Introduction ...................................................................................................... 107 I. What "Shaming" Means and How It Works ............................................. 108 II. The "Tone at The Top" and Shaming within the Firm ............................. 110 III. The Wall Street Perp Walk ....................................................................... 112 IV. Shaming by Shareholders: CalPERS and Individual Activists ................. 113 V. Shaming Sentences and Penalties for Corporate Offenders ...................... 114 C onclu sion ....................................................................................................... 1 15
Introduction ......................................................................................................107 i,现在的“Shaming”表示一位,and如何学习It Works .............................................第108二世。《“Tone at The托普”,and Shaming within The Firm .............................110三世。《华尔街Perp“ .......................................................................股东们的羞辱：卡尔帕斯和个别的活动人士……113 V。对公司犯的可耻判决和处罚……第114 C onclu sion .......................................................................................................一个15
{"title":"Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein","authors":"Skeel, A. David","doi":"10.15779/Z382C5Z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z382C5Z","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction ...................................................................................................... 107 I. What \"Shaming\" Means and How It Works ............................................. 108 II. The \"Tone at The Top\" and Shaming within the Firm ............................. 110 III. The Wall Street Perp Walk ....................................................................... 112 IV. Shaming by Shareholders: CalPERS and Individual Activists ................. 113 V. Shaming Sentences and Penalties for Corporate Offenders ...................... 114 C onclu sion ....................................................................................................... 1 15","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130441354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B asel III ........................................................................................................ . . 4 Systemic Risk and the Dodd Frank Act ........................................................... 5 D FA and the FSO C .......................................................................................... 6 C onclusion ................................................................................................... 7
B分别三世 ........................................................................................................ . .4系统性风险和多德弗兰克法案 ...........................................................5 D FA和无线光通信C ..........................................................................................6 C onclusion ...................................................................................................7
{"title":"Systemic Risk and the Response to the Crisis","authors":"William S. Haraf","doi":"10.15779/Z38T86T","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38T86T","url":null,"abstract":"B asel III ........................................................................................................ . . 4 Systemic Risk and the Dodd Frank Act ........................................................... 5 D FA and the FSO C .......................................................................................... 6 C onclusion ................................................................................................... 7","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131995842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is part of a symposium in honor of William Klein on the subject of a functional typology of corporation law. Any typology must be animated by an underlying theory whose terms dictate the lines the typology draws. Here the focus is on the level of the theory that might animate the architecture of the grid. In particular, the article addresses the separation theorem, which states the implications of complete capital markets on shareholder preferences concerning corporate investment policy. The proposition is that the presence of markets in the characteristics that determine equity value makes a radical difference in the function played by corporate law, in these circumstances essentially limiting the criteria for good corporate law to a single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of shareholder wealth. I will illustrate the usefulness of a uni-criterion view of corporate law by briefly taking up two familiar issues that span the corporate law domain: the idea of a stakeholder-oriented board of directors in public corporations and the role of the courts in enforcing the reasonable expectations of private corporation shareholders.
{"title":"Separation and the Function of Corporation Law","authors":"R. Gilson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.732832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.732832","url":null,"abstract":"This article is part of a symposium in honor of William Klein on the subject of a functional typology of corporation law. Any typology must be animated by an underlying theory whose terms dictate the lines the typology draws. Here the focus is on the level of the theory that might animate the architecture of the grid. In particular, the article addresses the separation theorem, which states the implications of complete capital markets on shareholder preferences concerning corporate investment policy. The proposition is that the presence of markets in the characteristics that determine equity value makes a radical difference in the function played by corporate law, in these circumstances essentially limiting the criteria for good corporate law to a single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of shareholder wealth. I will illustrate the usefulness of a uni-criterion view of corporate law by briefly taking up two familiar issues that span the corporate law domain: the idea of a stakeholder-oriented board of directors in public corporations and the role of the courts in enforcing the reasonable expectations of private corporation shareholders.","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125836108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction................................................. 104 I. An Illustration of the Problem ......................... ...... 108 A. NYSE Operations ............................ ...... 108 1. The NYSE as an Auction Market .............. ...... 108 2. The Role of the Specialist ..................... ..... 109 B. The Regulatory Environment of the NYSE ...... .............. 111 1. The Nature of the Regulatory Scheme.............. ........ 111 2. The Regulation of Specialist Behavior ................. 113 C. Specialist Misconduct ......................... ...... 115 1. The Specialist Scandals of the Early 2000's ...... ....... 115 2. Inadequacy of NYSE Regulation ..........................117 3. Inadequacy of SEC Oversight.. ..................... 119 4. Inadequacy of the Threat of a Private Cause of Action..........121 D. The Free Ride ............................................. 127 II. NYSE Reform............... ...................... ..... 128 A. Governance Issues ............................... 128 B. Retention of the Specialist System........... .. .......... 129 C. The Current NYSE Structure ..................... ..... 130 D. Inadequacy of Reform. ......................... ...... 131 III. The Role of the Specialist .................................. 131 A. Arguments in Favor of Retaining Specialists ........ ......... 132 1. The Need for Human Judgment ............................. 132 2. Maintenance of Fair and Orderly Markets .................... 133 3. Reduced Volatility ......................... ...... 133 4. Enhanced Liquidity. .............................. 134 5. Increased Efficiency ........................ ...... 135
{"title":"The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failure of Self-Regulation","authors":"N. S. Ellis, L. M. Fairchild, Harold D. Fletcher","doi":"10.15779/Z38QK3Z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38QK3Z","url":null,"abstract":"TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction................................................. 104 I. An Illustration of the Problem ......................... ...... 108 A. NYSE Operations ............................ ...... 108 1. The NYSE as an Auction Market .............. ...... 108 2. The Role of the Specialist ..................... ..... 109 B. The Regulatory Environment of the NYSE ...... .............. 111 1. The Nature of the Regulatory Scheme.............. ........ 111 2. The Regulation of Specialist Behavior ................. 113 C. Specialist Misconduct ......................... ...... 115 1. The Specialist Scandals of the Early 2000's ...... ....... 115 2. Inadequacy of NYSE Regulation ..........................117 3. Inadequacy of SEC Oversight.. ..................... 119 4. Inadequacy of the Threat of a Private Cause of Action..........121 D. The Free Ride ............................................. 127 II. NYSE Reform............... ...................... ..... 128 A. Governance Issues ............................... 128 B. Retention of the Specialist System........... .. .......... 129 C. The Current NYSE Structure ..................... ..... 130 D. Inadequacy of Reform. ......................... ...... 131 III. The Role of the Specialist .................................. 131 A. Arguments in Favor of Retaining Specialists ........ ......... 132 1. The Need for Human Judgment ............................. 132 2. Maintenance of Fair and Orderly Markets .................... 133 3. Reduced Volatility ......................... ...... 133 4. Enhanced Liquidity. .............................. 134 5. Increased Efficiency ........................ ...... 135","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127046807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article concerns how to measure share price accuracy. It is prompted by the fact that many scholars believe that the prices established in the stock market affect the efficiency of the real economy.1 In their view, more accurate prices increase the amount of value added by capital-utilizing enterprises as these enterprises use society's scarce resources for the production of goods and services. More accurate share prices help improve both the quality of choice among new proposed investment projects in the economy and the operation of existing real assets currently in corporate hands.2 The proposition that more accurate share prices improve the efficiency of the real economy implies that promoting share price accuracy is a worthy goal of public policy. It would therefore be helpful to be able to measure whether the policies adopted in fact accomplish this aim. A wide variety of policy
{"title":"Measuring Share Price Accuracy","authors":"M. Fox","doi":"10.15779/Z38828V","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38828V","url":null,"abstract":"This Article concerns how to measure share price accuracy. It is prompted by the fact that many scholars believe that the prices established in the stock market affect the efficiency of the real economy.1 In their view, more accurate prices increase the amount of value added by capital-utilizing enterprises as these enterprises use society's scarce resources for the production of goods and services. More accurate share prices help improve both the quality of choice among new proposed investment projects in the economy and the operation of existing real assets currently in corporate hands.2 The proposition that more accurate share prices improve the efficiency of the real economy implies that promoting share price accuracy is a worthy goal of public policy. It would therefore be helpful to be able to measure whether the policies adopted in fact accomplish this aim. A wide variety of policy","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115958129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association1, Professor William Klein has provided useful normative parameters for the law of business associations. I believe, however, that we still have much work to do in trying to understand the positive parameters of the law, especially in a field where the object of study continues to evolve rapidly. This essay draws from the spirit of Klein's Criteria Project to suggest three major areas of socio-legal inquiry into the law of business associations, namely, private governance, the political economy of business associations, and the role of business association law in facilitating entrepreneurship. It also argues that such inquiry should be conducted through close empirical fieldwork. Much corporate law scholarship has been driven by high theory,2 and much of this inevitably has a normative bent. Although steeped in both the major theoretical debates and the finer points of legal doctrine, I have admired William Klein's scholarship less for its normative content than for its challenge of conventions and assumptions, always in ways that point to interesting empirical questions. For anyone interested in a more robust agenda for socio-legal understanding of contemporary business association, Klein's Criteria Project provides the beginnings of a useful roadmap for identifying the positive parameters for organizing the study of business associations. In some ways, however, Klein's categorization periodically mixes functions that could be usefully disaggregated and reconfigured. Therefore, the task of this brief essay is to identify what I think is most salient in Klein's criteria for the socio-legal scholar seriously interested in studying the institutions that govern contemporary business associations.
{"title":"Organizing the Socio-Legal Study of Business Associations","authors":"P. Edwards","doi":"10.15779/Z38KK3K","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38KK3K","url":null,"abstract":"In Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association1, Professor William Klein has provided useful normative parameters for the law of business associations. I believe, however, that we still have much work to do in trying to understand the positive parameters of the law, especially in a field where the object of study continues to evolve rapidly. This essay draws from the spirit of Klein's Criteria Project to suggest three major areas of socio-legal inquiry into the law of business associations, namely, private governance, the political economy of business associations, and the role of business association law in facilitating entrepreneurship. It also argues that such inquiry should be conducted through close empirical fieldwork. Much corporate law scholarship has been driven by high theory,2 and much of this inevitably has a normative bent. Although steeped in both the major theoretical debates and the finer points of legal doctrine, I have admired William Klein's scholarship less for its normative content than for its challenge of conventions and assumptions, always in ways that point to interesting empirical questions. For anyone interested in a more robust agenda for socio-legal understanding of contemporary business association, Klein's Criteria Project provides the beginnings of a useful roadmap for identifying the positive parameters for organizing the study of business associations. In some ways, however, Klein's categorization periodically mixes functions that could be usefully disaggregated and reconfigured. Therefore, the task of this brief essay is to identify what I think is most salient in Klein's criteria for the socio-legal scholar seriously interested in studying the institutions that govern contemporary business associations.","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124310631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Teaching Transactional Skills in Partnership with the Bar","authors":"Carl J. Circo","doi":"10.15779/Z38CP1T","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38CP1T","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122066753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Simplification of the Criteria for Good Corporate Law or Why Corporate Law Is Not as Important Anymore","authors":"E. Kitch","doi":"10.15779/Z38V00N","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38V00N","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125045394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction................................................151 I. Establishing Liability: The Present Options for Civil Litigation Against Cell Phone Manufacturers... ....................... 152 A. What Must a Litigant Prove to Recover? . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . 152 B. Causation: Satisfying the Daubert Standard for Expert Testimony ................................... ..... 153 C. Duty to Warn: The Effect of FCC Regulation on Liability After Pinney and Murray ...................... ....... 154 II. Possible Business Solutions for Cell phone Manufacturers .... ...... 158 A. Manufacturers Should Voluntarily Incorporate Warning Labels into Packaging ......................... ...... 158 B. Manufacturers Should Invest Heavily in R&D to Combat These Developing Issues.............. ................... 160 Conclusion ........................................................ 161
{"title":"Warning Labels and FCC Regulations: The New Legal and Business Frontier for Cell Phone Manufacturers","authors":"Stephen Rushin","doi":"10.15779/Z38M289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38M289","url":null,"abstract":"TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction................................................151 I. Establishing Liability: The Present Options for Civil Litigation Against Cell Phone Manufacturers... ....................... 152 A. What Must a Litigant Prove to Recover? . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . 152 B. Causation: Satisfying the Daubert Standard for Expert Testimony ................................... ..... 153 C. Duty to Warn: The Effect of FCC Regulation on Liability After Pinney and Murray ...................... ....... 154 II. Possible Business Solutions for Cell phone Manufacturers .... ...... 158 A. Manufacturers Should Voluntarily Incorporate Warning Labels into Packaging ......................... ...... 158 B. Manufacturers Should Invest Heavily in R&D to Combat These Developing Issues.............. ................... 160 Conclusion ........................................................ 161","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116620294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commodity Exchanges and Antitrust","authors":"James M. Falvey, Andrew N. Kleit","doi":"10.15779/Z38ZG4N","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38ZG4N","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132183802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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