{"title":"Strategic Benefit of Request for Proposal/Quotation","authors":"Leon Yang Chu, Ying Rong, Huan Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3200030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3200030","url":null,"abstract":"The Design of the Procurement Process","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122172457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian Rongqing Han, Lixia Wu, Tianshu Sun, Leon Yang Chu, Yinghui Xu
Many e-commerce platforms have established extensive networks of stations as their last-mile logistics infrastructure. In this study, we investigate how this last-mile infrastructure may serve as an offline platform to connect customers and merchants in the physical world and stimulate offline-to-online effect by leveraging the spontaneous walk-in traffic (organic interaction) and by prompting interested customers through online intervention (induced interaction). Using free sample distribution as an example, we design two large-scale experimental studies in collaboration with Alibaba---a quasi-experiment across 1,032 stations and a randomized field experiment among 189,019 customers---to examine the causal effects of organic and induced interactions on customers' subsequent online purchases at the focal brands, respectively. We find that induced interaction drives significantly more online sales compared with organic interaction. We further identify a textit{screening} mechanism underlying its effectiveness. Because of the additional traveling cost on the customer side, induced interaction tends to attract customers who have a stronger preference over the focal products. Such advantageous self-selection, in turn, leads to a large increase in customers' subsequent online engagement. Finally, we propose a customized targeting framework using instrumental forest to further enhance the effectiveness of induced interaction at the last-mile stations.
{"title":"Connecting Customers and Merchants Offline: Experimental Evidence From the Commercialization of Last-Mile Stations at Alibaba","authors":"Brian Rongqing Han, Lixia Wu, Tianshu Sun, Leon Yang Chu, Yinghui Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3452769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452769","url":null,"abstract":"Many e-commerce platforms have established extensive networks of stations as their last-mile logistics infrastructure. In this study, we investigate how this last-mile infrastructure may serve as an offline platform to connect customers and merchants in the physical world and stimulate offline-to-online effect by leveraging the spontaneous walk-in traffic (organic interaction) and by prompting interested customers through online intervention (induced interaction). Using free sample distribution as an example, we design two large-scale experimental studies in collaboration with Alibaba---a quasi-experiment across 1,032 stations and a randomized field experiment among 189,019 customers---to examine the causal effects of organic and induced interactions on customers' subsequent online purchases at the focal brands, respectively. We find that induced interaction drives significantly more online sales compared with organic interaction. We further identify a textit{screening} mechanism underlying its effectiveness. Because of the additional traveling cost on the customer side, induced interaction tends to attract customers who have a stronger preference over the focal products. Such advantageous self-selection, in turn, leads to a large increase in customers' subsequent online engagement. Finally, we propose a customized targeting framework using instrumental forest to further enhance the effectiveness of induced interaction at the last-mile stations.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"109 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126113133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stocks earn significantly negative abnormal returns before earnings announcements and positive after them. This "earnings announcement return cycle" (EARC) is unrelated to the earnings announcement premium, and it is a feature of stocks widely covered by analysts. Analysts' forecasts follow the same pattern as returns: analysts' forecasts become more optimistic after an earnings announcement and more pessimistic as the next one draws near. We attribute one-half of the earnings announcement return cycle to this optimism cycle. The EARC may stem from mispricing: both the return and optimism patterns are stronger among high-uncertainty and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks, and the EARC strategy is more profitable on days when it would accommodate larger amounts of arbitrage capital.
{"title":"The Earnings Announcement Return Cycle","authors":"Juhani T. Linnainmaa, Yingguang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3183318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183318","url":null,"abstract":"Stocks earn significantly negative abnormal returns before earnings announcements and positive after them. This \"earnings announcement return cycle\" (EARC) is unrelated to the earnings announcement premium, and it is a feature of stocks widely covered by analysts. Analysts' forecasts follow the same pattern as returns: analysts' forecasts become more optimistic after an earnings announcement and more pessimistic as the next one draws near. We attribute one-half of the earnings announcement return cycle to this optimism cycle. The EARC may stem from mispricing: both the return and optimism patterns are stronger among high-uncertainty and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks, and the EARC strategy is more profitable on days when it would accommodate larger amounts of arbitrage capital.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132884741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a pricing and information provisioning game between a better-informed seller (such as a retailer) and its customers. The seller is (ex post) better informed about product availability and can choose how to communicate this information to the customers. The customers are heterogeneous in their valuation for the product. The firm optimizes on publicly posted prices (which are the same for all customers) and its information provisioning (which can be personalized). Using a Bayesian persuasion framework, we find that public information provisioning, in which the firm sends the same information to all customers, has limited value. However, personalized information provisioning, in which the firm can share different information with different customers, has significant value and has attributes very similar to personalized pricing. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.
{"title":"Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning","authors":"K. Drakopoulos, Shobhit Jain, R. Randhawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3191629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191629","url":null,"abstract":"We study a pricing and information provisioning game between a better-informed seller (such as a retailer) and its customers. The seller is (ex post) better informed about product availability and can choose how to communicate this information to the customers. The customers are heterogeneous in their valuation for the product. The firm optimizes on publicly posted prices (which are the same for all customers) and its information provisioning (which can be personalized). Using a Bayesian persuasion framework, we find that public information provisioning, in which the firm sends the same information to all customers, has limited value. However, personalized information provisioning, in which the firm can share different information with different customers, has significant value and has attributes very similar to personalized pricing. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131459595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daniel Barron, R. Gibbons, Ricard Gil, Kevin J. Murphy
We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contr...
{"title":"Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority","authors":"Daniel Barron, R. Gibbons, Ricard Gil, Kevin J. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3153155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3153155","url":null,"abstract":"We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contr...","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114194067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xin Zheng, Xingyao Ren, Y. Hong, Jisu Cao, Sha Yang
To help consumers evaluate products that often differ along multiple dimensions, many online review platforms have started to implement multi-dimensional rating systems, wherein a user provides product ratings on multiple product dimensions, in addition to an overall product rating. In contrast with prior work that has primarily focused on the effects of overall product evaluation, we explore how dimensional ratings affect product sales from an information-inconsistency perspective. Drawing on the diagnosticity theory, we examine two types of information inconsistency in multi-dimensional rating systems: inconsistency across ratings on different dimensions of a product and inconsistency across reviewers for a product dimension. Based on panel data analysis of a unique proprietary data set combining multi-dimensional rating information on 456 car brand models with their corresponding monthly sales, we find that (1) while the highest rating among different dimensions does not have a significant impact, the lowest rating among different dimensions increases product sales; (2) the rating variance among different dimensions has an inverted U-shaped relationship with product sales; and (3) the negative impact of the variance across reviewers for a dimension is contingent on whether the dimension is a vertical or a horizontal attribute. Our findings offer important theoretical and managerial implications for a better understanding of multi-dimensional rating systems.
{"title":"Understanding the Impact of Multi-Dimensional Ratings on Product Sales: An Information-Inconsistency Perspective","authors":"Xin Zheng, Xingyao Ren, Y. Hong, Jisu Cao, Sha Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3148033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3148033","url":null,"abstract":"To help consumers evaluate products that often differ along multiple dimensions, many online review platforms have started to implement multi-dimensional rating systems, wherein a user provides product ratings on multiple product dimensions, in addition to an overall product rating. In contrast with prior work that has primarily focused on the effects of overall product evaluation, we explore how dimensional ratings affect product sales from an information-inconsistency perspective. Drawing on the diagnosticity theory, we examine two types of information inconsistency in multi-dimensional rating systems: inconsistency across ratings on different dimensions of a product and inconsistency across reviewers for a product dimension. Based on panel data analysis of a unique proprietary data set combining multi-dimensional rating information on 456 car brand models with their corresponding monthly sales, we find that (1) while the highest rating among different dimensions does not have a significant impact, the lowest rating among different dimensions increases product sales; (2) the rating variance among different dimensions has an inverted U-shaped relationship with product sales; and (3) the negative impact of the variance across reviewers for a dimension is contingent on whether the dimension is a vertical or a horizontal attribute. Our findings offer important theoretical and managerial implications for a better understanding of multi-dimensional rating systems.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128379034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
{"title":"Auctions with Endogenous Initiation","authors":"Alexander S. Gorbenko, A. Malenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3014110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3014110","url":null,"abstract":"We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"223 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122832089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines political lobbying and investigates firms’ decisions regarding whether to employ internal functionalities (i.e., to “make” or insource), to contract with external professionals (i.e., to “buy” or outsource), or to do both (i.e., to “make and buy” or plural source). I first develop an integrated framework based on the twin perspectives of economic efficiency and legitimacy. When the political audience faces little uncertainty about lobbying content, firms make sourcing decisions to maximize economic efficiency in producing such content in line with transaction cost economics and the capabilities view. However, when the political audience faces substantial uncertainty about lobbying content, it relies on the perceived legitimacy of the lobbying entity to draw inferences about the quality of the such content; therefore, the legitimacy of a potential lobbying entity matters to firms making sourcing decisions related to lobbying. Then, I connect firms’ sourcing decisions with several concrete characteristics of lobbying entities that can affect political audiences’ judgment regarding their legitimacy. Finally, I examine the tension that develops when legitimacy and economic efficiency considerations call for different forms of sourcing, and I examine how complementarities in plural sourcing help resolve this tension in certain situations.
{"title":"The 'Make and/or Buy' Decisions of Corporate Political Lobbying: Integrating the Economic Efficiency and Legitimacy Perspectives","authors":"Nan Jia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2943585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2943585","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines political lobbying and investigates firms’ decisions regarding whether to employ internal functionalities (i.e., to “make” or insource), to contract with external professionals (i.e., to “buy” or outsource), or to do both (i.e., to “make and buy” or plural source). I first develop an integrated framework based on the twin perspectives of economic efficiency and legitimacy. When the political audience faces little uncertainty about lobbying content, firms make sourcing decisions to maximize economic efficiency in producing such content in line with transaction cost economics and the capabilities view. However, when the political audience faces substantial uncertainty about lobbying content, it relies on the perceived legitimacy of the lobbying entity to draw inferences about the quality of the such content; therefore, the legitimacy of a potential lobbying entity matters to firms making sourcing decisions related to lobbying. Then, I connect firms’ sourcing decisions with several concrete characteristics of lobbying entities that can affect political audiences’ judgment regarding their legitimacy. Finally, I examine the tension that develops when legitimacy and economic efficiency considerations call for different forms of sourcing, and I examine how complementarities in plural sourcing help resolve this tension in certain situations.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"03 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130695226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We create a new database of retail prices in Argentina with over 10 million observations per day. Our main novel finding is that, different from Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2016), chains, rather than stores, explain most of the price variation in our data. We show this in three ways: (a) Even though chains have on average 158 stores, there are on average less than 2.5 unique prices per product by chain; (b) Among products that change prices in one store, the probability that other stores of the same chain also change the price of the same product in the same day is 2.4 times the probability for other stores of any chain; and (c) A formal variance decomposition shows that only 28% of the price dispersion (for the same product, day, and city) is explained by stores setting different prices within a chain. This finding is relevant for retail-pricing theories since there are significantly fewer chains than stores, which matters for the degree of competition in the market. This paper also studies the heterogeneity in price changes and price dispersion across product categories.
{"title":"Retail Prices: New Evidence from Argentina","authors":"Diego Daruich, J. Kozlowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2989324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2989324","url":null,"abstract":"We create a new database of retail prices in Argentina with over 10 million observations per day. Our main novel finding is that, different from Kaplan, Menzio, Rudanko, and Trachter (2016), chains, rather than stores, explain most of the price variation in our data. We show this in three ways: (a) Even though chains have on average 158 stores, there are on average less than 2.5 unique prices per product by chain; (b) Among products that change prices in one store, the probability that other stores of the same chain also change the price of the same product in the same day is 2.4 times the probability for other stores of any chain; and (c) A formal variance decomposition shows that only 28% of the price dispersion (for the same product, day, and city) is explained by stores setting different prices within a chain. This finding is relevant for retail-pricing theories since there are significantly fewer chains than stores, which matters for the degree of competition in the market. This paper also studies the heterogeneity in price changes and price dispersion across product categories.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128135360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Extensive prior literature has studied how young organizations are impacted by and often benefit from embeddedness in key industry networks. Indeed, some research advises that entrepreneurs “don’t go it alone” (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). This literature has also highlighted a dynamic whereby young organizations with higher quality are most likely to sort into these networks. Yet this perspective often fails to consider the drivers and prevalence of high-quality young organizations not becoming embedded, and instead remaining network isolates. Drawing on resource dependence and exchange theory’s emphasis on network ties arising from mutual and balanced interdependence, we explicate how organizational design decisions, current performance, and competitive pressures influence whether a young organization remains a network isolate. We test and find support for our arguments using an unusually rich, complete, and large “big data” dataset that captures all competitors in the mobile app ecosystem on the Apple iPhone ecosystem over a period of 5 years, showing that a substantial fraction of high-performing mobile app developers remain outside of the venture finance network.
大量先前的文献研究了年轻的组织如何受到关键行业网络的嵌入性的影响，并经常从中受益。事实上，一些研究建议企业家“不要单干”(Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000)。这些文献还强调了一种动态，即质量较高的年轻组织最有可能进入这些网络。然而，这种观点往往没有考虑到高质量年轻组织的驱动因素和流行程度，这些组织没有嵌入网络，而是保持网络隔离。利用资源依赖和交换理论对相互和平衡的相互依赖所产生的网络联系的强调，我们解释了组织设计决策、当前绩效和竞争压力如何影响一个年轻的组织是否保持网络孤立。我们使用了一个异常丰富、完整、庞大的“大数据”数据集(该数据集捕获了苹果iPhone生态系统中移动应用生态系统中的所有竞争对手，历时5年)，对我们的论点进行了测试并找到了支持，结果表明，相当一部分高性能移动应用开发者仍未进入风险融资网络。
{"title":"Network Isolates: Entrepreneurial Bootstrapping and the Social Disconnection of New Organizations in the Mobile App Ecosystem","authors":"Benjamin L. Hallen, Jason P. Davis, Pai-Ling Yin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2907526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2907526","url":null,"abstract":"Extensive prior literature has studied how young organizations are impacted by and often benefit from embeddedness in key industry networks. Indeed, some research advises that entrepreneurs “don’t go it alone” (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). This literature has also highlighted a dynamic whereby young organizations with higher quality are most likely to sort into these networks. Yet this perspective often fails to consider the drivers and prevalence of high-quality young organizations not becoming embedded, and instead remaining network isolates. Drawing on resource dependence and exchange theory’s emphasis on network ties arising from mutual and balanced interdependence, we explicate how organizational design decisions, current performance, and competitive pressures influence whether a young organization remains a network isolate. We test and find support for our arguments using an unusually rich, complete, and large “big data” dataset that captures all competitors in the mobile app ecosystem on the Apple iPhone ecosystem over a period of 5 years, showing that a substantial fraction of high-performing mobile app developers remain outside of the venture finance network.","PeriodicalId":332226,"journal":{"name":"USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125005177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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