The trade war between the United States and China is generating significant costs; it is rooted in the technological revolution based on big data, artificial intelligence and machine learning, which create the grounds for strategic trade and investment policies and geostrategic rivalry; and solutions must be based on addressing the elemental forces being unleashed by this technology rather than on ironing out nominal frictions that have arisen between the United States and China. This note argues for a new Digital Round at the WTO premised on the search for a global digital realm in which all countries have a mutual stake in ensuring its integrity, as opposed to a world of what might be termed “Digitalpolitik” (the digital version of realpolitik), which features walled off realms subject to mutual routine attack, with ruinous prospects for all.
{"title":"The US-China Trade War: Costs, Causes, and Potential Responses by Tier II Powers","authors":"Dan Ciuriak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3302026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3302026","url":null,"abstract":"The trade war between the United States and China is generating significant costs; it is rooted in the technological revolution based on big data, artificial intelligence and machine learning, which create the grounds for strategic trade and investment policies and geostrategic rivalry; and solutions must be based on addressing the elemental forces being unleashed by this technology rather than on ironing out nominal frictions that have arisen between the United States and China. This note argues for a new Digital Round at the WTO premised on the search for a global digital realm in which all countries have a mutual stake in ensuring its integrity, as opposed to a world of what might be termed “Digitalpolitik” (the digital version of realpolitik), which features walled off realms subject to mutual routine attack, with ruinous prospects for all.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134417469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the twentieth century, economic sanctions became more prevalent. In the twenty-first century they have become a frequently used tool for governments seeking to change the behaviour of other countries. An extensive research literature exists on the effectiveness of sanctions. Overall the research shows that sanctions very rarely achieve foreign policy goals. At the same time, sanctions create negative externalities. Sanctions limit the economic well-being of people in targeted countries, in some cases leading to malnourishment or even starvation. They also undermine economic and civil liberties, instead encouraging centralised state control. While sanctions are often aimed at destabilising governments, people in sanctioned countries often turn to their government when the country is isolated from the global marketplace. The sanctions on Russia in early 2014 coincided with Vladimir Putin’s popularity rising from an all-time low to an all-time high point. The sanctions against Russia have led to a trade loss estimated at US$114 billion, with US$44 billion borne by the sanctioning Western countries. In percentage terms, Germany bears almost 40 per cent of the Western trade loss, compared with just 0.6 per cent incurred by the United States. Two wealthy countries that are neutral in sanctions against Russia – Israel and Switzerland – have experienced a trade loss of 25% between 2014 and 2016. This is nearly as high as the 30% trade loss of the largest four sanctioning economies. Since sanctions undermine global value chains, neutral third-party countries are also hurt. Fostering global value chains is a better strategy for promoting security, since economic interdependency makes peace a more attractive alternative than conflict. Market exchange is typically a better option than sanctions if the objective is a free, peaceful and prosperous world.
{"title":"Blocking Progress: The Damaging Side Effects of Economic Sanctions","authors":"Nima Sanandaji","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853146","url":null,"abstract":"During the twentieth century, economic sanctions became more prevalent. In the twenty-first century they have become a frequently used tool for governments seeking to change the behaviour of other countries. An extensive research literature exists on the effectiveness of sanctions. Overall the research shows that sanctions very rarely achieve foreign policy goals. At the same time, sanctions create negative externalities. Sanctions limit the economic well-being of people in targeted countries, in some cases leading to malnourishment or even starvation. They also undermine economic and civil liberties, instead encouraging centralised state control. While sanctions are often aimed at destabilising governments, people in sanctioned countries often turn to their government when the country is isolated from the global marketplace. The sanctions on Russia in early 2014 coincided with Vladimir Putin’s popularity rising from an all-time low to an all-time high point. The sanctions against Russia have led to a trade loss estimated at US$114 billion, with US$44 billion borne by the sanctioning Western countries. In percentage terms, Germany bears almost 40 per cent of the Western trade loss, compared with just 0.6 per cent incurred by the United States. Two wealthy countries that are neutral in sanctions against Russia – Israel and Switzerland – have experienced a trade loss of 25% between 2014 and 2016. This is nearly as high as the 30% trade loss of the largest four sanctioning economies. Since sanctions undermine global value chains, neutral third-party countries are also hurt. Fostering global value chains is a better strategy for promoting security, since economic interdependency makes peace a more attractive alternative than conflict. Market exchange is typically a better option than sanctions if the objective is a free, peaceful and prosperous world.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126021568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This briefing on roaming charges argues that this problem is hugely exaggerated. But it also sets out two options for the Government to prevent consumers facing higher phone bills in a no-deal scenario. Solutions include replicating the existing arrangements by retaining restrictions on retail roaming charges in UK law unilaterally. This could be overseen by Ofcom. Alternatively, and preferably, they could let market forces do their job. There is now a much weaker case for state intervention in capping mobile phone tariffs. Consumers have alternative options with increased access to wi-fi and they can compare prices of different providers more easily putting those who introduce retail roaming charges at a competitive disadvantage. Given these developments, roaming charges have tumbled worldwide.
{"title":"\"Mobile Phone Bills Will Soar\": No-Deal Brexit Fear-Checker","authors":"J. Jessop","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3853600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3853600","url":null,"abstract":"This briefing on roaming charges argues that this problem is hugely exaggerated. But it also sets out two options for the Government to prevent consumers facing higher phone bills in a no-deal scenario. Solutions include replicating the existing arrangements by retaining restrictions on retail roaming charges in UK law unilaterally. This could be overseen by Ofcom. Alternatively, and preferably, they could let market forces do their job. There is now a much weaker case for state intervention in capping mobile phone tariffs. Consumers have alternative options with increased access to wi-fi and they can compare prices of different providers more easily putting those who introduce retail roaming charges at a competitive disadvantage. Given these developments, roaming charges have tumbled worldwide.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129882830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The debate on trade wars and currency wars has re-emerged since the Great recession of 2009. We study the two forms of non-cooperative policies within a single framework. First, we compare the elasticity of trade flows to import tariffs and to the real exchange rate, based on product level data for 110 countries over the 1989-2013 period. We find that a 1 percent depreciation of the importer's currency reduces imports by around 0.5 percent in current dollar, whereas an increase in import tariffs by 1 percentage point reduces imports by around 1.4 percent. Hence the two instruments are not equivalent. Second, we build a stylized short-term macroeconomic model where the government aims at internal and external balance. We find that, in this setting, monetary policy is more stabilizing for the economy than trade policy, except when the internal transmission channel of monetary policy is muted (at the zero-lower bound). One implication is that, in normal times, a country will more likely react to a trade "aggression" through monetary easing rather than through a tariff increase. The result is reversed at the ZLB.
{"title":"Trade and Currency Weapons","authors":"A. Bénassy-Quéré, M. Bussière, Pauline Wibaux","doi":"10.1111/ROIE.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ROIE.12517","url":null,"abstract":"The debate on trade wars and currency wars has re-emerged since the Great recession of 2009. We study the two forms of non-cooperative policies within a single framework. First, we compare the elasticity of trade flows to import tariffs and to the real exchange rate, based on product level data for 110 countries over the 1989-2013 period. We find that a 1 percent depreciation of the importer's currency reduces imports by around 0.5 percent in current dollar, whereas an increase in import tariffs by 1 percentage point reduces imports by around 1.4 percent. Hence the two instruments are not equivalent. Second, we build a stylized short-term macroeconomic model where the government aims at internal and external balance. We find that, in this setting, monetary policy is more stabilizing for the economy than trade policy, except when the internal transmission channel of monetary policy is muted (at the zero-lower bound). One implication is that, in normal times, a country will more likely react to a trade \"aggression\" through monetary easing rather than through a tariff increase. The result is reversed at the ZLB.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"23 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134618892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relationship between Vietnam and China could be captured in the Chinese expression of “同床异梦”, which means lying on the same bed but having different dreams. The two countries share certain cultural and political similarities but also diverge vastly in their national interests. This paper adds to the extant literature on this topic by analyzing the element of trust/mistrust in their interactions in trade-investment, tourism, and defense-security. The analysis shows how the relationship is increasingly interdependent but is equally fragile due to the lack of trust on both sides. The mistrust or even distrust of Chinese subjects run deep within the Vietnamese mindset, from the skepticism of Chinese investment, Chinese tourists, discrimination against ethnic Chinese, to the caution against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The paper forecasts that, despite the deep-seated differences and occasional mistrust, going forward, neither side would risk damaging the status quo even when tensions peak.
{"title":"The 'Same Bed, Different Dreams' of Vietnam and China: How (Mis)Trust Could Make or Break it","authors":"H. Nguyen, Q. Vuong, T. Ho, Thu-Trang Vuong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3185278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3185278","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between Vietnam and China could be captured in the Chinese expression of “同床异梦”, which means lying on the same bed but having different dreams. The two countries share certain cultural and political similarities but also diverge vastly in their national interests. This paper adds to the extant literature on this topic by analyzing the element of trust/mistrust in their interactions in trade-investment, tourism, and defense-security. The analysis shows how the relationship is increasingly interdependent but is equally fragile due to the lack of trust on both sides. The mistrust or even distrust of Chinese subjects run deep within the Vietnamese mindset, from the skepticism of Chinese investment, Chinese tourists, discrimination against ethnic Chinese, to the caution against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The paper forecasts that, despite the deep-seated differences and occasional mistrust, going forward, neither side would risk damaging the status quo even when tensions peak.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117040264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research paper conducts an analysis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, scheduled to cost an estimated US$60 Billion. In particular, the paper examines Chinese motivations for investment in Pakistan, the benefits of the corridor to Pakistan, the specific impact on the economy of Pakistan of projects under this scheme; and the global and domestic threats that may hamper its realization. The paper begins by introducing the essential themes of the CPEC, before undertaking an overview of the relevant research literature. The methodical approach adopted in the course of the study is examined, and the paper’s findings are presented and discussed. Finally, the research paper develops a set of conclusions and recommendations, which will be crucial to the successful development of the projects and to maximizing the socio-economic possibilities and potential of the corridor.
{"title":"Game-Changer or Game-Over for Pakistan? An Analysis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor","authors":"Ali Alam Qamar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3751952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3751952","url":null,"abstract":"This research paper conducts an analysis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, scheduled to cost an estimated US$60 Billion. In particular, the paper examines Chinese motivations for investment in Pakistan, the benefits of the corridor to Pakistan, the specific impact on the economy of Pakistan of projects under this scheme; and the global and domestic threats that may hamper its realization. The paper begins by introducing the essential themes of the CPEC, before undertaking an overview of the relevant research literature. The methodical approach adopted in the course of the study is examined, and the paper’s findings are presented and discussed. Finally, the research paper develops a set of conclusions and recommendations, which will be crucial to the successful development of the projects and to maximizing the socio-economic possibilities and potential of the corridor.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"195 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114475262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this review is analyzed the current economic and integration processes in ASEAN member States in the context of opportunities and constraints for the implementation of the future foreign economic policy of Russia in the South-East Asia region. Currently most of the countries of the Association belong to the dynamic developing countries in the world that have significant natural and economic potential and large market, and also form a common economic space within the framework of the grouping and are reaching a new level of integration with major foreign partners. Besides one of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states priority is the establishment of preferential relations with third party countries at the present stage. It is noticeable that EAEU approached some positive tendency with the Association of South-East Asian Nations in recent years.
{"title":"Государства Асеан Во Внешнеэкономической Политике России На Современном Этапе: Новые Возможности и Ограничения (ASEAN Countries in Russia's Foreign Economic Policy at the Present Stage: New Opportunities and Limitations)","authors":"A. Pakhomov, A. Makarov, Kniaz Bagdasaryan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3169756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3169756","url":null,"abstract":"In this review is analyzed the current economic and integration processes in ASEAN member States in the context of opportunities and constraints for the implementation of the future foreign economic policy of Russia in the South-East Asia region. Currently most of the countries of the Association belong to the dynamic developing countries in the world that have significant natural and economic potential and large market, and also form a common economic space within the framework of the grouping and are reaching a new level of integration with major foreign partners. Besides one of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states priority is the establishment of preferential relations with third party countries at the present stage. It is noticeable that EAEU approached some positive tendency with the Association of South-East Asian Nations in recent years.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121910258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-23DOI: 10.16980/jitc.14.2.201804.179
J. Hong, Haneul Han, C. Shim
The purpose of this study is to suggest strategies for ASEAN MSME’s in the Korean e-commerce market. The ASEAN is the second largest trading partner of South Korea. However, the share of ASEAN in the cross-border e-commerce market of Korea is extremely low. First, we analyzed the Trade Specification Index (TSI) for competitiveness between Korea to ASEAN. Except for the food and drinks industry, Korea has the upper hand on ASEAN in cross-border e-commerce. Second, we focused on the priority factors of ASEAN MSME’s for making strategies for the Korea e-commerce market using AHP analysis. In this analysis, the experience of entering an overseas logistics market ranked first by a value of 0.087 (8.7%), followed by the Korean logistics network existence by 0.086 (8.6%). Lastly, we suggest logistics solutions for advance to korea such as strategic alliances with korean logistics companies, and using integrated e-platforms for vitalizing Cross-Border E-Commerce between Korea and ASEAN.
{"title":"A Study of the Vitalization of Cross-border E-commerce between ASEAN and Korea: Focus on Trade and Logistics Issue","authors":"J. Hong, Haneul Han, C. Shim","doi":"10.16980/jitc.14.2.201804.179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.16980/jitc.14.2.201804.179","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to suggest strategies for ASEAN MSME’s in the Korean e-commerce market. The ASEAN is the second largest trading partner of South Korea. However, the share of ASEAN in the cross-border e-commerce market of Korea is extremely low. First, we analyzed the Trade Specification Index (TSI) for competitiveness between Korea to ASEAN. Except for the food and drinks industry, Korea has the upper hand on ASEAN in cross-border e-commerce. Second, we focused on the priority factors of ASEAN MSME’s for making strategies for the Korea e-commerce market using AHP analysis. In this analysis, the experience of entering an overseas logistics market ranked first by a value of 0.087 (8.7%), followed by the Korean logistics network existence by 0.086 (8.6%). Lastly, we suggest logistics solutions for advance to korea such as strategic alliances with korean logistics companies, and using integrated e-platforms for vitalizing Cross-Border E-Commerce between Korea and ASEAN.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132240796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The US is likely to be at ‘the front of the queue’ for a new trade deal with the UK after Brexit. This would require the UK to escape the constraints of the EU’s Customs Union and also be free to diverge from EU regulations. But if these two conditions are not met, many would question whether ‘Brexit’ has any meaning at all. The political support for a US-UK trade deal is strong and the economic and financial ties between the two countries are already close. The UK should therefore be able to do a good trade deal with the US more quickly than the EU ever could. An early deal with the US, and other friendly countries such as Australia and New Zealand, would also get UK trade negotiators back in the swing again. This should help in the harder talks that lie ahead with faster-growing emerging economies, such as China and India, where the potential gains are even greater. Some sensitive issues will have to be carefully managed. However, British opponents of a US-UK trade deal have tended to exaggerate the risks. These include fears that a US-UK trade deal would inevitably lead to the ‘Americanisation’ of the NHS, a free-for-all for powerful multinational corporations, or a race to the bottom in food standards. In reality, allowing more US firms to bid for public sector contracts should only improve quality and drive down costs. The rules determining any investor-state dispute resolution mechanism would be part of the negotiations. The impact on the agricultural sector may be most delicate. But the UK government has already made clear that it will not compromise on food safety or animal welfare. The upshot is that there is much to gain and little to fear from a US-UK trade deal. And as well as further strengthening one of the UK’s closest relationships, it would help post-Brexit Britain to set out its stall as a global champion of free trade.
{"title":"Much to Gain and Little to Fear from a US-UK Trade Deal","authors":"J. Jessop","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853694","url":null,"abstract":"The US is likely to be at ‘the front of the queue’ for a new trade deal with the UK after Brexit. This would require the UK to escape the constraints of the EU’s Customs Union and also be free to diverge from EU regulations. But if these two conditions are not met, many would question whether ‘Brexit’ has any meaning at all. The political support for a US-UK trade deal is strong and the economic and financial ties between the two countries are already close. The UK should therefore be able to do a good trade deal with the US more quickly than the EU ever could. An early deal with the US, and other friendly countries such as Australia and New Zealand, would also get UK trade negotiators back in the swing again. This should help in the harder talks that lie ahead with faster-growing emerging economies, such as China and India, where the potential gains are even greater. Some sensitive issues will have to be carefully managed. However, British opponents of a US-UK trade deal have tended to exaggerate the risks. These include fears that a US-UK trade deal would inevitably lead to the ‘Americanisation’ of the NHS, a free-for-all for powerful multinational corporations, or a race to the bottom in food standards. In reality, allowing more US firms to bid for public sector contracts should only improve quality and drive down costs. The rules determining any investor-state dispute resolution mechanism would be part of the negotiations. The impact on the agricultural sector may be most delicate. But the UK government has already made clear that it will not compromise on food safety or animal welfare. The upshot is that there is much to gain and little to fear from a US-UK trade deal. And as well as further strengthening one of the UK’s closest relationships, it would help post-Brexit Britain to set out its stall as a global champion of free trade.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133782330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the quantitative consequences of transatlantic trade liberalization envisioned in a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union. Our key innovation is to develop a new quantitative spatial trade model and to use an associated technique which is extraordinarily parsimonious and tightly connects theory and data. We take input-output linkages across industries into account and make use of the recently established World Input Output Database (WIOD). We also explore the consequences of labor mobility across local labor markets in Germany and the countries of the European Union. We address the considerable uncertainties connected both with the quantification of non-tariff trade barriers and the outcome of the negotiations by taking a corridor of trade liberalization paths into account.
{"title":"How Deep is Your Love? A Quantitative Spatial Analysis of the Transatlantic Trade Partnership","authors":"O. Krebs, Michael Pflüger","doi":"10.1111/roie.12323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12323","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the quantitative consequences of transatlantic trade liberalization envisioned in a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union. Our key innovation is to develop a new quantitative spatial trade model and to use an associated technique which is extraordinarily parsimonious and tightly connects theory and data. We take input-output linkages across industries into account and make use of the recently established World Input Output Database (WIOD). We also explore the consequences of labor mobility across local labor markets in Germany and the countries of the European Union. We address the considerable uncertainties connected both with the quantification of non-tariff trade barriers and the outcome of the negotiations by taking a corridor of trade liberalization paths into account.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125280772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：