In this paper, we present a simple theoretical extension from the Economic Geography literature to characterize the main features of pollution havens (lax environmental regulation, good market access to high-income countries and corruption opportunities). Using structural and reduced-form estimations, we find that pollution havens are not a “popular myth” for European firms, laxer environmental standards significantly explain the location choice of polluting affiliates. We analyze in depth the role of trade costs (using various bilateral and multilateral measures), a 1% increase in access to the European market from a pollution haven fosters relocation there by 0.1%. We also find that corruption lowers environmental standards, which strongly attract polluting firms: a 1% increase of corruption fuels relocation by 0.28%. We test the economic significance of these empirical findings via simulations. The protection of the European market (e.g., a carbon tax on imports) to stop relocations to pollution havens must be high (a decrease of the European market for Morocco and Tunisia equivalent to 13%) not to say prohibitive (31% for China).
{"title":"Pollution Haven and Corruption Paradise","authors":"F. Candau, E. Dienesch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1864170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1864170","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a simple theoretical extension from the Economic Geography literature to characterize the main features of pollution havens (lax environmental regulation, good market access to high-income countries and corruption opportunities). Using structural and reduced-form estimations, we find that pollution havens are not a “popular myth” for European firms, laxer environmental standards significantly explain the location choice of polluting affiliates. We analyze in depth the role of trade costs (using various bilateral and multilateral measures), a 1% increase in access to the European market from a pollution haven fosters relocation there by 0.1%. We also find that corruption lowers environmental standards, which strongly attract polluting firms: a 1% increase of corruption fuels relocation by 0.28%. We test the economic significance of these empirical findings via simulations. The protection of the European market (e.g., a carbon tax on imports) to stop relocations to pollution havens must be high (a decrease of the European market for Morocco and Tunisia equivalent to 13%) not to say prohibitive (31% for China).","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.1864170","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67764256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their pioneering works on prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) propose the ground-breaking idea that in making decisions under risk individuals evaluate asymmetrically losses and gains against to a personal reference point. According to the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) statement “losses loom larger than gains”, individuals display loss aversion. However, Sacchi and Stanca (2014) argue that people may exhibit gain appetite that states that “gains loom larger than losses”. Although the prospect theory can be traced back of more than thirty years, how to formalize asymmetrical preferences to a reference point is still an open issue (see Abdellaoui et al., 2007; and Ghossoub, 2012). In this short note we set a preference-based definition for loss aversion, gain appetite and equally weighted preferences “in the small”, i.e. for outcomes around a given reference point; and “in the large”, i.e. for any outcome of the domain. The classical Kahneman and Tversky (1979, page 279) loss aversion definition follows as a special case.
Kahneman和Tversky(1979,1992)在他们关于前景理论的开创性著作中提出了突破性的观点,即在风险决策中,个体根据个人参考点不对称地评估损失和收益。根据卡尼曼和特沃斯基(1979)的陈述“损失比收益更大”,个体表现出损失厌恶。然而,Sacchi和Stanca(2014)认为,人们可能会表现出“收益大于损失”的收益偏好。尽管前景理论可以追溯到三十多年前,但如何将不对称偏好正式化到一个参考点仍然是一个悬而未决的问题(见Abdellaoui et al., 2007;and Ghossoub, 2012)。在这篇短文中,我们为损失厌恶、收益偏好和“小范围”的均等加权偏好设定了一个基于偏好的定义,即在给定参考点附近的结果;以及“in the large”,即对于域的任何结果。卡尼曼和特沃斯基(1979,第279页)的经典损失厌恶定义是一个特例。
{"title":"Loss Aversion and Gain Appetite in the Small and in the Large","authors":"R. Bordley, L. Tibiletti, M. Uberti","doi":"10.12988/IMF.2016.6558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12988/IMF.2016.6558","url":null,"abstract":"In their pioneering works on prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) propose the ground-breaking idea that in making decisions under risk individuals evaluate asymmetrically losses and gains against to a personal reference point. According to the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) statement “losses loom larger than gains”, individuals display loss aversion. However, Sacchi and Stanca (2014) argue that people may exhibit gain appetite that states that “gains loom larger than losses”. Although the prospect theory can be traced back of more than thirty years, how to formalize asymmetrical preferences to a reference point is still an open issue (see Abdellaoui et al., 2007; and Ghossoub, 2012). In this short note we set a preference-based definition for loss aversion, gain appetite and equally weighted preferences “in the small”, i.e. for outcomes around a given reference point; and “in the large”, i.e. for any outcome of the domain. The classical Kahneman and Tversky (1979, page 279) loss aversion definition follows as a special case.","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.12988/IMF.2016.6558","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66383203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amani Kahloul, R. Lahmandi‐Ayed, H. Lasram, D. Laussel
We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and a limited number of firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated respectively by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the view point of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, in a concentrated-ownership society, the duopoly is always preferred by the majority, while in an egalitarian-ownership society, the choice of the majority depends on the size of workers and consumers segments.
{"title":"Vertical Differentiation and Labour in a General Equilibrium Model","authors":"Amani Kahloul, R. Lahmandi‐Ayed, H. Lasram, D. Laussel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2722448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2722448","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences and a limited number of firms, where workers and consumers are differentiated respectively by their sensitivity to effort and their preference for quality. We compare the duopoly and the monopoly cases from the view point of each individual, then we deduce the choice of the majority. We prove that, in a concentrated-ownership society, the duopoly is always preferred by the majority, while in an egalitarian-ownership society, the choice of the majority depends on the size of workers and consumers segments.","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68273546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay discusses the process of harmonization of the legislation impacting on intellectual property rights at international level and within the European Union. To this end, after an up-to-date account of the international treaties applicable within the EU and of the European Directives and Regulations on various domains, such as copyright and related rights, patents and utility models, design, trademarks, geographical indications, etc., the paper preliminarily suggests hurdles and perspectives of a global IP harmonization. The essay concludes that whilst world-wide IP rights are not an easy target, they are nonetheless an obligatory choice, especially in some wide-ranging areas of Intellectual Property.
{"title":"Intellectual Property Law Harmonization within and Beyond Europe: Achievements and Future Challenges","authors":"M. Favale, M. Borghi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2613515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2613515","url":null,"abstract":"This essay discusses the process of harmonization of the legislation impacting on intellectual property rights at international level and within the European Union. To this end, after an up-to-date account of the international treaties applicable within the EU and of the European Directives and Regulations on various domains, such as copyright and related rights, patents and utility models, design, trademarks, geographical indications, etc., the paper preliminarily suggests hurdles and perspectives of a global IP harmonization. The essay concludes that whilst world-wide IP rights are not an easy target, they are nonetheless an obligatory choice, especially in some wide-ranging areas of Intellectual Property.","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68225676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU seeks to create a seamless online Digital Single Market for media products such as digital music and film. The territoriality of the copyright regime is often perceived as an obstacle that induces geographical segmentation. This paper provides empirical evidence on the extent of market segmentation in the EU on the supply and demand side and measures the contribution of several drivers of this market segmentation. We use data from the Apple iTunes country stores in 27 EU Member States to measure geographical market segmentation in supply (availability), demand (sales) and prices across the EU for downloadable digital music and film. We find that availability of EU media products across country stores in the EU is close to 80% for music and 40% for films but only 27% for EU-produced films. Recent industry initiatives to reduce the transaction costs of making digital music available across borders result in a reasonably wide availability though still short of the 100% mark. Vertical agreements in the supply chain of films remain an obstacle for wider availability of digital films. Consumer preference variables such as cultural proximity, a shared language or border and inherent preferences for home market products are the main drivers for the observed geographical market segmentation in supply and demand patterns. Supply side factors including copyright-related trade costs probably still play a role though we can only infer this indirectly in the absence of data on copyright licensing arrangements at product level. Commercial strategies in general and competition-restricting territorial agreements in film distribution in particular will also reduce availability. We also find evidence of price differentiation across iTunes EU country stores, correlated with overall country price levels.
{"title":"Language, Copyright and Geographic Segmentation in the EU Digital, Single Market for Music and Film","authors":"Estrella Gómez Herrera, B. Martens","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2603144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2603144","url":null,"abstract":"The EU seeks to create a seamless online Digital Single Market for media products such as digital music and film. The territoriality of the copyright regime is often perceived as an obstacle that induces geographical segmentation. This paper provides empirical evidence on the extent of market segmentation in the EU on the supply and demand side and measures the contribution of several drivers of this market segmentation. We use data from the Apple iTunes country stores in 27 EU Member States to measure geographical market segmentation in supply (availability), demand (sales) and prices across the EU for downloadable digital music and film. We find that availability of EU media products across country stores in the EU is close to 80% for music and 40% for films but only 27% for EU-produced films. Recent industry initiatives to reduce the transaction costs of making digital music available across borders result in a reasonably wide availability though still short of the 100% mark. Vertical agreements in the supply chain of films remain an obstacle for wider availability of digital films. Consumer preference variables such as cultural proximity, a shared language or border and inherent preferences for home market products are the main drivers for the observed geographical market segmentation in supply and demand patterns. Supply side factors including copyright-related trade costs probably still play a role though we can only infer this indirectly in the absence of data on copyright licensing arrangements at product level. Commercial strategies in general and competition-restricting territorial agreements in film distribution in particular will also reduce availability. We also find evidence of price differentiation across iTunes EU country stores, correlated with overall country price levels.","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2603144","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68219596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the presence of nonlinear mechanism in the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to CPI inflation for 12 euro area (EA) countries. Using logistic smooth transition models, we explore the existence of nonlinearity with respect to economic activity along the business cycle. Our results provide a strong evidence of nonlinearity in 6 out of 12 EA countries with significant differences in the degree of ERPT between the periods of expansion and recession. However, we find no clear direction in this regime-dependence of pass-through to business cycle. In some countries, ERPT is higher during expansions than in recessions; however, in other countries, this result is reversed. These cross-country differences in the nonlinear mechanism of pass-through would have important implications for the design of monetary policy and the control of inflation in the EA context.
{"title":"Nonlinear Mechanism of the Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Does Business Cycle Matter?","authors":"Nidhaleddine Ben Cheikh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2144003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the presence of nonlinear mechanism in the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to CPI inflation for 12 euro area (EA) countries. Using logistic smooth transition models, we explore the existence of nonlinearity with respect to economic activity along the business cycle. Our results provide a strong evidence of nonlinearity in 6 out of 12 EA countries with significant differences in the degree of ERPT between the periods of expansion and recession. However, we find no clear direction in this regime-dependence of pass-through to business cycle. In some countries, ERPT is higher during expansions than in recessions; however, in other countries, this result is reversed. These cross-country differences in the nonlinear mechanism of pass-through would have important implications for the design of monetary policy and the control of inflation in the EA context.","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67944772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Undoubtedly, the idea of strong property rights is the underlying idea of economics and one of the main sources of economic incentive. In his paper, Prof. Shavell (see Shavell, 2009) seems to question and eventually impugn the idea of the economic efficiency of property rights in the market place of ideas in the academic world. In this regard, I will criticize his paper with the economic methods and will explain how Prof. Shavell’s idea of the abolishing copyrights for the academic works might suffer from inconsistencies and also lacks the merits in generating a more economically efficient atmosphere for the academic works.
{"title":"A Response to Prof. Shavell’s ‘Should Copyright of Academic Works Be Abolished?’","authors":"Hossein Nabilou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1493466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1493466","url":null,"abstract":"Undoubtedly, the idea of strong property rights is the underlying idea of economics and one of the main sources of economic incentive. In his paper, Prof. Shavell (see Shavell, 2009) seems to question and eventually impugn the idea of the economic efficiency of property rights in the market place of ideas in the academic world. In this regard, I will criticize his paper with the economic methods and will explain how Prof. Shavell’s idea of the abolishing copyrights for the academic works might suffer from inconsistencies and also lacks the merits in generating a more economically efficient atmosphere for the academic works.","PeriodicalId":36243,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68187761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}