Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1276768
Nicolas Kyriakides
ABSTRACT The average length of a first instance civil trial in Cyprus is approximately two years. The article identifies the elements of Cypriot civil litigation that contribute to lengthy and costly trials despite the recent amendments to the Cypriot Civil Procedure Rules. It then examines the civil procedure reforms that took place in England and Wales in the last twenty years and examines whether and to what extent they can provide inspiration for a thorough reform in Cyprus law.
{"title":"Civil procedure reform in Cyprus: looking to England and beyond","authors":"Nicolas Kyriakides","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1276768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1276768","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The average length of a first instance civil trial in Cyprus is approximately two years. The article identifies the elements of Cypriot civil litigation that contribute to lengthy and costly trials despite the recent amendments to the Cypriot Civil Procedure Rules. It then examines the civil procedure reforms that took place in England and Wales in the last twenty years and examines whether and to what extent they can provide inspiration for a thorough reform in Cyprus law.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"262 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1276768","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1274034
W. Fotherby
ABSTRACT This article defends the British courts against charges of colonialism in determining challenges brought to the British Government’s direct intervention in the administration of its overseas territories. Primarily from the analysis of three sets of cases (Christian v R [2007] 2 AC 400 (PC), R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2009] 1 AC 453 (HL), and R (Misick) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 1039 (Admin), [2009] EWCA Civ 1549), I argue that the courts have adopted a sensitive approach to questions of how these territories are governed—little different to the one employed in the domestic context—that appropriately safeguards the rights of territory citizens from British Government overreach.
本文为英国法院在裁决英国政府直接干预其海外领土管理的挑战时反对殖民主义指控辩护。主要通过对三组案例的分析(Christian v R [2007] 2 AC 400 (PC)， R (Bancoult)诉外交和联邦事务大臣(No . 2) [2009] 1 AC 453 (HL)， R (Misick)诉外交和联邦事务大臣[2009]EWHC 1039 (Admin)， [2009] EWCA Civ 1549)，我认为，法院对如何治理这些领土的问题采取了一种敏感的做法——与在国内情况下采用的做法几乎没有什么不同——适当地保护领土公民的权利，使其免受英国政府越权的影响。
{"title":"The overseas territories and the British courts","authors":"W. Fotherby","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1274034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1274034","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article defends the British courts against charges of colonialism in determining challenges brought to the British Government’s direct intervention in the administration of its overseas territories. Primarily from the analysis of three sets of cases (Christian v R [2007] 2 AC 400 (PC), R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2009] 1 AC 453 (HL), and R (Misick) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 1039 (Admin), [2009] EWCA Civ 1549), I argue that the courts have adopted a sensitive approach to questions of how these territories are governed—little different to the one employed in the domestic context—that appropriately safeguards the rights of territory citizens from British Government overreach.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"292 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1274034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59820968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1281631
Brian Sang YK
ABSTRACT Kenya’s 2010 Constitution departs from its predecessor by extending the reach of its Bill of Rights to the private sphere of legal relations. It applies horizontally to private law and conduct, thereby binding private actors both directly and indirectly. This bears significant implications for fundamental rights enforcement in Kenya, which has long been influenced by the common law and where the previous bill of rights did not expressly bind private actors. Focusing on both pre- and post-2010 case law, this article analyses the horizontal effect of constitutional rights in Kenya and highlights the constraints of the common law-based vertical application on the effective enforcement of constitutional rights against private actors. It also provides some critical insights into the consequences of constitutionalising the horizontality of fundamental rights. In addition, on the basis of comparative experiences, it offers proposals for determining the extent to which constitutional rights should impact private legal relations.
{"title":"The reach of the bill of rights into personal legal relations in Kenyan constitutional law and jurisprudence","authors":"Brian Sang YK","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1281631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1281631","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Kenya’s 2010 Constitution departs from its predecessor by extending the reach of its Bill of Rights to the private sphere of legal relations. It applies horizontally to private law and conduct, thereby binding private actors both directly and indirectly. This bears significant implications for fundamental rights enforcement in Kenya, which has long been influenced by the common law and where the previous bill of rights did not expressly bind private actors. Focusing on both pre- and post-2010 case law, this article analyses the horizontal effect of constitutional rights in Kenya and highlights the constraints of the common law-based vertical application on the effective enforcement of constitutional rights against private actors. It also provides some critical insights into the consequences of constitutionalising the horizontality of fundamental rights. In addition, on the basis of comparative experiences, it offers proposals for determining the extent to which constitutional rights should impact private legal relations.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"235 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1281631","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2017.1281643
E. Cameron
ABSTRACT This is the text of the 2015 Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture, delivered at Rhodes House, Oxford, on 16 June 2015. These Memorial Lectures honour Bram Fischer QC, a South African lawyer who defended Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the liberation movement when on trial for their lives, and who himself died in imprisonment in 1975. The 2015 Lecture discusses Fischer’s moral heroism, but also the compromises he made as a result of his involvement in an unjust legal system. It concludes by reflecting on Fischer’s dissent against that system, and against the Afrikaner establishment of which he was part, and the lessons this has for us today. The Lecture is reproduced here with the kind permission of its organisers, Lord Joel Joffe and Prof Nic Cheeseman, and appears as it was delivered, with only minor editorial changes.
{"title":"Fidelity and betrayal under law","authors":"E. Cameron","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2017.1281643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2017.1281643","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is the text of the 2015 Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture, delivered at Rhodes House, Oxford, on 16 June 2015. These Memorial Lectures honour Bram Fischer QC, a South African lawyer who defended Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the liberation movement when on trial for their lives, and who himself died in imprisonment in 1975. The 2015 Lecture discusses Fischer’s moral heroism, but also the compromises he made as a result of his involvement in an unjust legal system. It concludes by reflecting on Fischer’s dissent against that system, and against the Afrikaner establishment of which he was part, and the lessons this has for us today. The Lecture is reproduced here with the kind permission of its organisers, Lord Joel Joffe and Prof Nic Cheeseman, and appears as it was delivered, with only minor editorial changes.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"346 - 360"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2017.1281643","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1244452
B. H. Simamba
ABSTRACT Many countries in the British Commonwealth do not recognize proportionality as a general ground for judicial review. In the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory, the 2009 Constitution provides that decisions of public authorities must, among other things, be proportionate. In the United Kingdom, by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’), domestic courts must take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence, which applies the proportionality principle in cases involving the European Convention on Human Rights. This article examines the extent to which proportionality may have become, if at all, a general ground for review in the Cayman Islands. The answer to this question is likely to influence the interpretation of other constitutions (and statutes in general) in the Commonwealth which have codified some aspects of judicial review. The extent to which the HRA is relevant to the interpretation of human rights provisions in the British Overseas Territories is also considered.
{"title":"Proportionality as a constitutional ground of judicial review with special reference to human rights","authors":"B. H. Simamba","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1244452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244452","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many countries in the British Commonwealth do not recognize proportionality as a general ground for judicial review. In the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory, the 2009 Constitution provides that decisions of public authorities must, among other things, be proportionate. In the United Kingdom, by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’), domestic courts must take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence, which applies the proportionality principle in cases involving the European Convention on Human Rights. This article examines the extent to which proportionality may have become, if at all, a general ground for review in the Cayman Islands. The answer to this question is likely to influence the interpretation of other constitutions (and statutes in general) in the Commonwealth which have codified some aspects of judicial review. The extent to which the HRA is relevant to the interpretation of human rights provisions in the British Overseas Territories is also considered.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"58 2 1","pages":"125 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244452","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1244454
V. Stace
ABSTRACT What is the role of ‘assumption of responsibility’ when determining directors’ liability in negligence to third parties? A recent decision of the English High Court of Justice confirms that, so far as the English courts are concerned, ‘assumption of responsibility’ is a threshold test for establishing liability. This test requires conduct that would lead a third party to conclude that the director intended to assume personal responsibility. However recent academic writing argues that assumption of responsibility is not a threshold test, but rather a subset of proximity. This note suggests that a preferable approach, which is the approach taken by New Zealand courts, is to apply a two-stage proximity plus policy inquiry, which enables the court to address policy considerations relevant to imposing liability on directors.
{"title":"Directors’ liability in negligence to third parties: challenging the assumption of responsibility approach","authors":"V. Stace","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1244454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244454","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What is the role of ‘assumption of responsibility’ when determining directors’ liability in negligence to third parties? A recent decision of the English High Court of Justice confirms that, so far as the English courts are concerned, ‘assumption of responsibility’ is a threshold test for establishing liability. This test requires conduct that would lead a third party to conclude that the director intended to assume personal responsibility. However recent academic writing argues that assumption of responsibility is not a threshold test, but rather a subset of proximity. This note suggests that a preferable approach, which is the approach taken by New Zealand courts, is to apply a two-stage proximity plus policy inquiry, which enables the court to address policy considerations relevant to imposing liability on directors.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"183 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244454","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59820916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1211613
Joe McIntyre, Lorne Neudorf
ABSTRACT From the starting point that public officials and specialist administrative agencies affect most areas of economic and social life in the modern ‘administrative state’, the authors highlight rule of law concerns that have been raised with recent English reforms to restrict the availability of access to a reviewing court through changes to the judicial review procedure. The authors consider this argument in light of comparative studies of the existing law and recent reforms in Australia, Canada, and England and Wales. This comparison provides evidence of much tighter restrictions on time limits for bringing an application for judicial review as opposed to litigation in other subject matters. The authors also situate the focus on judicial review procedure within the broader trend of proceduralism in civil litigation. The authors conclude that while there is a legitimate need for established procedures to control the judicial process and ensure efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and broader public interests, overbearing procedural reforms risk accessible and effective judicial review of public agencies and officials, which can impair the principle of legality in that all public decision-making must be held to established legal standards.
{"title":"Judicial review reform: avoiding effective review through procedural means?","authors":"Joe McIntyre, Lorne Neudorf","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1211613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1211613","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT From the starting point that public officials and specialist administrative agencies affect most areas of economic and social life in the modern ‘administrative state’, the authors highlight rule of law concerns that have been raised with recent English reforms to restrict the availability of access to a reviewing court through changes to the judicial review procedure. The authors consider this argument in light of comparative studies of the existing law and recent reforms in Australia, Canada, and England and Wales. This comparison provides evidence of much tighter restrictions on time limits for bringing an application for judicial review as opposed to litigation in other subject matters. The authors also situate the focus on judicial review procedure within the broader trend of proceduralism in civil litigation. The authors conclude that while there is a legitimate need for established procedures to control the judicial process and ensure efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and broader public interests, overbearing procedural reforms risk accessible and effective judicial review of public agencies and officials, which can impair the principle of legality in that all public decision-making must be held to established legal standards.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"65 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1211613","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59820464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1211745
F. Carrigan
ABSTRACT The objective of the article is to track the part played by self-employed or independent contractors in shaping the wage contract. A petite bourgeoisie class that cannot be a party to an employment contract has been influential in shaping its judicial design. The reality is that in both English and Australian doctrine the judiciary has utilised the distinction between independent contractors and workers as the benchmark for categorising those embraced by an employment contract. The article argues that this state of affairs has resulted in a long standing judicial failure to provide a lucid exposition of the economic characteristics of the self-employed and wage earners, and that this has produced over an extensive historical period a series of misguided contract of employment tests. The failure to provide a cogent legal test for distinguishing the self-employed from those selling labour hours has a steep cost. When those who should be categorised as employees are classified as independent contractors the victims lose the prospect of access to employment protection rights. Social justice is the loser when the law fails to adopt a test that accurately identifies those asserting their right to the protective mantle of labour laws. A cardinal feature of the article is the space given to revisionist judges who in the past have been willing to take tentative steps towards forging an employment contract test that better reflected the economic lines separating the self-employed or independent contractors from wage labour. These bold spirits have been prepared to take the bull by the horns and begin the process of seeing class as an organising principle in distinguishing employees from independent contractors.
{"title":"The economic and legal identity of the self-employed in Anglo-Australian Jurisdictions","authors":"F. Carrigan","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1211745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1211745","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The objective of the article is to track the part played by self-employed or independent contractors in shaping the wage contract. A petite bourgeoisie class that cannot be a party to an employment contract has been influential in shaping its judicial design. The reality is that in both English and Australian doctrine the judiciary has utilised the distinction between independent contractors and workers as the benchmark for categorising those embraced by an employment contract. The article argues that this state of affairs has resulted in a long standing judicial failure to provide a lucid exposition of the economic characteristics of the self-employed and wage earners, and that this has produced over an extensive historical period a series of misguided contract of employment tests. The failure to provide a cogent legal test for distinguishing the self-employed from those selling labour hours has a steep cost. When those who should be categorised as employees are classified as independent contractors the victims lose the prospect of access to employment protection rights. Social justice is the loser when the law fails to adopt a test that accurately identifies those asserting their right to the protective mantle of labour laws. A cardinal feature of the article is the space given to revisionist judges who in the past have been willing to take tentative steps towards forging an employment contract test that better reflected the economic lines separating the self-employed or independent contractors from wage labour. These bold spirits have been prepared to take the bull by the horns and begin the process of seeing class as an organising principle in distinguishing employees from independent contractors.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"1 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1211745","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59820545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1244451
Sarah E. Hamill
ABSTRACT This paper uses the idea of the meta-constitution to interrogate issues with Canada’s constitutional amendment and recognition procedures. Put simply, the meta-constitution is that part or parts of a written constitution which are self-referential. Typically, meta-constitutions explain what document(s) make up the constitution and how the constitution can be amended. Most meta-constitutions are simple but Canada’s is not and the difficulties with Canada’s meta-constitution highlight the key legal and political role that this often overlooked constitutional feature plays. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada issued decisions in two reference cases which dealt with meta-constitutional issues and, as argued in this paper, the Court used the meta-constitution to greatly expand the scope of what courts regard as supreme law in Canada.
{"title":"The meta-constitution: amendment, recognition, and the continuing puzzle of supreme law in Canada","authors":"Sarah E. Hamill","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1244451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244451","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper uses the idea of the meta-constitution to interrogate issues with Canada’s constitutional amendment and recognition procedures. Put simply, the meta-constitution is that part or parts of a written constitution which are self-referential. Typically, meta-constitutions explain what document(s) make up the constitution and how the constitution can be amended. Most meta-constitutions are simple but Canada’s is not and the difficulties with Canada’s meta-constitution highlight the key legal and political role that this often overlooked constitutional feature plays. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada issued decisions in two reference cases which dealt with meta-constitutional issues and, as argued in this paper, the Court used the meta-constitution to greatly expand the scope of what courts regard as supreme law in Canada.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"28 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244451","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2016.1244450
Cheluchi Onyemelukwe
ABSTRACT In Nigeria, childhood mortality is very high, with almost a million children dying each year. A fifth of these die from vaccine-preventable diseases. The role of immunisation in preventing childhood morbidity and mortality is widely recognised. Unfortunately little, if any, account has been given of the law’s role in immunisation in legal discourse in Nigeria. Yet recent steps have been taken at both federal and state levels to compel immunisation using the instrument of legislation. For instance, the Child Rights Act, a domestication of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, passed in 2003 includes provisions compelling immunisation. Also, several states in Nigeria like Jigawa, Niger and Katsina States, have recently enacted legislation that makes childhood immunisation compulsory under the law. These pieces of legislation criminalise refusal to immunise children and also public statements that discourage immunisation. I identify the challenges that limit or obstruct uptake of immunisation in Nigeria and ask what role the law can play in providing solutions to these challenges. I examine the ways in which the law has been engaged to promote immunisation, the impact of law and the limits of legislative intervention. I also suggest ways to improve the law’s effectiveness in this essential public health matter.
在尼日利亚，儿童死亡率非常高，每年有近100万儿童死亡。其中五分之一死于疫苗可预防的疾病。免疫接种在预防儿童发病率和死亡率方面的作用已得到广泛承认。不幸的是，在尼日利亚的法律论述中，很少(如果有的话)考虑到法律在免疫方面的作用。然而，最近在联邦和州一级采取了一些措施，利用立法手段强制进行免疫接种。例如，2003年通过的《儿童权利法案》(Child Rights Act)是对《儿童权利公约》(Convention of the Rights of the Child)的改编，其中包括强制接种疫苗的条款。此外，尼日利亚的几个州，如吉加瓦州、尼日尔州和卡齐纳州，最近颁布了立法，根据法律规定儿童免疫接种是强制性的。这些立法将拒绝给儿童接种疫苗和不鼓励接种疫苗的公开声明定为刑事犯罪。我确定了在尼日利亚限制或阻碍免疫接种的挑战，并询问法律在提供应对这些挑战的解决方案方面可以发挥什么作用。我研究了法律促进免疫接种的方式，法律的影响和立法干预的局限性。我还建议如何提高法律在这一重要公共卫生问题上的有效性。
{"title":"Can legislation mandating vaccination solve the challenges of routine childhood immunisation in Nigeria?","authors":"Cheluchi Onyemelukwe","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2016.1244450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244450","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Nigeria, childhood mortality is very high, with almost a million children dying each year. A fifth of these die from vaccine-preventable diseases. The role of immunisation in preventing childhood morbidity and mortality is widely recognised. Unfortunately little, if any, account has been given of the law’s role in immunisation in legal discourse in Nigeria. Yet recent steps have been taken at both federal and state levels to compel immunisation using the instrument of legislation. For instance, the Child Rights Act, a domestication of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, passed in 2003 includes provisions compelling immunisation. Also, several states in Nigeria like Jigawa, Niger and Katsina States, have recently enacted legislation that makes childhood immunisation compulsory under the law. These pieces of legislation criminalise refusal to immunise children and also public statements that discourage immunisation. I identify the challenges that limit or obstruct uptake of immunisation in Nigeria and ask what role the law can play in providing solutions to these challenges. I examine the ways in which the law has been engaged to promote immunisation, the impact of law and the limits of legislative intervention. I also suggest ways to improve the law’s effectiveness in this essential public health matter.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"100 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2016.1244450","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59821238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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