In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc describe, in rich detail, the pervasive involvement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat in the resolution of trade disputes.1 The authors conclude, rather emphatically, that the Secretariat “exerts more influence over dispute settlement proceedings than the staff of any comparable . . . tribunal.”2 In my view, this conclusion is somewhat misleading, as it portrays the WTO as “exceptional” or “sui generis”3 among international courts. In fact, the invisible army of legal bureaucrats (clerks, registry and secretariat lawyers, arbitral assistants, etc.) plays a “critically important”4 part across the whole field of international adjudication. What is missing is a comparative analysis of the power those bureaucrats wield in different judicial regimes. In this Essay, I outline a basic framework for the comparison, focusing on two main factors: first, the organizational and contractual arrangements that govern the relationship of international judges and bureaucrats; second, the relative distribution of expertise and capital between the two.
{"title":"The Myth of the Lone Judge: Comparing International Judicial Bureaucracies","authors":"T. Soave","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.63","url":null,"abstract":"In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc describe, in rich detail, the pervasive involvement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat in the resolution of trade disputes.1 The authors conclude, rather emphatically, that the Secretariat “exerts more influence over dispute settlement proceedings than the staff of any comparable . . . tribunal.”2 In my view, this conclusion is somewhat misleading, as it portrays the WTO as “exceptional” or “sui generis”3 among international courts. In fact, the invisible army of legal bureaucrats (clerks, registry and secretariat lawyers, arbitral assistants, etc.) plays a “critically important”4 part across the whole field of international adjudication. What is missing is a comparative analysis of the power those bureaucrats wield in different judicial regimes. In this Essay, I outline a basic framework for the comparison, focusing on two main factors: first, the organizational and contractual arrangements that govern the relationship of international judges and bureaucrats; second, the relative distribution of expertise and capital between the two.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"373 - 377"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47392894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their article “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc recharacterize the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement System (DSS) as a sui generis administrative review system wherein the “Guardians of the System,” i.e., the Secretariat, no longer merely “assists” panels and the Appellate Body (AB) in their reports, but also exerts influence and control over adjudicators. For them “‘the guardians of the system’ may have contributed to the system's demise by the expansion of their influence.” This Essay attempts to illustrate that Pauwelyn and Pelc's fatalistic view of the DSS is overstated, by providing some comments into the practical functioning of the DSS. We argue that, first, the “guardians of the system” are also restrained by suitable accountability mechanisms in their functions relating to appointment and financial “oversight” of adjudicators. Second, while acknowledging that the Secretariat retains a much stronger institutional memory than adjudicators, we suggest that this asymmetry between the staff and adjudicators’ familiarity with World Trade Organization (WTO) law and policy is not as stark and irredeemable as painted by the authors. Rather, the Secretariat's contribution to consistency and predictability in institutional decisions is ultimately desirable. For governments who established and make use of the WTO dispute system, the balance between ensuring legal coherence and preventing over-judicialization is at the core of the DSS. The participation of diplomats as panelists and the simultaneous creation of an office of Legal Affairs within the Secretariat was intended to ensure consistency in resolution of the members’ disputes to preserve a rules-based system. Finally, we contend that there is a strong internal legitimacy to Secretariat roles.
{"title":"Unmasking the Phantom of the Opera: Is there a Hidden Secretariat in the WTO Dispute Settlement System?","authors":"G. Marceau, Akshaya Venkataraman","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.68","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.68","url":null,"abstract":"In their article “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc recharacterize the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement System (DSS) as a sui generis administrative review system wherein the “Guardians of the System,” i.e., the Secretariat, no longer merely “assists” panels and the Appellate Body (AB) in their reports, but also exerts influence and control over adjudicators. For them “‘the guardians of the system’ may have contributed to the system's demise by the expansion of their influence.” This Essay attempts to illustrate that Pauwelyn and Pelc's fatalistic view of the DSS is overstated, by providing some comments into the practical functioning of the DSS. We argue that, first, the “guardians of the system” are also restrained by suitable accountability mechanisms in their functions relating to appointment and financial “oversight” of adjudicators. Second, while acknowledging that the Secretariat retains a much stronger institutional memory than adjudicators, we suggest that this asymmetry between the staff and adjudicators’ familiarity with World Trade Organization (WTO) law and policy is not as stark and irredeemable as painted by the authors. Rather, the Secretariat's contribution to consistency and predictability in institutional decisions is ultimately desirable. For governments who established and make use of the WTO dispute system, the balance between ensuring legal coherence and preventing over-judicialization is at the core of the DSS. The participation of diplomats as panelists and the simultaneous creation of an office of Legal Affairs within the Secretariat was intended to ensure consistency in resolution of the members’ disputes to preserve a rules-based system. Finally, we contend that there is a strong internal legitimacy to Secretariat roles.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"395 - 399"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45393183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,”1 Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc argue that the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO Secretariat) has more influence over dispute resolution than the staff of any comparable tribunal. This influence is the result of the institutional design of the WTO, but also of unexpected factors that extended the mandate of the WTO Secretariat beyond what was originally conceived. The authors claim that this influence has brought benefits but has also raised questions of legitimacy and accountability. It has also had unintended––and not necessarily positive––legal effects. In this Essay, I offer a comparative view of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the IACtHR Secretariat). I first wish to complement Pauwelyn and Pelc's analysis and provide another point of reference to understand the degree of influence that the WTO Secretariat has over dispute resolution. Second, I wish to provide some comparative insights as to the benefits and challenges that come with the existence of a permanent Secretariat playing a pivotal role within international judicial or quasi-judicial systems.
{"title":"The Role of the Secretariat in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis","authors":"Pablo González Domínguez","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.67","url":null,"abstract":"In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,”1 Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc argue that the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO Secretariat) has more influence over dispute resolution than the staff of any comparable tribunal. This influence is the result of the institutional design of the WTO, but also of unexpected factors that extended the mandate of the WTO Secretariat beyond what was originally conceived. The authors claim that this influence has brought benefits but has also raised questions of legitimacy and accountability. It has also had unintended––and not necessarily positive––legal effects. In this Essay, I offer a comparative view of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the IACtHR Secretariat). I first wish to complement Pauwelyn and Pelc's analysis and provide another point of reference to understand the degree of influence that the WTO Secretariat has over dispute resolution. Second, I wish to provide some comparative insights as to the benefits and challenges that come with the existence of a permanent Secretariat playing a pivotal role within international judicial or quasi-judicial systems.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"390 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43709928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are secretariats for in international dispute settlement bodies? The question is implicit in much of what Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc have written in their important article, “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System?’ The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” but is one that they do not ask outright.1 Pauwelyn and Pelc thoughtfully describe what the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement secretariat (WTO Secretariat) does as part of their call to determine what the WTO Secretariat is for. Asking what secretariats ought to be for advances the valuable work that has been done on these institutions with an eye to new secretariats that states are now constructing. This Essay makes two points. First, it argues that the work of the WTO Secretariat is typical of many international adjudicatory secretariats, especially those assisting with disputes over matters of international economic law. Seeing those similarities helps us understand how dispute settlement constituencies view the purpose of such secretariats: to carry out the activities highlighted by Pauwelyn and Pelc. Second, the essay picks up where Pauwelyn and Pelc left off and maintains that our collective attention ought to turn to newly envisioned and recently constructed trade dispute secretariats, and their substitutes. The authors provide a platform for examining what experimental designs of secretariats in upcoming trade agreements might look like, and, more important, what we think those secretariats are for.
{"title":"Old & New Dispute Secretariats","authors":"K. Claussen","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.65","url":null,"abstract":"What are secretariats for in international dispute settlement bodies? The question is implicit in much of what Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc have written in their important article, “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System?’ The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” but is one that they do not ask outright.1 Pauwelyn and Pelc thoughtfully describe what the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement secretariat (WTO Secretariat) does as part of their call to determine what the WTO Secretariat is for. Asking what secretariats ought to be for advances the valuable work that has been done on these institutions with an eye to new secretariats that states are now constructing. This Essay makes two points. First, it argues that the work of the WTO Secretariat is typical of many international adjudicatory secretariats, especially those assisting with disputes over matters of international economic law. Seeing those similarities helps us understand how dispute settlement constituencies view the purpose of such secretariats: to carry out the activities highlighted by Pauwelyn and Pelc. Second, the essay picks up where Pauwelyn and Pelc left off and maintains that our collective attention ought to turn to newly envisioned and recently constructed trade dispute secretariats, and their substitutes. The authors provide a platform for examining what experimental designs of secretariats in upcoming trade agreements might look like, and, more important, what we think those secretariats are for.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"400 - 404"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41843235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Essay explores whether the African Court of Human and People's Rights’ (African Court) Registry and Legal Division have a similar expansive role in the dispute settlement mechanism as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Secretariat. The African Court is the African Union's regional body for enforcing human rights. This Essay contributes to the scholarship on African international courts by testing the central arguments in Pauwelyn and Pelc's “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement”1 through a comparative analysis of the role of the Secretariat within the African Court.2 Despite the growing jurisprudence and influence of Africa's international courts, they continue to be neglected by mainstream scholarship of international courts and tribunals. This is evident in Pauwelyn and Pelc's article, which does not refer to any of Africa's seven international courts and tribunals. For that matter, the article makes no reference to any international tribunal outside Europe or the United States.3 Our analysis illustrates the fact that the influence of the African Court's Registry and Legal Division (Registry) in the process for dispute settlement is not as significant and concerning as that of the WTO Secretariat. As such, the influence of the Registry on the outcome of a case is significantly limited and does not raise any legitimacy crisis like the WTO. We attribute this disparity to the operational and structural disparities between the African Court and the WTO. In the following paragraphs, we examine each of the factors that Pauwelyn and Pelc raise concerning the influence of the WTO staff in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings4 in the context of the functions of the African Court Registry.
{"title":"The Role of the Registry and Legal Division of the African Court of Human and People's Rights in Dispute Settlement","authors":"Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, M. K. Odeh","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.69","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay explores whether the African Court of Human and People's Rights’ (African Court) Registry and Legal Division have a similar expansive role in the dispute settlement mechanism as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Secretariat. The African Court is the African Union's regional body for enforcing human rights. This Essay contributes to the scholarship on African international courts by testing the central arguments in Pauwelyn and Pelc's “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement”1 through a comparative analysis of the role of the Secretariat within the African Court.2 Despite the growing jurisprudence and influence of Africa's international courts, they continue to be neglected by mainstream scholarship of international courts and tribunals. This is evident in Pauwelyn and Pelc's article, which does not refer to any of Africa's seven international courts and tribunals. For that matter, the article makes no reference to any international tribunal outside Europe or the United States.3 Our analysis illustrates the fact that the influence of the African Court's Registry and Legal Division (Registry) in the process for dispute settlement is not as significant and concerning as that of the WTO Secretariat. As such, the influence of the Registry on the outcome of a case is significantly limited and does not raise any legitimacy crisis like the WTO. We attribute this disparity to the operational and structural disparities between the African Court and the WTO. In the following paragraphs, we examine each of the factors that Pauwelyn and Pelc raise concerning the influence of the WTO staff in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings4 in the context of the functions of the African Court Registry.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"384 - 389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48089831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Into the midst of the widely acknowledged crisis of international trade and multilateralism, represented sharply by the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, comes a provocative perspective by Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc, in “WhoGuards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” published in the American Journal of International Law.1 Pauwelyn and Pelc suggest that the crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) stems not only from external shocks, but also from cracks in its foundation. They argue that the WTO Secretariat operates in a way that has expanded far beyond providing research and logistical support toWTO panelists and Appellate Body judges as they resolve disputes amongWTO states parties. Rather, the Secretariat has amassed a great deal of influence over the substantive analyses that WTO panels and the Appellate Body produce. Some of this influence has arisen as an unanticipated outcome of institutional features that were themselves intentionally put into place, such as the contrast between the full-time and ongoing presence of Secretariat officials, and the time-bound, and therefore less stable, participation of individual WTO adjudicators. Other forms of influence have arisen from developments whose explicit institutional mandate is less clear, such as the emergence of precedent, which the Secretariat is better placed to manage due to its longterm institutional memory than are WTO adjudicators. Pauwelyn and Pelc describe eight distinct administrative functions that the Secretariat performs that contribute to its outsized influence in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.2 These functions combine with asymmetries they identify in training and expertise, as well as with various forms of institutional controls exerted by the Secretariat over adjudicators.3 When taken together, Pauwelyn and Pelc assert, the influence of the Secretariat renders the WTO dispute settlement system less a judicial forum than a “sui generis process of international administrative review.”4 With bracing clarity through this analysis, Pauwelyn and Pelc show that the “judicialization” of the dispute settlement system that had been so celebrated in many ways never existed in its perceived form. Rather,
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium on Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc, “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement”","authors":"Chantal Thomas","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.64","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.64","url":null,"abstract":"Into the midst of the widely acknowledged crisis of international trade and multilateralism, represented sharply by the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, comes a provocative perspective by Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc, in “WhoGuards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” published in the American Journal of International Law.1 Pauwelyn and Pelc suggest that the crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) stems not only from external shocks, but also from cracks in its foundation. They argue that the WTO Secretariat operates in a way that has expanded far beyond providing research and logistical support toWTO panelists and Appellate Body judges as they resolve disputes amongWTO states parties. Rather, the Secretariat has amassed a great deal of influence over the substantive analyses that WTO panels and the Appellate Body produce. Some of this influence has arisen as an unanticipated outcome of institutional features that were themselves intentionally put into place, such as the contrast between the full-time and ongoing presence of Secretariat officials, and the time-bound, and therefore less stable, participation of individual WTO adjudicators. Other forms of influence have arisen from developments whose explicit institutional mandate is less clear, such as the emergence of precedent, which the Secretariat is better placed to manage due to its longterm institutional memory than are WTO adjudicators. Pauwelyn and Pelc describe eight distinct administrative functions that the Secretariat performs that contribute to its outsized influence in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.2 These functions combine with asymmetries they identify in training and expertise, as well as with various forms of institutional controls exerted by the Secretariat over adjudicators.3 When taken together, Pauwelyn and Pelc assert, the influence of the Secretariat renders the WTO dispute settlement system less a judicial forum than a “sui generis process of international administrative review.”4 With bracing clarity through this analysis, Pauwelyn and Pelc show that the “judicialization” of the dispute settlement system that had been so celebrated in many ways never existed in its perceived form. Rather,","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"367 - 372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45443563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc make a novel and compelling contribution to our understanding of the secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Firmly grounded in principal-agent theory, their analysis nonetheless resonates with—and thereby suggests some advantages in pursuing—other, complementary approaches that probe the complex inner lives of the secretariats of international organizations. Two central themes in the article, one explicit and the other implicit, provide especially useful entry points for comparison and linkages with these other approaches. In exploring these themes, this Essay aims to build on Pauwelyn and Pelc's insightful work to encourage more critical engagement with the governance dynamics and effects of international secretariats.
{"title":"Unseen and Everyday: International Secretariats Under the Spotlight","authors":"G. Sinclair","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.66","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.66","url":null,"abstract":"In “Who Guards the ‘Guardians of the System’? The Role of the Secretariat in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc make a novel and compelling contribution to our understanding of the secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Firmly grounded in principal-agent theory, their analysis nonetheless resonates with—and thereby suggests some advantages in pursuing—other, complementary approaches that probe the complex inner lives of the secretariats of international organizations. Two central themes in the article, one explicit and the other implicit, provide especially useful entry points for comparison and linkages with these other approaches. In exploring these themes, this Essay aims to build on Pauwelyn and Pelc's insightful work to encourage more critical engagement with the governance dynamics and effects of international secretariats.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"378 - 383"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46876731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1916, at the first meeting of the then newly created American Institute of International Law, jurists from different countries adopted a declaration stipulating that “[i]nternational law is at one and the same time both national and international.”1 A century later, Latin American international human rights law clearly reflects that idea. Since the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948, and especially since the 1950s, with the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and later with the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights in 1969, human rights in Latin America have been, are, and will continue to be an essentially regional phenomenon of international law. By examining the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ case law, this essay analyzes the way in which Latin America has articulated transnational human rights law, from the establishment of the inter-American system, to the distinctive forms of interaction and influence between international law and constitutional law. Drawing from recent jurisprudence on social rights, this essay shows that the idea of a Latin American common law of human rights—an idea that has become highly influential in the past decade—is an example of the outer limits of the potential integration. As such, the idea presents challenges that must be addressed in order for regional human rights to realize their full potential as transnational norms.
{"title":"Human Rights as Transnational Law","authors":"J. Contesse","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.54","url":null,"abstract":"In 1916, at the first meeting of the then newly created American Institute of International Law, jurists from different countries adopted a declaration stipulating that “[i]nternational law is at one and the same time both national and international.”1 A century later, Latin American international human rights law clearly reflects that idea. Since the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948, and especially since the 1950s, with the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and later with the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights in 1969, human rights in Latin America have been, are, and will continue to be an essentially regional phenomenon of international law. By examining the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ case law, this essay analyzes the way in which Latin America has articulated transnational human rights law, from the establishment of the inter-American system, to the distinctive forms of interaction and influence between international law and constitutional law. Drawing from recent jurisprudence on social rights, this essay shows that the idea of a Latin American common law of human rights—an idea that has become highly influential in the past decade—is an example of the outer limits of the potential integration. As such, the idea presents challenges that must be addressed in order for regional human rights to realize their full potential as transnational norms.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"313 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46758151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
La literatura sobre el Derecho internacional suele asumir que la relación del populismo con este último es antagónica1. Sin embargo, una perspectiva centrada en América Latina, donde el populismo ha sido estudiado desde principios del siglo veinte, complejiza esta noción: líderes populistas han adoptado el multilateralismo, promovido la unidad regional e intentado crear instituciones internacionales. Además, tanto populistas como nopopulistas han resistido instituciones internacionales. Este ensayo problematiza la asunción de una relación necesariamente antagónica entre el populismo y el Derecho internacional, sosteniendo que dicha asunción carece de sustento empírico y está teóricamente subdesarrollada. Latinoamérica es un lugar relevante para problematizar esta noción, debido al rol del Poder Ejecutivo en la conducción de relaciones exteriores2 y la rica historia intelectual en la región respecto del populismo. El ensayo enfatiza la necesidad de desarrollar un marco teórico adecuado para el estudio de la relación entre populismo y Derecho internacional, marco que debiese ser menos eurocéntrico y sesgado normativamente, sin asumir que la resistencia al Derecho internacional siempre carece de mérito. Adicionalmente, debería permitirnos identificar lo distintivamente populista en esta relación y qué aspectos están mediados por las ideologías huésped.
{"title":"El Populismo y Su Antagonismo Hacia El Derecho Internacional: Lecciones Desde Latinoamérica","authors":"Marcela Prieto Rudolphy","doi":"10.1017/aju.2022.59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.59","url":null,"abstract":"La literatura sobre el Derecho internacional suele asumir que la relación del populismo con este último es antagónica1. Sin embargo, una perspectiva centrada en América Latina, donde el populismo ha sido estudiado desde principios del siglo veinte, complejiza esta noción: líderes populistas han adoptado el multilateralismo, promovido la unidad regional e intentado crear instituciones internacionales. Además, tanto populistas como nopopulistas han resistido instituciones internacionales. Este ensayo problematiza la asunción de una relación necesariamente antagónica entre el populismo y el Derecho internacional, sosteniendo que dicha asunción carece de sustento empírico y está teóricamente subdesarrollada. Latinoamérica es un lugar relevante para problematizar esta noción, debido al rol del Poder Ejecutivo en la conducción de relaciones exteriores2 y la rica historia intelectual en la región respecto del populismo. El ensayo enfatiza la necesidad de desarrollar un marco teórico adecuado para el estudio de la relación entre populismo y Derecho internacional, marco que debiese ser menos eurocéntrico y sesgado normativamente, sin asumir que la resistencia al Derecho internacional siempre carece de mérito. Adicionalmente, debería permitirnos identificar lo distintivamente populista en esta relación y qué aspectos están mediados por las ideologías huésped.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":"116 1","pages":"340 - 345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47769621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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