Moving from Fichte’s assumption that “the essence of the I is its activity”, this paper tries to analyze the meaning and implications of the idea of “activity” [Tathandlung] in order to explicate the peculiarities of Fichte’s critical, transcendental, and moral idealism. Fichte’s idea of activity will be examined with reference to such basic concepts as collision [Anstoss], interaction [Wechselwirkung], inter-determination [Wechselbestimmung], and striving [Streben]. However, it is freedom which frames and connects the core components of Fichte’s thinking and sets up the goal of his philosophy of action. What freedom accounts for, can be identified both at the transcendental level, in the internal dynamic of infinity and finitude constituting the subjectivity of the I, and at the moral and social levels of Fichte’s thought, as the goal of the human action in history and in the society. In assuming the unitary character of Fichte’s philosophical system, concluding remarks are developed concerning the moral meaning of the act of striving for freedom and, conversely, the immorality of attitudes and feelings such as fear, resignation, and fatigue.
{"title":"Striving for Freedom. Some Notes about Fichte’s Idealism","authors":"E. Alessiato","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.2.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.2.4","url":null,"abstract":"Moving from Fichte’s assumption that “the essence of the I is its activity”, this paper tries to analyze the meaning and implications of the idea of “activity” [Tathandlung] in order to explicate the peculiarities of Fichte’s critical, transcendental, and moral idealism. Fichte’s idea of activity will be examined with reference to such basic concepts as collision [Anstoss], interaction [Wechselwirkung], inter-determination [Wechselbestimmung], and striving [Streben]. However, it is freedom which frames and connects the core components of Fichte’s thinking and sets up the goal of his philosophy of action. What freedom accounts for, can be identified both at the transcendental level, in the internal dynamic of infinity and finitude constituting the subjectivity of the I, and at the moral and social levels of Fichte’s thought, as the goal of the human action in history and in the society. In assuming the unitary character of Fichte’s philosophical system, concluding remarks are developed concerning the moral meaning of the act of striving for freedom and, conversely, the immorality of attitudes and feelings such as fear, resignation, and fatigue.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41500171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We ignore the history of philosophy at our peril. Engels, who typically conflates Marx and Marxism, points to the relation of Marxism to the tradition while also denying it. In his little book on Feuerbach, Engels depicts Feuerbach as leading Marx away from Hegel, away from classical German philosophy, away from philosophy and towards materialism and science. This view suggests that Marx is at best negatively related to Classical German philosophy, including Hegel. Yet Engels elsewhere suggests that Marx belongs to the classical German philosophical tradition. In the preface to Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels wrote: “We German socialists are proud that we trace our descent not only from Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel” (Marx & Engels, Collected Works). In this paper I will focus on Marx’s relation to Fichte. This relation is rarely mentioned in the Marxist debate, but I will argue, it is crucial for the formulation of Marx’s position, and hence for assessing his contribution accurately. One of the results of this study will be to indicate that Marx, in reacting against Hegel, did not, as is often suggested, ‘leave’ philosophy, but in fact made a crucial philosophical contribution.
{"title":"Marx the Fichtean","authors":"T. Rockmore","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.2.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.2.9","url":null,"abstract":"We ignore the history of philosophy at our peril. Engels, who typically conflates Marx and Marxism, points to the relation of Marxism to the tradition while also denying it. In his little book on Feuerbach, Engels depicts Feuerbach as leading Marx away from Hegel, away from classical German philosophy, away from philosophy and towards materialism and science. This view suggests that Marx is at best negatively related to Classical German philosophy, including Hegel. Yet Engels elsewhere suggests that Marx belongs to the classical German philosophical tradition. In the preface to Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels wrote: “We German socialists are proud that we trace our descent not only from Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel” (Marx & Engels, Collected Works). In this paper I will focus on Marx’s relation to Fichte. This relation is rarely mentioned in the Marxist debate, but I will argue, it is crucial for the formulation of Marx’s position, and hence for assessing his contribution accurately. One of the results of this study will be to indicate that Marx, in reacting against Hegel, did not, as is often suggested, ‘leave’ philosophy, but in fact made a crucial philosophical contribution.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46230807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article interprets the methodological potential of Hegel’s speculative dialectics as a possible course of spiritual evolution of the Absolute subject. The intention is towards the method, first through the very construction of the “idea of freedom” from the point of view of Logic; second, through the constitutive function of freedom and the transition of the subjective spirit into the objective spirit; third, through the unfolding of mediation in the realms of the objective spirit. This essentially substantial methodologization dissolves the theoretical space of the idea of the mediating function of freedom as an ontological principle of ethical life. In line with the paradigm of such a course, the text considers a project of speculative ethics, a project within the framework of which the methodological and ontological sublation of spiritual evolution takes place.
{"title":"Hegel and the Spiritual Evolution of Absolute Subject","authors":"Ivo Minkov","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.2.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.2.7","url":null,"abstract":"The article interprets the methodological potential of Hegel’s speculative dialectics as a possible course of spiritual evolution of the Absolute subject. The intention is towards the method, first through the very construction of the “idea of freedom” from the point of view of Logic; second, through the constitutive function of freedom and the transition of the subjective spirit into the objective spirit; third, through the unfolding of mediation in the realms of the objective spirit. This essentially substantial methodologization dissolves the theoretical space of the idea of the mediating function of freedom as an ontological principle of ethical life. In line with the paradigm of such a course, the text considers a project of speculative ethics, a project within the framework of which the methodological and ontological sublation of spiritual evolution takes place.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67364753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Kant’s writings, we can discover four key moments in the realization of moral freedom: i) The original possibility of being free, ii) The act described by Kant as radical evil, iii) The opposite act, that is, an inner conversion to good, and, finally, iv) The long process of the self-development of virtue extending to immortality. There are further issues such as the double concept of moral evil, and practical temporality. Moral freedom is originally located (and presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction) in the individual, her decisions, and the maxims or principles that guide her actions, even though a community (as both a „kingdom of ends” and social reality) provides the scope wherein all this takes place and its socially and historically-situated shapes. This paper tries to systematize these crucial stages of Kant’s moral philosophy with the focus on the concept of virtue.
{"title":"Genesis of Moral Freedom in Kant","authors":"Jacinto Rivera de Rosales","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.2.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.2.2","url":null,"abstract":"In Kant’s writings, we can discover four key moments in the realization of moral freedom: i) The original possibility of being free, ii) The act described by Kant as radical evil, iii) The opposite act, that is, an inner conversion to good, and, finally, iv) The long process of the self-development of virtue extending to immortality. There are further issues such as the double concept of moral evil, and practical temporality. Moral freedom is originally located (and presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction) in the individual, her decisions, and the maxims or principles that guide her actions, even though a community (as both a „kingdom of ends” and social reality) provides the scope wherein all this takes place and its socially and historically-situated shapes. This paper tries to systematize these crucial stages of Kant’s moral philosophy with the focus on the concept of virtue.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44212818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I will focus on education as the core function of reason in Kant and Fichte. The notion of reason carries an intrinsic tendency to universality, which is difficult to be reconciled with its local (cultural, historical, anthropological) background and actualisation. I believe that the stress on the importance of learning, which can be seen in the works of both Kant and Fichte, might provide useful clues to approaching the relation between universality and particularity. I will start by focusing on Kant’s narration on the genealogy of human reason in the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, and then move on to the critical writings and selected lectures in order to focus on the role of human dignity and ethical education for the moral appraisal and the practice of virtue. Later, I will consider Fichte’s lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, the Vocation of Man and The Characteristics of the Present Age, which are crucial to understanding the social, ethical and political role of the scholar. For Fichte, education is the best instrument to eradicate selfishness, regarded as a historical phenomenon which can lead a nation to ruin. I will then provide some conclusions concerning the two accounts and their implications.
{"title":"The Humble Reason. On Education in Kant and Fichte","authors":"Lara Scaglia","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I will focus on education as the core function of reason in Kant and Fichte. The notion of reason carries an intrinsic tendency to universality, which is difficult to be reconciled with its local (cultural, historical, anthropological) background and actualisation. I believe that the stress on the importance of learning, which can be seen in the works of both Kant and Fichte, might provide useful clues to approaching the relation between universality and particularity. I will start by focusing on Kant’s narration on the genealogy of human reason in the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, and then move on to the critical writings and selected lectures in order to focus on the role of human dignity and ethical education for the moral appraisal and the practice of virtue. Later, I will consider Fichte’s lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, the Vocation of Man and The Characteristics of the Present Age, which are crucial to understanding the social, ethical and political role of the scholar. For Fichte, education is the best instrument to eradicate selfishness, regarded as a historical phenomenon which can lead a nation to ruin. I will then provide some conclusions concerning the two accounts and their implications.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43241153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The findings obtained by G. Lind using his original research instrument – the Moral Competence Test – suggest that universities lack the capacity to foster students’ moral competence development. The MCT has been translated into 39 languages, all of which have gone through the necessary validation procedure. The article reports on the MCT validation study for the 40th language, namely Lithuanian. The research sample consisted of 526 students of English/German/French languages, future foreign language teachers, in the 1 st to 4th years of study at two universities in Lithuania: the former Vilnius Pedagogical University and the Vilnius University. The majority of the respondents demonstrated low or medium level of moral competence. On the basis of this cross-sectional study (2019–2020), the MCT for Lithuanian has been successfully validated and certified. In the following article, we present and discuss all the validation criteria and revisit the theoretical background of MCT. We also argue for educating students in moral competence and evaluating the effects of moral competence promotion in academic contexts.
G. Lind使用他的原始研究工具——道德能力测试——得出的结果表明，大学缺乏培养学生道德能力的能力。MCT已被翻译成39种语言，所有语言都经过了必要的验证程序。本文报道了第40种语言即立陶宛语的MCT验证研究。研究样本包括526名英语/德语/法语学生，未来的外语教师，在立陶宛两所大学学习一到四年级:前维尔纽斯师范大学和维尔纽斯大学。大多数受访者表现出低水平或中等水平的道德能力。在这项横断面研究(2019-2020)的基础上，立陶宛语的MCT已经成功地进行了验证和认证。在下面的文章中，我们提出并讨论了所有的验证标准，并重新审视了MCT的理论背景。我们还主张在学术环境中对学生进行道德能力的教育，并评估道德能力提升的效果。
{"title":"Validation of the Lithuanian Version of Moral Competence Test and Application of KMDD in Language Teaching / Learning Process at Vilnius University, Lithuania","authors":"R. Kriaučiūnienė, G. Lind","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.1.2","url":null,"abstract":"The findings obtained by G. Lind using his original research instrument – the Moral Competence Test – suggest that universities lack the capacity to foster students’ moral competence development. The MCT has been translated into 39 languages, all of which have gone through the necessary validation procedure. The article reports on the MCT validation study for the 40th language, namely Lithuanian. The research sample consisted of 526 students of English/German/French languages, future foreign language teachers, in the 1 st to 4th years of study at two universities in Lithuania: the former Vilnius Pedagogical University and the Vilnius University. The majority of the respondents demonstrated low or medium level of moral competence. On the basis of this cross-sectional study (2019–2020), the MCT for Lithuanian has been successfully validated and certified. In the following article, we present and discuss all the validation criteria and revisit the theoretical background of MCT. We also argue for educating students in moral competence and evaluating the effects of moral competence promotion in academic contexts.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46244234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present study examines the relation between the moral intuitions proposed by the ‘Moral Foundations Theory’ according to J. Haidt and the moral orientations in relation with moral competence, as described by the ‘Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behaviour’ according to G. Lind.It is an empirical exploration of the relation between the five foundational domains (and/or the corresponding two higher-order clusters) and the moral orientations, as this results from the theoretical assumptions of both theories, and the influence on and of the moral competence on these aforementioned relations. The shared affective and, at the same time, habitual characteristics of moral intuitions and moral orientations, although based on different theories (intuitionism, respectively, cognitivism) should converge in a dynamic relationship. The basic motivation is the need to overcome the affective-cognitive disjunction in the study of moral judgment, which is artificial. The human (moral) reasoning is always a situated and situating one, in a symbolic narrative universe, in which the cognitive-affective dichotomy forms a dynamic unity. This overstated dichotomy is only a methodological necessity, but unfortunately hypostasized in an explanatory mechanism that leads to the impermissible simplification of the phenomenon that it seeks to understand.The empirical results confirm the limits of both cognitive and intuitions paradigms and advocates for a more nuanced and dynamic approach in understanding the moral judgment within a more comprehensive conception on human personality. Finally, the implications for the contemporary psychology’ paradigm are discussed.
{"title":"Moral Competence and Foundations of Moral Judgment. An Empirical Exploration of Concepts and New Possibilities for Understanding","authors":"Bogdan Popoveniuc","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.1.4","url":null,"abstract":"The present study examines the relation between the moral intuitions proposed by the ‘Moral Foundations Theory’ according to J. Haidt and the moral orientations in relation with moral competence, as described by the ‘Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behaviour’ according to G. Lind.It is an empirical exploration of the relation between the five foundational domains (and/or the corresponding two higher-order clusters) and the moral orientations, as this results from the theoretical assumptions of both theories, and the influence on and of the moral competence on these aforementioned relations. The shared affective and, at the same time, habitual characteristics of moral intuitions and moral orientations, although based on different theories (intuitionism, respectively, cognitivism) should converge in a dynamic relationship. The basic motivation is the need to overcome the affective-cognitive disjunction in the study of moral judgment, which is artificial. The human (moral) reasoning is always a situated and situating one, in a symbolic narrative universe, in which the cognitive-affective dichotomy forms a dynamic unity. This overstated dichotomy is only a methodological necessity, but unfortunately hypostasized in an explanatory mechanism that leads to the impermissible simplification of the phenomenon that it seeks to understand.The empirical results confirm the limits of both cognitive and intuitions paradigms and advocates for a more nuanced and dynamic approach in understanding the moral judgment within a more comprehensive conception on human personality. Finally, the implications for the contemporary psychology’ paradigm are discussed.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46859489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is a pleasure for me to introduce papers presented at the 14th InternationalSymposium „Moral Competence: Its Nature, Relevance, and Education” hosted by theInstitute of Foreign Languages of the Faculty of Philology at Vilnius University, Lithuania,on 23-24 July 2020, in collaboration with several academic institutions from abroad, suchas Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland. Due to the pandemic restrictions, asymposium was organized in an online mode. Six papers were revised and submitted tothis special issue as symposium proceedings, completed by two additional and relatedpapers. The contents offer a thorough insight into the concept of – and reasearch into – themoral competence defined by Georg Lind (Institute for Moral-Democratic Competence;formerly: University of Konstanz) and visualized by his Moral Competence Test (formerly:Moral Judgment Test) certified in 41 languages. In certain papers research findings andmethods based on further measuring instruments, as well as the alternative approaches tomoral judgment and decision making were applied and discussed (e.g., moral foundationsapproach).
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"R. Kriaučiūnienė","doi":"10.14746/eip.2021.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"It is a pleasure for me to introduce papers presented at the 14th InternationalSymposium „Moral Competence: Its Nature, Relevance, and Education” hosted by theInstitute of Foreign Languages of the Faculty of Philology at Vilnius University, Lithuania,on 23-24 July 2020, in collaboration with several academic institutions from abroad, suchas Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland. Due to the pandemic restrictions, asymposium was organized in an online mode. Six papers were revised and submitted tothis special issue as symposium proceedings, completed by two additional and relatedpapers. The contents offer a thorough insight into the concept of – and reasearch into – themoral competence defined by Georg Lind (Institute for Moral-Democratic Competence;formerly: University of Konstanz) and visualized by his Moral Competence Test (formerly:Moral Judgment Test) certified in 41 languages. In certain papers research findings andmethods based on further measuring instruments, as well as the alternative approaches tomoral judgment and decision making were applied and discussed (e.g., moral foundationsapproach).","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47177197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After the publication of Jaques Derrida’s book, L’animal que donc je suis, anti-speciesism has been looking for a theoretical foundation for its ethical content. In my opinion, the defect of all these philosophical perspectives is that they still reduce animals to objects of human philosophy. Here, I develop a new framework in which animals are considered as subjects of their own philosophy. In analogy to the concept of ethnophilosophy, the concept of speciophilosophy is here introduced (§ 1, §3). The different ways of thinking between humans and other animals are outlined, by explaining the difference between verbal reasoning and thinking through images (§ 2). Human philosophies are shown to be anthropocentric ideologies, related to carnivorism (§4, § 8). Subsequently, animal speciophilosophies are discussed (§6) and a dialogical symphilosophein (§ 5) among all living beings is proposed to be the extension of the so-called philosophy of dialogue. Finally, it is shown how this perspective was present in the original Christian ethics (§7, §9, § 10).
{"title":"Towards a Non-human Speciophilosophy","authors":"E. Giannetto","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2020.2.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2020.2.2","url":null,"abstract":"After the publication of Jaques Derrida’s book, L’animal que donc je suis, anti-speciesism has been looking for a theoretical foundation for its ethical content. In my opinion, the defect of all these philosophical perspectives is that they still reduce animals to objects of human philosophy. Here, I develop a new framework in which animals are considered as subjects of their own philosophy. In analogy to the concept of ethnophilosophy, the concept of speciophilosophy is here introduced (§ 1, §3). The different ways of thinking between humans and other animals are outlined, by explaining the difference between verbal reasoning and thinking through images (§ 2). Human philosophies are shown to be anthropocentric ideologies, related to carnivorism (§4, § 8). Subsequently, animal speciophilosophies are discussed (§6) and a dialogical symphilosophein (§ 5) among all living beings is proposed to be the extension of the so-called philosophy of dialogue. Finally, it is shown how this perspective was present in the original Christian ethics (§7, §9, § 10).","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49103490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nutritional choices are affected by culture, tradition and above all by the narrative we adopt for human history. The article gives an overview of the (pseudo)scientific beliefs, psychological factors and ethical orientations that affect nutritional choices. Among the various food theories today, great importance is given, for example, to the so-called Paleolithic diet, which consists of proposing a dietary model based on blood groups, which are assumed to have developed throughout different periods of the natural evolution of Homo sapiens, which were characterized by peculiar alimentary regimes. Moreover, psychological determinant drivers affect food choices and could lead to pathological eating behaviors (e.g., anorexia, overeating, binge eating). Finally, the ethical aspects of nutrition are closely correlated to vegetarianism, which in turn embraces an anti-speciesist thinking and recognizes the need for humans not to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals. Vegetarianism, anti-speciesism and ecologism often represent different aspects of the same issue: a lifestyle that testifies the need for a change in traditional paradigms, in the interest of humankind and the future of life on our planet.
{"title":"Nutritional Choices, New Health Approaches and Anti-speciesist Thinking","authors":"B. Tinghino","doi":"10.14746/EIP.2020.2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/EIP.2020.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"Nutritional choices are affected by culture, tradition and above all by the narrative we adopt for human history. The article gives an overview of the (pseudo)scientific beliefs, psychological factors and ethical orientations that affect nutritional choices. Among the various food theories today, great importance is given, for example, to the so-called Paleolithic diet, which consists of proposing a dietary model based on blood groups, which are assumed to have developed throughout different periods of the natural evolution of Homo sapiens, which were characterized by peculiar alimentary regimes. Moreover, psychological determinant drivers affect food choices and could lead to pathological eating behaviors (e.g., anorexia, overeating, binge eating). Finally, the ethical aspects of nutrition are closely correlated to vegetarianism, which in turn embraces an anti-speciesist thinking and recognizes the need for humans not to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals. Vegetarianism, anti-speciesism and ecologism often represent different aspects of the same issue: a lifestyle that testifies the need for a change in traditional paradigms, in the interest of humankind and the future of life on our planet.","PeriodicalId":36100,"journal":{"name":"Ethics in Progress","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41689843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：