Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1690333
Nick van der Steenhoven
ABSTRACT United Nations Charter Article 51 obliges states to immediately report the use of self-defence to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Besides the wording in Article 51, there are no (codified) rules or guidelines on how states should report or what should be included in the report to the UNSC. Reporting on self-defence is predominantly based on the conduct of UN member states and how these actors interpret their obligations. This article analyses whether there is common conduct that could indicate subsequent practice by parties to the Charter regarding the format of reporting, the notion of immediacy in reporting and the quality of reports submitted to the UNSC. It was found that there is subsequent practice identifiable regarding the format of reporting, that there are reliable indicators on parallel conduct regarding the immediacy of reporting and common conduct when reporting on measures taken in self-defence.
{"title":"Conduct and subsequent practice by states in the application of the requirement to report under UN Charter Article 51","authors":"Nick van der Steenhoven","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1690333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690333","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT United Nations Charter Article 51 obliges states to immediately report the use of self-defence to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Besides the wording in Article 51, there are no (codified) rules or guidelines on how states should report or what should be included in the report to the UNSC. Reporting on self-defence is predominantly based on the conduct of UN member states and how these actors interpret their obligations. This article analyses whether there is common conduct that could indicate subsequent practice by parties to the Charter regarding the format of reporting, the notion of immediacy in reporting and the quality of reports submitted to the UNSC. It was found that there is subsequent practice identifiable regarding the format of reporting, that there are reliable indicators on parallel conduct regarding the immediacy of reporting and common conduct when reporting on measures taken in self-defence.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"242 - 272"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41374329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1690269
Francis Grimal
A recent report noted that ninety-seven per cent of UN member states currently have an official Twitter presence. The report also highlighted the proliferation of Twitter accounts of Heads of State, including those that blur the ‘state’ and ‘personal’ divide. For example, the number of followers of the handle @realDonaldTrump has more than doubled in size since the US President took office in January 2017, while the number of people following the French President’s Twitter account, @EmmanuelMacron, has tripled since his election in May 2017. This editorial provides some initial thoughts on the implications of this increased use of Twitter by states (and, in particular, Heads of State) for the jus ad bellum. Its main focus, in section 1, which takes up the bulk of the editorial, is on the question of whether a tweet by a Head of State could constitute a violation of the prohibition of the threat of force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. In addition, though, section 2 briefly considers other possible ad bellum implications of the rise of Twitter as a means of state-level communication.
{"title":"Twitter and the jus ad bellum: threats of force and other implications","authors":"Francis Grimal","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1690269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690269","url":null,"abstract":"A recent report noted that ninety-seven per cent of UN member states currently have an official Twitter presence. The report also highlighted the proliferation of Twitter accounts of Heads of State, including those that blur the ‘state’ and ‘personal’ divide. For example, the number of followers of the handle @realDonaldTrump has more than doubled in size since the US President took office in January 2017, while the number of people following the French President’s Twitter account, @EmmanuelMacron, has tripled since his election in May 2017. This editorial provides some initial thoughts on the implications of this increased use of Twitter by states (and, in particular, Heads of State) for the jus ad bellum. Its main focus, in section 1, which takes up the bulk of the editorial, is on the question of whether a tweet by a Head of State could constitute a violation of the prohibition of the threat of force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. In addition, though, section 2 briefly considers other possible ad bellum implications of the rise of Twitter as a means of state-level communication.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"183 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690269","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43193855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1680019
P. Butchard
{"title":"Digest of state practice: 1 January–30 June 2019","authors":"P. Butchard","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1680019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1680019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"273 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1680019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44713974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1669323
Brian Drummond
ABSTRACT This article explores multiple ways in which the unlawfulness of a threat, under Article 2(4), can result from the threatened force being unlawful under another body of law. It concludes: (a) deterrence is a threat; (b) a threat is unlawful if use of the threatened force would be unlawful; (c) the only possible exception to the general rule that use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful is an extreme circumstance of self-defence; (d) use of nuclear weapons in a belligerent reprisal would be unlawful; and so (e) two specific aspects of UK policy are unlawful: the refusal to rule out first use, and the possibility of low level, high power use. Possible strategies to hold the UK to account are considered, and paragraphs 47–8 of the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion are dissected in an appendix. Despite the UK focus, the analysis and conclusions are relevant to other states.
{"title":"UK Nuclear deterrence policy: an unlawful threat of force","authors":"Brian Drummond","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1669323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1669323","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores multiple ways in which the unlawfulness of a threat, under Article 2(4), can result from the threatened force being unlawful under another body of law. It concludes: (a) deterrence is a threat; (b) a threat is unlawful if use of the threatened force would be unlawful; (c) the only possible exception to the general rule that use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful is an extreme circumstance of self-defence; (d) use of nuclear weapons in a belligerent reprisal would be unlawful; and so (e) two specific aspects of UK policy are unlawful: the refusal to rule out first use, and the possibility of low level, high power use. Possible strategies to hold the UK to account are considered, and paragraphs 47–8 of the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion are dissected in an appendix. Despite the UK focus, the analysis and conclusions are relevant to other states.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"193 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1669323","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46370953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1691365
G. Melling
Book Review: It is uncontroversial that the international law governing the use of force (jus ad bellum), forms a cornerstone of the international system, and its legal order. The question of the right to resort to war, and the use of force, have been a constant feature of the condition of people, states, and international society. It is certainly a depressing reality that despite efforts to outlaw, abolish, and regulate the use of force in the relations of states, we are apparently little closer to achieving that goal.
书评:无可争议的是，规范武力使用的国际法(jusus ad bellum)构成了国际体系及其法律秩序的基石。诉诸战争和使用武力的权利问题一直是人民、国家和国际社会状况的一个不变特征。这当然是一个令人沮丧的现实，尽管我们努力取缔、废除和规范在国家关系中使用武力，但我们显然离实现这一目标还差得远。
{"title":"The use of force in international law","authors":"G. Melling","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1691365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1691365","url":null,"abstract":"Book Review: It is uncontroversial that the international law governing the use of force (jus ad bellum), forms a cornerstone of the international system, and its legal order. The question of the right to resort to war, and the use of force, have been a constant feature of the condition of people, states, and international society. It is certainly a depressing reality that despite efforts to outlaw, abolish, and regulate the use of force in the relations of states, we are apparently little closer to achieving that goal.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"329 - 337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1691365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43054432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1672932
James A. Green
Anyone who has studied (or even just had a passing interest in) the law on the use of force will have come across the hallowed Caroline incident of 1837. It is this famous nineteenth century frontier raid that is the focus of Craig Forcese’s excellent new book, Destroying the Caroline, which was the 2019 winner of the American Society of International Law’s Certificate of Merit for a preeminent contribution to creative scholarship.
任何研究过（甚至只是对）使用武力的法律的人都会遇到1837年神圣的卡罗琳事件。克雷格·福塞斯（Craig Forcese）的优秀新书《毁灭卡罗琳》（Destroying the Caroline）聚焦于这场19世纪著名的边境突袭，该书因对创造性学术的卓越贡献而于2019年获得美国国际法学会功绩证书。
{"title":"Destroying the Caroline: the frontier raid that reshaped the right to war","authors":"James A. Green","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1672932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1672932","url":null,"abstract":"Anyone who has studied (or even just had a passing interest in) the law on the use of force will have come across the hallowed Caroline incident of 1837. It is this famous nineteenth century frontier raid that is the focus of Craig Forcese’s excellent new book, Destroying the Caroline, which was the 2019 winner of the American Society of International Law’s Certificate of Merit for a preeminent contribution to creative scholarship.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"338 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1672932","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43612103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1690235
James A. Green
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"James A. Green","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1690235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690235","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"181 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690235","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48075618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1621084
Johanna Friman
ABSTRACT Plausibly representing one of the most obscure concepts in the jus ad bellum, ‘breach of the peace’ may potentially serve as an essential component of contemporary international collective security. However, this potential may not be realised as long as its legal parameters remain obscure. The aim of the present article therefore is to conceptually and contextually shed some light on the outer legal boundaries of a ‘breach of the peace’. The deblurring examination contemplates, first, the ‘peace’ that is breached, with the central focus thereafter directed towards a tridimensional examination of the conceptual construction of a ‘breach’ of the peace encompassing ratione temporis, ratione materiae and ratione personae perspectives. The examination is methodologically projected from a clarifying position, drawing on comparative elements from related international legal regimes, primarily international criminal law.
{"title":"Deblurring the concept of a breach of the peace as a component of contemporary international collective security","authors":"Johanna Friman","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1621084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1621084","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Plausibly representing one of the most obscure concepts in the jus ad bellum, ‘breach of the peace’ may potentially serve as an essential component of contemporary international collective security. However, this potential may not be realised as long as its legal parameters remain obscure. The aim of the present article therefore is to conceptually and contextually shed some light on the outer legal boundaries of a ‘breach of the peace’. The deblurring examination contemplates, first, the ‘peace’ that is breached, with the central focus thereafter directed towards a tridimensional examination of the conceptual construction of a ‘breach’ of the peace encompassing ratione temporis, ratione materiae and ratione personae perspectives. The examination is methodologically projected from a clarifying position, drawing on comparative elements from related international legal regimes, primarily international criminal law.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"12 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1621084","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41456753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1612152
I. Wong
ABSTRACT This article analyses the legal framework by which consent may justify a prohibited use of force in the context of two internal conflicts: Russia’s intervention in Crimea in 2014 and the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen since 2015. First, it contends that the valid consent of a legitimate government may constitute a legal justification for a foreign military intervention where it does not interfere with the political independence of the inviting government, or constitutes a ‘counter-intervention’. Secondly, it finds an ostensible absence of authority to consent in both the Crimean and Yemeni conflicts, which implies that the interventions amounted to a prohibited use of force. Thirdly, it discerns from the extensive condemnation of the Russian intervention and the widespread acquiescence to the Saudi-led intervention in state practice and the academic literature a paradoxical interpretation of the legality of the interventions.
{"title":"Authority to consent to the use of force in contemporary international law: the Crimean and Yemeni conflicts","authors":"I. Wong","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1612152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1612152","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyses the legal framework by which consent may justify a prohibited use of force in the context of two internal conflicts: Russia’s intervention in Crimea in 2014 and the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen since 2015. First, it contends that the valid consent of a legitimate government may constitute a legal justification for a foreign military intervention where it does not interfere with the political independence of the inviting government, or constitutes a ‘counter-intervention’. Secondly, it finds an ostensible absence of authority to consent in both the Crimean and Yemeni conflicts, which implies that the interventions amounted to a prohibited use of force. Thirdly, it discerns from the extensive condemnation of the Russian intervention and the widespread acquiescence to the Saudi-led intervention in state practice and the academic literature a paradoxical interpretation of the legality of the interventions.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"52 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1612152","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46079170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2019.1575124
Davis Brown
ABSTRACT Why do states violate jus ad bellum and how do we know? Lack of comprehensive data on armed conflict initiation, as opposed to occurrence, hampers scholarly understanding of this question. Datasets used by political scientists do not measure the critical legal outcome – violation of Article 2(4). In response, this article derives such a variable from the Militarised Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset, at progressively higher thresholds of severity of militarisation. This enables empirical testing for relationships of other political characteristics on low-, mid-, and high-level interstate armed conflict initiation. This article illustrates this variable’s prospective applications by regressing initiation of interstate armed conflict on many other armed conflict contributors grounded in the international relations literature, including regime type, power, wealth, alliances, proximity, trade dependence, unilateralism, and time. Results show which factors are related most consistently to Article 2(4) violations – autocracy, proximity, and recency of past conflict – and which factors are not.
{"title":"Measuring first use of force: methods, results, and implications","authors":"Davis Brown","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2019.1575124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2019.1575124","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Why do states violate jus ad bellum and how do we know? Lack of comprehensive data on armed conflict initiation, as opposed to occurrence, hampers scholarly understanding of this question. Datasets used by political scientists do not measure the critical legal outcome – violation of Article 2(4). In response, this article derives such a variable from the Militarised Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset, at progressively higher thresholds of severity of militarisation. This enables empirical testing for relationships of other political characteristics on low-, mid-, and high-level interstate armed conflict initiation. This article illustrates this variable’s prospective applications by regressing initiation of interstate armed conflict on many other armed conflict contributors grounded in the international relations literature, including regime type, power, wealth, alliances, proximity, trade dependence, unilateralism, and time. Results show which factors are related most consistently to Article 2(4) violations – autocracy, proximity, and recency of past conflict – and which factors are not.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"112 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20531702.2019.1575124","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48522412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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