Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0005
M. Bergmann
This chapter completes the presentation and examination of the piecemeal underdetermination-based case for global skepticism (initiated earlier in the book) by focusing on underdetermination worries about a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning. For each of these three belief sources, the chapter argues for two conclusions that were defended previously in the book with respect to two other belief sources: namely, perception and memory. The first conclusion is that there is an important gap between the evidence for the beliefs in question and the truth of the beliefs based on that evidence. The second conclusion is that we are unable to identify good arguments that can adequately bridge that gap. What these conclusions show, when applied to all five of these belief sources, is that trying to resist the piecemeal underdetermination-based case for global skepticism by relying on anti-skeptical arguments will not work.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0013
M. Bergmann
This chapter considers the skeptical objection to epistemic intuition that is based on experimental philosophy, which aims to use the methods of cognitive science to conduct experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about central philosophical issues. Section 1 carefully lays out this objection, identifying the crucial premises on which it relies. Section 2 considers how strong this objection needs to be if it is to be successful, arguing that stronger objections are needed if the beliefs the objections are intended to undermine are rationally held with a high degree of confidence (as appears to be the case with the beliefs based on epistemic intuition that are targeted by this objection). Section 3 examines the objection from experimental philosophy in detail, noting that each of its crucial premises faces serious challenges, with the result that it is not strong enough to undermine the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s reliance on epistemic intuitions. Section 4 draws together the various argumentative strands in the book and situates the book’s conclusions in a moderate commonsense tradition that avoids the extremes of both dogmatism and radical skepticism.
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