Pub Date : 2021-05-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0005
J. Hazelton
This chapter evaluates how the counterinsurgency campaign during the Salvadoran civil war provides support for the compellence theory. In El Salvador from 1979 to 1992, the U.S.-backed government fought the Communist and nationalist insurgency to a draw, preserving the government from an insurgent takeover. Elite accommodation took place largely among civilian and military officers in the government as hard-liners and slightly more liberal political and military entrepreneurs jockeyed for influence. The Salvadoran government resisted U.S.-pressed reforms but accepted U.S. efforts to strengthen its security forces. It used its increased fighting ability to clear civilian areas, creating vast refugee flows that reduced provision of material support to the insurgency. It also used U.S.-provided air power to break down the insurgency's conventional formations but was never able to successfully pursue and destroy the smaller bands of insurgents or gain more popular support than it began the war with. Continued insurgent political and military strength, along with the end of the Cold War, forced the United States and the hard-liners within the military to accept peace talks and a political settlement to the war rather than the military victory they had pressed for.
{"title":"High Cost Success","authors":"J. Hazelton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter evaluates how the counterinsurgency campaign during the Salvadoran civil war provides support for the compellence theory. In El Salvador from 1979 to 1992, the U.S.-backed government fought the Communist and nationalist insurgency to a draw, preserving the government from an insurgent takeover. Elite accommodation took place largely among civilian and military officers in the government as hard-liners and slightly more liberal political and military entrepreneurs jockeyed for influence. The Salvadoran government resisted U.S.-pressed reforms but accepted U.S. efforts to strengthen its security forces. It used its increased fighting ability to clear civilian areas, creating vast refugee flows that reduced provision of material support to the insurgency. It also used U.S.-provided air power to break down the insurgency's conventional formations but was never able to successfully pursue and destroy the smaller bands of insurgents or gain more popular support than it began the war with. Continued insurgent political and military strength, along with the end of the Cold War, forced the United States and the hard-liners within the military to accept peace talks and a political settlement to the war rather than the military victory they had pressed for.","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116984039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0004
J. Hazelton
This chapter discusses how the British-led counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar, Oman, which ran from 1965 to 1976, provides support for the compellence theory. The sultan of Oman, Sa'id bin Taimur, faced a popular nationalist and Communist insurgency in its remote southwestern corner. His British backers pressed reforms on him, which he resisted, but he welcomed the buildup of his military. In a palace coup in 1970, the sultan's son replaced him and gained additional British and regional support for the campaign. Accommodations took place in the form of empowering warlords and others, including insurgent defectors and tribal leaders. The British-formed militias led by these men were better able to fight the insurgents and gain information from the populace than was the regular army. Ultimately, the British-led military, the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), defeated the insurgent threat by controlling civilians to cut the flow of resources to insurgents, physically blocking the flow of resources from the insurgents' safe haven across the border with Yemen, and controlling the populace in the guerrilla-ridden mountains. Limited political reforms such as construction of clinics followed the military's success against the insurgency rather than causing insurgent defeat.
本章讨论了英国领导的1965年至1976年在阿曼佐法尔的平叛行动是如何为强迫理论提供支持的。阿曼苏丹萨义德·本·泰穆尔(said bin Taimur)在遥远的西南角面临着民族主义和共产主义的叛乱。他的英国支持者敦促他进行改革，他对此表示反对，但他对加强军队表示欢迎。在1970年的一次宫廷政变中，苏丹的儿子取代了他，并获得了英国和该地区对这场运动的额外支持。和解的形式是赋予军阀和其他人权力，包括叛逃者和部落领袖。由这些人领导的英国民兵比正规军更能打击叛乱分子，从民众那里获取信息。最终，以英国为首的苏丹武装部队(SAF)通过控制平民切断了向叛乱分子提供的资源，从物理上阻断了从叛乱分子的安全避难所越过也门边境的资源流动，并控制了游击队横行的山区的民众，从而击败了叛乱分子的威胁。有限的政治改革，如诊所的建设，是在军队成功打击叛乱之后进行的，而不是导致叛乱分子的失败。
{"title":"A New Laboratory","authors":"J. Hazelton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses how the British-led counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar, Oman, which ran from 1965 to 1976, provides support for the compellence theory. The sultan of Oman, Sa'id bin Taimur, faced a popular nationalist and Communist insurgency in its remote southwestern corner. His British backers pressed reforms on him, which he resisted, but he welcomed the buildup of his military. In a palace coup in 1970, the sultan's son replaced him and gained additional British and regional support for the campaign. Accommodations took place in the form of empowering warlords and others, including insurgent defectors and tribal leaders. The British-formed militias led by these men were better able to fight the insurgents and gain information from the populace than was the regular army. Ultimately, the British-led military, the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), defeated the insurgent threat by controlling civilians to cut the flow of resources to insurgents, physically blocking the flow of resources from the insurgents' safe haven across the border with Yemen, and controlling the populace in the guerrilla-ridden mountains. Limited political reforms such as construction of clinics followed the military's success against the insurgency rather than causing insurgent defeat.","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125855430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0001
J. Hazelton
This chapter provides an overview of counterinsurgency, which means defeating armed, organized, persistent political challengers to the government. What explains success in counterinsurgency? This book argues that government success against an insurgency is a nonviolent and violent competition among elites that leads to political stability after a single armed actor — the counterinsurgent government — gains dominance over the others within its territory. The use of compellence (the use or threat of force to change an actor's behavior) and brute force (the power to take and to hold) together break the challenger's ability and will to fight. The book examines counterinsurgency as a form of liberal great power military intervention with relevance to contemporary Western policy debates and offers better understanding of how the use of force may — or may not — help threatened governments attain their political objectives. The chapter then introduces the compellence theory, which differs from good governance counterinsurgency.
{"title":"Counterinsurgency","authors":"J. Hazelton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides an overview of counterinsurgency, which means defeating armed, organized, persistent political challengers to the government. What explains success in counterinsurgency? This book argues that government success against an insurgency is a nonviolent and violent competition among elites that leads to political stability after a single armed actor — the counterinsurgent government — gains dominance over the others within its territory. The use of compellence (the use or threat of force to change an actor's behavior) and brute force (the power to take and to hold) together break the challenger's ability and will to fight. The book examines counterinsurgency as a form of liberal great power military intervention with relevance to contemporary Western policy debates and offers better understanding of how the use of force may — or may not — help threatened governments attain their political objectives. The chapter then introduces the compellence theory, which differs from good governance counterinsurgency.","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131253148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0006
J. Hazelton
This chapter focuses on the case of Turkey against the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party; PKK) in 1984–1999, which involves a democracy conducting a counterinsurgency campaign on its own territory against its own populace. Elite accommodation in Turkey took the form of government support for the great Kurdish landowners of the southeast, providing impunity for illegal smuggling and other accommodations in exchange for the provision of organized violence, controlling civilians to cut the flow of resources to the insurgency. The militia and military campaigns cleared vast areas of the region of their inhabitants. Indeed, the campaign defeated the PKK threat militarily. It captured and imprisoned its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, with U.S. assistance, and the insurgency withered. It was the structural change of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that created the opportunity for remnants of the PKK to regroup and reopen their campaign from northern Iraq, as well as within Turkey. Ultimately, Turkey shows the external validity of the compellence theory because it is considered a particularly brutal campaign and thus should bear little similarity to successful campaigns conducted by democratic great powers and lauded as models if the governance approach explains counterinsurgency success.
{"title":"How Much Does the Compellence Theory Explain?","authors":"J. Hazelton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the case of Turkey against the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party; PKK) in 1984–1999, which involves a democracy conducting a counterinsurgency campaign on its own territory against its own populace. Elite accommodation in Turkey took the form of government support for the great Kurdish landowners of the southeast, providing impunity for illegal smuggling and other accommodations in exchange for the provision of organized violence, controlling civilians to cut the flow of resources to the insurgency. The militia and military campaigns cleared vast areas of the region of their inhabitants. Indeed, the campaign defeated the PKK threat militarily. It captured and imprisoned its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, with U.S. assistance, and the insurgency withered. It was the structural change of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that created the opportunity for remnants of the PKK to regroup and reopen their campaign from northern Iraq, as well as within Turkey. Ultimately, Turkey shows the external validity of the compellence theory because it is considered a particularly brutal campaign and thus should bear little similarity to successful campaigns conducted by democratic great powers and lauded as models if the governance approach explains counterinsurgency success.","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121982533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0007
J. Hazelton
This chapter argues that counterinsurgency success is about power, co-optation, building a coalition, and crushing opposition, not good governance. In the cases examined in the previous chapters, great power backing helped the client government achieve counterinsurgent success, and all six states remain at least nominally partnered with the West on important issues. But all six campaigns also had high human and moral costs. These findings force those who support great-power, liberal military intervention to consider unpalatable choices about national interests. Individually and collectively, these cases provide strong evidence of the explanatory power of the compellence theory, with its emphasis on coalition building among rival elites and a military campaign targeting civilians as well as insurgents. The chapter then looks at the implications of this analysis on peacekeeping and state-building efforts.
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Pub Date : 2021-05-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0003
J. Hazelton
This chapter examines support for the compellence theory in three cases: the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, and the Philippines' campaign against the Huk insurgency. In the British campaign in Malaya, 1948–1957, the colonial government defeated a small, isolated Communist insurgency that failed to gain political traction even within the population of impoverished ethnic Chinese rubber plantation workers that it targeted as its often-unwilling base of support. In Greece in 1947–1949, the United States backed the repressive, fragile post-World War II Greek government and built its military capacity sufficiently to defeat the Communist and nationalist insurgents. In the Philippines in 1946–1954, the United States backed the Philippine government as a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia, pressing for major governance reforms while building Philippine security forces. In all three cases, elite accommodation played a significant role in the counterinsurgent's ability to defeat the insurgency militarily, with the type of elite involved varying by case; uses of force included forcefully controlling civilians; and uses of force broke the insurgency before reforms were implemented, if they were implemented at all, as the compellence theory predicts.
{"title":"Not the Wars You’re Looking For","authors":"J. Hazelton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754784.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines support for the compellence theory in three cases: the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, and the Philippines' campaign against the Huk insurgency. In the British campaign in Malaya, 1948–1957, the colonial government defeated a small, isolated Communist insurgency that failed to gain political traction even within the population of impoverished ethnic Chinese rubber plantation workers that it targeted as its often-unwilling base of support. In Greece in 1947–1949, the United States backed the repressive, fragile post-World War II Greek government and built its military capacity sufficiently to defeat the Communist and nationalist insurgents. In the Philippines in 1946–1954, the United States backed the Philippine government as a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia, pressing for major governance reforms while building Philippine security forces. In all three cases, elite accommodation played a significant role in the counterinsurgent's ability to defeat the insurgency militarily, with the type of elite involved varying by case; uses of force included forcefully controlling civilians; and uses of force broke the insurgency before reforms were implemented, if they were implemented at all, as the compellence theory predicts.","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120966569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781501754807-008
{"title":"7. Counterinsurgency Success: Costs High and Rising","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501754807-008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501754807-008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116415441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781501754807-007
{"title":"6. How Much Does the Compellence Theory Explain? Turkey and the PKK","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501754807-007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501754807-007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"50 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120903977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781501754807-010
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501754807-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501754807-010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"377 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129095947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781501754807-fm
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501754807-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501754807-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":309333,"journal":{"name":"Bullets Not Ballots","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132184031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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