Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040125
Julian Lamb
There is a curious moment in the balcony scene in Romeo and Juliet. Thinking she speaks in solitude, Juliet says, “Romeo, doff thy name, / And, for thy name, which is no part of thee, / Take all myself”. Emerging from the shadows, Romeo replies, “I take thee at thy word” (Act 2, Scene 1, 92). Suddenly, Juliet’s utterance has seemingly become binding: because they have been overheard by Romeo, her words have become her word. But is Juliet truly bound by her words given that she did not know they were being overheard, let alone intend for them to be binding? Using J. L. Austin’s notion of the performative, I consider the nature and status of Juliet’s utterance, its influence on the remainder of the scene, and what insight it might afford into the play as a whole.
在《罗密欧与朱丽叶》的阳台场景中有一个奇特的时刻。茱丽叶以为自己是在独处时说话，便说："罗密欧，放弃你的名字，/为了你的名字，这不是你的一部分，/把我自己全部带走"。从阴影中走出来的罗密欧回答道："我相信你的话"（第 2 幕，第 1 场，92）。突然之间，朱丽叶的话语似乎变得具有约束力：因为被罗密欧听到了，她的话就成了她的话。但是，朱丽叶并不知道她的话被偷听，更不打算让这些话具有约束力，那么她的话真的具有约束力吗？我将运用 J. L. 奥斯汀的表演概念，考虑朱丽叶话语的性质和地位、它对该场景其余部分的影响，以及它对整部剧的启示。
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Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040123
Sophie Grace Chappell
Carpe Diem (Horace and Odes 1.11) [...]
Carpe Diem（贺拉斯与奥德 1.11）[......］
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Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040124
Myka S. H. Lahaie
This essay assesses the relevance of Søren Kierkegaard’s non-pseudonymous, edifying writings for considering themes of desire, detachment, and humility within the religious context of Christian spiritual formation. Building on the argument of recent scholars who identify in Kierkegaard’s writings an account of a fundamental desire for God “implanted” in the human being, I explore the influence of this vision on Kierkegaard’s depiction of desire and detachment in his “Discourses on the Lilies and the Birds”. I then turn to how this relates to the perspective of humility that emerges from Kierkegaard’s reflections on the biblical story of “the widow’s mite”. In each case, these edifying writings aim to stir the reader into a process of interrogating faulty self-perceptions based on arbitrary measures of value. I read this mode of communication as able to initiate a “counter-experience”, provoking the reader to reorient her horizon of prior self-valuations so she might come to recognize the hidden significance of things and, ultimately, achieve a more accurate sense of oneself in relation to the authentic source of the self’s desire. Insofar as this reorientation of the self informs the practice of detachment or the development of humility, people might experience this same process in diverse ways. In this respect, the relevance of Kierkegaard’s edifying writings for reflecting on Christian spirituality is not that they provide a thoroughgoing account of detachment or humility that should replace the insights of various spiritual traditions. Rather, I argue that his discourses—when read alongside these traditions—offer a supplemental resource for reflecting on how our positionalities, dispositions, and proximate contexts will inform the divergent ways we might experience the practice of detachment or the manifestation of humility in each new life circumstance.
{"title":"The Gift of a Penny as “Counter-Experience” in Kierkegaard’s Discourses: Humility, Detachment, and the Hidden Significance of Things","authors":"Myka S. H. Lahaie","doi":"10.3390/philosophies9040124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040124","url":null,"abstract":"This essay assesses the relevance of Søren Kierkegaard’s non-pseudonymous, edifying writings for considering themes of desire, detachment, and humility within the religious context of Christian spiritual formation. Building on the argument of recent scholars who identify in Kierkegaard’s writings an account of a fundamental desire for God “implanted” in the human being, I explore the influence of this vision on Kierkegaard’s depiction of desire and detachment in his “Discourses on the Lilies and the Birds”. I then turn to how this relates to the perspective of humility that emerges from Kierkegaard’s reflections on the biblical story of “the widow’s mite”. In each case, these edifying writings aim to stir the reader into a process of interrogating faulty self-perceptions based on arbitrary measures of value. I read this mode of communication as able to initiate a “counter-experience”, provoking the reader to reorient her horizon of prior self-valuations so she might come to recognize the hidden significance of things and, ultimately, achieve a more accurate sense of oneself in relation to the authentic source of the self’s desire. Insofar as this reorientation of the self informs the practice of detachment or the development of humility, people might experience this same process in diverse ways. In this respect, the relevance of Kierkegaard’s edifying writings for reflecting on Christian spirituality is not that they provide a thoroughgoing account of detachment or humility that should replace the insights of various spiritual traditions. Rather, I argue that his discourses—when read alongside these traditions—offer a supplemental resource for reflecting on how our positionalities, dispositions, and proximate contexts will inform the divergent ways we might experience the practice of detachment or the manifestation of humility in each new life circumstance.","PeriodicalId":31446,"journal":{"name":"Philosophies","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142185904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040122
Edgar Graham Daylight
The outputs of a Turing machine are not revealed for inputs on which the machine fails to halt. Why is an observer not allowed to see the generated output symbols as the machine operates? Building on the pioneering work of Mark Burgin, we introduce an extension of the Turing machine model with a visible output tape. As a subtle refinement to Burgin’s theory, we stipulate that the outputted symbols cannot be overwritten: at step i, the content of the output tape is a prefix of the content at step j, where i
对于机器无法停止的输入，图灵机的输出不会显示。为什么观察者不能看到机器运行时生成的输出符号呢？在马克-伯金（Mark Burgin）的开创性工作基础上，我们引入了图灵机模型的扩展，即可见输出带。作为对伯金理论的微妙改进，我们规定输出符号不能被覆盖：在第 i 步，输出带的内容是第 j 步内容的前缀，其中 i
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Pub Date : 2024-08-11DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040121
Lucy Van
Theoretically, a poem can begin in any way. What does it mean that in practice, poems often begin in a particular way—that is, by returning to a fragment of some prior thing? We see this in the encore of John Milton’s opening to Lycidas (‘Yet once more, O ye laurels, and once more’); differently, we see this in the widely used convention of the poetic epigraph (for instance, T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ begins with six lines from Dante’s Inferno). While there is an established model for understanding the beginning as an act that invokes poetic precedent, this paper seeks to expose the beginning’s logic of return to a broader sense of language that is beyond the remit of poetic tradition as such. With a focus on the epigraph, this paper thinks about the everyday existence of poems and about how this existence relates to ordinary language, asking, how do these different modes of language function together? How does ordinary language collude in the creation of poetry? In its enactment of the passage of language from one mode of existence to another, the beginning of a poem might offer some answers to these questions.
{"title":"The Beginning of the Poem: The Epigraph","authors":"Lucy Van","doi":"10.3390/philosophies9040121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040121","url":null,"abstract":"Theoretically, a poem can begin in any way. What does it mean that in practice, poems often begin in a particular way—that is, by returning to a fragment of some prior thing? We see this in the encore of John Milton’s opening to Lycidas (‘Yet once more, O ye laurels, and once more’); differently, we see this in the widely used convention of the poetic epigraph (for instance, T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ begins with six lines from Dante’s Inferno). While there is an established model for understanding the beginning as an act that invokes poetic precedent, this paper seeks to expose the beginning’s logic of return to a broader sense of language that is beyond the remit of poetic tradition as such. With a focus on the epigraph, this paper thinks about the everyday existence of poems and about how this existence relates to ordinary language, asking, how do these different modes of language function together? How does ordinary language collude in the creation of poetry? In its enactment of the passage of language from one mode of existence to another, the beginning of a poem might offer some answers to these questions.","PeriodicalId":31446,"journal":{"name":"Philosophies","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141947662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-07DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040120
Gottfried Schweiger
Ulrika Carlsson has argued that it its justified to harbor non-moral resentment towards a person with whom one is unrequitedly in love. Anca Gheaus has rejected this with convincing arguments. This text explores the question of whether Gheaus’ verdict changes if the person being loved has previously flirted with the loving person. For this, it is first relevant what flirting actually is and how it relates to falling in love and love. On this basis, it is argued here that in the case of flirting, the non-moral resentment of the loved person defended by Carlsson is appropriate. By flirting, he or she has contributed to the unrequited love, even if he or she cannot be held responsible for it in a moral sense.
{"title":"Unrequited Love, Flirting and Non-Moral Resentment","authors":"Gottfried Schweiger","doi":"10.3390/philosophies9040120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040120","url":null,"abstract":"Ulrika Carlsson has argued that it its justified to harbor non-moral resentment towards a person with whom one is unrequitedly in love. Anca Gheaus has rejected this with convincing arguments. This text explores the question of whether Gheaus’ verdict changes if the person being loved has previously flirted with the loving person. For this, it is first relevant what flirting actually is and how it relates to falling in love and love. On this basis, it is argued here that in the case of flirting, the non-moral resentment of the loved person defended by Carlsson is appropriate. By flirting, he or she has contributed to the unrequited love, even if he or she cannot be held responsible for it in a moral sense.","PeriodicalId":31446,"journal":{"name":"Philosophies","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141947575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040119
Jane Anna Gordon
This article begins with critical discussion of why parochialism is so alluring, suggesting that we need to understand its tenacious seductions if we really aim to displace, uproot, or transcend it. Arguing that parochialism as a value is not primarily a question of ignorance, but an antipathetic orientation toward incompleteness, interdependency, and entanglement, it then turns briefly to explaining what is meant by creolizing theory. The article closes by offering creolizing’s central insights as a potential antidote to parochialism since they begin with the observation that for any lifeways to meaningfully continue, especially those to which we are most attached, they must be constantly resituated, refashioned, and made new. It ends with a brief meditation on ways to manage anxieties unleashed with radical uncertainty, affirming the depth of the challenges of turning from idolatry.
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Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040117
Federica Negri
For many 20th century philosophers, the “death of God” became an opportunity to rethink the limits of the human, eliminating its claims to a transcendent foundation in order to start again, more modestly, “from below”. The new humanity, freed from the burdens of the old metaphysics, becomes able to reappropriate responsibility, rediscovering in the other an irreducible presence. The human and philosophical story of Sarah Kofman offers the possibility of following an original development in this sense, starting from the unspeakable event of the Shoah towards a new possibility for human kind.
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Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040118
Hong Wang
In this paper I attempt to trace the semiotic path of meaning experience from “nothing” into “something”. Traditional communication studies are problematic in 1. focusing on the message to the effect of ignoring the communicators; 2. choosing to overlook how yet-to-be signs acquire meanings in the communicative moments; and 3. tending to assume a “natural science” attitude toward the studied phenomenon so that embodied consciousness is either sidetracked or psychologized. Taking communicology as both the theory and methodology, I first describe the semiotic network in which blank paper, a nonconventional sign, acquires its signness in a specified communicative event. Then, I look inward to the relation of consciousness and embodiment. Finally, I argue that communication is such a life-world moment wherein non-expression is collectively constituted as a form of expression.
{"title":"The Communicology of a Blank Paper, a Void That Expresses","authors":"Hong Wang","doi":"10.3390/philosophies9040118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040118","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I attempt to trace the semiotic path of meaning experience from “nothing” into “something”. Traditional communication studies are problematic in 1. focusing on the message to the effect of ignoring the communicators; 2. choosing to overlook how yet-to-be signs acquire meanings in the communicative moments; and 3. tending to assume a “natural science” attitude toward the studied phenomenon so that embodied consciousness is either sidetracked or psychologized. Taking communicology as both the theory and methodology, I first describe the semiotic network in which blank paper, a nonconventional sign, acquires its signness in a specified communicative event. Then, I look inward to the relation of consciousness and embodiment. Finally, I argue that communication is such a life-world moment wherein non-expression is collectively constituted as a form of expression.","PeriodicalId":31446,"journal":{"name":"Philosophies","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141947659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-01DOI: 10.3390/philosophies9040116
M. G. Piety
Christian universalism, or the theory of universal salvation, is increasingly popular among religious thinkers. A small group of scholars has put forward the contentious claim that Kierkegaard was a universalist, despite that he refers in places to the idea of eternal damnation as essential to Christianity. This paper examines the evidence both for and against the view that Kierkegaard was a universalist and concludes that despite Kierkegaard’s occasional references to the importance of the idea of eternal damnation to Christianity, there is reason to believe that Kierkegaard may have been a universalist, both in terms of the substance of his thought, including two unequivocal statements in his journals that he believed everyone would eventually be saved and in terms of his rhetorical style which prioritizes the effect his writings would have on the reader over the literal truth of the views they present.
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