{"title":"The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International Adjudication","authors":"Joseph R. Brubaker","doi":"10.15779/Z38X65P","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38X65P","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125205540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The adjudication of transnational criminal cases is burdened by a very narrow compulsory process mechanism known as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. These treaties regularize foreign evidence gathering for prosecutors and explicitly prevent their use by criminal defendants. The danger of inaccurate verdicts and wrongful convictions that may result from unequal access to evidence highlights the need to resolve this flawed transnational adjudication process, and specifically, its evidentiary method. Building on the works of Neil Komesar, Ronald Coase, and Mancur Nelson, the author utilizes a comparative institutional analysis approach to consider the question of how to obtain parity between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to compel foreign evidence in transnational criminal cases. The issue is of great importance in a post-9/11 world where the fairness and accuracy norms that underpin criminal prosecutions are increasingly ephemeral and illusory. The comparative framework illumes the important considerations for identifying the institution best suited to achieve the norm of parity. Criminal process scholars have not explicitly utilized the comparative institutional analysis framework. This oversight is a mistake. The comparative framework provides an ideal theory to dissect criminal process questions. Explicit institutional comparison, rather than simplistic single institutional considerations, should underlie criminal process scholarship addressing fairness and equity norms.
{"title":"Convicting the Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Approach to the Problem","authors":"L. S. Richardson","doi":"10.15779/Z38207M","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38207M","url":null,"abstract":"The adjudication of transnational criminal cases is burdened by a very narrow compulsory process mechanism known as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. These treaties regularize foreign evidence gathering for prosecutors and explicitly prevent their use by criminal defendants. The danger of inaccurate verdicts and wrongful convictions that may result from unequal access to evidence highlights the need to resolve this flawed transnational adjudication process, and specifically, its evidentiary method. Building on the works of Neil Komesar, Ronald Coase, and Mancur Nelson, the author utilizes a comparative institutional analysis approach to consider the question of how to obtain parity between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to compel foreign evidence in transnational criminal cases. The issue is of great importance in a post-9/11 world where the fairness and accuracy norms that underpin criminal prosecutions are increasingly ephemeral and illusory. The comparative framework illumes the important considerations for identifying the institution best suited to achieve the norm of parity. Criminal process scholars have not explicitly utilized the comparative institutional analysis framework. This oversight is a mistake. The comparative framework provides an ideal theory to dissect criminal process questions. Explicit institutional comparison, rather than simplistic single institutional considerations, should underlie criminal process scholarship addressing fairness and equity norms.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131444818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Should reputational protections exist for the dead in general and in artistic works in particular? After all, there currently seems to be a trend to spice up depictions of actual incidents by adding imaginary elements, or to intersperse historical facts and figures to render a fully made-up story more credible. The present article examines whether family heirs have legally cognizable rights against inaccurate portrayals of their deceased relatives. Toward this end, the article compares U.S. law to the quite different German approach in the Mephisto decision - a landmark ruling issued by German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) that established a right to posthumous personality protections based on human dignity (BVerfGE 30, 173). The traditional common law position is, however, that the publication of defamatory material about a deceased person does not give rise to a cause of action by relatives or an organization having the task of protecting the deceased's reputation, and that even a commenced action often has no survivability. This the dead don't hear approach gets - as said - contrasted with the wide-ranging protection for deceased persons in Germany, which is only limited by the passage of time. The article covers in comparative perspective issue such as human dignity as a constitutional value, the basis of of postmortales Persoenlichkeitsrecht including its time span and rights to sue, the prospects for developing a common law posthumous personality right, the particular value of artistic expressions and the remedies available.
{"title":"Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights - An Analysis of U.S. and German Constitutional and Tort Law","authors":"H. Rösler","doi":"10.15779/Z38SH3W","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38SH3W","url":null,"abstract":"Should reputational protections exist for the dead in general and in artistic works in particular? After all, there currently seems to be a trend to spice up depictions of actual incidents by adding imaginary elements, or to intersperse historical facts and figures to render a fully made-up story more credible. The present article examines whether family heirs have legally cognizable rights against inaccurate portrayals of their deceased relatives. Toward this end, the article compares U.S. law to the quite different German approach in the Mephisto decision - a landmark ruling issued by German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) that established a right to posthumous personality protections based on human dignity (BVerfGE 30, 173). The traditional common law position is, however, that the publication of defamatory material about a deceased person does not give rise to a cause of action by relatives or an organization having the task of protecting the deceased's reputation, and that even a commenced action often has no survivability. This the dead don't hear approach gets - as said - contrasted with the wide-ranging protection for deceased persons in Germany, which is only limited by the passage of time. The article covers in comparative perspective issue such as human dignity as a constitutional value, the basis of of postmortales Persoenlichkeitsrecht including its time span and rights to sue, the prospects for developing a common law posthumous personality right, the particular value of artistic expressions and the remedies available.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114248803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to enhance judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory.
{"title":"The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils","authors":"Nuno Garoupa, Tom Ginsburg","doi":"10.15779/Z383S9H","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z383S9H","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to enhance judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127030301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic liberalization not only requires rules goveming economic exchange (such as multilateral trade agreements), but also institutions (such as courts) goveming how rules are enforced. However, once courts are established to govem economic exchange, they tend to expand their competence to political and social policy. Political scientists have used this theoretical framework to explain the evolution of national (for example the U.S. Supreme Court) and quasi-intemational (for example the European Court of Justice) judicial institutions. In this article, I explain how this model can be extended to a truly intemational "judicial" institution, the WTO's Appellate Body. The thesis of this article is that the Appellate Body has followed the process predicted by political science by using its institutional independence to develop doctrine that has spilled over to political and social policy areas.
{"title":"International Judicial Lawmaking: A Theoretical and Political Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body","authors":"S. Ghias","doi":"10.15779/Z38K36H","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38K36H","url":null,"abstract":"Economic liberalization not only requires rules goveming economic exchange (such as multilateral trade agreements), but also institutions (such as courts) goveming how rules are enforced. However, once courts are established to govem economic exchange, they tend to expand their competence to political and social policy. Political scientists have used this theoretical framework to explain the evolution of national (for example the U.S. Supreme Court) and quasi-intemational (for example the European Court of Justice) judicial institutions. In this article, I explain how this model can be extended to a truly intemational \"judicial\" institution, the WTO's Appellate Body. The thesis of this article is that the Appellate Body has followed the process predicted by political science by using its institutional independence to develop doctrine that has spilled over to political and social policy areas.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121170100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Acknowledging the special difficulty of managing the politically critical linkage of free trade with labor welfare and environmental protection across the Pacific Basin, this Article argues that, despite the differences between various regional free trade groupings, regional development of this linkage presents distinct advantages over the GATT model of global, multilateral standards. It examines the regional model that evolved as a product of controversies over NAFTA (and particularly the dispute resolution model originated in the NAFTA Side Agreements). The Article demonstrates how this model can be drawn upon to facilitate constructive linkage of trade liberalization with environmental and labor welfare, to meet the challenges for developing a Pacific Basin free trade area.
{"title":"AFTA after NAFTA: Regional Trade Blocs and the Propagation of Environmental and Labor Standards","authors":"Jack I. Garvey","doi":"10.15779/Z382W7G","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z382W7G","url":null,"abstract":"Acknowledging the special difficulty of managing the politically critical linkage of free trade with labor welfare and environmental protection across the Pacific Basin, this Article argues that, despite the differences between various regional free trade groupings, regional development of this linkage presents distinct advantages over the GATT model of global, multilateral standards. It examines the regional model that evolved as a product of controversies over NAFTA (and particularly the dispute resolution model originated in the NAFTA Side Agreements). The Article demonstrates how this model can be drawn upon to facilitate constructive linkage of trade liberalization with environmental and labor welfare, to meet the challenges for developing a Pacific Basin free trade area.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129118239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The arbitral decisions under Articles 21.3(c) of the DSU raise various legal questions that may poses a threat to the certainty and predictability of the WTO regime. This paper explores the potentially relevant factors for determining implementation periods, and performs a critical analysis of the difficulties arbitrators face when determining reasonable implementation periods. This paper also seeks to clarify what criteria should be relevant to the determination of a compliance deadline. This paper highlights factors that arbitrators may find determinative in 21.3(c) proceedings. With regard to domestic constitutional issues surrounding implementation, most arbitral decisions take the position that the amendment of an act by Parliament or Congress is generally more time-consuming than the amendment of an act by the Executive. As to social and political complexity, this paper concludes that simple contentiousness is not a sufficient consideration under Article 21.3(c) to justify a longer period of time. With regard to economic situations, it agrees with the view that economic harm suffered by foreign exporters should not have an impact on what is the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. As for the mandate of the arbitrator, this paper concludes that it is up to the implementing Member to determine the proper scope and content of anticipated legislation, and that only after the Member has selected how it will implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings, should an arbitrator consider whether the proposed reasonable period of time is the shortest period possible for the anticipated means of implementation within the legal system of that Member. The proper concern of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) is when, not what.
{"title":"How Much Time Is Reasonable - The Arbitral Decisions under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU","authors":"Shin-yi Peng","doi":"10.15779/Z38D65H","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38D65H","url":null,"abstract":"The arbitral decisions under Articles 21.3(c) of the DSU raise various legal questions that may poses a threat to the certainty and predictability of the WTO regime. This paper explores the potentially relevant factors for determining implementation periods, and performs a critical analysis of the difficulties arbitrators face when determining reasonable implementation periods. This paper also seeks to clarify what criteria should be relevant to the determination of a compliance deadline. This paper highlights factors that arbitrators may find determinative in 21.3(c) proceedings. With regard to domestic constitutional issues surrounding implementation, most arbitral decisions take the position that the amendment of an act by Parliament or Congress is generally more time-consuming than the amendment of an act by the Executive. As to social and political complexity, this paper concludes that simple contentiousness is not a sufficient consideration under Article 21.3(c) to justify a longer period of time. With regard to economic situations, it agrees with the view that economic harm suffered by foreign exporters should not have an impact on what is the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. As for the mandate of the arbitrator, this paper concludes that it is up to the implementing Member to determine the proper scope and content of anticipated legislation, and that only after the Member has selected how it will implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings, should an arbitrator consider whether the proposed reasonable period of time is the shortest period possible for the anticipated means of implementation within the legal system of that Member. The proper concern of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) is when, not what.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121894890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many of China's 150 million migrant workers travel from their rural homes to labor in the cities each year only to have their wages withheld by their employer. This phenomenon has led to riots, protests and violence by frustrated migrants. Therefore, finding a better means for resolving these wage disputes is crucial to preserving China's social stability. This article examines the various paths that migrants can take to get this money back. It argues that despite government attention to this problem, the formal dispute resolution system of arbitration and court tribunals has failed these workers because it is both inaccessible to them and ineffective at resolving their disputes. Instead, informal mediation is a far more suitable and effective means of inducing employers to pay the wages owed to the workers. Moreover, a case study of the organization Little Bird reveals how NGOs may be more successful at mediating these disputes than are government officials. This article is based on over two years of fieldwork in China, which includes countless interviews of the actors involved in the labor dispute resolution system, a review of internal government reports, Chinese laws and regulations, media reports, official handbooks and scholarly articles, as well as the observation of several labor arbitrations and mediations. In concluding, the article considers the options for reforming the China's labor dispute resolution system, the significance of the 2007 Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, and the implications of this paper's findings on the rule of law and social stability in China.
{"title":"Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China's Migrant Workers","authors":"Aaron Halegua","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1133731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1133731","url":null,"abstract":"Many of China's 150 million migrant workers travel from their rural homes to labor in the cities each year only to have their wages withheld by their employer. This phenomenon has led to riots, protests and violence by frustrated migrants. Therefore, finding a better means for resolving these wage disputes is crucial to preserving China's social stability. This article examines the various paths that migrants can take to get this money back. It argues that despite government attention to this problem, the formal dispute resolution system of arbitration and court tribunals has failed these workers because it is both inaccessible to them and ineffective at resolving their disputes. Instead, informal mediation is a far more suitable and effective means of inducing employers to pay the wages owed to the workers. Moreover, a case study of the organization Little Bird reveals how NGOs may be more successful at mediating these disputes than are government officials. This article is based on over two years of fieldwork in China, which includes countless interviews of the actors involved in the labor dispute resolution system, a review of internal government reports, Chinese laws and regulations, media reports, official handbooks and scholarly articles, as well as the observation of several labor arbitrations and mediations. In concluding, the article considers the options for reforming the China's labor dispute resolution system, the significance of the 2007 Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, and the implications of this paper's findings on the rule of law and social stability in China.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129001069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The jus ad bellum is generally viewed as a static field of law. The standard account is that when the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, it enshrined a complete prohibition on the use of force in inter-state relations, except when action is being taken in self-defense against an armed attack or under authorization of the UN Security Council. Yet it seems likely that in the years to come, many states and non-state actors will increasingly insist upon a different vision of the jus ad bellum, one that conceives of it as more protean in nature. Protean jus ad bellum acknowledges that, as of 1945, the static view was correct, but that over time-as we approach the 70th anniversary of the United Nations-the jus ad bellum is changing, buffeted in particular by several significant developments: (1) the emergence of weapons of mass destruction of various types potentially controllable by states and non-state actors; (2) the rise of global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state actors; (3) the elevation of the person to a central place in the realm of international law, both in terms of being protected and in terms of being accountable for misconduct; (4) the inability of the Security Council to be accepted by all states as a disinterested arbiter willing and capable of acting to address all threats to international peace and security as they arise; and (5) the continuing erosion of the sanctity of the sovereign state, resulting from exposure to myriad effects of globalization, including intrusive transnational rule of law programs, election monitoring, incessant and extensive media coverage, powerful transnational corporations and non-governmental organization, and relatively unrestricted transborder movement of capital, goods, and persons across borders.This essay suggests that the failure to either formally accept or reject the idea of protean jus ad bellum is likely, over time, to diminish the jus ad bellum's effectiveness as a normative regime. Too often transnational uses of military force are occurring in circumstances that are inconsistent with the idea of a static jus ad bellum: states and non-state actors are, at least in some situations, tolerating certain types of force in response to the overarching developments noted above. As the International Criminal Court moves closer to including aggression within its mandate for indicting and prosecuting persons, government leaders may see greater value in clarifying what uses of force are permissible. Things could continue as they are. But in the long-term, if the jus ad bellum is not to break down, then a more formal way should be found either to reject the notion of protean jus ad bellum or to accept it, and if the latter, then to try to identify the contemporary rules in this area, either through formal amendment of the UN Charter, through authoritative interpretations by the principal organs of the United Nations or regional organizations, or through other means.
{"title":"Protean Jus Ad Bellum","authors":"S. Murphy","doi":"10.15779/Z387H2Z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z387H2Z","url":null,"abstract":"The jus ad bellum is generally viewed as a static field of law. The standard account is that when the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, it enshrined a complete prohibition on the use of force in inter-state relations, except when action is being taken in self-defense against an armed attack or under authorization of the UN Security Council. Yet it seems likely that in the years to come, many states and non-state actors will increasingly insist upon a different vision of the jus ad bellum, one that conceives of it as more protean in nature. Protean jus ad bellum acknowledges that, as of 1945, the static view was correct, but that over time-as we approach the 70th anniversary of the United Nations-the jus ad bellum is changing, buffeted in particular by several significant developments: (1) the emergence of weapons of mass destruction of various types potentially controllable by states and non-state actors; (2) the rise of global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state actors; (3) the elevation of the person to a central place in the realm of international law, both in terms of being protected and in terms of being accountable for misconduct; (4) the inability of the Security Council to be accepted by all states as a disinterested arbiter willing and capable of acting to address all threats to international peace and security as they arise; and (5) the continuing erosion of the sanctity of the sovereign state, resulting from exposure to myriad effects of globalization, including intrusive transnational rule of law programs, election monitoring, incessant and extensive media coverage, powerful transnational corporations and non-governmental organization, and relatively unrestricted transborder movement of capital, goods, and persons across borders.This essay suggests that the failure to either formally accept or reject the idea of protean jus ad bellum is likely, over time, to diminish the jus ad bellum's effectiveness as a normative regime. Too often transnational uses of military force are occurring in circumstances that are inconsistent with the idea of a static jus ad bellum: states and non-state actors are, at least in some situations, tolerating certain types of force in response to the overarching developments noted above. As the International Criminal Court moves closer to including aggression within its mandate for indicting and prosecuting persons, government leaders may see greater value in clarifying what uses of force are permissible. Things could continue as they are. But in the long-term, if the jus ad bellum is not to break down, then a more formal way should be found either to reject the notion of protean jus ad bellum or to accept it, and if the latter, then to try to identify the contemporary rules in this area, either through formal amendment of the UN Charter, through authoritative interpretations by the principal organs of the United Nations or regional organizations, or through other means.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117062883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The WTO Doha Development Agenda: What Is at Stake","authors":"Christine Sevilla","doi":"10.15779/Z38F65V","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38F65V","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125116120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}