With the development of autonomous robots, one day probably capable of speaking, thinking and learning, self-reflecting, sharing emotions, in fact, with the raise of robots becoming artificial moral agents (AMAs) robot scientists like Abney, Veruggio and Petersen are already optimistic that sooner or later we need to call those robots “people” or rather “Artificial People” (AP). The paper rejects this forecast, due to its argument based on three metaphysical conflicting assumptions. Firstly, it is the idea that it is possible to precisely define persons and apply the definition to robots or use it to differentiate human beings from robots. Further, the argument of APs favors a position of non-reductive physicalism (second assumption) and materialism (third assumption), finally producing weird convictions about future robotics. Therefore, I will suggest to follow Christine Korsgaard’s defence of animals as ends in themselves with moral standing. I will show that her argument can be transmitted to robots, too, at least to robots which are capable of pursuing their own good (even if they are not rational). Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant delivers an option that allows us to leave out complicated metaphysical notions like “person” or “subject” in the debate, without denying robots’ status as agents.
{"title":"Why Can´t We Regard Robots As People?","authors":"André Schmiljun","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2018.1.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2018.1.3","url":null,"abstract":"With the development of autonomous robots, one day probably capable of speaking, thinking and learning, self-reflecting, sharing emotions, in fact, with the raise of robots becoming artificial moral agents (AMAs) robot scientists like Abney, Veruggio and Petersen are already optimistic that sooner or later we need to call those robots “people” or rather “Artificial People” (AP). The paper rejects this forecast, due to its argument based on three metaphysical conflicting assumptions. Firstly, it is the idea that it is possible to precisely define persons and apply the definition to robots or use it to differentiate human beings from robots. Further, the argument of APs favors a position of non-reductive physicalism (second assumption) and materialism (third assumption), finally producing weird convictions about future robotics. Therefore, I will suggest to follow Christine Korsgaard’s defence of animals as ends in themselves with moral standing. I will show that her argument can be transmitted to robots, too, at least to robots which are capable of pursuing their own good (even if they are not rational). Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant delivers an option that allows us to leave out complicated metaphysical notions like “person” or “subject” in the debate, without denying robots’ status as agents.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46822311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I present Christine Korsgaard’s style of building a conception of animal rights protection based on a concept of Kantian provenance, namely “end in itself”. Considering that an end in itself in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy includes only human beings, the American philosopher needed to modify (extend) the meaning of the abovementioned concept. This study aims at showing this change of the meaning in categories derived from Fregean semantics (sense and reference). Moreover, I will attempt to prove that by broadening the extension of “end in itself” Korsgaard uses a strategy called ethical extensionism and situates the revised (naturalized) categorical imperative ipso facto within environmental ethics.I start with elucidating Korsgaard’s views on the meaning of “end in itself” before she took interest in animal rights (set out mainly in Kant’s Formula of Humanity and The Sources of Normativity) and then I synthetically describe her animal rights philosophy with a special regard to the category of “natural good”. The second part of the article explains the methodology used in the paper, while the last part is intended to be an interpretation of Korsgaard’s thought.
{"title":"The Categorical Imperative in Defence of Animal Rights. Christine Korsgaard’s Ethical Extensionism","authors":"M. Adamska","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2018.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2018.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I present Christine Korsgaard’s style of building a conception of animal rights protection based on a concept of Kantian provenance, namely “end in itself”. Considering that an end in itself in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy includes only human beings, the American philosopher needed to modify (extend) the meaning of the abovementioned concept. This study aims at showing this change of the meaning in categories derived from Fregean semantics (sense and reference). Moreover, I will attempt to prove that by broadening the extension of “end in itself” Korsgaard uses a strategy called ethical extensionism and situates the revised (naturalized) categorical imperative ipso facto within environmental ethics.I start with elucidating Korsgaard’s views on the meaning of “end in itself” before she took interest in animal rights (set out mainly in Kant’s Formula of Humanity and The Sources of Normativity) and then I synthetically describe her animal rights philosophy with a special regard to the category of “natural good”. The second part of the article explains the methodology used in the paper, while the last part is intended to be an interpretation of Korsgaard’s thought.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45613209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation that is relevant to explanation, but not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy.
{"title":"Deliberation and Automaticity in Habitual Acts","authors":"C. Douskos","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2018.1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2018.1.2","url":null,"abstract":"Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation that is relevant to explanation, but not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41739010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article is focused on the issues relating to a legal situation of an animal as a victim of a criminal offense. Currently, according to the rules of criminal procedure, an animal, as an entity, cannot be legally recognised a victim, which significantly lowers efficiency with which its interests can be protected. There are strong moral and pragmatic reasons to grant animals the status of a non-personal carrier of legal rights. Legal personality of animals as victims during a criminal trial should be of only passive nature, allowing recognition of legally-protected interests of the animal.
{"title":"Uwagi o sytuacji prawnej zwierzęcia pokrzywdzonego czynem zabronionym w polskim procesie karnym","authors":"P. Mazur","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2018.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2018.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"The article is focused on the issues relating to a legal situation of an animal as a victim of a criminal offense. Currently, according to the rules of criminal procedure, an animal, as an entity, cannot be legally recognised a victim, which significantly lowers efficiency with which its interests can be protected. There are strong moral and pragmatic reasons to grant animals the status of a non-personal carrier of legal rights. Legal personality of animals as victims during a criminal trial should be of only passive nature, allowing recognition of legally-protected interests of the animal.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49036015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A total of 843 college students in Guangdong University of Foreign Studies were investigated using a social support evaluation scale, a resilience scale, and a life satisfaction evaluation scale. Results were analyzed using IBM® SPSS 21.0® and Amos 17.0. It was shown that there existed a positive correlation respectively among resilience, social support and life satisfaction. Social support predicted resilience positively and resilience partially mediated the association between social support and life satisfaction. Finally, resilience moderated the association between social support and life satisfaction; the higher the resilience level, the more significant the positive predictive effect of social support on life satisfaction. College students' life satisfaction is closely related to social support and resilience; resilience partially plays a mediating and moderating role between social support and life satisfaction.
{"title":"Relationship between Social Support and Life Satisfaction of College Students: Resilience As a Mediator and Moderator","authors":"Yuangeng Guo","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2017.2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2017.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"A total of 843 college students in Guangdong University of Foreign Studies were investigated using a social support evaluation scale, a resilience scale, and a life satisfaction evaluation scale. Results were analyzed using IBM® SPSS 21.0® and Amos 17.0. It was shown that there existed a positive correlation respectively among resilience, social support and life satisfaction. Social support predicted resilience positively and resilience partially mediated the association between social support and life satisfaction. Finally, resilience moderated the association between social support and life satisfaction; the higher the resilience level, the more significant the positive predictive effect of social support on life satisfaction. College students' life satisfaction is closely related to social support and resilience; resilience partially plays a mediating and moderating role between social support and life satisfaction. ","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48374706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Preface to the Issue Moral Competence & Subjectivity: Topical Issues.
道德能力与主体性问题序言：主题性问题。
{"title":"Preface to the Issue Moral Competence & Subjectivity: Topical Issues","authors":"J. Dutka, Karolina Napiwodzka","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2017.2.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2017.2.1","url":null,"abstract":"Preface to the Issue Moral Competence & Subjectivity: Topical Issues.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42916539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The review paper revisits the problem of subjectivity with particular focus on the latest research in this field presented in The Dispute about Subjectivity – an Interdisciplinary Perspective, edited by Adriana Warmbier (2016). I pay special attention to the interdisciplinary perspective of the analyzed issues of subjectivity as a research object in humanities (philosophy, psychology, anthropology) and cognitive sciences.
这篇综述文章重新审视了主体性问题，特别关注了Adriana Warmbier(2016)编辑的《主体性之争——跨学科视角》(The Dispute about subjectivity - an Interdisciplinary Perspective)中提出的这一领域的最新研究。我特别关注作为人文学科(哲学、心理学、人类学)和认知科学研究对象的主体性分析问题的跨学科视角。
{"title":"Approaching Subjectivity. On “The Dispute About Subjectivity: Interdisciplinary Perspective”","authors":"Karolina Napiwodzka","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2017.2.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2017.2.10","url":null,"abstract":"The review paper revisits the problem of subjectivity with particular focus on the latest research in this field presented in The Dispute about Subjectivity – an Interdisciplinary Perspective, edited by Adriana Warmbier (2016). I pay special attention to the interdisciplinary perspective of the analyzed issues of subjectivity as a research object in humanities (philosophy, psychology, anthropology) and cognitive sciences.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46872280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is an attempt to show that the KMDD® method is the best for both our brain and our moral functioning, which undoubtedly has its basis in the brain. At the same time, it is an attempt to draw attention to the importance of planning interventions (e.g. at the educational level) which stimulate moral development in accordance with the psychological and neurobiological functioning of an individual. The paper briefly presents the neuropsychological context of moral functioning, and then a series of arguments in support of the thesis that the scientifically proven effectiveness of using the KMDD® method has its support in adapting the method not only to one's pattern of individual behavior, but also to the proper functioning of one's brain.
{"title":"Is The Stimulation of Moral Competence with KMDD® Well-suited for Our Brain? A Perspective From Neuroethics","authors":"M. Steć","doi":"10.14746/eip.2017.2.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2017.2.4","url":null,"abstract":"This article is an attempt to show that the KMDD® method is the best for both our brain and our moral functioning, which undoubtedly has its basis in the brain. At the same time, it is an attempt to draw attention to the importance of planning interventions (e.g. at the educational level) which stimulate moral development in accordance with the psychological and neurobiological functioning of an individual. The paper briefly presents the neuropsychological context of moral functioning, and then a series of arguments in support of the thesis that the scientifically proven effectiveness of using the KMDD® method has its support in adapting the method not only to one's pattern of individual behavior, but also to the proper functioning of one's brain.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43444371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rise of embodied cognition in recent ten years has brought about significant influence on the research of moral psychology. On the one hand, the development of neuro-cognitive science has facilitated the research of morality deeply into the mirror neurons of brain, no longer being limited simply on the philosophical speculation; and on the other hand the experimental research of embodied cognition has provided new evidence for some traditional and philosophical moral issues and even made some new recognition of the issues which are different from the traditional interpretations. Tracing back to the research of the Western moral psychology, we find that cognitive rationality and virtual ethics are the two main research lines for moral psychology.（1）J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg opened a way for the research of cognitive development of morality, and their successors have formed new Kohlbergian School, such as the moral judgment theory based on DIT proposed by J. Rest and his colleagues, G. Lind’s dual-aspect theory based on his MCT and KMDD®; the social cognitive domain theory proposed by E. Turiel and his colleagues; the feminine caring ethics advocated by C. Gilligan and N. Noddings; the Social Intuitionist Theory proposed by J. Haidt based on evolutionary psychology, cultural psychology and neuro-cognitive science and so on. (2) The traditional moral philosophy and ethics have opened another way to the research of character education and virtues, such as the American movement of character education facilitated by W, Bennett and T. Lickona and others; the argument between J. Rawls and R. Nozick on moral problems; A. C. MacIntyre’s moral critique to the Western societies and his virtue ethics and so on. Since 21st century the research of embodied cognition has broken through the limitation of the traditional research on moral psychology, attempting to realize the new synthesis of intellect, human body and its environment, and therefore started the embodied research of moral judgment which is unfolded around the three dimensions of physical cleanliness, disgust, body temperature and body movements. I has also assimilated Piaget and Vygotsky’s ideas of psychological development, the theory of conceptual metaphor in cognitive semantics and the theory of evolutionary psychology, and made its theoretical interpretation and exploration for the embodied effect of moral judgment. Since the variable of physical body could have its influence on individual moral judgment by means of one’s emotion and cognitive elements, the moral judgment based on embodied cognition should be integrated with the theories of moral judgment, especially with moral competencies that are the core of moral judgment, and meanwhile the relationship between the embodied cognition and moral intuition should be deeply explored, and the issues such as chronergy, that is, time efficiency, and dynamics taken place when there is the embodied effect should be further examined, the regulate
{"title":"A Commentary Reflection of Moral Psychology Based on Embodied Cognition","authors":"Shaogang Yang","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2017.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2017.2.5","url":null,"abstract":" The rise of embodied cognition in recent ten years has brought about significant influence on the research of moral psychology. On the one hand, the development of neuro-cognitive science has facilitated the research of morality deeply into the mirror neurons of brain, no longer being limited simply on the philosophical speculation; and on the other hand the experimental research of embodied cognition has provided new evidence for some traditional and philosophical moral issues and even made some new recognition of the issues which are different from the traditional interpretations. Tracing back to the research of the Western moral psychology, we find that cognitive rationality and virtual ethics are the two main research lines for moral psychology.（1）J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg opened a way for the research of cognitive development of morality, and their successors have formed new Kohlbergian School, such as the moral judgment theory based on DIT proposed by J. Rest and his colleagues, G. Lind’s dual-aspect theory based on his MCT and KMDD®; the social cognitive domain theory proposed by E. Turiel and his colleagues; the feminine caring ethics advocated by C. Gilligan and N. Noddings; the Social Intuitionist Theory proposed by J. Haidt based on evolutionary psychology, cultural psychology and neuro-cognitive science and so on. (2) The traditional moral philosophy and ethics have opened another way to the research of character education and virtues, such as the American movement of character education facilitated by W, Bennett and T. Lickona and others; the argument between J. Rawls and R. Nozick on moral problems; A. C. MacIntyre’s moral critique to the Western societies and his virtue ethics and so on. Since 21st century the research of embodied cognition has broken through the limitation of the traditional research on moral psychology, attempting to realize the new synthesis of intellect, human body and its environment, and therefore started the embodied research of moral judgment which is unfolded around the three dimensions of physical cleanliness, disgust, body temperature and body movements. I has also assimilated Piaget and Vygotsky’s ideas of psychological development, the theory of conceptual metaphor in cognitive semantics and the theory of evolutionary psychology, and made its theoretical interpretation and exploration for the embodied effect of moral judgment. Since the variable of physical body could have its influence on individual moral judgment by means of one’s emotion and cognitive elements, the moral judgment based on embodied cognition should be integrated with the theories of moral judgment, especially with moral competencies that are the core of moral judgment, and meanwhile the relationship between the embodied cognition and moral intuition should be deeply explored, and the issues such as chronergy, that is, time efficiency, and dynamics taken place when there is the embodied effect should be further examined, the regulate","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44897050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In my article, I will give a short historical overview of inclusion-research. The focus lies on relation between moral and inclusion. I will introduce three branches of inclusion research and deduce my definition of inclusion from it. Inclusion can be understood as a dynamic process of realizing of equal participation on the one hand and of entitlement to diversity on the other hand. That means, inclusion lives from the solution of its immanent conflict- the conflict between equality and diversity. Therefore, I assume that “the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of universal moral principles by means of deliberation and discussion, instead of using violence, deceit and coercion, or more specifically… the ability to judge arguments in regard to their moral quality instead of their opinion-agreement” (Lind 2016) is urgently needed. This ability is an important precondition for realizing inclusion. Following educational theory of morality by Lind and others, it’s not necessary to change the moral attitudes (moral orientation) in persons that are involved in the process of inclusion. It’s more important to improve their inclusive ability and their inclusive behavior. Inclusive behavior means a behavior with which shows recognition of both: of diversity of all as well as of the dignity of each individual. On this theoretical basis, I furthermore want to introduce a little research project carried out by the author in Vocational School Centre. The aim of this project was to improve the inclusive behavior by using the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion®.
{"title":"Inclusion and Moral Competence. Hypotheses about Two Closely Related Tasks of the School","authors":"M. Reinicke","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2017.2.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2017.2.2","url":null,"abstract":"In my article, I will give a short historical overview of inclusion-research. The focus lies on relation between moral and inclusion. I will introduce three branches of inclusion research and deduce my definition of inclusion from it. Inclusion can be understood as a dynamic process of realizing of equal participation on the one hand and of entitlement to diversity on the other hand. That means, inclusion lives from the solution of its immanent conflict- the conflict between equality and diversity. Therefore, I assume that “the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of universal moral principles by means of deliberation and discussion, instead of using violence, deceit and coercion, or more specifically… the ability to judge arguments in regard to their moral quality instead of their opinion-agreement” (Lind 2016) is urgently needed. This ability is an important precondition for realizing inclusion. Following educational theory of morality by Lind and others, it’s not necessary to change the moral attitudes (moral orientation) in persons that are involved in the process of inclusion. It’s more important to improve their inclusive ability and their inclusive behavior. Inclusive behavior means a behavior with which shows recognition of both: of diversity of all as well as of the dignity of each individual. On this theoretical basis, I furthermore want to introduce a little research project carried out by the author in Vocational School Centre. The aim of this project was to improve the inclusive behavior by using the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion®.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48554407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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