H. Zbinden, N. Walenta, O. Guinnard, Raphael Houlmann, Charles Lim Ci Wen, B. Korzh, T. Lunghi, N. Gisin, A. Burg, J. Constantin, M. Legre, P. Trinkler, Dario Caselunghe, N. Kulesza, Gregory Trolliet, F. Vannel, P. Junod, Olivier Auberson, Yoan Graf, G. Curchod, Gilles Habegger, Etienne Messerli, C. Portmann, L. Henzen, C. Keller, C. Pendl, Michael Mühlberghuber, C. Roth, N. Felber, Frank K. Gürkaynak, Daniel Schöni, Beat Muheim
We present the results of a Swiss project dedicated to the development of high speed quantum key distribution and data encryption. The QKD engine features fully automated key exchange, hardware key distillation based on finite key security analysis, efficient authentication and wavelength division multiplexing of the quantum and the classical channel and one-time pas encryption. The encryption device allows authenticated symmetric key encryption (e.g AES) at rates of up to 100 Gb/s. A new quantum key can uploaded up to 1000 times second from the QKD engine.
{"title":"Continuous QKD and high speed data encryption","authors":"H. Zbinden, N. Walenta, O. Guinnard, Raphael Houlmann, Charles Lim Ci Wen, B. Korzh, T. Lunghi, N. Gisin, A. Burg, J. Constantin, M. Legre, P. Trinkler, Dario Caselunghe, N. Kulesza, Gregory Trolliet, F. Vannel, P. Junod, Olivier Auberson, Yoan Graf, G. Curchod, Gilles Habegger, Etienne Messerli, C. Portmann, L. Henzen, C. Keller, C. Pendl, Michael Mühlberghuber, C. Roth, N. Felber, Frank K. Gürkaynak, Daniel Schöni, Beat Muheim","doi":"10.1117/12.2032731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032731","url":null,"abstract":"We present the results of a Swiss project dedicated to the development of high speed quantum key distribution and data encryption. The QKD engine features fully automated key exchange, hardware key distillation based on finite key security analysis, efficient authentication and wavelength division multiplexing of the quantum and the classical channel and one-time pas encryption. The encryption device allows authenticated symmetric key encryption (e.g AES) at rates of up to 100 Gb/s. A new quantum key can uploaded up to 1000 times second from the QKD engine.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124951020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Donaldson, R. Collins, V. Dunjko, Partick J. Clarke, E. Andersson, J. Jeffers, G. Buller
As society becomes more reliant on electronic communication and transactions, ensuring the security of these interactions becomes more important. Digital signatures are a widely used form of cryptography which allows parties to certify the origins of their communications, meaning that one party, a sender, can send information to other parties in such a way that messages cannot be forged. In addition, messages are transferrable, meaning that a recipient who accepts a message as genuine can be sure that if it is forwarded to another recipient, it will again be accepted as genuine. The classical digital signature schemes currently employed typically rely on computational complexity for security. Quantum digital signatures offer the potential for increased security. In our system, quantum signature states are passed through a network of polarization maintaining fiber interferometers (a multiport) to ensure that recipients will not disagree on the validity of a message. These signatures are encoded in the phase of photonic coherent states and the choice of photon number, signature length and number of possible phase states affects the level of security possible by this approach. We will give a brief introduction into quantum digital signatures and present results from our experimental demonstration system.
{"title":"An approach to experimental photonic quantum digital signatures in fiber","authors":"R. Donaldson, R. Collins, V. Dunjko, Partick J. Clarke, E. Andersson, J. Jeffers, G. Buller","doi":"10.1117/12.2028720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2028720","url":null,"abstract":"As society becomes more reliant on electronic communication and transactions, ensuring the security of these interactions becomes more important. Digital signatures are a widely used form of cryptography which allows parties to certify the origins of their communications, meaning that one party, a sender, can send information to other parties in such a way that messages cannot be forged. In addition, messages are transferrable, meaning that a recipient who accepts a message as genuine can be sure that if it is forwarded to another recipient, it will again be accepted as genuine. The classical digital signature schemes currently employed typically rely on computational complexity for security. Quantum digital signatures offer the potential for increased security. In our system, quantum signature states are passed through a network of polarization maintaining fiber interferometers (a multiport) to ensure that recipients will not disagree on the validity of a message. These signatures are encoded in the phase of photonic coherent states and the choice of photon number, signature length and number of possible phase states affects the level of security possible by this approach. We will give a brief introduction into quantum digital signatures and present results from our experimental demonstration system.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130122610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Stucki, Samuel Burri, E. Charbon, C. Chunnilall, Alessio Meneghetti, F. Regazzoni
Randomness is of fundamental importance in various fields, such as cryptography, numerical simulations, or the gaming industry. Quantum physics, which is fundamentally probabilistic, is the best option for a physical random number generator. In this article, we will present the work carried out in various projects in the context of the development of a commercial and certified high speed random number generator.
{"title":"Towards a high-speed quantum random number generator","authors":"D. Stucki, Samuel Burri, E. Charbon, C. Chunnilall, Alessio Meneghetti, F. Regazzoni","doi":"10.1117/12.2029287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2029287","url":null,"abstract":"Randomness is of fundamental importance in various fields, such as cryptography, numerical simulations, or the gaming industry. Quantum physics, which is fundamentally probabilistic, is the best option for a physical random number generator. In this article, we will present the work carried out in various projects in the context of the development of a commercial and certified high speed random number generator.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115318116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we discuss some of the main known problems, particularly those on operational security guarantee and error correction. Most basic are the points that there is no security parameter in such protocols and it is not the case the generated key is perfect with probability ≥ 1 - ϵ under the trace distance criterion d ≤ ϵ, which is widely claimed in the technical and popular literature. The many serious security consequences of this error about the QKD generated key would be explained, including practical ramification on achievable security levels. It will be shown how the error correction problem alone may already defy rigorous quantitative analysis. Various other problems would be touched upon. It is pointed out that rigorous security guarantee of much more efficient quantum cryptosystems may be obtained by abandoning the disturbance-information tradeoff principle and utilizing instead the known KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) principle in conjunction with a new DBM (decoy bits method) principle that will be detailed elsewhere.
{"title":"Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution","authors":"H. Yuen","doi":"10.1117/12.2032082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032082","url":null,"abstract":"All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we discuss some of the main known problems, particularly those on operational security guarantee and error correction. Most basic are the points that there is no security parameter in such protocols and it is not the case the generated key is perfect with probability ≥ 1 - ϵ under the trace distance criterion d ≤ ϵ, which is widely claimed in the technical and popular literature. The many serious security consequences of this error about the QKD generated key would be explained, including practical ramification on achievable security levels. It will be shown how the error correction problem alone may already defy rigorous quantitative analysis. Various other problems would be touched upon. It is pointed out that rigorous security guarantee of much more efficient quantum cryptosystems may be obtained by abandoning the disturbance-information tradeoff principle and utilizing instead the known KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) principle in conjunction with a new DBM (decoy bits method) principle that will be detailed elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116634237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We report several vulnerabilities found in Clavis2, the flagship quantum key distribution (QKD) system from ID Quantique. We show the hacking of a calibration sequence run by Clavis2 to synchronize the Alice and Bob devices before performing the secret key exchange. This hack induces a temporal detection efficiency mismatch in Bob that can allow Eve to break the security of the cryptosystem using faked states. We also experimentally investigate the superlinear behaviour in the single-photon detectors (SPDs) used by Bob. Due to this superlinearity, the SPDs feature an actual multi-photon detection probability which is generally higher than the theoretically-modelled value. We show how this increases the risk of detector control attacks on QKD systems (including Clavis2) employing such SPDs. Finally, we review the experimental feasibility of Trojan-horse attacks. In the case of Clavis2, the objective is to read Bob's phase modulator to acquire knowledge of his basis choice as this information suffices for constructing the raw key in the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol. We work in close collaboration with ID Quantique and for all these loopholes, we notified them in advance. Wherever possible, we or ID Quantique proposed countermeasures and they implemented suitable patches and upgrade their systems.
{"title":"Quantum key distribution: vulnerable if imperfectly implemented","authors":"G. Leuchs","doi":"10.1117/12.2033066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2033066","url":null,"abstract":"We report several vulnerabilities found in Clavis2, the flagship quantum key distribution (QKD) system from ID Quantique. We show the hacking of a calibration sequence run by Clavis2 to synchronize the Alice and Bob devices before performing the secret key exchange. This hack induces a temporal detection efficiency mismatch in Bob that can allow Eve to break the security of the cryptosystem using faked states. We also experimentally investigate the superlinear behaviour in the single-photon detectors (SPDs) used by Bob. Due to this superlinearity, the SPDs feature an actual multi-photon detection probability which is generally higher than the theoretically-modelled value. We show how this increases the risk of detector control attacks on QKD systems (including Clavis2) employing such SPDs. Finally, we review the experimental feasibility of Trojan-horse attacks. In the case of Clavis2, the objective is to read Bob's phase modulator to acquire knowledge of his basis choice as this information suffices for constructing the raw key in the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol. We work in close collaboration with ID Quantique and for all these loopholes, we notified them in advance. Wherever possible, we or ID Quantique proposed countermeasures and they implemented suitable patches and upgrade their systems.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131889166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Dulski, J. Barela, P. Trzaskawka, T. Pia̧tkowski
The recent necessity to protect military bases, convoys and patrols gave serious impact to the development of multisensor security systems for perimeter protection. One of the most important devices used in such systems are IR cameras. The paper discusses technical possibilities and limitations to use uncooled IR camera in a multi-sensor surveillance system for perimeter protection. Effective ranges of detection depend on the class of the sensor used and the observed scene itself. Application of IR camera increases the probability of intruder detection regardless of the time of day or weather conditions. It also simultaneously decreased the false alarm rate produced by the surveillance system. The role of IR cameras in the system was discussed as well as technical possibilities to detect human being. Comparison of commercially available IR cameras, capable to achieve desired ranges was done. The required spatial resolution for detection, recognition and identification was calculated. The simulation of detection ranges was done using a new model for predicting target acquisition performance which uses the Targeting Task Performance (TTP) metric. Like its predecessor, the Johnson criteria, the new model bounds the range performance with image quality. The scope of presented analysis is limited to the estimation of detection, recognition and identification ranges for typical thermal cameras with uncooled microbolometer focal plane arrays. This type of cameras is most widely used in security systems because of competitive price to performance ratio. Detection, recognition and identification range calculations were made, and the appropriate results for the devices with selected technical specifications were compared and discussed.
{"title":"Application of infrared uncooled cameras in surveillance systems","authors":"R. Dulski, J. Barela, P. Trzaskawka, T. Pia̧tkowski","doi":"10.1117/12.2028507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2028507","url":null,"abstract":"The recent necessity to protect military bases, convoys and patrols gave serious impact to the development of multisensor security systems for perimeter protection. One of the most important devices used in such systems are IR cameras. The paper discusses technical possibilities and limitations to use uncooled IR camera in a multi-sensor surveillance system for perimeter protection. Effective ranges of detection depend on the class of the sensor used and the observed scene itself. Application of IR camera increases the probability of intruder detection regardless of the time of day or weather conditions. It also simultaneously decreased the false alarm rate produced by the surveillance system. The role of IR cameras in the system was discussed as well as technical possibilities to detect human being. Comparison of commercially available IR cameras, capable to achieve desired ranges was done. The required spatial resolution for detection, recognition and identification was calculated. The simulation of detection ranges was done using a new model for predicting target acquisition performance which uses the Targeting Task Performance (TTP) metric. Like its predecessor, the Johnson criteria, the new model bounds the range performance with image quality. The scope of presented analysis is limited to the estimation of detection, recognition and identification ranges for typical thermal cameras with uncooled microbolometer focal plane arrays. This type of cameras is most widely used in security systems because of competitive price to performance ratio. Detection, recognition and identification range calculations were made, and the appropriate results for the devices with selected technical specifications were compared and discussed.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115101142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, the current status of infrared imaging detecting technology was introduced briefly. The impact of changes of target, environment and mission on the development of infrared imaging detecting technology was analyzed. The main innovation strategies of infrared imaging detecting technology–modifying information acquisition mode, enhancing realization ability and increasing resources utilization were discussed. The promoting effects of the advancement of basic theories and the revolution of relevant technologies on the development of infrared imaging detecting technology were analyzed. The fundamental law of the development of infrared imaging detecting technology was summarized as stepwise evolution from low into high dimension detection. And the developing trends and main characteristics of future infrared imaging detecting technology were deduced based on this fundamental law. Furthermore, technology directions that should be concerned were introduced according to the development of new concept and technologies for infrared imaging detecting, especially, meeting the new requirements through new concept imaging mechanism such as novel optical technology and computing imaging.
{"title":"Trends in infrared imaging detecting technology","authors":"J. Fan, Jianyu Yang","doi":"10.1117/12.2032443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032443","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, the current status of infrared imaging detecting technology was introduced briefly. The impact of changes of target, environment and mission on the development of infrared imaging detecting technology was analyzed. The main innovation strategies of infrared imaging detecting technology–modifying information acquisition mode, enhancing realization ability and increasing resources utilization were discussed. The promoting effects of the advancement of basic theories and the revolution of relevant technologies on the development of infrared imaging detecting technology were analyzed. The fundamental law of the development of infrared imaging detecting technology was summarized as stepwise evolution from low into high dimension detection. And the developing trends and main characteristics of future infrared imaging detecting technology were deduced based on this fundamental law. Furthermore, technology directions that should be concerned were introduced according to the development of new concept and technologies for infrared imaging detecting, especially, meeting the new requirements through new concept imaging mechanism such as novel optical technology and computing imaging.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122351356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Rutz, P. Kleinow, R. Aidam, W. Bronner, L. Kirste, M. Walther
We report on materials and technology development for short-wave infrared photodetectors based on InGaAs p-i-n and avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Using molecular beam epitaxy for the growth of thin layers with abrupt interfaces, which are required for optimized APD structures, excellent crystalline quality has been achieved for detector structures grown on 3-inch InP substrates. For the fabrication of focal plane detector arrays, we employed a mesa etching technology in order to compare the results with the commonly utilized planar technology. Camera detector arrays as well as test structures with various sizes and geometries for materials and process characterization are processed using a dry-etch mesa technology. Aspects of the process development are presented along with measured dark-current and photo-current characteristics of the detector devices.
{"title":"InGaAs infrared detector development for SWIR imaging applications","authors":"F. Rutz, P. Kleinow, R. Aidam, W. Bronner, L. Kirste, M. Walther","doi":"10.1117/12.2026879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2026879","url":null,"abstract":"We report on materials and technology development for short-wave infrared photodetectors based on InGaAs p-i-n and avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Using molecular beam epitaxy for the growth of thin layers with abrupt interfaces, which are required for optimized APD structures, excellent crystalline quality has been achieved for detector structures grown on 3-inch InP substrates. For the fabrication of focal plane detector arrays, we employed a mesa etching technology in order to compare the results with the commonly utilized planar technology. Camera detector arrays as well as test structures with various sizes and geometries for materials and process characterization are processed using a dry-etch mesa technology. Aspects of the process development are presented along with measured dark-current and photo-current characteristics of the detector devices.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114881236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, thermal detectors with a 17 μm pixel pitch have become well-established for use in various applications, such as thermal imaging in cars. This has allowed the civilian infrared market to steadily mature. The main cost for these lens designs comes from the number of lenses used. The development of thermal detectors, which are less sensitive than quantum detectors, has compelled camera manufacturers to demand very fast F-numbers such as f/1.2 or faster. This also minimizes the impact of diffraction in the 8-12 μmm waveband. The freedom afforded by the choice of the stop position in these designs has been used to create high-resolution lenses that operate near the diffraction limit. Based on GASIR®1, a chalcogenide glass, two-lens designs have been developed for all pixel counts and fields of view. Additionally, all these designs have been passively athermalized, either optically or mechanically. Lenses for cooled quantum detectors have a defined stop position called the cold stop (CS) near the FPA-plane. The solid angle defined by the CS fixes not only the F-number (which is less fast than for thermal detectors), but determines also the required resolution. The main cost driver of these designs is the lens diameter. Lenses must be sufficiently large to avoid any vignetting of ray bundles intended to reach the cooled detector. This paper studies the transfer of approved lens design principles for thermal detectors to lenses for cooled quantum detectors with CS for same pixel count at three horizontal fields of view: a 28° medium field lens, an 8° narrow field lens, and a 90° wide field lens. The lens arrangements found for each category have similar lens costs.
{"title":"Two-lens designs for modern uncooled and cooled IR imaging devices","authors":"N. Schuster, J. Franks","doi":"10.1117/12.2028716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2028716","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, thermal detectors with a 17 μm pixel pitch have become well-established for use in various applications, such as thermal imaging in cars. This has allowed the civilian infrared market to steadily mature. The main cost for these lens designs comes from the number of lenses used. The development of thermal detectors, which are less sensitive than quantum detectors, has compelled camera manufacturers to demand very fast F-numbers such as f/1.2 or faster. This also minimizes the impact of diffraction in the 8-12 μmm waveband. The freedom afforded by the choice of the stop position in these designs has been used to create high-resolution lenses that operate near the diffraction limit. Based on GASIR®1, a chalcogenide glass, two-lens designs have been developed for all pixel counts and fields of view. Additionally, all these designs have been passively athermalized, either optically or mechanically. Lenses for cooled quantum detectors have a defined stop position called the cold stop (CS) near the FPA-plane. The solid angle defined by the CS fixes not only the F-number (which is less fast than for thermal detectors), but determines also the required resolution. The main cost driver of these designs is the lens diameter. Lenses must be sufficiently large to avoid any vignetting of ray bundles intended to reach the cooled detector. This paper studies the transfer of approved lens design principles for thermal detectors to lenses for cooled quantum detectors with CS for same pixel count at three horizontal fields of view: a 28° medium field lens, an 8° narrow field lens, and a 90° wide field lens. The lens arrangements found for each category have similar lens costs.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"8896 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131287235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the advent of the laser in 1960, the protection of human eyes and sensors against intended or unintended damage by laser radiation is a hot research topic. As long as the parameters of a laser source such as the wavelength and the output power are known, adequate laser safety can be ensured simply by utilizing conventional laser protection filters which are based on absorption or interference effects. This is typically the case in cooperative environments like a laboratory or industrial facilities. A very different situation prevails in military defense or civil security. There, the parameters of encountering laser threats are usually unknown. Protection measures, helping against all types of laser threats, are the long desired objective of countless research activities. The biggest challenge in finding an effective measure arises from single laser pulses of unknown wavelength. The problem demands for a passive protection concept and may be based for example on intensity dependent effects. Moreover, the requested solutions shall comprise add-on possibilities like thin films to be put on existing optics, windshields or glasses. Unfortunately, such an all-embracing solution is still far out of reach. The Fraunhofer IOSB has been working on the evaluation and development of non-conventional laser protection methods for more than 20 years. An overview of the past and present research activities shall be presented, comprising protection measures against laser damaging and laser dazzling.
{"title":"Research on laser protection: an overview of 20 years of activities at Fraunhofer IOSB","authors":"G. Ritt, D. Walter, B. Eberle","doi":"10.1117/12.2029083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2029083","url":null,"abstract":"Since the advent of the laser in 1960, the protection of human eyes and sensors against intended or unintended damage by laser radiation is a hot research topic. As long as the parameters of a laser source such as the wavelength and the output power are known, adequate laser safety can be ensured simply by utilizing conventional laser protection filters which are based on absorption or interference effects. This is typically the case in cooperative environments like a laboratory or industrial facilities. A very different situation prevails in military defense or civil security. There, the parameters of encountering laser threats are usually unknown. Protection measures, helping against all types of laser threats, are the long desired objective of countless research activities. The biggest challenge in finding an effective measure arises from single laser pulses of unknown wavelength. The problem demands for a passive protection concept and may be based for example on intensity dependent effects. Moreover, the requested solutions shall comprise add-on possibilities like thin films to be put on existing optics, windshields or glasses. Unfortunately, such an all-embracing solution is still far out of reach. The Fraunhofer IOSB has been working on the evaluation and development of non-conventional laser protection methods for more than 20 years. An overview of the past and present research activities shall be presented, comprising protection measures against laser damaging and laser dazzling.","PeriodicalId":344928,"journal":{"name":"Optics/Photonics in Security and Defence","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127870287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}