Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1990600
M. Paterson
ABSTRACT Domicile is an old and unwieldy concept of private international law. Nevertheless, it remains relevant to a variety of areas of law across the UK and Australia. While neither country has codified the law of domicile, Australia has gone much further to modernise it. This paper discusses the state of the law of domicile in the United Kingdom and Australia and the effect of Australia’s modernisation attempts. After addressing the state of the law as it currently stands, it shows how both the subjective nature of domicile’s focus on a person’s intention, and more mechanical rules in respect of domiciles of dependence, are outmoded and in serious need of reform.
{"title":"On dom: the case for revisiting domicile law reform in the United Kingdom and Australia","authors":"M. Paterson","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1990600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1990600","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Domicile is an old and unwieldy concept of private international law. Nevertheless, it remains relevant to a variety of areas of law across the UK and Australia. While neither country has codified the law of domicile, Australia has gone much further to modernise it. This paper discusses the state of the law of domicile in the United Kingdom and Australia and the effect of Australia’s modernisation attempts. After addressing the state of the law as it currently stands, it shows how both the subjective nature of domicile’s focus on a person’s intention, and more mechanical rules in respect of domiciles of dependence, are outmoded and in serious need of reform.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43040071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1990635
Kian Peng Soh
ABSTRACT In Khan v Meadows [2021] UKSC 21, the United Kingdom Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider whether the principle laid down in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 applied in the context of medical negligence. While the Court unanimously agreed that the SAAMCO principle applied in the context of medical negligence, they parted ways as to how the SAAMCO principle, or ‘scope of duty’ principle, fitted into the analytical structure of the tort of negligence. This note argues that the approach taken by Lord Hodge and Lord Sales conflates the scope of duty analysis with that for ascertaining the existence of a duty of care.
在Khan v Meadows [2021] UKSC 21中，英国最高法院有机会考虑南澳大利亚资产管理公司诉York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191中规定的原则是否适用于医疗过失。虽然法院一致同意SAAMCO原则适用于医疗过失的情况，但他们在SAAMCO原则或“责任范围”原则如何适用于过失侵权的分析结构方面存在分歧。本说明认为，霍奇勋爵和萨莱斯勋爵采取的方法将责任分析的范围与确定注意义务存在的范围混为一谈。
{"title":"Scope of a doctor’s duty to advise","authors":"Kian Peng Soh","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1990635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1990635","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Khan v Meadows [2021] UKSC 21, the United Kingdom Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider whether the principle laid down in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 applied in the context of medical negligence. While the Court unanimously agreed that the SAAMCO principle applied in the context of medical negligence, they parted ways as to how the SAAMCO principle, or ‘scope of duty’ principle, fitted into the analytical structure of the tort of negligence. This note argues that the approach taken by Lord Hodge and Lord Sales conflates the scope of duty analysis with that for ascertaining the existence of a duty of care.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46414349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1980699
Thomas Yeon, Diana Siu
ABSTRACT This case note examines the judicial controls on emergency powers established by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Kwok Wing Hang v Chief Executive in Council [2020] HKCFA 42. It argues that, despite the Court’s promises to the contrary, none of those controls offer a meaningful constraint on the Chief Executive in Council’s power to enact regulations under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (Cap 241). It also observes that the Court’s flawed articulation of the judicial controls is of cautionary value for courts in the United Kingdom interpreting the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
{"title":"Judicial control and interpretation of emergency powers: lessons from Hong Kong","authors":"Thomas Yeon, Diana Siu","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1980699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1980699","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This case note examines the judicial controls on emergency powers established by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Kwok Wing Hang v Chief Executive in Council [2020] HKCFA 42. It argues that, despite the Court’s promises to the contrary, none of those controls offer a meaningful constraint on the Chief Executive in Council’s power to enact regulations under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (Cap 241). It also observes that the Court’s flawed articulation of the judicial controls is of cautionary value for courts in the United Kingdom interpreting the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43972549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-19DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1940788
Raza Nazar
ABSTRACT In The Jurists Foundation v Federal Government, the Supreme Court of Pakistan delivered a significant judgment about the country's Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The Court held that an executive attempt to extend the tenure of the COAS was ‘meaningless and of no consequence’ because Parliament had not legislated on the COAS’ tenure or terms of service. According to the Court, legislation was required on such terms based on ‘structural requirements’ of a repealed constitution and a universal premise that senior officers of the armed forces must be regulated by law. This note argues that the Court's approach is difficult to reconcile with key constitutional principles and that, on a proper understanding of the Court's role, the extension should have been subject to ordinary principles of judicial review.
{"title":"Legislation is ‘required’: The Jurists Foundation v Federal Government on the tenure extension of Pakistan’s army chief","authors":"Raza Nazar","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1940788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1940788","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In The Jurists Foundation v Federal Government, the Supreme Court of Pakistan delivered a significant judgment about the country's Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The Court held that an executive attempt to extend the tenure of the COAS was ‘meaningless and of no consequence’ because Parliament had not legislated on the COAS’ tenure or terms of service. According to the Court, legislation was required on such terms based on ‘structural requirements’ of a repealed constitution and a universal premise that senior officers of the armed forces must be regulated by law. This note argues that the Court's approach is difficult to reconcile with key constitutional principles and that, on a proper understanding of the Court's role, the extension should have been subject to ordinary principles of judicial review.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2021.1940788","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47414903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1940795
Kenny Chng
ABSTRACT In Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney-General [2020] SGCA 122, the Singapore Court of Appeal reconsidered how Article 12(1), the Singapore Constitution's equal protection provision, should apply to executive actions. Departing from the established ‘deliberate and arbitrary’ test, the Court of Appeal proposed to first consider whether the relevant persons were ‘equally situated’ and subject to differential treatment. If so, this treatment had to be justified by legitimate reasons. This case note argues that while the rejection of the ‘deliberate and arbitrary’ test is welcomed, this approach risks returning to an emphasis on classes in equal protection analysis—an emphasis which has been criticised as tautological in the Singapore courts’ own Article 12(1) jurisprudence. A requirement to articulate the substantive requirements of equality in the specific context of the executive decision in question would offer a more principled means of analysing the constitutionality of executive actions under Article 12(1).
摘要在Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin诉司法部长【2020】SGCA 122一案中，新加坡上诉法院重新考虑了新加坡宪法的平等保护条款第12（1）条应如何适用于行政行为。与既定的“蓄意和武断”测试不同，上诉法院建议首先考虑相关人员是否“处境平等”并受到差别待遇。如果是这样，这种待遇必须有正当理由。本案例说明认为，虽然拒绝“蓄意和武断”的测试是受欢迎的，但这种方法有可能在平等保护分析中重新强调阶级——在新加坡法院自己的第12（1）条判例中，这种强调被批评为重复。要求在有关行政决定的具体背景下阐明平等的实质性要求，将为分析第12条第（1）款规定的行政行动的合宪性提供一种更有原则的手段。
{"title":"A reconsideration of equal protection and executive action in Singapore","authors":"Kenny Chng","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1940795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1940795","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney-General [2020] SGCA 122, the Singapore Court of Appeal reconsidered how Article 12(1), the Singapore Constitution's equal protection provision, should apply to executive actions. Departing from the established ‘deliberate and arbitrary’ test, the Court of Appeal proposed to first consider whether the relevant persons were ‘equally situated’ and subject to differential treatment. If so, this treatment had to be justified by legitimate reasons. This case note argues that while the rejection of the ‘deliberate and arbitrary’ test is welcomed, this approach risks returning to an emphasis on classes in equal protection analysis—an emphasis which has been criticised as tautological in the Singapore courts’ own Article 12(1) jurisprudence. A requirement to articulate the substantive requirements of equality in the specific context of the executive decision in question would offer a more principled means of analysing the constitutionality of executive actions under Article 12(1).","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2021.1940795","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49334920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-06DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1934298
Saloni Khanderia
ABSTRACT The determination of the ‘international jurisdiction’ of the court of origin remains the backbone of the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters in India and South Africa. Thus, a foreign judgment is ineffective in these jurisdictions unless the court of origin was competent according to the principles of private international law. The grounds to determine the ‘international jurisdiction’ of the foreign court are narrow and primarily rest on the ‘allegiance’ of the judgment-debtor towards the State of origin. This paper demonstrates how the rules to ascertain the competency of the foreign forum in these BRICS jurisdictions impede the free movement of judgments and prevent access to justice. The paper accordingly suggests plausible new approaches to overcome these shortcomings.
{"title":"The prevalence of ‘jurisdiction’ in the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil and commercial judgments in India and South Africa: a comparative analysis","authors":"Saloni Khanderia","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1934298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1934298","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The determination of the ‘international jurisdiction’ of the court of origin remains the backbone of the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters in India and South Africa. Thus, a foreign judgment is ineffective in these jurisdictions unless the court of origin was competent according to the principles of private international law. The grounds to determine the ‘international jurisdiction’ of the foreign court are narrow and primarily rest on the ‘allegiance’ of the judgment-debtor towards the State of origin. This paper demonstrates how the rules to ascertain the competency of the foreign forum in these BRICS jurisdictions impede the free movement of judgments and prevent access to justice. The paper accordingly suggests plausible new approaches to overcome these shortcomings.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2021.1934298","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48076503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1888207
Justice Winston Anderson
ABSTRACT The Caribbean Court of Justice was established in 2005 to have a determinative role in the further development of Caribbean jurisprudence, and, during its sixteen years of existence, the CCJ has made many important pronouncements on the rule of law. A recent study of these pronouncements suggests that the Court appears to be headed towards the acceptance of a substantive conception of the rule of law which is hierarchically superior to the Constitution and which limits the legislative power to amend the Constitution. But any such court-determined rule of law may be difficult to reconcile with orthodox principles of Caribbean constitutionalism and the orderly development of Caribbean Constitutional democracies. This paper identifies an alternative method of disciplining legislative action in the norms of jus cogens and explores the conceptual methodologies and precedents for making these norms applicable in domestic law.
{"title":"The rule of law and the Caribbean Court of Justice: taking jus cogens for a spin","authors":"Justice Winston Anderson","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1888207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1888207","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Caribbean Court of Justice was established in 2005 to have a determinative role in the further development of Caribbean jurisprudence, and, during its sixteen years of existence, the CCJ has made many important pronouncements on the rule of law. A recent study of these pronouncements suggests that the Court appears to be headed towards the acceptance of a substantive conception of the rule of law which is hierarchically superior to the Constitution and which limits the legislative power to amend the Constitution. But any such court-determined rule of law may be difficult to reconcile with orthodox principles of Caribbean constitutionalism and the orderly development of Caribbean Constitutional democracies. This paper identifies an alternative method of disciplining legislative action in the norms of jus cogens and explores the conceptual methodologies and precedents for making these norms applicable in domestic law.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2021.1888207","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49654617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1927425
Sonali Walpola
ABSTRACT The end of Privy Council appeals in 1986 was a transformative event in Australia’s common law history. This article examines the High Court of Australia’s attitude to changing common law doctrines in the period 1987–2016, covering the Mason, Brennan, Gleeson and French Courts. Throughout this period, it is shown that the Court has consistently been willing to overturn and modify common law rules for the sake of achieving coherence and certainty to the law. However, it is argued that the Mason Court espoused a bolder vision of the permissible bases for change, in contrast to the Gleeson and French Courts. The Mason Court derived new common law rights from general principles, and invoked contemporary values and international human rights norms to change common law doctrines. In the Gleeson and French eras, a majority of judges were disinclined to consider justifications of this nature, even when opportunities existed.
{"title":"After the Australia Acts: the High Court’s attitude to changing the common law (1987–2016)","authors":"Sonali Walpola","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1927425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1927425","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The end of Privy Council appeals in 1986 was a transformative event in Australia’s common law history. This article examines the High Court of Australia’s attitude to changing common law doctrines in the period 1987–2016, covering the Mason, Brennan, Gleeson and French Courts. Throughout this period, it is shown that the Court has consistently been willing to overturn and modify common law rules for the sake of achieving coherence and certainty to the law. However, it is argued that the Mason Court espoused a bolder vision of the permissible bases for change, in contrast to the Gleeson and French Courts. The Mason Court derived new common law rights from general principles, and invoked contemporary values and international human rights norms to change common law doctrines. In the Gleeson and French eras, a majority of judges were disinclined to consider justifications of this nature, even when opportunities existed.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2021.1927425","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46354816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1901400
M. Tan
ABSTRACT Courts around the world often have to balance a whole host of competing considerations in determining whether witnesses should be permitted to testify via video link. In Polanski v Condé Nast Publications Ltd [2005] UKHL 10, the United Kingdom House of Lords was narrowly split (3–2) in carrying out this difficult balancing exercise. In February 2020, the Singapore Court of Appeal had the opportunity to carry out a similar balancing exercise in Anil Singh Gurm v J S Yeh & Co [2020] SGCA 5. At that time, very little was known about the coronavirus and its potentially far-reaching impact on judicial proceedings. Now, more than a year later, as the world continues to grapple with the effects of the global coronavirus pandemic, it may well be time for a rethink of the underlying policy considerations surrounding the use of video link evidence.
摘要世界各地的法院在决定是否允许证人通过视频链接作证时，往往需要平衡一系列相互竞争的因素。在Polanski v CondéNast Publications Ltd[2005]UKHL 10案中，英国上议院在进行这一艰难的平衡过程中以3比2的微弱优势分裂。2020年2月，新加坡上诉法院有机会在Anil Singh Gurm v J S Yeh&Co【2020】SGCA 5案中进行了类似的平衡工作。当时，人们对冠状病毒及其对司法程序的潜在深远影响知之甚少。现在，一年多过去了，随着世界继续努力应对全球冠状病毒大流行的影响，很可能是时候重新思考围绕使用视频链接证据的根本政策考虑了。
{"title":"Testifying via video link: a view from Singapore Anil Singh Gurm v J S Yeh & Co","authors":"M. Tan","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2021.1901400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2021.1901400","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Courts around the world often have to balance a whole host of competing considerations in determining whether witnesses should be permitted to testify via video link. In Polanski v Condé Nast Publications Ltd [2005] UKHL 10, the United Kingdom House of Lords was narrowly split (3–2) in carrying out this difficult balancing exercise. In February 2020, the Singapore Court of Appeal had the opportunity to carry out a similar balancing exercise in Anil Singh Gurm v J S Yeh & Co [2020] SGCA 5. At that time, very little was known about the coronavirus and its potentially far-reaching impact on judicial proceedings. Now, more than a year later, as the world continues to grapple with the effects of the global coronavirus pandemic, it may well be time for a rethink of the underlying policy considerations surrounding the use of video link evidence.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2021.1901400","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45686186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2021.1884949
Kenny Yang
ABSTRACT The criminal disclosure regime in Singapore has come a long way from the ‘dark age of disclosure’ prior to the disclosure obligations set out in the Criminal Procedure Code and Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 32. While cases such as Public Prosecutor v Li Weiming [2014] SGCA 7 and Lee Siew Boon Winston v Public Prosecutor [2015] SGHC 186 have seen some judicial oversight of the disclosure obligations, its extent has remained substantially the same. However, the decision in Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 25 has fundamentally increased the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations. This case note discusses these changes and their impact on the accused and Prosecutors.
摘要新加坡的刑事披露制度已经从《刑事诉讼法》和Muhammad bin Kadar诉公诉人[2011]SGCA 32规定的披露义务之前的“披露黑暗时代”走过了漫长的道路。虽然检察官诉李伟明[2014]SGCA 7和李诉检察官[2015]SGHC 186等案件对披露义务进行了一些司法监督，但其程度基本保持不变。然而，Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad诉公诉人【2020】SGCA 25案的裁决从根本上增加了检方的披露义务。本案例说明讨论了这些变化及其对被告和检察官的影响。
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