This study shows how import and export shocks propagate through domestic supply chains by using actual Japanese supply chain data and a world input-output table based on firm-level agent-based simulations. We propose three different models to connect the domestic firm-level supply chain to the world input-output table. Then, we estimate the value-added losses of Japanese firms caused by shocks of different magnitudes and durations originating in China, in the EU and US, and globally. The losses caused by Chinese and European and US shocks are comparable to those caused by global shocks, which indicates the importance of China and the EU and US for Japanese supply chains, although their trade volumes are 21.2% and 25.9%, respectively. The volume and the rates at which losses increase are very different across the connection models, which indicates that the assignment of international connections to firms matters greatly and that it is not appropriate to make naive assumptions, such as that sectoral-level supply chain models are equivalent to firm-level supply chain models. The losses increase sublinealy as the duration expands, which indicates that the shock propagation ultimately saturates the economy. The speeds of saturation differ substantially depending on the assignment of international connections. Finally, the losses increase superlinearly as the initial reduction rate increases. This is because there is a greater probability of one supplier being replaced by other suppliers if the reduction is smaller.
{"title":"How Do International Trade Shocks Propagate Through Domestic Supply Chains? Connecting World Input-Output Tables and Firm-Level Supply Chain Data","authors":"H. Inoue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3874309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3874309","url":null,"abstract":"This study shows how import and export shocks propagate through domestic supply chains by using actual Japanese supply chain data and a world input-output table based on firm-level agent-based simulations. We propose three different models to connect the domestic firm-level supply chain to the world input-output table. Then, we estimate the value-added losses of Japanese firms caused by shocks of different magnitudes and durations originating in China, in the EU and US, and globally. The losses caused by Chinese and European and US shocks are comparable to those caused by global shocks, which indicates the importance of China and the EU and US for Japanese supply chains, although their trade volumes are 21.2% and 25.9%, respectively. The volume and the rates at which losses increase are very different across the connection models, which indicates that the assignment of international connections to firms matters greatly and that it is not appropriate to make naive assumptions, such as that sectoral-level supply chain models are equivalent to firm-level supply chain models. The losses increase sublinealy as the duration expands, which indicates that the shock propagation ultimately saturates the economy. The speeds of saturation differ substantially depending on the assignment of international connections. Finally, the losses increase superlinearly as the initial reduction rate increases. This is because there is a greater probability of one supplier being replaced by other suppliers if the reduction is smaller.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115666961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, but when we successively improve contract enforcement, larger effects of trust emerge. Likewise, improvements in contract enforcement generate no increases in gains from trade under low initial trust, but cause high increases when initial trust is high. Thus, the effect of improvements in contract enforcement is trust-dependent, and the effect of increases in trust is dependent on the strength of contract enforcement. We identify three key ingredients underlying this complementarity: (1) heterogeneity in trustworthiness; (2) strength of contract enforcement affecting the ability to elicit reciprocal behavior from trustworthy types, and screen out untrustworthy types; (3) trust beliefs determining willingness to try such strategies.
{"title":"The Complementarity Between Trust and Contract Enforcement","authors":"Björn Bartling, E. Fehr, David Huffman, N. Netzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3762391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762391","url":null,"abstract":"Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, but when we successively improve contract enforcement, larger effects of trust emerge. Likewise, improvements in contract enforcement generate no increases in gains from trade under low initial trust, but cause high increases when initial trust is high. Thus, the effect of improvements in contract enforcement is trust-dependent, and the effect of increases in trust is dependent on the strength of contract enforcement. We identify three key ingredients underlying this complementarity: (1) heterogeneity in trustworthiness; (2) strength of contract enforcement affecting the ability to elicit reciprocal behavior from trustworthy types, and screen out untrustworthy types; (3) trust beliefs determining willingness to try such strategies.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117337600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The most contentious and problematic issue negotiated in the Brexit deal was the so-called “level playing field”, which was to be preserved by the parties through “rebalancing” provisions. This note takes up the issue of the meaning of a “level playing field” in light of fundamental features of international trade: firm-level heterogeneity within industries; economic geography; policy heterogeneity in taxation and the provision of public goods; the principle of comparative advantage; and fluctuating national currencies. Based on this, it comments on the meaning in economic terms and practicality of “rebalancing”.
{"title":"Level Playing Fields and Rebalancing: A Comment","authors":"Dan Ciuriak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3756444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3756444","url":null,"abstract":"The most contentious and problematic issue negotiated in the Brexit deal was the so-called “level playing field”, which was to be preserved by the parties through “rebalancing” provisions. This note takes up the issue of the meaning of a “level playing field” in light of fundamental features of international trade: firm-level heterogeneity within industries; economic geography; policy heterogeneity in taxation and the provision of public goods; the principle of comparative advantage; and fluctuating national currencies. Based on this, it comments on the meaning in economic terms and practicality of “rebalancing”.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115865460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China has rolled out the red carpet of the Belt and Road (BRI) back in 2013 drawing inspiration from the Silk Road in ancient times. The grand plan focuses on infrastructure development and investments to enhance regional and global connectivity between China and the world. It includes a Silk Road Economic Belt on land and a 21st century Maritime Silk Road at sea. Given the cross-border nature of the projects and the sheer size of financing needed to accomplish its goals (estimated at around USD 5 trillion by Chinese authorities ), it seems clear that major offshore centers should play a role in intermediating savings towards these projects along the BRI countries. In Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are the clear choices given the proximity and relationship with Mainland China.
Hong Kong is well placed to finance the infrastructure projects under the BRI as it includes a large number of foreign banks which can intermediate foreign savings to that end (Garcia-Herrero, 2017). Other than the large asset pool in hard currency, Hong Kong is also the largest offshore RMB center in the world. Given that Chinese authorities have long tried to accelerate the use of the RMB as a financing vehicle for BRI projects, Hong Kong should benefit from its pole position in the offshore RMB market (Chan, 2015). Besides, Hong Kong’s large stock market with the largest amount of IPOs globally by value in 2019 should serve as a platform to provide equity finance to companies operating in the BRI geographies (HKGCC, 2019). Finally, as part of the Greater Bay Area (GBA), Hong Kong can have more venues than Singapore to integrate BRI investment with that of GBA, which has long been the most dynamic part of China. This should make Hong Kong as the intermediator for BRI financing more appealing for investors (KPMG, 2018). Cheung and Hong (2019) pointed though Hong Kong had the potential to be a financial hub in the BRI thanks to its transparent legal framework among other reasons (EY, 2016), but this result hasn’t happened partially due to the listing rule in Hong Kong. Infrastructure project companies are regarded as risky applicants by Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong. Therefore, several factors need to be fulfilled including but not limited to a large shareholding by state-owned enterprise in Mainland China, sovereign wealth fund, substantial listed company or globally active institutional investor.
{"title":"Hong Kong’s Intermediary Role on Funding the BRI: How Does it Fare Against Singapore?","authors":"A. Garcia-Herrero, Hanrui Li, G. Ng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3721905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721905","url":null,"abstract":"China has rolled out the red carpet of the Belt and Road (BRI) back in 2013 drawing inspiration from the Silk Road in ancient times. The grand plan focuses on infrastructure development and investments to enhance regional and global connectivity between China and the world. It includes a Silk Road Economic Belt on land and a 21st century Maritime Silk Road at sea. Given the cross-border nature of the projects and the sheer size of financing needed to accomplish its goals (estimated at around USD 5 trillion by Chinese authorities ), it seems clear that major offshore centers should play a role in intermediating savings towards these projects along the BRI countries. In Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are the clear choices given the proximity and relationship with Mainland China.<br><br>Hong Kong is well placed to finance the infrastructure projects under the BRI as it includes a large number of foreign banks which can intermediate foreign savings to that end (Garcia-Herrero, 2017). Other than the large asset pool in hard currency, Hong Kong is also the largest offshore RMB center in the world. Given that Chinese authorities have long tried to accelerate the use of the RMB as a financing vehicle for BRI projects, Hong Kong should benefit from its pole position in the offshore RMB market (Chan, 2015). Besides, Hong Kong’s large stock market with the largest amount of IPOs globally by value in 2019 should serve as a platform to provide equity finance to companies operating in the BRI geographies (HKGCC, 2019). Finally, as part of the Greater Bay Area (GBA), Hong Kong can have more venues than Singapore to integrate BRI investment with that of GBA, which has long been the most dynamic part of China. This should make Hong Kong as the intermediator for BRI financing more appealing for investors (KPMG, 2018). Cheung and Hong (2019) pointed though Hong Kong had the potential to be a financial hub in the BRI thanks to its transparent legal framework among other reasons (EY, 2016), but this result hasn’t happened partially due to the listing rule in Hong Kong. Infrastructure project companies are regarded as risky applicants by Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong. Therefore, several factors need to be fulfilled including but not limited to a large shareholding by state-owned enterprise in Mainland China, sovereign wealth fund, substantial listed company or globally active institutional investor.<br>","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":" 38","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120825942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Today, the problem facing the United States is not whether cryptocurrencies are money or “thin air,” Iran’s nuclear ambition, or COVID-19 induced recession; it is China’s fast acceleration in becoming a game changer in the world order that the U.S. has dominated for more than a century. Raging a war on cryptocurrencies will not stop life-changing inventions (Bitcoin and Facebook’s Libra coin) from forging ahead unabated regardless of persistent as well as absurd efforts by doubters, pessimists, doomsayers, skeptics, disbelievers, and short-sighted/blindfolded politicians who are so anxious to put another nail in the coffin. Stories have repeatedly told that the United States of America is the land of opportunities for brave entrepreneurs and inventors who trust their visions and believe taking risks will lead to great returns, this is the true American way not President Trump’s way of bullying sovereign nations’ governments to get what he wants or believes is good for America. One wonders how much more of the world’s scarce resources the U.S. will exploit and how many more lives will be perished just so that America can keep enjoying the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege”.
{"title":"Diminishing American Power: The US - China Trade War, Sanctions, and Coronavirus","authors":"John Taskinsoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3677841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677841","url":null,"abstract":"Today, the problem facing the United States is not whether cryptocurrencies are money or “thin air,” Iran’s nuclear ambition, or COVID-19 induced recession; it is China’s fast acceleration in becoming a game changer in the world order that the U.S. has dominated for more than a century. Raging a war on cryptocurrencies will not stop life-changing inventions (Bitcoin and Facebook’s Libra coin) from forging ahead unabated regardless of persistent as well as absurd efforts by doubters, pessimists, doomsayers, skeptics, disbelievers, and short-sighted/blindfolded politicians who are so anxious to put another nail in the coffin. Stories have repeatedly told that the United States of America is the land of opportunities for brave entrepreneurs and inventors who trust their visions and believe taking risks will lead to great returns, this is the true American way not President Trump’s way of bullying sovereign nations’ governments to get what he wants or believes is good for America. One wonders how much more of the world’s scarce resources the U.S. will exploit and how many more lives will be perished just so that America can keep enjoying the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege”.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133736786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
North Korea declared a “breakthrough in sanctions” through self-rehabilitation at the Labor Party Central Committee meeting held on December 28-31, 2019. How is the North Korean economy now? In 2019, North Korea’s imports and exports to China each slightly increased compared to the previous year, showing some adaptation to sanctions against North Korea, but the already deformed structure and large deficit have worsened. Due to UN sanctions, the import of items necessary for production (machinery, electronics, and transportation) was completely banned, and overall industrial production was adversely affected.North Korean authorities are trying to minimize the impact of sanctions on the North Korean economy. The most representative measure has been to continuously increase the import of items not subject to sanctions. Since 2018, North Korea has responded to the sanctions by diversifying its import regions. Even during the sanctions, North Korea continued to promote the replacement of imported goods in the food industry with domestic products and construction facilities, in line with industrial policies set by Chairman Kim Jong-un, and the import of related items increased. In addition, as the demand for consumer goods increases, it seems that imports are increas-ing, maintaining the purchasing power of North Koreans to some extent. In summary, in 2019, the North Korean economy showed signs of slowing industrial produc-tion, but the nation also tried to minimize the adverse effects of sanctions by continuously in-creasing the import of non-sanctioned items. In the first quarter of 2020, the North Korean economy suffered from both sanctions and COVID-19.
{"title":"North Korea’s Trade with China in 2019","authors":"Jangho Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889188","url":null,"abstract":"North Korea declared a “breakthrough in sanctions” through self-rehabilitation at the Labor Party Central Committee meeting held on December 28-31, 2019. How is the North Korean economy now? In 2019, North Korea’s imports and exports to China each slightly increased compared to the previous year, showing some adaptation to sanctions against North Korea, but the already deformed structure and large deficit have worsened. Due to UN sanctions, the import of items necessary for production (machinery, electronics, and transportation) was completely banned, and overall industrial production was adversely affected.North Korean authorities are trying to minimize the impact of sanctions on the North Korean economy. The most representative measure has been to continuously increase the import of items not subject to sanctions. Since 2018, North Korea has responded to the sanctions by diversifying its import regions. Even during the sanctions, North Korea continued to promote the replacement of imported goods in the food industry with domestic products and construction facilities, in line with industrial policies set by Chairman Kim Jong-un, and the import of related items increased. In addition, as the demand for consumer goods increases, it seems that imports are increas-ing, maintaining the purchasing power of North Koreans to some extent. In summary, in 2019, the North Korean economy showed signs of slowing industrial produc-tion, but the nation also tried to minimize the adverse effects of sanctions by continuously in-creasing the import of non-sanctioned items. In the first quarter of 2020, the North Korean economy suffered from both sanctions and COVID-19.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129846503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group are touted as a new age of equitable partnership between European countries and former colonies. However, many critics argue that the EPAs simply substitute a different form of political and economic domination. In this paper, we consider if the siting of meetings has a substantive impact on the language of media describing the EPAs and/or communiques and statements that arise from those discussions. Using data culled from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) via Google’s BigQuery, we use a difference-in-difference like approach to evaluate if the tone and polarity of media reports about the EPAs during periods of ‘home’ meetings in the ACP countries differs from media reports during ‘away’ meetings in the EU. We supplement these findings with analysis of joint statements released from a subset of EPA meetings. In general, we find that ACP countries’ tone and interests are better represented in media reports during ‘home’ meetings, but this may not translate to any meaningful difference in actual meeting outcomes. As such, meeting siting may be only a limited tool for reducing political domination.
{"title":"Home Field Advantage? EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreement Meeting Locations and Textual Tone","authors":"Samuel Brazys, Martijn Schoonvelde","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3603938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3603938","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group are touted as a new age of equitable partnership between European countries and former colonies. However, many critics argue that the EPAs simply substitute a different form of political and economic domination. In this paper, we consider if the siting of meetings has a substantive impact on the language of media describing the EPAs and/or communiques and statements that arise from those discussions. Using data culled from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) via Google’s BigQuery, we use a difference-in-difference like approach to evaluate if the tone and polarity of media reports about the EPAs during periods of ‘home’ meetings in the ACP countries differs from media reports during ‘away’ meetings in the EU. We supplement these findings with analysis of joint statements released from a subset of EPA meetings. In general, we find that ACP countries’ tone and interests are better represented in media reports during ‘home’ meetings, but this may not translate to any meaningful difference in actual meeting outcomes. As such, meeting siting may be only a limited tool for reducing political domination.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133320821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-02-28DOI: 10.22904/SJE.2020.33.1.003
Nakgyoon Choi
Recently, international trade has become regional rather than global. This paper aims to test if deeper regional integration contributes to the organization of global value chains along the regional clusters including Asia, Europe, and America. We estimate the impacts of deep regional integrations on global value chains by region, investigating the implications of mega FTAs for global value chains by scenario. We use not only data on trade in value added but also global value chains participation indexes which reflect the global value chains better than domestic value added in goods and services exports. The estimation results reveal that a deep regional trade agreement has heterogeneous effects on global value chains depending on the regional clusters. In particular, Asia turns out to import more intermediate goods than Europe and America while RTA member countries tend to import more intermediate goods from Europe than Asia and America.
{"title":"Deeper Regional Integration and Global Value Chains","authors":"Nakgyoon Choi","doi":"10.22904/SJE.2020.33.1.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22904/SJE.2020.33.1.003","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, international trade has become regional rather than global. This paper aims to test if deeper regional integration contributes to the organization of global value chains along the regional clusters including Asia, Europe, and America. We estimate the impacts of deep regional integrations on global value chains by region, investigating the implications of mega FTAs for global value chains by scenario. We use not only data on trade in value added but also global value chains participation indexes which reflect the global value chains better than domestic value added in goods and services exports. The estimation results reveal that a deep regional trade agreement has heterogeneous effects on global value chains depending on the regional clusters. In particular, Asia turns out to import more intermediate goods than Europe and America while RTA member countries tend to import more intermediate goods from Europe than Asia and America.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"21 20","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113942540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a growing debate on the electronic commerce modes of deliveries, the core issue of the two-year moratorium and the extension of similar treatment of all digitisable products. Looking for similarity to Doha Round sectoral proposals, wherein also tariff elimination was at the core of negotiation. Therefore, this working paper seeks to provide answers for some pertinent questions that would help to bring clarity in further negotiations. One of the principal questions is the extent to which the elimination of tariff would influence trade in digitisable products. We have explored this question using imports data of WTO membership and non-WTO members. Further, extending the analysis, we are also looking at implications for WTO member countries of the possible impact of electronic commerce on the traditional means of distribution of physical goods (WTO, 1998). The following questions: What is the global trend of digitisable products trade and the implication for Trade Negotiations, and Secondly, what is the extent of revenue losses across the WTO grouping?
One major challenge is there are no mechanism to capture the fast vanishing commerce (trade) which is flowing through the internet and wires. It is established beyond doubt that a significant amount of commerce has shifted in the context of 30 digitisable products. The official data as recorded by the established practice is unable to account for and therefore is largely made available by private consultant firms. Some other challenges that would discussed are increasing necessity to built-in legitimate and official mechanisms that capture trade and data flows, at two levels custom-ports and at the micro-level capturing the financial flows of firms/merchant banks/transaction banks. The study would explore the possibility of expansion in the digitization across the manufacturing sector with the application of 3D printers and other enabling legislation. Further, the study clearly establishes that the developing and the LDCs are turned into prime markets for expansion of digitisable products exported by developed and other emerging markets. The developed countries and other emerging markets had the least impacts in terms of revenue losses based on the evidence in 2017.
{"title":"Global Digital Trade and Implications for Trade Negotiation: Deciphering the Data Flows and Implications on Revenues Losses","authors":"K. Murali","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3527690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527690","url":null,"abstract":"There is a growing debate on the electronic commerce modes of deliveries, the core issue of the two-year moratorium and the extension of similar treatment of all digitisable products. Looking for similarity to Doha Round sectoral proposals, wherein also tariff elimination was at the core of negotiation. Therefore, this working paper seeks to provide answers for some pertinent questions that would help to bring clarity in further negotiations. One of the principal questions is the extent to which the elimination of tariff would influence trade in digitisable products. We have explored this question using imports data of WTO membership and non-WTO members. Further, extending the analysis, we are also looking at implications for WTO member countries of the possible impact of electronic commerce on the traditional means of distribution of physical goods (WTO, 1998). The following questions: What is the global trend of digitisable products trade and the implication for Trade Negotiations, and Secondly, what is the extent of revenue losses across the WTO grouping?<br><br>One major challenge is there are no mechanism to capture the fast vanishing commerce (trade) which is flowing through the internet and wires. It is established beyond doubt that a significant amount of commerce has shifted in the context of 30 digitisable products. The official data as recorded by the established practice is unable to account for and therefore is largely made available by private consultant firms. Some other challenges that would discussed are increasing necessity to built-in legitimate and official mechanisms that capture trade and data flows, at two levels custom-ports and at the micro-level capturing the financial flows of firms/merchant banks/transaction banks. The study would explore the possibility of expansion in the digitization across the manufacturing sector with the application of 3D printers and other enabling legislation. Further, the study clearly establishes that the developing and the LDCs are turned into prime markets for expansion of digitisable products exported by developed and other emerging markets. The developed countries and other emerging markets had the least impacts in terms of revenue losses based on the evidence in 2017.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127508207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile harbor most of the world’s lithium resources in a triangulated region of the Atacama Desert. With the advent of the consumer electronic device and electronic car age, all powered by lithium ion batteries, attention is turning to the Lithium Triangle and the fortune that awaits extraction of this increasingly demanded resource. Lithium mining uses water intensively and in this area, perhaps the most hyper-arid inhabited area on Earth, water use engenders myriad questions relating to economic growth, global capitalism, indigenous rights, topophilia, the environment, and human rights. This article frames these important questions in terms of an underlying consideration: international law’s co-constitutive relationship with neoliberalism. This article argues that this relationship, variously construed in the respective histories of these countries, shapes and constrains domestic policies due to forum shopping by the handful of oligopolistic producers able to extract lithium in line with international law’s neoliberal investment preferences. A double movement of marketization generates calls for environmental and human rights protection against the same forces that drive the process of neoliberal extraction policy. Lithium, although construed as a domestic resource subject to exploitation, is also a metaphor for international law’s problematic hemispheric encounters in the Americas.
{"title":"Neoliberalism's Contested Encounter with International Law in the Lithium Triangle","authors":"Christopher R. Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3480642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3480642","url":null,"abstract":"Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile harbor most of the world’s lithium resources in a triangulated region of the Atacama Desert. With the advent of the consumer electronic device and electronic car age, all powered by lithium ion batteries, attention is turning to the Lithium Triangle and the fortune that awaits extraction of this increasingly demanded resource. Lithium mining uses water intensively and in this area, perhaps the most hyper-arid inhabited area on Earth, water use engenders myriad questions relating to economic growth, global capitalism, indigenous rights, topophilia, the environment, and human rights. This article frames these important questions in terms of an underlying consideration: international law’s co-constitutive relationship with neoliberalism. This article argues that this relationship, variously construed in the respective histories of these countries, shapes and constrains domestic policies due to forum shopping by the handful of oligopolistic producers able to extract lithium in line with international law’s neoliberal investment preferences. A double movement of marketization generates calls for environmental and human rights protection against the same forces that drive the process of neoliberal extraction policy. Lithium, although construed as a domestic resource subject to exploitation, is also a metaphor for international law’s problematic hemispheric encounters in the Americas.","PeriodicalId":341166,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Trade Relationships (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115797994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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