Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2019.1616943
J. Parkin
ABSTRACT This article considers the quotation exception to copyright infringement under EU and UK law. It challenges the broad interpretation of the exception offered by academic commentators to date, as approximating a US-style fair use defence to copyright infringement, and presents an alternative understanding of the exception in its place. According to that understanding, established principles of EU and UK copyright law, including those adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Deckmyn with respect to the parody exception, limit the acts permitted under the quotation exception to (1) reproductions of copyright material that are (2) identified as reproductions and (3) for a purpose of criticism, review, or an analogous purpose.
{"title":"The copyright quotation exception: not fair use by another name","authors":"J. Parkin","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2019.1616943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2019.1616943","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article considers the quotation exception to copyright infringement under EU and UK law. It challenges the broad interpretation of the exception offered by academic commentators to date, as approximating a US-style fair use defence to copyright infringement, and presents an alternative understanding of the exception in its place. According to that understanding, established principles of EU and UK copyright law, including those adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Deckmyn with respect to the parody exception, limit the acts permitted under the quotation exception to (1) reproductions of copyright material that are (2) identified as reproductions and (3) for a purpose of criticism, review, or an analogous purpose.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2019.1616943","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46047005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2019.1573610
Martin Kwan
ABSTRACT In Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the standard of review to be applied, on appeal from a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel regarding professional misconduct of lawyers. It is argued that the approaches taken by the majority, dissenting judges and dissenting Côté J can be conceptually classified as according some, full and no deference to the Panel’s decision, respectively. This note explores the three approaches by comparing them with the English and Hong Kong approaches. It is submitted that there should not be full deference. The note also explores Côté J’s view on the distinction between ‘in-court’ and ‘out-of-court’ misconduct. Côté J has raised concerns regarding judicial independence and the fundamental right to a fair trial when ‘in-court’ misconduct is involved. These insightful concerns would justify less deference and these concerns can be equally applicable to England and Wales, and Hong Kong.
{"title":"The standard of review on appeal for lawyer professional misconduct: the Canadian perspective","authors":"Martin Kwan","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2019.1573610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2019.1573610","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the standard of review to be applied, on appeal from a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel regarding professional misconduct of lawyers. It is argued that the approaches taken by the majority, dissenting judges and dissenting Côté J can be conceptually classified as according some, full and no deference to the Panel’s decision, respectively. This note explores the three approaches by comparing them with the English and Hong Kong approaches. It is submitted that there should not be full deference. The note also explores Côté J’s view on the distinction between ‘in-court’ and ‘out-of-court’ misconduct. Côté J has raised concerns regarding judicial independence and the fundamental right to a fair trial when ‘in-court’ misconduct is involved. These insightful concerns would justify less deference and these concerns can be equally applicable to England and Wales, and Hong Kong.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2019.1573610","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45881312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2019.1610303
Benjamin Joshua Ong
ABSTRACT Section 33B(4) of Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act purportedly partly ousts judicial review of the Public Prosecutor’s determination of whether a drug trafficker has substantively assisted the anti-drug enforcement agency. This paper argues that Singapore’s High Court erred in holding this provision constitutionally valid. Ouster clauses are unconstitutional vis-à-vis Articles 12(1) and 93 of the Constitution; the High Court’s view does not accord with the law on non-justiciability and is premised on a flawed theory of legislative intention. It is no answer that judicial power is subject to a ‘balance’ which renders a partial ouster clause constitutionally valid. The High Court’s view that section 33B(4) ousts review for non-jurisdictional errors of law is incompatible with Article 93, and is not justified by the ‘green-light’ theory. The effect of these problems is tempered by a potentially wider definition of unconstitutionality as a ground of review than the High Court considered.
{"title":"The constitutionality of ouster clauses: Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2018] SGHC 112","authors":"Benjamin Joshua Ong","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2019.1610303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2019.1610303","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Section 33B(4) of Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act purportedly partly ousts judicial review of the Public Prosecutor’s determination of whether a drug trafficker has substantively assisted the anti-drug enforcement agency. This paper argues that Singapore’s High Court erred in holding this provision constitutionally valid. Ouster clauses are unconstitutional vis-à-vis Articles 12(1) and 93 of the Constitution; the High Court’s view does not accord with the law on non-justiciability and is premised on a flawed theory of legislative intention. It is no answer that judicial power is subject to a ‘balance’ which renders a partial ouster clause constitutionally valid. The High Court’s view that section 33B(4) ousts review for non-jurisdictional errors of law is incompatible with Article 93, and is not justified by the ‘green-light’ theory. The effect of these problems is tempered by a potentially wider definition of unconstitutionality as a ground of review than the High Court considered.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2019.1610303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44213423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1537994
J. Corrin
ABSTRACT This article commences with a review of the administrative law regime in Papua New Guinea, including the avenues for review of administrative decisions. Against this background, the constitutional mandate to take a Papua New Guinean approach to the development of administrative law is considered. More specifically, the article explores the approach of the courts to review of decisions involving customary law. The article also discusses whether decisions of traditional leaders are or should be subject to judicial review, given that the notion of governmental action has been expanded to cover not only action taken by government officials and officers acting for statutory bodies, but also actions by private persons who are part of a framework of governmental control.
{"title":"Administrative law and customary law in Papua New Guinea","authors":"J. Corrin","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1537994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1537994","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article commences with a review of the administrative law regime in Papua New Guinea, including the avenues for review of administrative decisions. Against this background, the constitutional mandate to take a Papua New Guinean approach to the development of administrative law is considered. More specifically, the article explores the approach of the courts to review of decisions involving customary law. The article also discusses whether decisions of traditional leaders are or should be subject to judicial review, given that the notion of governmental action has been expanded to cover not only action taken by government officials and officers acting for statutory bodies, but also actions by private persons who are part of a framework of governmental control.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1537994","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43778267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1537076
J. Senu, Mahmoud Serewel
ABSTRACT Following the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd on the issue of ‘no oral modification’ (NOM) clauses, we examine its implications for contractual variations. This article considers the reasons for finding NOM clauses legally effective in English law (a clause commonly included in commercial contracts). It further touches upon the way the law now favours transactional certainty over the protection of vulnerable parties, querying whether the legal certainty for commercial parties that arises as a consequence of giving effect to NOM clauses is as appealing as it may seem.
摘要根据英国最高法院在Rock Advertising Ltd诉MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd一案中关于“无口头修改”（NOM）条款问题的裁决，我们研究了其对合同变更的影响。本文认为NOM条款在英国法律中具有法律效力的原因（商业合同中常见的一种条款）。它进一步触及了法律现在倾向于交易确定性而非对弱势方的保护的方式，质疑由于NOM条款的生效而产生的商业方的法律确定性是否像看起来那样具有吸引力。
{"title":"Between a rock and a hard place: no oral modification clauses after Rock Advertising v MWB","authors":"J. Senu, Mahmoud Serewel","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1537076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1537076","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Following the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd on the issue of ‘no oral modification’ (NOM) clauses, we examine its implications for contractual variations. This article considers the reasons for finding NOM clauses legally effective in English law (a clause commonly included in commercial contracts). It further touches upon the way the law now favours transactional certainty over the protection of vulnerable parties, querying whether the legal certainty for commercial parties that arises as a consequence of giving effect to NOM clauses is as appealing as it may seem.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1537076","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41791276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1507809
Philip E. Devenish
ABSTRACT In the decision of Nikolay Viktorovich Maximov v Open Joint Stock Company ‘Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat’, the English High Court dismissed the claimant's application to enforce a Russian arbitral award that had been set aside in Russia. The High Court held that in order to refuse recognition of the annulment decision, ‘[t]he decision of the foreign court must be deliberately wrong, not simply wrong by incompetence’. The High Court found that the claimant had failed to discharge this heavy burden, notwithstanding its ‘severe criticism’ of the Russian annulment decision. The case serves as a reminder of the difficulties that a party will face in seeking to enforce an arbitral award in England if it has been set aside in the country of origin.
摘要在Nikolay Viktorovich Maximov诉Novolipetsky metallurgical ichesky Kombinat Open Joint Stock Company一案的判决中，英国高等法院驳回了原告要求执行在俄罗斯被搁置的仲裁裁决的申请。高等法院认为，为了拒绝承认撤销决定，“外国法院的决定必须是故意错误的，而不仅仅是由于无能而错误的”。高等法院认为，尽管对俄罗斯的撤销决定提出“严厉批评”，但索赔人未能解除这一沉重负担。该案件提醒人们，如果仲裁裁决在原籍国被撤销，一方当事人在英国寻求执行仲裁裁决时将面临的困难。
{"title":"Enforcement in England and Wales of arbitral awards set aside in their country of origin","authors":"Philip E. Devenish","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1507809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1507809","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the decision of Nikolay Viktorovich Maximov v Open Joint Stock Company ‘Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat’, the English High Court dismissed the claimant's application to enforce a Russian arbitral award that had been set aside in Russia. The High Court held that in order to refuse recognition of the annulment decision, ‘[t]he decision of the foreign court must be deliberately wrong, not simply wrong by incompetence’. The High Court found that the claimant had failed to discharge this heavy burden, notwithstanding its ‘severe criticism’ of the Russian annulment decision. The case serves as a reminder of the difficulties that a party will face in seeking to enforce an arbitral award in England if it has been set aside in the country of origin.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1507809","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46071504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1530862
J. Lai
ABSTRACT Everybody who owns a smartphone is the chattel owner of an artefact embodying patented inventions. The extent to which one may use the smartphone depends on the scope of patent rights and the implied licences granted by the patent owners. Little attention has been given to this in New Zealand. This article seeks to address this gap by exploring patentees’ exclusive rights and implied licences and how these play out domestically and internationally. It examines the convoluted case law that traverses the interface between patent exclusive rights and chattel owner rights. The article focuses on New Zealand, but borrows case law from the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada to fill gaps. It surmises that the current law in New Zealand is complicated and fact-dependent, and relatively pro-patentee as opposed to pro-chattel owner. The article concludes by analysing whether an exhaustion model would be simpler and more balanced than the implied licence approach.
{"title":"Exclusive rights of patent owners versus rights of chattel owners: the implied licence approach","authors":"J. Lai","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1530862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1530862","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Everybody who owns a smartphone is the chattel owner of an artefact embodying patented inventions. The extent to which one may use the smartphone depends on the scope of patent rights and the implied licences granted by the patent owners. Little attention has been given to this in New Zealand. This article seeks to address this gap by exploring patentees’ exclusive rights and implied licences and how these play out domestically and internationally. It examines the convoluted case law that traverses the interface between patent exclusive rights and chattel owner rights. The article focuses on New Zealand, but borrows case law from the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada to fill gaps. It surmises that the current law in New Zealand is complicated and fact-dependent, and relatively pro-patentee as opposed to pro-chattel owner. The article concludes by analysing whether an exhaustion model would be simpler and more balanced than the implied licence approach.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1530862","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45273137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1455479
Shamnad Basheer
ABSTRACT Section 3(d) of India’s Patents Act forbids patents on pharmaceutical substances that do not demonstrate a significantly enhanced efficacy over and above prior known substances. This article discusses the long and tortuous history of the provision. Only after an extended period of difficulty did India get to grips with World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and interpret it strategically to benefit the nation and its industry. This sophistication reached a near crescendo with the emergence of section 3(d), its crude drafting notwithstanding. India’s efforts to tailor its patent regime to promote the national interest whilst remaining compliant with TRIPS stands in stark contrast to a number of other countries that have simply toed the line of the developed world’s maximalist intellectual property (IP) agenda. As such, it represents a significant milestone and a valuable lesson in the IP and development debates.
{"title":"Trumping TRIPS: Indian patent proficiency and the evolution of an evergreening enigma","authors":"Shamnad Basheer","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1455479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1455479","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Section 3(d) of India’s Patents Act forbids patents on pharmaceutical substances that do not demonstrate a significantly enhanced efficacy over and above prior known substances. This article discusses the long and tortuous history of the provision. Only after an extended period of difficulty did India get to grips with World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and interpret it strategically to benefit the nation and its industry. This sophistication reached a near crescendo with the emergence of section 3(d), its crude drafting notwithstanding. India’s efforts to tailor its patent regime to promote the national interest whilst remaining compliant with TRIPS stands in stark contrast to a number of other countries that have simply toed the line of the developed world’s maximalist intellectual property (IP) agenda. As such, it represents a significant milestone and a valuable lesson in the IP and development debates.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1455479","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48658819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1471835
K. Amirthalingam
ABSTRACT The Public Prosecutor has a role to play in assisting the courts in sentencing. However, the extent of this role remains controversial with different jurisdictions drawing the line at different points. It is generally accepted that the Public Prosecutor, as a member of the Executive, should not be empowered to determine the sentence, as doing so would violate the doctrine of the separation of powers. This article examines the role of the Public Prosecutor in sentencing in the context of drug trafficking offences that carry the death penalty in Singapore. The Government has abolished the mandatory death penalty and replaced it with discretionary sentencing when certain conditions are met, one of which is that the Public Prosecutor has certified that the offender has rendered substantive assistance in disrupting drug trafficking activities. This discretionary power is largely protected from judicial review, raising an important constitutional question pertaining to the separation of powers.
{"title":"The public prosecutor and sentencing: drug trafficking and the death penalty in Singapore","authors":"K. Amirthalingam","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1471835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1471835","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Public Prosecutor has a role to play in assisting the courts in sentencing. However, the extent of this role remains controversial with different jurisdictions drawing the line at different points. It is generally accepted that the Public Prosecutor, as a member of the Executive, should not be empowered to determine the sentence, as doing so would violate the doctrine of the separation of powers. This article examines the role of the Public Prosecutor in sentencing in the context of drug trafficking offences that carry the death penalty in Singapore. The Government has abolished the mandatory death penalty and replaced it with discretionary sentencing when certain conditions are met, one of which is that the Public Prosecutor has certified that the offender has rendered substantive assistance in disrupting drug trafficking activities. This discretionary power is largely protected from judicial review, raising an important constitutional question pertaining to the separation of powers.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1471835","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47579056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2018.1455478
E. Cameron
ABSTRACT This is the text of the High Court of Australia's annual lecture delivered at the High Court of Australia on 11 October 2017. The lecture critiques ‘legalism’, the denial of personal choice or value judgment in adjudication. It discusses the impact of legalism in apartheid South Africa and Australia, and the break with legalism effected by South Africa's new Constitution. The lecture is reproduced here with the kind permission of its organiser, Justice James Edelman.
{"title":"Judges, justice, and public power: the constitution and the rule of law in South Africa","authors":"E. Cameron","doi":"10.1080/14729342.2018.1455478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14729342.2018.1455478","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is the text of the High Court of Australia's annual lecture delivered at the High Court of Australia on 11 October 2017. The lecture critiques ‘legalism’, the denial of personal choice or value judgment in adjudication. It discusses the impact of legalism in apartheid South Africa and Australia, and the break with legalism effected by South Africa's new Constitution. The lecture is reproduced here with the kind permission of its organiser, Justice James Edelman.","PeriodicalId":35148,"journal":{"name":"Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14729342.2018.1455478","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49029032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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