Pub Date : 2024-09-18DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050146
Lorenz Engell
The article starts from Gilles Deleuze’s assumption of film being a philosophy in its own right and applies it to the horror genre. It reads Stanley Cavell’s concept of genre, Timothy Jay Walker’s work on the Horror of the Other (1) and Eugene Thacker’s understanding of philosophical horror (2). It researches horror film as philosophically relevant access to nothingness (3) and shifts to the operations of assigning places to nothingness according to its respective place of access (off screen, on screen, behind the screen/behind the camera) (4). It then gives short analyses of Midsommar (5), Hereditary (6), Tarantula (7), and The Conjuring (8). In Tarantula, the screen functions as a shield against the agent of nothingness residing behind it. Once surmounted from behind by nothingness, the screen is finally purged. In Hereditary and Midsommar, nothingness is always already here, in full light, constantly transforming everything into nothing. In The Conjuring, the morphings and vectorial movements have nothingness evaporate from the screen to what lies behind it, namely (digital) picture technology. The screen turns into a membrane between nothingness and its condition, technology. As a consequence, we have to switch from philosophical horror to technological horror as access to nothingness (9).
文章从吉勒-德勒兹关于电影本身就是一种哲学的假设出发，将其应用于恐怖类型。文章解读了斯坦利-卡维尔（Stanley Cavell）的类型概念、蒂莫西-杰伊-沃克（Timothy Jay Walker）关于 "他者的恐怖"（Horror of the Other）的著作（1）以及尤金-萨克（Eugene Thacker）对哲学恐怖的理解（2）。它研究了恐怖电影作为与哲学相关的通向虚无的途径(3)，并转向根据其各自的通向地点（银幕外、银幕上、银幕后/摄影机后）为虚无分配位置的操作(4)。随后，它对《Midsommar》（5）、《Hereditary》（6）、《Tarantula》（7）和《The Conjuring》（8）进行了简短分析。在《蛛网》中，银幕起到了抵御幕后虚无媒介的作用。一旦被虚无从背后超越，屏风最终会被清除。在《遗传》和《Midsommar》中，虚无总是在这里，在光的照耀下，不断地将一切转化为虚无。在《魔咒》中，变形和矢量运动让虚无从屏幕上蒸发到屏幕背后，即（数字）图像技术。屏幕变成了虚无与其条件（技术）之间的一层薄膜。因此，我们不得不从哲学的恐怖转向技术的恐怖，以此来通向虚无(9)。
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Pub Date : 2024-09-11DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050144
Paul Magee
Speaking is a highly conventional enterprise. But unusual usages are, nonetheless, frequently encountered. Some of these novelties fall flat, while others find favour, to the extent of entering common usage. He considered to say something will sound wrong to most native speakers, while The military disappeared her husband, which was more or less unsayable prior to the 1960s, has come to seem fine. Linguist Adelle E. Goldberg has recently argued that speakers display a remarkable openness to new words, phrases and even grammatical forms, when there is no current way of communicating whatever it is those novel strings serve to express. My paper exegetes Goldberg’s findings to illuminate the question of poetic judgement. It proposes that there is a strong parallel between how people judge linguistic innovation in everyday speaking, and the way poets and critics judge innovative poetic diction: in both cases there is a premium on what cannot otherwise be said. The paper proceeds to deepen the analogies between these two modes of judgement. It starts by linking the lack of rules for determining the acceptability of new words and phrases in everyday speaking with the indifference to prior rules associated with aesthetic judgement in Kant’s third critique, and apparent in the appraisals of many a contemporary poetry critic. It turns to consider the claim that what motivates the judgements under consideration is a preference in the human conceptual system for distinct symbols to have mutually exclusive meanings. A fourth section concerns what Construction Grammar, the broad field of Goldberg’s intervention, has to reveal about the conditions under which new words and phrases can take on meaning in the first place. This too has something to suggest about why we judge certain poetic efforts poor, others landed.
说话是一项非常传统的工作。但不寻常的用法还是经常遇到。这些新奇的用法有的平淡无奇，有的却大受欢迎，甚至成为常用语。在大多数以英语为母语的人听来，"他认为说了些什么"（He considered to say something）听起来是错误的，而 "她的丈夫失踪了"（The military disappeared her husband）在 20 世纪 60 年代以前几乎是不可说的，但现在听起来却不错。语言学家阿黛尔-E-戈德堡（Adelle E. Goldberg）最近提出，当新词、短语甚至语法形式所要表达的内容在当前没有任何交流方式时，说话者对这些新词、短语甚至语法形式表现出非凡的开放性。我的论文对戈德伯格的研究成果进行了诠释，以阐明诗歌判断的问题。论文提出，人们在日常口语中对语言创新的判断，与诗人和评论家对创新诗歌辞藻的判断，两者之间存在着很强的相似性：在这两种情况下，人们都重视那些无法以其他方式表达的东西。本文进而深化了这两种判断方式之间的类比。首先，本文将日常用语中缺乏确定新词和新句是否可接受的规则与康德第三次批判中美学判断对先前规则的漠视联系起来，这种漠视在许多当代诗歌批评家的评价中也是显而易见的。本章转而考虑这样一种说法，即促使我们做出这种判断的是人类概念系统中对具有相互排斥意义的不同符号的偏好。第四部分涉及《构建语法》--戈德堡介入的广泛领域--所揭示的新词和短语首先具有意义的条件。这也是我们评判某些诗歌作品差强人意，而另一些则出类拔萃的原因。
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Pub Date : 2024-09-09DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050143
Pascal Oliver Omlin
In this article, I develop a critique of Chantal Mouffe’s leftist populism and its construction of ‘the people’ against an opposed ‘them’, from a perspective informed by the thought of Didier Eribon. I draw on both his public interventions and his theoretical work, employing his concepts of return, society as verdict, and his two principles of critical thinking to question the desirability of crafting ‘the people’ in the first place. I contend that Eribon’s critique renders Mouffe’s proposal problematic on three accounts. First, her approach is too politically volatile; its instability leaves it devoid of a critical analysis of the differences between concrete social positions, struggles, and subjectivities within ‘the people’. Consequently, the political becomes merely a function of the social. Yet, the social and its determining power remain mostly unaddressed by her framework. Second, its simplistic opposition of an overly generalised ‘the people’ against ‘the oligarchy’ is susceptible to right-wing populist appropriations. Third, for a shot at hegemony and a general appeal, it eclipses plurality and dissensus within ‘the people’. In contrast, Eribon encourages a connection between the social and the political by suggesting that a self-critical analysis be mutually intertwined with social analysis. Instead of merely mobilising affects, they must be critically interrogated. Instead of summoning ‘the people’, a return to their respective genesis must be attempted. Unless both principles of critical thinking, the insights of return, and societal verdicts are deployed to come to terms with the social determinisms at hand, the ‘people’s’ mobilisation against an opposed ‘them’ risks sacrificing pluralism and equality alike and neglecting the criteria of the desirability of specific changes in favour of a “whatever it costs” attempt at hegemony.
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Pub Date : 2024-09-06DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050142
Colette Sybille Jung
Coalitional communication is a dwelling amidst non-dominant differences that requires introspective, complex communicative philosophy and practice. My concern is with differentiation in hierarchies. They are understood and shaped by colonial modernity. They are historical logics and practices of settler colonialism, enslavement, and citizenship. My perspective is feminist, decolonial critiques of modern, capitalist social systems. The analysis is grounded in communicative philosophy in intercultural contexts where folks intend justice and equality. For example, in political democracies, localized social alliances actually harm one another being hegemonic by taking routes of familiarity through structures of linguistic and practical cultural systems. Communicative projects of liberation across oppressions (with monologic and single-axis perceptions) tend to miss intersections of our raced and gendered experiences. The result is unintelligibility among us. In this state, one can sense in the body the space of the liminal—with both a communicative impasse and opening. Rather than aligning liberation and domination in the impasse, I describe the creativity of liminal space as a communicative opening. The opening is a recognition of multiplicity and a refusal to assimilate each other’s lived experiences into familiar, complex codes of habituated thought and action. Examining communication hostilities in oppressed–oppressing relations is a necessary condition for coalition. Thus, coalitional communication is a call to engage a full sense of listening to one another as relevant. Ways that decipher codes and signals of resistance come to constitute the project of creating relevant intelligibility together. Praxis as critical, dialectical, and intersectional thinking is part of this method.
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Pub Date : 2024-09-05DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050141
Justin Eckstein
This study delves into the creative protest tactics of Belarusian activists in 2011, highlighting their use of “sound bodies” created through clapping to challenge authoritarian constraints. The research posits that these ethereal sound bodies exert significant normative pressure on the regime by challenging the regime’s legitimacy. By analyzing the clapping protests as civil disobedience, this study illustrates the effectiveness of this non-visual form of protest in compelling the authoritarian regime to address the collective call for change. Through this lens, this paper contributes a nuanced understanding of how decentralized protest strategies, particularly those leveraging sound, can serve as potent mechanisms for challenging oppressive governance in a digitally connected global landscape. This essay thus intervenes into the realms of argumentation theory and sound studies.
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Pub Date : 2024-09-03DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050140
Javier Pérez-Jara
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
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Pub Date : 2024-08-31DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050139
David Jakobsen
The article discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff’s explanations for the flourishing of philosophical theology in analytic philosophy by taking Arthur Norman Prior’s (1914–1969) development of tense-logic into account. Prior’s work challenged the prevailing anti-metaphysical norms in analytic philosophy and introduced an alternative understanding of the relationship between logic and metaphysics. Prior’s application of tense-logic to an analysis of the concept of existence in quantified tense-logic and his exploration of future contingency in branching time semantics provide a strong reason for why analytic philosophy naturally incorporates philosophical theology. These considerations lead us to modify Wolterstorff’s emphasis on the importance of meta-epistemology for the resurgence of philosophical theology. A development in logic was necessary. Furthermore, Prior’s importance questions the assumption that philosophical theology was a consequence of theistic philosophers seeking ways to defend theistic beliefs in analytic philosophy. This is not true for Prior. His invention of tense-logic and discussion of omniscience was driven by an existential interest in finding answers to philosophical problems concerning divine foreknowledge and human freedom which ultimately led him to reject his Christian beliefs.
文章讨论了尼古拉斯-沃尔斯托夫（Nicholas Wolterstorff）通过考虑阿瑟-诺曼-普赖尔（Arthur Norman Prior，1914-1969 年）对时态逻辑的发展对分析哲学中哲学神学蓬勃发展的解释。普赖尔的著作挑战了分析哲学中盛行的反形而上学规范，并对逻辑与形而上学之间的关系提出了另一种理解。普赖尔将时态逻辑应用于对量化时态逻辑中存在概念的分析，以及他对分支时间语义学中未来偶然性的探索，为分析哲学自然而然地纳入哲学神学提供了强有力的理由。这些考虑使我们对沃尔特斯托夫强调的元认识论对哲学神学复兴的重要性进行了修正。逻辑学的发展是必要的。此外，Prior 的重要性质疑了哲学神学是有神论哲学家在分析哲学中寻求捍卫有神论信仰的方法的结果这一假设。普赖尔的情况并非如此。他发明时态逻辑和讨论全知全能是出于一种存在主义的兴趣，他想找到有关神的预知和人的自由的哲学问题的答案，这最终导致他摒弃了他的基督教信仰。
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Pub Date : 2024-08-31DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050138
Igor Tavilla
This paper aims to show how Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christendom still works today to contrast current forms of conformism disguised under the appearance of new secular religions. I will start with considering Kierkegaard’s concept of conformism as a form of despair. As such, conformism is incompatible with Christianity, as well as with the development of a true Self. Secondly, I will focus on the current religious scene in Western Europe. While Christianity has become a minority in society, new secular religions have arisen and, along with them, new compelling narratives. Mainstream environmentalism appears to be one of these. Finally, I will try to show how Kierkegaard’s arguments against Christendom can be also applied to environmental propaganda.
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Pub Date : 2024-08-29DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050136
Ana Suelen Tossige Gomes
Western culture has assigned an essential role to productive activity in defining our lives. In Locke’s and Hegel’s thought, we see the model that became dominant in modern political philosophy: that of conceiving the subject as a result of, and only possible within, the triad of work–property–subject. Nowadays, this has reached the level of shaping the meaning of living, and our entire existences seem to be subjected to a concept of lives-as-work. Combining anthropology and philosophy, this article seeks to rethink subjectivation beyond the process of work and appropriation, delving into worldviews different from those of the West. Specifically, we will focus on the Yanomami form of life, a non-stratified indigenous people living in the Brazilian Amazon. We will analyze how the Yanomami prevent the process of subjectification by the objectification of one’s own work through a sort of anti-work and anti-property apparatus. This is achieved through specific techniques of underproduction, which constitute another approach to work, as well as through a completely different way of conceiving subjectivity. Furthermore, the Yanomami’s view of all entities as subjects endowed with intentionality appears as de-ontologizing the subject position and deactivating the dyads of subject/object and own/common. The result is a worldview where, with everyone being subjects—humans and non-humans, living and dead, entities and things of nature—no one can be dominus of anyone.
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Pub Date : 2024-08-29DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9050137
Nicola Angius, Pietro Perconti, Alessio Plebe, Alessandro Acciai
This paper provides an epistemological and methodological analysis of the recent practice of using neural language models to simulate brain language processing. It is argued that, on the one hand, this practice can be understood as an instance of the traditional simulative method in artificial intelligence, following a mechanistic understanding of the mind; on the other hand, that it modifies the simulative method significantly. Firstly, neural language models are introduced; a study case showing how neural language models are being applied in cognitive neuroscience for simulative purposes is then presented; after recalling the main epistemological features of the simulative method in artificial intelligence, it is finally highlighted how the epistemic opacity of neural language models is tackled by using the brain itself to simulate the neural language model and to test hypotheses about it, in what is called here a co-simulation.
{"title":"The Simulative Role of Neural Language Models in Brain Language Processing","authors":"Nicola Angius, Pietro Perconti, Alessio Plebe, Alessandro Acciai","doi":"10.3390/philosophies9050137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9050137","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an epistemological and methodological analysis of the recent practice of using neural language models to simulate brain language processing. It is argued that, on the one hand, this practice can be understood as an instance of the traditional simulative method in artificial intelligence, following a mechanistic understanding of the mind; on the other hand, that it modifies the simulative method significantly. Firstly, neural language models are introduced; a study case showing how neural language models are being applied in cognitive neuroscience for simulative purposes is then presented; after recalling the main epistemological features of the simulative method in artificial intelligence, it is finally highlighted how the epistemic opacity of neural language models is tackled by using the brain itself to simulate the neural language model and to test hypotheses about it, in what is called here a co-simulation.","PeriodicalId":31446,"journal":{"name":"Philosophies","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142185891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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