Book review of Moi, Toril, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary studies after Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, Chicago : Chicago University Press, 2017. 290 pages.
{"title":"Review of Revolution of the Ordinary by Toril Moi","authors":"R. Vinten","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I2.3460","url":null,"abstract":"Book review of Moi, Toril, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary studies after Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, Chicago : Chicago University Press, 2017. 290 pages.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75357634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this very first contribution to the new section "Replies", Venturinha adresses some concerns of general interest regarding intrerpretative discussions of Wittgenstein's work, in the form of a reply to James W. Hearne and Marcos Silva. The section aims at opening up for constructive discussion on themes which have arisen in earlier issues of Nordic Wittgenstein Review. The section is open for submissions via http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com.
{"title":"Matters of Fact and Relations of Ideas","authors":"Nuno Venturinha","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3449","url":null,"abstract":"In this very first contribution to the new section \"Replies\", Venturinha adresses some concerns of general interest regarding intrerpretative discussions of Wittgenstein's work, in the form of a reply to James W. Hearne and Marcos Silva. The section aims at opening up for constructive discussion on themes which have arisen in earlier issues of Nordic Wittgenstein Review. The section is open for submissions via http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72704865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is often held that Wittgenstein had to introduce numbers in elementary propositions due to problems related to the so-called colour-exclusion problem. I argue in this paper that he had other reasons for introducing them, reasons that arise from an investigation of the continuity of visual space and what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘intensional infinity’. In addition, I argue that the introduction of numbers by this route was prior to introducing them via the colour-exclusion problem. To conclude, I discuss two problems that Wittgenstein faced in the writings before Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929), problems that are independent of the colour-exclusion problem but dependent on the introduction of numbers in elementary propositions.
{"title":"Numbers in Elementary Propositions","authors":"A. Nakano","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3438","url":null,"abstract":"It is often held that Wittgenstein had to introduce numbers in elementary propositions due to problems related to the so-called colour-exclusion problem. I argue in this paper that he had other reasons for introducing them, reasons that arise from an investigation of the continuity of visual space and what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘intensional infinity’. In addition, I argue that the introduction of numbers by this route was prior to introducing them via the colour-exclusion problem. To conclude, I discuss two problems that Wittgenstein faced in the writings before Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929), problems that are independent of the colour-exclusion problem but dependent on the introduction of numbers in elementary propositions.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86955440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I seek to demonstrate the interplay of philosophical voices – particularly, that of a platonist voice and a community-agreement-view voice – that drives Wittgenstein’s rule-following dialectic forward; and I argue that each voice succumbs to a particular form of dialectical oscillation that renders its response to the problem of rule-following philosophically inadequate. Finally, I suggest that, by seeing and taking stock of the dilemma in which these responses to the skeptical problem are caught, we can come to appreciate Wittgenstein’s own view of what might constitute a proper a response to the so-called problem of rule-following. This view can be preliminarily characterized by saying that Wittgenstein’s aim is to dissolve the temptation to philosophically rebut the skeptical challenge posed by the rule-following dialectic, an aim he achieves by revealing the semantic emptiness of the apparent sentences that raise the skeptical problem.
{"title":"Excursus on Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations","authors":"Elek Lane","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v6i1.3423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v6i1.3423","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I seek to demonstrate the interplay of philosophical voices – particularly, that of a platonist voice and a community-agreement-view voice – that drives Wittgenstein’s rule-following dialectic forward; and I argue that each voice succumbs to a particular form of dialectical oscillation that renders its response to the problem of rule-following philosophically inadequate. Finally, I suggest that, by seeing and taking stock of the dilemma in which these responses to the skeptical problem are caught, we can come to appreciate Wittgenstein’s own view of what might constitute a proper a response to the so-called problem of rule-following. This view can be preliminarily characterized by saying that Wittgenstein’s aim is to dissolve the temptation to philosophically rebut the skeptical challenge posed by the rule-following dialectic, an aim he achieves by revealing the semantic emptiness of the apparent sentences that raise the skeptical problem.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"125 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76461405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Book review of Rebecca Schuman: Kafka and Wittgenstein: The Case for an Analytic Modernism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015.
丽贝卡·舒曼书评:卡夫卡与维特根斯坦:分析现代主义的案例。埃文斯顿:西北大学出版社，2015。
{"title":"Review of Rebecca Schuman: \"Kafka and Wittgenstein\"","authors":"H. Strandberg","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3447","url":null,"abstract":"Book review of Rebecca Schuman: Kafka and Wittgenstein: The Case for an Analytic Modernism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"111 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76373255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Book review of Ian Dearden: Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense? An inquiry into the possibility of illusions of meaning (Revised edition). London, Rellet Press 2013, 136 pp.
{"title":"Review of Ian Dearden: \"Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense?\"","authors":"Antony Fredriksson","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3445","url":null,"abstract":"Book review of Ian Dearden: Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense? An inquiry into the possibility of illusions of meaning (Revised edition). London, Rellet Press 2013, 136 pp.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81035394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does one’s love for a particular person, when it is pure, also constitute a love of life? The significance of speaking about leading a passionate life, I submit, is found in the spontaneous, embodied character of opening up to and finding meaning in one’s life rather than in heightened fleeting feelings or experiences of meaning that help one forget life’s meaninglessness. I contrast this view with Simone Weil’s suspicion that our passionate attachment to another person is an obstacle to attending to him or her from the distance proper to love and friendship. From that perspective it appears as if the meaning with which personal love endows life is mostly illusory, including the loss of meaning characteristic of grief. I question whether Weil’s view should be seen as an unconditional, though for most unattainable, ideal of love, or if it is rather expressive of a rejection of one of the central features of love: the vulnerability that ensues from the recognition that when we love there are times where we stand in need of the other’s love to be able to embrace life as meaningful.
{"title":"Passion for Life: Love and Meaning","authors":"Camilla Kronqvist","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3424","url":null,"abstract":"Does one’s love for a particular person, when it is pure, also constitute a love of life? The significance of speaking about leading a passionate life, I submit, is found in the spontaneous, embodied character of opening up to and finding meaning in one’s life rather than in heightened fleeting feelings or experiences of meaning that help one forget life’s meaninglessness. I contrast this view with Simone Weil’s suspicion that our passionate attachment to another person is an obstacle to attending to him or her from the distance proper to love and friendship. From that perspective it appears as if the meaning with which personal love endows life is mostly illusory, including the loss of meaning characteristic of grief. I question whether Weil’s view should be seen as an unconditional, though for most unattainable, ideal of love, or if it is rather expressive of a rejection of one of the central features of love: the vulnerability that ensues from the recognition that when we love there are times where we stand in need of the other’s love to be able to embrace life as meaningful.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87053930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the Investigations that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his remark should be taken more at face value, and that we can understand its purport via a consideration of the notion of consisting in. I explore this multi-faceted notion and its connection with (an extended version of) the Context Principle, beginning with the case of certain “propositional attitudes” and moving on to sensations. Wittgenstein was right to think it a philosophical prejudice to say that X’s being in pain, say, must consist in, be constituted by, something.
{"title":"\"Not a Something\"","authors":"R. Teichmann","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3446","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the Investigations that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his remark should be taken more at face value, and that we can understand its purport via a consideration of the notion of consisting in. I explore this multi-faceted notion and its connection with (an extended version of) the Context Principle, beginning with the case of certain “propositional attitudes” and moving on to sensations. Wittgenstein was right to think it a philosophical prejudice to say that X’s being in pain, say, must consist in, be constituted by, something.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82432901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright were Wittgenstein’s literary heirs and edited many posthumous volumes from Wittgenstein’s writings. Their archived correspondence provides unique insights into this editorial work. The selection of letters written by Rhees which is presented here stems from an early phase of his editorial endeavour to shed light on Wittgenstein’s philosophical development between the TLP and the PI. The letters were written between 1962 and 1964, in connection with the volume that appeared as Philosophische Bemerkungen (PB 1964), and show how Rhees’ understanding of Wittgenstein’s texts developed during editing. They contain some of the central considerations that governed Rhees’ work as Wittgenstein’s literary executor.
{"title":"The Logbook of Editing Wittgenstein's \"Philosophische Bemerkungen\"","authors":"Christian Erbacher, Julia Jung, A. Seibel","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V6I1.3442","url":null,"abstract":"Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright were Wittgenstein’s literary heirs and edited many posthumous volumes from Wittgenstein’s writings. Their archived correspondence provides unique insights into this editorial work. The selection of letters written by Rhees which is presented here stems from an early phase of his editorial endeavour to shed light on Wittgenstein’s philosophical development between the TLP and the PI. The letters were written between 1962 and 1964, in connection with the volume that appeared as Philosophische Bemerkungen (PB 1964), and show how Rhees’ understanding of Wittgenstein’s texts developed during editing. They contain some of the central considerations that governed Rhees’ work as Wittgenstein’s literary executor.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75296989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Drawing on recent work on the nature of the numbering system of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s use of that system in his composition of the Prototractatus, the paper sets out the rationale for the online tool called The University of Iowa Tractatus Map. The map consists of a website with a front page that links to two separate subway-style maps of the hypertextual numbering system Wittgenstein used in his Tractatus. One map displays the structure of the published Tractatus; the other lays out the structure of the Prototractatus. The site makes available the full text of the German and the two canonical English translations. While we envisage the map as a tool that we would like a wide variety of readers to find helpful, we argue that our website amounts to a radically new edition of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, with far-reaching implications for the interpretation of that text. In particular, we claim that our visually compelling presentation of the book’s overall structure delivers on Wittgenstein’s cryptic claim in a letter to his publisher that it is the numbers that “make the book surveyable and clear”.
{"title":"The University of Iowa Tractatus Map","authors":"D. Stern","doi":"10.15845/NWR.V5I2.3437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/NWR.V5I2.3437","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on recent work on the nature of the numbering system of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s use of that system in his composition of the Prototractatus, the paper sets out the rationale for the online tool called The University of Iowa Tractatus Map. The map consists of a website with a front page that links to two separate subway-style maps of the hypertextual numbering system Wittgenstein used in his Tractatus. One map displays the structure of the published Tractatus; the other lays out the structure of the Prototractatus. The site makes available the full text of the German and the two canonical English translations. While we envisage the map as a tool that we would like a wide variety of readers to find helpful, we argue that our website amounts to a radically new edition of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, with far-reaching implications for the interpretation of that text. In particular, we claim that our visually compelling presentation of the book’s overall structure delivers on Wittgenstein’s cryptic claim in a letter to his publisher that it is the numbers that “make the book surveyable and clear”.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81733846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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