Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1057/978-1-349-95839-9_1430
R. Haynes
{"title":"Moldova","authors":"R. Haynes","doi":"10.1057/978-1-349-95839-9_1430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95839-9_1430","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126082283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122865652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Back Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125798112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0004
Marinko Bobić
This chapter traces the military confrontation between Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the United States backed by the international community, known as the Gulf War. To understand Saddam's decision to militarily engage the US, one must go back to his rise in power, his beliefs, and consequences of the Iraq-Iran war, as well as the invasion of Kuwait. The simplified explanation is that Saddam found himself in a difficult domestic situation. He had to maintain an extensive system of control, partially dependent on coercion, and partially dependent on incentives and rewards. This system was shaken by the Iraq-Iran war. While such domestic crisis alone might not have induced Saddam to fight a losing war, his anomalous beliefs ensured that he thought he could win by seeing the US as unable to stomach another war. In a way, such a belief could be interpreted as a wrongly-perceived window of opportunity. The counter-factual assessment provides additional evidence that a change in these conditions would likely have led to a different outcome.
{"title":"Iraq: Military Confrontation with the United States and its Thirty-Three Allies","authors":"Marinko Bobić","doi":"10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter traces the military confrontation between Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the United States backed by the international community, known as the Gulf War. To understand Saddam's decision to militarily engage the US, one must go back to his rise in power, his beliefs, and consequences of the Iraq-Iran war, as well as the invasion of Kuwait. The simplified explanation is that Saddam found himself in a difficult domestic situation. He had to maintain an extensive system of control, partially dependent on coercion, and partially dependent on incentives and rewards. This system was shaken by the Iraq-Iran war. While such domestic crisis alone might not have induced Saddam to fight a losing war, his anomalous beliefs ensured that he thought he could win by seeing the US as unable to stomach another war. In a way, such a belief could be interpreted as a wrongly-perceived window of opportunity. The counter-factual assessment provides additional evidence that a change in these conditions would likely have led to a different outcome.","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"301 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131464431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"About the Author","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130606355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"List of Abbreviations","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132513673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of minor powers in asymmetric interstate conflicts, in line with problem-driven pragmatism. The framework examines how foreign support, window of opportunity, domestic crisis, regime stability, and anomalous beliefs shape their choices, particularly the choice to go to war. There are theoretical disagreements over definite roles each condition plays, the reason why further inquiry is justified. Moreover, to account for the possibility that conditions can offset or complement each other, the concept of conjunctural causation is utilised, reflecting on greater complexity in understanding the asymmetric conflict. An important caveat is raised, namely, that this study focuses on conventional interstate wars, because, unlike unconventional conflict, state actors have identifiable territory, resources, and military personnel. Such exposure makes them more vulnerable in asymmetric conflict compared to the vulnerability of non-state actors.
{"title":"In Search of a Theory of Minor Powers in Interstate Asymmetric Conflict","authors":"Marinko Bobić","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.8","url":null,"abstract":"The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of minor powers in asymmetric interstate conflicts, in line with problem-driven pragmatism. The framework examines how foreign support, window of opportunity, domestic crisis, regime stability, and anomalous beliefs shape their choices, particularly the choice to go to war. There are theoretical disagreements over definite roles each condition plays, the reason why further inquiry is justified. Moreover, to account for the possibility that conditions can offset or complement each other, the concept of conjunctural causation is utilised, reflecting on greater complexity in understanding the asymmetric conflict. An important caveat is raised, namely, that this study focuses on conventional interstate wars, because, unlike unconventional conflict, state actors have identifiable territory, resources, and military personnel. Such exposure makes them more vulnerable in asymmetric conflict compared to the vulnerability of non-state actors.","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115038541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0006
Marinko Bobić
Chapter six covers the military confrontation launched by the NATO alliance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 1999. It explains why and under what conditions Slobodan Milošević’s regime rejected a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. It does so by highlighting how antagonisms in Kosovo presented a unique domestic crisis, giving Milošević an opportunity to seize power and ride on the popular sentiment, but also limited Milošević’s ability to compromise with Kosovo Albanians. To retain regime stability and popularity, Milošević resisted compromising on Kosovo. In addition, he was given foreign support by Russia, which opposed NATO intervention at a diplomatic level. Once the conditions change, a counter-factual analysis shows that so does their causal power, further strengthening the findings.
{"title":"Serbia: Military Confrontation with NATO","authors":"Marinko Bobić","doi":"10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter six covers the military confrontation launched by the NATO alliance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 1999. It explains why and under what conditions Slobodan Milošević’s regime rejected a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. It does so by highlighting how antagonisms in Kosovo presented a unique domestic crisis, giving Milošević an opportunity to seize power and ride on the popular sentiment, but also limited Milošević’s ability to compromise with Kosovo Albanians. To retain regime stability and popularity, Milošević resisted compromising on Kosovo. In addition, he was given foreign support by Russia, which opposed NATO intervention at a diplomatic level. Once the conditions change, a counter-factual analysis shows that so does their causal power, further strengthening the findings.","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"516 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133307096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endnotes","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xmm.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132655038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0005
Marinko Bobić
Chapter five focuses on the asymmetric conflict between Moldova and the Russian forces which supported separatists in Transnistria. The purpose was to uncover why Mircea Snegur’s Moldovan regime seemed unyielding to Russian demands, which resulted in armed conflict. The underlying argument is primarily based on the necessary condition, namely that Chisinau had a domestic crisis that needed immediate attention. Moldova was trying to claim its sovereignty, where an important step entailed establishing a common identity and territorial control. While Snegur’s presidency was stable and popular, it was dependent on nationalists’ support. Such dependency required policies that marginalised minorities and fuelled conflict with Russia, which wanted to retain Moldova within its sphere of influence. However, having perceived numerous crises unfolding in the late Soviet Union and emerging Russia, Snegur made a calculatable gamble that Russia would not be able to commit to a conflict. In other words, Snegur perceived a window of opportunity. The gamble failed, however. Nonetheless, with a counter-factual assessment, these findings are further strengthened.
{"title":"Moldova: Military Confrontation with Russian Forces","authors":"Marinko Bobić","doi":"10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529205206.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter five focuses on the asymmetric conflict between Moldova and the Russian forces which supported separatists in Transnistria. The purpose was to uncover why Mircea Snegur’s Moldovan regime seemed unyielding to Russian demands, which resulted in armed conflict. The underlying argument is primarily based on the necessary condition, namely that Chisinau had a domestic crisis that needed immediate attention. Moldova was trying to claim its sovereignty, where an important step entailed establishing a common identity and territorial control. While Snegur’s presidency was stable and popular, it was dependent on nationalists’ support. Such dependency required policies that marginalised minorities and fuelled conflict with Russia, which wanted to retain Moldova within its sphere of influence. However, having perceived numerous crises unfolding in the late Soviet Union and emerging Russia, Snegur made a calculatable gamble that Russia would not be able to commit to a conflict. In other words, Snegur perceived a window of opportunity. The gamble failed, however. Nonetheless, with a counter-factual assessment, these findings are further strengthened.","PeriodicalId":317648,"journal":{"name":"Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133549580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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