{"title":"Introduction: Wittgenstein and Feminism","authors":"M. Provost, J. Trächtler, S. Laugier","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3651","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction to Special Issue","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77513378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My paper deals with the fragility of women and girls’ voices in sexist contexts. I describe this situation as one of linguistic injustice, and I propose an approach based on Wittgenstein and Cavell’s works. I argue that the characteristic female experience of being silenced when they express their experiences in sexist contexts can be understood as a lack of attunement with the community of male locutors.
{"title":"Linguistic Injustice","authors":"Layla Raïd","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3639","url":null,"abstract":"My paper deals with the fragility of women and girls’ voices in sexist contexts. I describe this situation as one of linguistic injustice, and I propose an approach based on Wittgenstein and Cavell’s works. I argue that the characteristic female experience of being silenced when they express their experiences in sexist contexts can be understood as a lack of attunement with the community of male locutors.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"111 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75966833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At Oxford University, in the context of WW2, when men were largely obliged to abandon the university benches to take part in the war effort, four women philosophers, Iris Murdoch (1919-1999), Mary Midgley (1919-2018), Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) and Philippa Foot (1920-2010), formed a group of philosophical reflections that would become a competitor, after the war, to John L. Austin’s famous ‘Saturday Mornings’. At the heart of the concerns of this ‘wartime quartet’: putting the importance of being human back at the centre of ethics. They opposed “modern moral philosophy” and its many presuppositions, including the claim that ethical questions are independent of the facts of human life or concern a purely rational subject abstracted from everyday issues and from its belonging to the human species. By putting the importance of being human back at the heart of their ethical reflections, these philosophers came to reflect on issues that directly concern human life, far from the philosophical abstractions that interested their men homologues. In this paper, I explore the extent to which this re-inscription of philosophy into everyday life and into ordinary human concerns, opens the way to a feminist philosophy and ethics.
在牛津大学，在二战的背景下，当男性在很大程度上被迫放弃大学的长椅参加战争时，四位女哲学家，Iris Murdoch (1919-1999)， Mary Midgley (1919-2018)， Elizabeth Anscombe(1919-2001)和Philippa Foot(1920-2010)，组成了一个哲学反思小组，在战争结束后，这将成为约翰·l·奥斯汀著名的“周六早晨”的竞争对手。这一“战时四重奏”关注的核心是:将做人的重要性重新置于伦理的中心。他们反对“现代道德哲学”及其许多预设，包括声称伦理问题独立于人类生活的事实，或涉及从日常问题中抽象出来的纯粹理性主体，以及它属于人类物种。通过将作为人的重要性重新置于他们伦理思考的核心，这些哲学家开始思考与人类生活直接相关的问题，而不是他们的男性同代人感兴趣的哲学抽象。在本文中，我探讨了这种将哲学重新铭刻到日常生活和普通人类关注的程度，为女性主义哲学和伦理学开辟了道路。
{"title":"Philosophy of everyday life","authors":"Valérie Aucouturier","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3638","url":null,"abstract":"At Oxford University, in the context of WW2, when men were largely obliged to abandon the university benches to take part in the war effort, four women philosophers, Iris Murdoch (1919-1999), Mary Midgley (1919-2018), Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) and Philippa Foot (1920-2010), formed a group of philosophical reflections that would become a competitor, after the war, to John L. Austin’s famous ‘Saturday Mornings’. At the heart of the concerns of this ‘wartime quartet’: putting the importance of being human back at the centre of ethics. They opposed “modern moral philosophy” and its many presuppositions, including the claim that ethical questions are independent of the facts of human life or concern a purely rational subject abstracted from everyday issues and from its belonging to the human species. By putting the importance of being human back at the heart of their ethical reflections, these philosophers came to reflect on issues that directly concern human life, far from the philosophical abstractions that interested their men homologues. In this paper, I explore the extent to which this re-inscription of philosophy into everyday life and into ordinary human concerns, opens the way to a feminist philosophy and ethics.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90082986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the Tractactus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein concludes that what cannot be spoken about is better left unsaid, which would correspond to everything that is not scientific language susceptible of being formalized in the propositional framework. It is not until Philosophical Investigations that he will find the formula of the “expression” taken in an encompassing sense with its notion of “seeing aspects”. For his part, in his course “Le problème de la parole”, Merleau-Ponty, elaborates a reflection on language that begins with the consideration of the scientific and logical naivety of language, in relation to Saussure's linguistics, and ends with the comparison between Proust and Stendhal. In this last part, he proposes that literature, as a creative language and an expressive operation, is both true life, connected with the ontological foundation of what exists, and phenomenology that shows the institution of that life. In both authors, the logical consideration is overwhelmed by the expressive power of language. Our contribution will make a comparison between Wittgenstein's and Merleau-Ponty's reflections on language and expressiveness. With this, we will seek to propose the bases of a feminist theory of expression, that is, a theory that seeks to show the particularity of female expressiveness.
在《逻辑哲学论》中，维特根斯坦总结说，不能说的东西最好不说，这就对应于一切非科学语言，容易在命题框架中形式化。直到《哲学研究》，他才找到了“表达”的公式，在它的“看得见的方面”的概念的包罗万象的意义上。梅洛-庞蒂在他的课程“Le problem de la parole”中，阐述了对语言的反思，从考虑语言的科学和逻辑纯朴开始，与索绪尔的语言学有关，以普鲁斯特和司汤达的比较结束。在最后一部分中，他提出文学作为一种创造性的语言和表达的操作，既是与存在的本体论基础相联系的真实生活，又是表现这种生活制度的现象学。在两位作者的作品中，逻辑思考都被语言的表现力所压倒。我们的贡献是比较维特根斯坦和梅洛-庞蒂对语言和表现力的思考。在此基础上，我们将试图提出女权主义表达理论的基础，即一种旨在展示女性表达能力特殊性的理论。
{"title":"In Search of a Feminist Theory of Expression","authors":"Luz Ascárate","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3623","url":null,"abstract":"In the Tractactus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein concludes that what cannot be spoken about is better left unsaid, which would correspond to everything that is not scientific language susceptible of being formalized in the propositional framework. It is not until Philosophical Investigations that he will find the formula of the “expression” taken in an encompassing sense with its notion of “seeing aspects”. For his part, in his course “Le problème de la parole”, Merleau-Ponty, elaborates a reflection on language that begins with the consideration of the scientific and logical naivety of language, in relation to Saussure's linguistics, and ends with the comparison between Proust and Stendhal. In this last part, he proposes that literature, as a creative language and an expressive operation, is both true life, connected with the ontological foundation of what exists, and phenomenology that shows the institution of that life. In both authors, the logical consideration is overwhelmed by the expressive power of language. Our contribution will make a comparison between Wittgenstein's and Merleau-Ponty's reflections on language and expressiveness. With this, we will seek to propose the bases of a feminist theory of expression, that is, a theory that seeks to show the particularity of female expressiveness.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84807737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miranda Fricker’s account of what is involved in cases of hermeneutical injustice has been criticised for neglecting the existence of alternative hermeneutical resources developed by non-dominant groups and consequently overlooking its members’ cognitive agency. I argue that this critical strand might be extended to consider what I call “uncontroversial cases of hermeneutical injustice”, i.e. cases in which no alternative resources are available, but marginalized subjects can still be said to resist dominant interpretations of their experiences. Following Alice Crary, I trace the limitations of Fricker’s original account of hermeneutical injustice back to her reliance on a neutral conception of reason and argue that widening the realm of rationality to accommodate affective responses authorizes a revaluation of marginalized subjects’ agency under ideological systems. To illustrate this point, I indicate that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on hinges present a notion of objectivity that serves liberatory projects and might guide a more adequate response to cases of hermeneutical injustice.
{"title":"Speaking Silences","authors":"Camila Lobo","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3643","url":null,"abstract":"Miranda Fricker’s account of what is involved in cases of hermeneutical injustice has been criticised for neglecting the existence of alternative hermeneutical resources developed by non-dominant groups and consequently overlooking its members’ cognitive agency. I argue that this critical strand might be extended to consider what I call “uncontroversial cases of hermeneutical injustice”, i.e. cases in which no alternative resources are available, but marginalized subjects can still be said to resist dominant interpretations of their experiences. Following Alice Crary, I trace the limitations of Fricker’s original account of hermeneutical injustice back to her reliance on a neutral conception of reason and argue that widening the realm of rationality to accommodate affective responses authorizes a revaluation of marginalized subjects’ agency under ideological systems. To illustrate this point, I indicate that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on hinges present a notion of objectivity that serves liberatory projects and might guide a more adequate response to cases of hermeneutical injustice.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82538032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue that humour is an underutilized tool in countering social injustice. Within feminist epistemology much has been made about implicit bias stemming from knowledge gaps. Yet studies that have shown that awareness of our implicit bias does little to change our behaviour. Instead, I argue that overcoming bias might require a less purely intellectual, more creative approach. Wittgenstein speculated that one could write a book of philosophy entirely in the form of jokes. In part, he thought that jokes offer an illuminating synopsis or overview of a state of affairs. We might even say jokes offer a fresh gestalt. It’s not just about a picture of the facts, but of our attitude towards them. As a result, while it can be tempting to respond to oppressive comments or slurs with outrage and indignation, there is a unique effect when we respond with a joke. First, jokes can reframe the perspective suggested by the slur. Second, jokes allow the speaker to make a lateral conversational move to evade being trapped in a defensive argumentative position. Using tone to open up new discursive planes allows for more communicative possibilities on an emotional as well as intellectual level.
{"title":"Joke's On Who","authors":"Lisa McKeown","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3622","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that humour is an underutilized tool in countering social injustice. Within feminist epistemology much has been made about implicit bias stemming from knowledge gaps. Yet studies that have shown that awareness of our implicit bias does little to change our behaviour. Instead, I argue that overcoming bias might require a less purely intellectual, more creative approach. Wittgenstein speculated that one could write a book of philosophy entirely in the form of jokes. In part, he thought that jokes offer an illuminating synopsis or overview of a state of affairs. We might even say jokes offer a fresh gestalt. It’s not just about a picture of the facts, but of our attitude towards them. As a result, while it can be tempting to respond to oppressive comments or slurs with outrage and indignation, there is a unique effect when we respond with a joke. First, jokes can reframe the perspective suggested by the slur. Second, jokes allow the speaker to make a lateral conversational move to evade being trapped in a defensive argumentative position. Using tone to open up new discursive planes allows for more communicative possibilities on an emotional as well as intellectual level. \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84270684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is the second of two parts of an interview with Alice Crary conducted in a single exchange in the first weeks of January 2022, where she discusses ordinary language philosophy and feminism, Wittgenstein’s conception of mind and its relation to feminist ethics, the link between Wittgenstein and Critical Theory, and her own views about efforts to bring about social and political transformations. The first part on “Wittgenstein and Feminism” is published in the NWR Special Issue “Wittgenstein and Feminism”, forthcoming later this year.
{"title":"Wittgenstein and Critical Theory: Mickaëlle Provost in Conversation with Alice Crary","authors":"Alice Crary, M. Provost","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3650","url":null,"abstract":"This is the second of two parts of an interview with Alice Crary conducted in a single exchange in the first weeks of January 2022, where she discusses ordinary language philosophy and feminism, Wittgenstein’s conception of mind and its relation to feminist ethics, the link between Wittgenstein and Critical Theory, and her own views about efforts to bring about social and political transformations. The first part on “Wittgenstein and Feminism” is published in the NWR Special Issue “Wittgenstein and Feminism”, forthcoming later this year.","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"201 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81083048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jônadas Techio, The Threat of Solipsism: Wittgenstein and Cavell on Meaning, Skepticism, and Finitude","authors":"R. P. Severo","doi":"10.15845/nwr.v11.3641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v11.3641","url":null,"abstract":"Book review","PeriodicalId":31828,"journal":{"name":"Nordic Wittgenstein Review","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79359418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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