Following the implementation of a set of road safety measures since 2000, the numbers of disastrous accidents have decreased. Currently, we have detailed data and statistics about drivers’ behavior. In fact, this information is not mentioned in the insurer portfolio. Therefore, it was essential to hold a summary report in order to provide a better quantitative analysis. The sample helps to identify the driving variables which might influence the driver’s claims in Paris and its suburbs. Three rules of driver’s behaviour are taken into account in order to shed lights on the relevance of the link between the accidents and the practices of control. These three rules involve (i) the permanent use of the safety belt, (ii) the acquirements of information about the emplacement of radio detection and ranging, and (iii) the use of parking sites reserved for disabled persons. While the first and the second variables do not significantly contribute in assessing or explaining claims, the third variable appears to be significant in explaining the frequency of accidents. Consequently, the use of the seat belt has recorded a significant progress during the last years.
{"title":"Do Driving Habits Amplify Road Risk?","authors":"Mériem Maatig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1430912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1430912","url":null,"abstract":"Following the implementation of a set of road safety measures since 2000, the numbers of disastrous accidents have decreased. Currently, we have detailed data and statistics about drivers’ behavior. In fact, this information is not mentioned in the insurer portfolio. Therefore, it was essential to hold a summary report in order to provide a better quantitative analysis. The sample helps to identify the driving variables which might influence the driver’s claims in Paris and its suburbs. Three rules of driver’s behaviour are taken into account in order to shed lights on the relevance of the link between the accidents and the practices of control. These three rules involve (i) the permanent use of the safety belt, (ii) the acquirements of information about the emplacement of radio detection and ranging, and (iii) the use of parking sites reserved for disabled persons. While the first and the second variables do not significantly contribute in assessing or explaining claims, the third variable appears to be significant in explaining the frequency of accidents. Consequently, the use of the seat belt has recorded a significant progress during the last years.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133484282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The World Bank is a leading intellectual institution on development. It is a world leader in analytical studies in areas including poverty measurement, delivery of social services, impact evaluation, measurement of development outcomes, international trade and migration. It is also a leader in development data, including the Living Standard Measurement Surveys; the enterprise surveys, and the International Price Comparison Project. World Bank research is resolutely empirical and policy oriented. By both learning from past policies and operations and thinking critically about future policies, research plays a critical role in the formulation of policy advice to developing countries. This paper reviews the intellectual and institutional forces that have shaped research at the World Bank since the latter started lending to developing countries in the early 1950s. It provides an overview of the shifts in development economics that have influenced Bank research and briefly surveys the changes in research organization, structure and approach. The first section, after a short introduction, examines the shifts in positive and normative views about development during the past half century that have influenced Bank thinking. The Bank itself has been an active participant in the rise and fall of long-lived development dogmas about the nature of development; the most appropriate policies and actions for achieving it; and the respective roles of government and markets. The second section examines how the World Bank has adapted its organization to keep abreast of emerging issues and produce relevant policy research of good quality. On the one hand, the Bank has experienced several reorganizations that have affected the research unit(s) as well as its relationship with operational units. On the other hand, the Banks research units themselves have been reorganized at several junctures, leading to new priorities and new means of achieving them.
{"title":"World Bank Policy Research: A Historical Overview","authors":"J. Dethier","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-5000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5000","url":null,"abstract":"The World Bank is a leading intellectual institution on development. It is a world leader in analytical studies in areas including poverty measurement, delivery of social services, impact evaluation, measurement of development outcomes, international trade and migration. It is also a leader in development data, including the Living Standard Measurement Surveys; the enterprise surveys, and the International Price Comparison Project. World Bank research is resolutely empirical and policy oriented. By both learning from past policies and operations and thinking critically about future policies, research plays a critical role in the formulation of policy advice to developing countries. This paper reviews the intellectual and institutional forces that have shaped research at the World Bank since the latter started lending to developing countries in the early 1950s. It provides an overview of the shifts in development economics that have influenced Bank research and briefly surveys the changes in research organization, structure and approach. The first section, after a short introduction, examines the shifts in positive and normative views about development during the past half century that have influenced Bank thinking. The Bank itself has been an active participant in the rise and fall of long-lived development dogmas about the nature of development; the most appropriate policies and actions for achieving it; and the respective roles of government and markets. The second section examines how the World Bank has adapted its organization to keep abreast of emerging issues and produce relevant policy research of good quality. On the one hand, the Bank has experienced several reorganizations that have affected the research unit(s) as well as its relationship with operational units. On the other hand, the Banks research units themselves have been reorganized at several junctures, leading to new priorities and new means of achieving them.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123901974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current financial crisis has highlighted the growing importance of the "shadow banking system," which grew out of the securitization of assets and the integration of banking with capital market developments. This trend has been most pronounced in the United States, but it has had a profound influence on the global financial system. In a market-based financial system, banking and capital market developments are inseparable: Funding conditions are closely tied to fluctuations in the leverage of market-based financial intermediaries. Growth in the balance sheets of these intermediaries provides a sense of the availability of credit, while contractions of their balance sheets have tended to precede the onset of financial crises. Securitization was intended as a way to transfer credit risk to those better able to absorb losses, but instead it increased the fragility of the entire financial system by allowing banks and other intermediaries to "leverage up" by buying one another's securities. In the new, post-crisis financial system, the role of securitization will likely be held in check by more stringent financial regulation and by the recognition that it is important to prevent excessive leverage and maturity mismatch, both of which can undermine financial stability.
{"title":"The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation","authors":"T. Adrian, H. Shin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1441324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441324","url":null,"abstract":"The current financial crisis has highlighted the growing importance of the \"shadow banking system,\" which grew out of the securitization of assets and the integration of banking with capital market developments. This trend has been most pronounced in the United States, but it has had a profound influence on the global financial system. In a market-based financial system, banking and capital market developments are inseparable: Funding conditions are closely tied to fluctuations in the leverage of market-based financial intermediaries. Growth in the balance sheets of these intermediaries provides a sense of the availability of credit, while contractions of their balance sheets have tended to precede the onset of financial crises. Securitization was intended as a way to transfer credit risk to those better able to absorb losses, but instead it increased the fragility of the entire financial system by allowing banks and other intermediaries to \"leverage up\" by buying one another's securities. In the new, post-crisis financial system, the role of securitization will likely be held in check by more stringent financial regulation and by the recognition that it is important to prevent excessive leverage and maturity mismatch, both of which can undermine financial stability.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131241285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small and for subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors.
{"title":"Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization","authors":"Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, P. Willen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1433777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433777","url":null,"abstract":"We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small and for subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131867802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-07-01DOI: 10.5089/9781451872903.001.A001
Gianni De Nicoló, J. Boyd, A. Jalal
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
{"title":"Bank Competition, Risk and Asset Allocations","authors":"Gianni De Nicoló, J. Boyd, A. Jalal","doi":"10.5089/9781451872903.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451872903.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124584135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-07-01DOI: 10.5089/9781451872989.001.A001
G. Impavido, Ian Tower
This paper discusses the key sources of vulnerabilities for pension plans and insurance companies in light of the global financial crisis of 2008. It also discusses how these institutional investors transit shocks to the rest of the financial sector and economy. The crisis has re-ignited the policy debate on key issues such as: 1) the need for countercyclical funding and solvency rules; 2) the tradeoffs implied in marked based valuation rules; 3) the need to protect contributors towards retirement from excessive market volatility; 4) the need to strengthen group supervision for large complex financial institutions including insurance and pensions; and 5) the need to revisit the resolution and crisis management framework for insurance and pensions.
{"title":"How the Financial Crisis Affects Pensions and Insurance and Why the Impacts Matter","authors":"G. Impavido, Ian Tower","doi":"10.5089/9781451872989.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451872989.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the key sources of vulnerabilities for pension plans and insurance companies in light of the global financial crisis of 2008. It also discusses how these institutional investors transit shocks to the rest of the financial sector and economy. The crisis has re-ignited the policy debate on key issues such as: 1) the need for countercyclical funding and solvency rules; 2) the tradeoffs implied in marked based valuation rules; 3) the need to protect contributors towards retirement from excessive market volatility; 4) the need to strengthen group supervision for large complex financial institutions including insurance and pensions; and 5) the need to revisit the resolution and crisis management framework for insurance and pensions.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128444353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski, L. Weill
This paper considers whether local bank participation exerts an impact on the spreads for syndicated loans in Russia. Following Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), we test whether local banks possess a superior ability to deal with information asymmetries. Using a sample of 528 syndicated loans to Russian borrowers, we perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information on local bank participation and the characteristics of loans and borrowers. Unlike earlier studies, we distinguish foreign banks with a local presence from those without such presence. The intuition here is that a local presence may influence a foreign bank’s monitoring ability and access to information about borrowers. We observe no significant impact on the spread when there is local bank participation in a syndicated loan, nor do we find any significant influence of the presence of domestic-owned banks or foreign-owned banks on the spread. Additional estimations considering subsamples with exacerbated information asymmetries provide similar results. Therefore our conclusion is that local banks do not benefit from an advantage in monitoring ability and in information in Russia.
{"title":"Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans","authors":"Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski, L. Weill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1428239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1428239","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers whether local bank participation exerts an impact on the spreads for syndicated loans in Russia. Following Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), we test whether local banks possess a superior ability to deal with information asymmetries. Using a sample of 528 syndicated loans to Russian borrowers, we perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information on local bank participation and the characteristics of loans and borrowers. Unlike earlier studies, we distinguish foreign banks with a local presence from those without such presence. The intuition here is that a local presence may influence a foreign bank’s monitoring ability and access to information about borrowers. We observe no significant impact on the spread when there is local bank participation in a syndicated loan, nor do we find any significant influence of the presence of domestic-owned banks or foreign-owned banks on the spread. Additional estimations considering subsamples with exacerbated information asymmetries provide similar results. Therefore our conclusion is that local banks do not benefit from an advantage in monitoring ability and in information in Russia.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121213530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An electronic stock exchange is a market place where buyers and sellers of financial instruments conclude trades without physical contact. In India, we have electronic exchanges for currencies, commodities, equity, debt, etc. This article looks at the need for and importance of an electronic exchange for distressed bank loans and outlines the benefits that banks and financial institutions can realize by using the electronic trading platform for distressed loan sales. RBI issued detailed procedural guidelines in July, 2005 for sale of distressed loans to banks and ARCs (Asset Reconstruction Companies). It is observed that the performance of banks on the loan sales front is very tardy. The reasons are not far to seek. Currently, all loan sale deals are done off line and the entire loan sales cycle take about 45 to 60 days on an average. Introduction of electronic trading would substantially bring down the transaction processing time to less than a week.
{"title":"Electronic Trading of Distressed Bank Loans","authors":"R. Manickam","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1420702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1420702","url":null,"abstract":"An electronic stock exchange is a market place where buyers and sellers of financial instruments conclude trades without physical contact. In India, we have electronic exchanges for currencies, commodities, equity, debt, etc. This article looks at the need for and importance of an electronic exchange for distressed bank loans and outlines the benefits that banks and financial institutions can realize by using the electronic trading platform for distressed loan sales. RBI issued detailed procedural guidelines in July, 2005 for sale of distressed loans to banks and ARCs (Asset Reconstruction Companies). It is observed that the performance of banks on the loan sales front is very tardy. The reasons are not far to seek. Currently, all loan sale deals are done off line and the entire loan sales cycle take about 45 to 60 days on an average. Introduction of electronic trading would substantially bring down the transaction processing time to less than a week.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124856124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Liquidity premiums have been widely documented for equity and bond markets. However, there is a lack of easily implementable measures of systematic liquidity for bond markets, which are typically far less liquid. We show that a simple liquidity factor - based on the difference between corporate bond spreads and credit default swaps - is signifcantly associated with returns in a wide range of fixed income markets. The corresponding liquidity premium is time-varying but persistent and drives a fair amount of serial and cross-sectional variation in fixed income prices. Moreover, liquidity exposure varies predictably with maturity and credit rating suggesting a ight-to-quality phenomenon.
{"title":"A Global Liquidity Factor for Fixed Income Pricing","authors":"Andreas Gintschel, Christian Wiehenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1316820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1316820","url":null,"abstract":"Liquidity premiums have been widely documented for equity and bond markets. However, there is a lack of easily implementable measures of systematic liquidity for bond markets, which are typically far less liquid. We show that a simple liquidity factor - based on the difference between corporate bond spreads and credit default swaps - is signifcantly associated with returns in a wide range of fixed income markets. The corresponding liquidity premium is time-varying but persistent and drives a fair amount of serial and cross-sectional variation in fixed income prices. Moreover, liquidity exposure varies predictably with maturity and credit rating suggesting a ight-to-quality phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115669201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been a searing experience. The popping of a housing bubble exposed the subprime lending debacle, which in turn created a wider financial crisis. In its response to this crisis, the federal government has provided financial assistance to a number of financial institutions that are often described as 'too big to fail' (TBTF) – which, to those who associate antitrust with size, seems to bring antitrust potentially into the picture. This paper will offer a guide to the antitrust community that will cover the U.S. financial sector, financial regulation, and the debacle and subsequent financial crisis. The tensions that can arise between financial regulation and antitrust will be highlighted. TBTF is not one of them, however, because TBTF is about size and interconnectedness, but not about competition and market power. Although much progress has been made in removing anticompetitive elements from financial regulation over the past three to four decades, there are still important advances that can be made. The paper concludes by offering a set of policy recommendations for the removal of some of the important remaining elements of financial regulation that impede competition.
{"title":"Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the Antitrust Community","authors":"L. White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1426188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1426188","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been a searing experience. The popping of a housing bubble exposed the subprime lending debacle, which in turn created a wider financial crisis. In its response to this crisis, the federal government has provided financial assistance to a number of financial institutions that are often described as 'too big to fail' (TBTF) – which, to those who associate antitrust with size, seems to bring antitrust potentially into the picture. This paper will offer a guide to the antitrust community that will cover the U.S. financial sector, financial regulation, and the debacle and subsequent financial crisis. The tensions that can arise between financial regulation and antitrust will be highlighted. TBTF is not one of them, however, because TBTF is about size and interconnectedness, but not about competition and market power. Although much progress has been made in removing anticompetitive elements from financial regulation over the past three to four decades, there are still important advances that can be made. The paper concludes by offering a set of policy recommendations for the removal of some of the important remaining elements of financial regulation that impede competition.","PeriodicalId":315176,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124481414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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