Improving social welfare in the developing world remains a top priority on the global development agenda, as policymakers and international development partners worldwide strive to meet the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Using data on 40 African countries over the period 2010–2015, this paper investigates the extent to which trade facilitation contributes to improving social welfare in Africa. To do so, we construct three indices of trade facilitation capturing infrastructure, institutions, and market efficiency from several primary indicators. With regard to social welfare, we use education (net primary school enrollment rate), child health (under-5 mortality rate), population health (life expectancy), and human development (human development index). The system-GMM estimation technique is employed in order to address the problem of endogeneity. The main finding is that better trade facilitation results in improved social welfare outcomes. Our findings suggest that effective trade facilitation reforms, targeted particularly at improving infrastructure, institutions, and market efficiency, will likely be associated with improvements of social welfare in Africa.
This paper is an empirical application of the micro-founded measure of trade costs by Head and Mayer (2004) and Novy (2013). The derived micro-founded measure, consistent with the Ricardian and heterogeneous firm's models of trade, captures all trade costs components that hitherto have been impossible to include in the gravity framework because of severe data limitations and the impracticability of measuring some of the trade cost components.
Based on bilateral trade and production data from the Trade, Production, and Protection database by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) over the period 1980–2003, the micro-founded estimate of relative bilateral trade cost measure computed for ECOWAS clearly indicates lower trade costs among member ECOWAS countries compared with that for trade with other countries from SSA. With regard to accounting for variations in the computed measure of trade costs, the estimates obtained support the literature on the contribution of trade cost proxies to trade costs. Common non-tariff trade costs proxies explain over two-thirds of the variation in the trade costs estimates obtained for trade within the ECOWAS sub-region.
This paper argues for the need for policy makers within the sub-region to identify and reduce the trade barriers associated with trading within the ECOWAS sub-region. In addition, results from this paper, that bilateral transactions in a common currency reduces trade costs, suggest that current efforts at establishing a common currency, if successful, may improve intra-ECOWAS trade.
This paper examines the co-movement between OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil prices and the six largest African stock markets. We used wavelet coherence to analyze the evolution of this relationship both in time and by frequency. Our results show that the co-movement between African stock markets and oil prices is relatively low, with the exception of emerging stock markets such as South Africa and Egypt. For most of the African stock markets, the co-movement takes place over large time scales and both during and after the U.S. financial crisis. At small scales, African stock markets could represent a means of capital diversification for active investors in the oil market.
How will Brexit impact on Africa? This paper looks at the available empirical evidence and carries out a Computable General Equilibrium simulation, focusing particularly on the prospects for the East African Community (EAC). The paper makes three main points. First, while the direct impacts through investment, trade and remittances are likely to be relatively small, African countries may benefit from the creation of new export opportunities. However, these are mainly in resource-intensive sectors that are not considered a priority for the development agendas of most African countries. Second, indirect consequences, through Brexit's impact on the global economy, its influence on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union, or a potential reduction in UK development cooperation, are likely to be equally important over the longer run. Finally, one overlooked consequence of Brexit for Africa is that it could undermine confidence in ‘deep’ regional integration processes like the EAC. The paper concludes that the correct response at such a time is not to falter but to redouble efforts towards regional integration through the implementation of the recently-signed African Continental Free Trade Area, while learning the pertinent lessons from Europe.