A short proof of Reny (1999)'s equilibrium existence theorem for payoff secure games is provided. At the heart of the proof lies the concept of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed-point theorem, we show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem which covers a number of known games. Reny's theorem follows from it straightforwardly.
{"title":"A Short Proof of Reny's Existence Theorem for Payoff Secure Games","authors":"Pavlo Prokopovych","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1325191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1325191","url":null,"abstract":"A short proof of Reny (1999)'s equilibrium existence theorem for payoff secure games is provided. At the heart of the proof lies the concept of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed-point theorem, we show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem which covers a number of known games. Reny's theorem follows from it straightforwardly.","PeriodicalId":369373,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology eJournal","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131414560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of too much truth-telling (compared to the equilibrium prediction) also holds in the face-to-face setting. A new result is that although many people claim that they are good at lie-detection, few reveal belief in this ability when money is at stake. Correlations between the subjects' characteristics and their behavior and performances in the game are also explored.
{"title":"Face-to-Face Lying: An Experimental Study in Sweden and Japan","authors":"H. Holm, Toshiji Kawagoe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1091315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091315","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of too much truth-telling (compared to the equilibrium prediction) also holds in the face-to-face setting. A new result is that although many people claim that they are good at lie-detection, few reveal belief in this ability when money is at stake. Correlations between the subjects' characteristics and their behavior and performances in the game are also explored.","PeriodicalId":369373,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122197173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-06-11DOI: 10.1111/J.1475-4975.2007.00160.X
K. Ludwig
There has been a movement recently to bring to bear on the conduct of philosophical thought experiments (henceforth “thought experiments”) the empirical techniques of the social sciences, that is, to treat their conduct as in the nature of an anthropological investigation into the application conditions of the concepts of a group of subjects. This is to take a third person, in contrast to the traditional first person, approach to conceptual analysis.This has taken the form of conducting surveys about scenarios used in thought experiments. It has been called “experimental philosophy” by its practitioners and has been applied across a range of fields: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics. The results of these surveys have been used to support conclusions about the application conditions of particular concepts of interest in philosophy. They have also been used to support (and been motivated by) skeptical claims about the traditional approach to conceptual analysis. The
{"title":"The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches","authors":"K. Ludwig","doi":"10.1111/J.1475-4975.2007.00160.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1475-4975.2007.00160.X","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a movement recently to bring to bear on the conduct of philosophical thought experiments (henceforth “thought experiments”) the empirical techniques of the social sciences, that is, to treat their conduct as in the nature of an anthropological investigation into the application conditions of the concepts of a group of subjects. This is to take a third person, in contrast to the traditional first person, approach to conceptual analysis.This has taken the form of conducting surveys about scenarios used in thought experiments. It has been called “experimental philosophy” by its practitioners and has been applied across a range of fields: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics. The results of these surveys have been used to support conclusions about the application conditions of particular concepts of interest in philosophy. They have also been used to support (and been motivated by) skeptical claims about the traditional approach to conceptual analysis. The","PeriodicalId":369373,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology eJournal","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134196548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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