and misleading’,1 the authors choose to ground their contributions on the basis that the USA has operated, and continues to operate, as if it were in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its associated groups. According to the authors, this stance is justified by the argument that the three branches of government of the USA have repeatedly and consistently reached decisions to this effect. As a result, many readers might be inclined to approach the book with caution at first. This fundamental stance is however well-noted, emphasised, and indeed reasonable as the authors approach the controversial subjects from a factual, and most importantly, a military perspective.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70727293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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