Infrastructures encompass dynamic networks and assemblages that enable and control flows of goods, people, and information over space. These can be physical, informational, or digital; most now are combinations of these, for example, the Internet, or Global Positioning and Navigation Systems (such as GPS and Beidou). Many other things run or depend on an infrastructure—andmost infrastructures depend on or link with other infrastructures. Some infrastructures lie underneath, barely noticed for long periods until things go wrong, while others attract much public and political attention and are joyously celebrated, fiercely resisted, or resignedly accepted. Infrastructures are important, but not much systematic work has been done on the significance of their relationship with international (or transversal) law. Consideration of how infrastructures affect or shape international law entails consideration of how relations, processes, and imaginations of particular infrastructures interact with law, and vice versa. This symposium contributes to the investigation of how infrastructures may work as fundamental components of regulatory ordering—or may work against or orthogonal to some such ordering projects and in support of competing or resistance projects.1 Even if it is not (yet) studied as a field, international infrastructure law is a large practice area and many of its components have long been prominent in specialized scholarship.2 International law—its praxis, doctrines, and structures—is routinely deployed in the enabling and controlling of certain kinds of transnational infrastructures, or the flows these infrastructures channel or block. Some notable infrastructures could barely exist or function without particular international law arrangements (specific infrastructures of this sort include the Suez Canal, the France-UKChannel Tunnel, the Schengen Information System, the World Health Organization’s pandemic monitoring system, and the Nordstream 2 pipeline built but suspended from becoming operational following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine). International law figures in sprawling initiatives of “infrastructural developmentalism” such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.3 International law enables or regulates financing and investment protection for large physical infrastructures, requirements to obtain
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium on Infrastructuring International Law","authors":"B. Kingsbury","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.74","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.74","url":null,"abstract":"Infrastructures encompass dynamic networks and assemblages that enable and control flows of goods, people, and information over space. These can be physical, informational, or digital; most now are combinations of these, for example, the Internet, or Global Positioning and Navigation Systems (such as GPS and Beidou). Many other things run or depend on an infrastructure—andmost infrastructures depend on or link with other infrastructures. Some infrastructures lie underneath, barely noticed for long periods until things go wrong, while others attract much public and political attention and are joyously celebrated, fiercely resisted, or resignedly accepted. Infrastructures are important, but not much systematic work has been done on the significance of their relationship with international (or transversal) law. Consideration of how infrastructures affect or shape international law entails consideration of how relations, processes, and imaginations of particular infrastructures interact with law, and vice versa. This symposium contributes to the investigation of how infrastructures may work as fundamental components of regulatory ordering—or may work against or orthogonal to some such ordering projects and in support of competing or resistance projects.1 Even if it is not (yet) studied as a field, international infrastructure law is a large practice area and many of its components have long been prominent in specialized scholarship.2 International law—its praxis, doctrines, and structures—is routinely deployed in the enabling and controlling of certain kinds of transnational infrastructures, or the flows these infrastructures channel or block. Some notable infrastructures could barely exist or function without particular international law arrangements (specific infrastructures of this sort include the Suez Canal, the France-UKChannel Tunnel, the Schengen Information System, the World Health Organization’s pandemic monitoring system, and the Nordstream 2 pipeline built but suspended from becoming operational following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine). International law figures in sprawling initiatives of “infrastructural developmentalism” such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.3 International law enables or regulates financing and investment protection for large physical infrastructures, requirements to obtain","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43310282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For the past 150 years, the Institut de Droit International (IDI) has held a prominent position in the field of international law, garnering recognition as one of the world's distinguished professional organizations for international lawyers. Yet, a closer look at its structures reveals that in fact, the IDI has been and remains an elitist club, comprised of renowned international legal jurists, practitioners, and scholars. Its goal was and is to formulate “principles from which rules [of international law] could be deduced.”1 While there may be doubts regarding the contemporary authority of the IDI in shaping today's international law, it possessed significant influence during its first century of existence. Therefore, on the occasion of its 150th anniversary, this essay offers an alternative perspective on the IDI's contribution to the field, focusing on the implications of its claimed status of the “legal conscience of the civilized world” and exploring whether this status had somehow impacted international legal norms and principles. While further empirical investigation is required to establish a definitive correlation between the IDI's affiliations with the “civilized world” and a skewed focus of international law on Western legal traditions, a few examples can serve as a starting point. The illustrations from the IDI's engagement with the laws of war—specifically, the nineteenth-century regulation of occupation and the post-World War II determination of military targets—exemplify how the inherent elitism rooted in the notion of “civilization” can be discerned in pivotal advancements of international law.
{"title":"Unveiling the “Legal Conscience of the Civilized World:” a Critical Look at the Institut de Droit International","authors":"Julia Emtseva","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.36","url":null,"abstract":"For the past 150 years, the Institut de Droit International (IDI) has held a prominent position in the field of international law, garnering recognition as one of the world's distinguished professional organizations for international lawyers. Yet, a closer look at its structures reveals that in fact, the IDI has been and remains an elitist club, comprised of renowned international legal jurists, practitioners, and scholars. Its goal was and is to formulate “principles from which rules [of international law] could be deduced.”1 While there may be doubts regarding the contemporary authority of the IDI in shaping today's international law, it possessed significant influence during its first century of existence. Therefore, on the occasion of its 150th anniversary, this essay offers an alternative perspective on the IDI's contribution to the field, focusing on the implications of its claimed status of the “legal conscience of the civilized world” and exploring whether this status had somehow impacted international legal norms and principles. While further empirical investigation is required to establish a definitive correlation between the IDI's affiliations with the “civilized world” and a skewed focus of international law on Western legal traditions, a few examples can serve as a starting point. The illustrations from the IDI's engagement with the laws of war—specifically, the nineteenth-century regulation of occupation and the post-World War II determination of military targets—exemplify how the inherent elitism rooted in the notion of “civilization” can be discerned in pivotal advancements of international law.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135358597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The 150th anniversary of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) and the International Law Association (ILA) provides an opportunity to assess the role of legal scholarship in the codification and institutionalization of international law. This essay argues that academic expertise is a form of social and political capital that is at once individual, institutional, and structural. Empirically focused on international dispute settlement mechanisms (interstate adjudication and arbitration), this essay underscores that academic expertise shapes the professional status of international lawyers, and influences the clout of international institutions as codifiers of international law.
{"title":"Legal Knowledge as Social and Political Capital","authors":"Sara Dezalay","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.34","url":null,"abstract":"The 150th anniversary of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) and the International Law Association (ILA) provides an opportunity to assess the role of legal scholarship in the codification and institutionalization of international law. This essay argues that academic expertise is a form of social and political capital that is at once individual, institutional, and structural. Empirically focused on international dispute settlement mechanisms (interstate adjudication and arbitration), this essay underscores that academic expertise shapes the professional status of international lawyers, and influences the clout of international institutions as codifiers of international law.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136257201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium on 150 Years of the Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association: Cause for Celebration or Concern?","authors":"Jeffrey L. Dunoff","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.32","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135358588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-war Inheritance,” Anna Saunders highlights that the study and practice of constitutionalism exhibit a reluctance to consider the relationship between national constitutions and international economic relations. She argues that the prevailing epistemic boundaries of constitutionalism—understood as a self-contained project, separate from projects of global economic ordering—have largely insulated it from critiques raised by scholars concerned with the material and distributive implications of reshaping the global legal order through the making and revising of constitutions. This essay takes up Saunders's call to de-insulate constitution-making as a technique of international law from such critique by pointing to the family as an institution that is central both to constitutional ordering and to economic ordering, and thus can help overcome the epistemic boundary between the two. To this end, the essay brings together various strands of critical thought that identify one particular family structure—the nuclear family—as an exploitative institution that has (re)produced structural inequality both within and between states. Described as the “original sin” of modern constitutionalism and as an essential “instrument of colonization,” the nuclear family model represents an apt entry point to reconceiving constitution-making as Saunders suggests—in a way “that both acknowledges the discipline's past collaboration with forms of dispossession and exploitation, and that actively reconsiders its future boundaries.”
{"title":"International Constitution-making as a Technique of Gender Ordering: Considering the Role of the Family in Global Economic Relations","authors":"Michele Krech","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.41","url":null,"abstract":"In “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-war Inheritance,” Anna Saunders highlights that the study and practice of constitutionalism exhibit a reluctance to consider the relationship between national constitutions and international economic relations. She argues that the prevailing epistemic boundaries of constitutionalism—understood as a self-contained project, separate from projects of global economic ordering—have largely insulated it from critiques raised by scholars concerned with the material and distributive implications of reshaping the global legal order through the making and revising of constitutions. This essay takes up Saunders's call to de-insulate constitution-making as a technique of international law from such critique by pointing to the family as an institution that is central both to constitutional ordering and to economic ordering, and thus can help overcome the epistemic boundary between the two. To this end, the essay brings together various strands of critical thought that identify one particular family structure—the nuclear family—as an exploitative institution that has (re)produced structural inequality both within and between states. Described as the “original sin” of modern constitutionalism and as an essential “instrument of colonization,” the nuclear family model represents an apt entry point to reconceiving constitution-making as Saunders suggests—in a way “that both acknowledges the discipline's past collaboration with forms of dispossession and exploitation, and that actively reconsiders its future boundaries.”","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135106272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit International (IDI) were both founded in 1873 at a critical juncture in the history of pacifism and internationalism, in the immediate aftermath of the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War and the 1872 British-American Alabama arbitration. Frustrated by the blatant violations of international rules during the war and then emboldened by the arbitral resolution of the protracted Alabama dispute between Britain and the United States, pacifists and international jurists joined forces to promote an ordered system of international law and advocate for legalized international dispute settlement. The aim was to marshal the scattered reformist forces of international law in furtherance of international legal reform—“international law needed to be institutionalized,” as Gerald Fitzmaurice put it. 1 This resulted in the almost simultaneous establishment of the pacifism-originated ILA and the legal-scientism-oriented IDI, and helped to explain the similarity in institutional telos and the high degree of overlap in membership between the two institutions in their early years. 2 Nevertheless, the ILA and the IDI differed in their working agendas and strategies. In terms of agendas, while the ILA tended to adopt an idealist view of international law hardly succumbing to compromises, the IDI mainly adhered to a scientifically pragmatic approach. With respect to strategies, the ILA sought social influence based on expansive membership, while the IDI's membership consisted of a limited number of international jurists. Despite changes over time, these organizational structures and distinctions between the two institutions at their founding moment are still visible.
{"title":"The Institutionalization of International Law at a Crossroads: Pacifists, Jurists, and the Creation of the ILA and the IDI","authors":"Xiaohang Chen","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.33","url":null,"abstract":"The International Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit International (IDI) were both founded in 1873 at a critical juncture in the history of pacifism and internationalism, in the immediate aftermath of the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War and the 1872 British-American Alabama arbitration. Frustrated by the blatant violations of international rules during the war and then emboldened by the arbitral resolution of the protracted Alabama dispute between Britain and the United States, pacifists and international jurists joined forces to promote an ordered system of international law and advocate for legalized international dispute settlement. The aim was to marshal the scattered reformist forces of international law in furtherance of international legal reform—“international law needed to be institutionalized,” as Gerald Fitzmaurice put it. 1 This resulted in the almost simultaneous establishment of the pacifism-originated ILA and the legal-scientism-oriented IDI, and helped to explain the similarity in institutional telos and the high degree of overlap in membership between the two institutions in their early years. 2 Nevertheless, the ILA and the IDI differed in their working agendas and strategies. In terms of agendas, while the ILA tended to adopt an idealist view of international law hardly succumbing to compromises, the IDI mainly adhered to a scientifically pragmatic approach. With respect to strategies, the ILA sought social influence based on expansive membership, while the IDI's membership consisted of a limited number of international jurists. Despite changes over time, these organizational structures and distinctions between the two institutions at their founding moment are still visible.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135357295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Constitutional engineering is a complicated practice, and much less is known about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy than many are willing to admit. A cursory look at the political science literature reveals that constitutional design has only a moderate to small impact on the stability of a democratic regime. This is not to suggest that constitutionalism is altogether irrelevant, but the findings of different social scientists suggest that we should be humbler and more realistic about the role of constitutionalism and institutions in fostering peace, democracy, and development. Anna Saunders's article, “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-War Inheritance,” provides an important contribution to such a realistic reassessment of constitutionalism. Nevertheless, her critique of constitutional assistance needs to be developed further, examining the limitations of constitutional law in itself as a promoter of peace and democracy, rather than just the fact that material and economic questions are often neglected in international constitution-making. A key question is not so much whether and how to create a better constitutional design that would integrate economic and structural issues more openly, but, more fundamentally, whether traditional constitutional approaches are in fact appropriate for the promotion of peace, democracy, and development in post-conflict settings. In this essay, I argue for a democratic and experimentalist form of constitutionalism, which is often at odds with the core ideas of traditional constitutionalism, namely, rigidity and entrenchment.
{"title":"The False Promise of Constitutionalism","authors":"Bojan Bugarič","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.44","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutional engineering is a complicated practice, and much less is known about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy than many are willing to admit. A cursory look at the political science literature reveals that constitutional design has only a moderate to small impact on the stability of a democratic regime. This is not to suggest that constitutionalism is altogether irrelevant, but the findings of different social scientists suggest that we should be humbler and more realistic about the role of constitutionalism and institutions in fostering peace, democracy, and development. Anna Saunders's article, “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-War Inheritance,” provides an important contribution to such a realistic reassessment of constitutionalism. Nevertheless, her critique of constitutional assistance needs to be developed further, examining the limitations of constitutional law in itself as a promoter of peace and democracy, rather than just the fact that material and economic questions are often neglected in international constitution-making. A key question is not so much whether and how to create a better constitutional design that would integrate economic and structural issues more openly, but, more fundamentally, whether traditional constitutional approaches are in fact appropriate for the promotion of peace, democracy, and development in post-conflict settings. In this essay, I argue for a democratic and experimentalist form of constitutionalism, which is often at odds with the core ideas of traditional constitutionalism, namely, rigidity and entrenchment.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135107715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I want to explore a tension in Anna Saunders's rich argument because it confronts much scholarship critical of what we can think of as the liberal democratic constitutional project (LDCP), and which has its roots in debates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sparked by the Marxist critique of capitalism. The tension is between the following two claims that she makes in her article, “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-war Inheritance.” First, LDCP focuses on the formal dimension of institutional design and thereby fails to pay attention to a significant dimension of a constitutional order: its material basis. In this case, the remedy might seem simple: “Pay attention!” The second claim, however, is that the formal structure of LDCP is formal in name only. It has its own material basis in the ideology of neoliberalism. If, then, one is concerned as Saunders is about a material basis that reproduces social inequality and economic exploitation, the remedy is to abandon LDCP. My exploration is through Saunders's attention to the divergent analyses of the Nazi state set out by Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel in the 1930s as the launching pad for her investigation of the structure of thought that underpins LDCP and her suggestion that Fraenkel is responsible for the juridical turn in LDCP. I start with some biography, in part inspired by the way in which Saunders weaves the personal and the political into her narrative. It helps to show that the turn is not in itself problematic and, as I conclude, that material questions need to be posed and answered within the framework of a well-designed constitutional order.
{"title":"Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel on the Liberal Democratic Constitutional Project","authors":"David Dyzenhaus","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.45","url":null,"abstract":"I want to explore a tension in Anna Saunders's rich argument because it confronts much scholarship critical of what we can think of as the liberal democratic constitutional project (LDCP), and which has its roots in debates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sparked by the Marxist critique of capitalism. The tension is between the following two claims that she makes in her article, “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-war Inheritance.” First, LDCP focuses on the formal dimension of institutional design and thereby fails to pay attention to a significant dimension of a constitutional order: its material basis. In this case, the remedy might seem simple: “Pay attention!” The second claim, however, is that the formal structure of LDCP is formal in name only. It has its own material basis in the ideology of neoliberalism. If, then, one is concerned as Saunders is about a material basis that reproduces social inequality and economic exploitation, the remedy is to abandon LDCP. My exploration is through Saunders's attention to the divergent analyses of the Nazi state set out by Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel in the 1930s as the launching pad for her investigation of the structure of thought that underpins LDCP and her suggestion that Fraenkel is responsible for the juridical turn in LDCP. I start with some biography, in part inspired by the way in which Saunders weaves the personal and the political into her narrative. It helps to show that the turn is not in itself problematic and, as I conclude, that material questions need to be posed and answered within the framework of a well-designed constitutional order.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135105425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unlike the International Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit International (the Institut), the International Law Commission (the Commission, or ILC) is not 150 years old. Established in 1948, the Commission is exactly half the age of the two codification bodies to which this Symposium is dedicated and is celebrating its seventy-fifth anniversary in 2023. 1 Like its older cousins, the Commission is charged with the codification and progressive development of international law. Among the many differences between the Commission and its older cousins, one that stands out and that provides the lens for this essay, is its close relationship to states. Although a comparison of both the ILA and the Institut with the younger, but apparently more “authoritative” body, the Commission, is worthwhile, 2 due to space limitations, I focus my comments on the Institut and the Commission. This essay will home in on the impact of the relationship of these two bodies with states and argues that this relationship affects, to some extent , the work of the relevant bodies, both in terms of what topics they may address and how they address them. This broad conclusion, which is necessarily limited by space considerations, is substantiated on the basis of the membership and outputs of the two bodies.
与国际法协会(ILA)和国际法学会(institute de Droit International)不同，国际法委员会(Commission，简称ILC)的历史还不到150年。该委员会成立于1948年，其年龄正好是本专题讨论会致力于的两个编纂机构的一半，并将于2023年庆祝其75周年。1 .同其前身一样，委员会负责编纂和逐步发展国际法。在欧盟委员会与其前辈们之间的诸多差异中，有一个最为突出，并为本文提供了视角，那就是它与各国的密切关系。虽然将国际法研究所和研究所同较年轻但显然更“权威”的机构委员会进行比较是值得的，但由于篇幅限制，我的评论主要集中在研究所和委员会上。本文将集中讨论这两个机构与国家之间关系的影响，并认为这种关系在某种程度上影响着相关机构的工作，无论是就它们可能处理的主题而言，还是就它们如何处理这些主题而言。这一必然受到空间考虑限制的广泛结论是根据这两个机构的成员和产出得到证实的。
{"title":"The International Law Commission, the Institut, and States","authors":"Dire Tladi","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.38","url":null,"abstract":"Unlike the International Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit International (the Institut), the International Law Commission (the Commission, or ILC) is not 150 years old. Established in 1948, the Commission is exactly half the age of the two codification bodies to which this Symposium is dedicated and is celebrating its seventy-fifth anniversary in 2023. 1 Like its older cousins, the Commission is charged with the codification and progressive development of international law. Among the many differences between the Commission and its older cousins, one that stands out and that provides the lens for this essay, is its close relationship to states. Although a comparison of both the ILA and the Institut with the younger, but apparently more “authoritative” body, the Commission, is worthwhile, 2 due to space limitations, I focus my comments on the Institut and the Commission. This essay will home in on the impact of the relationship of these two bodies with states and argues that this relationship affects, to some extent , the work of the relevant bodies, both in terms of what topics they may address and how they address them. This broad conclusion, which is necessarily limited by space considerations, is substantiated on the basis of the membership and outputs of the two bodies.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135357803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay examines the activities of the Institute of International Law (the Institute or IIL) during its 150 years of existence, dealing directly or indirectly with the colonial phenomenon. It distinguishes between two major periods of roughly equal length: first the period between the years 1873 and 1945; and second, the period from 1945 to the present. These correspond to two important periods of international relations: the second wave of colonial expansion and its remnants and the regime of mandates following World War I, on the one hand, and the era of the United Nations Charter, the promotion of human rights, self-determination, and decolonialization, on the other hand.
{"title":"The Institute of International Law and the Colonial Phenomenon","authors":"Georges Abi-Saab","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.35","url":null,"abstract":"This essay examines the activities of the Institute of International Law (the Institute or IIL) during its 150 years of existence, dealing directly or indirectly with the colonial phenomenon. It distinguishes between two major periods of roughly equal length: first the period between the years 1873 and 1945; and second, the period from 1945 to the present. These correspond to two important periods of international relations: the second wave of colonial expansion and its remnants and the regime of mandates following World War I, on the one hand, and the era of the United Nations Charter, the promotion of human rights, self-determination, and decolonialization, on the other hand.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135358382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：