Pub Date : 2023-04-11DOI: 10.1177/0067205X231166704
Yee-Fui Ng
Numerous recent scandals have surfaced relating to the Australian government allegedly engaging in ‘pork barrelling’, that is, the partisan channelling of grants funding to government electorates, instead of merit-based allocation. Yet the probity of the use of public money is crucial towards preserving public trust in Australian democratic institutions. This article will critically analyse the legal accountability mechanisms for grants funding through public finance legislation, ‘soft law’ such as grants, guidelines and ministerial standards, and the availability of legal redress. It will also examine political accountability mechanisms, including the operation of parliamentary committees, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman. The author argues that although political regulation provides transparency in the government’s use of public funds, it remains ineffective to combat the government’s deeply entrenched incentives to allocate grants in a partisan manner. As such, it is contended that stronger legal accountability in terms of enforceable rules and regulations is required to reform grants regulation towards improving the probity and accountability of the use of public funding.
{"title":"Regulating the Rorts: The Legal Governance of Grants Programs in Australia","authors":"Yee-Fui Ng","doi":"10.1177/0067205X231166704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X231166704","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous recent scandals have surfaced relating to the Australian government allegedly engaging in ‘pork barrelling’, that is, the partisan channelling of grants funding to government electorates, instead of merit-based allocation. Yet the probity of the use of public money is crucial towards preserving public trust in Australian democratic institutions. This article will critically analyse the legal accountability mechanisms for grants funding through public finance legislation, ‘soft law’ such as grants, guidelines and ministerial standards, and the availability of legal redress. It will also examine political accountability mechanisms, including the operation of parliamentary committees, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman. The author argues that although political regulation provides transparency in the government’s use of public funds, it remains ineffective to combat the government’s deeply entrenched incentives to allocate grants in a partisan manner. As such, it is contended that stronger legal accountability in terms of enforceable rules and regulations is required to reform grants regulation towards improving the probity and accountability of the use of public funding.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"205 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41350752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-07DOI: 10.1177/0067205x231166697
Brendan Walker-Munro
In April 2016, then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull confirmed the existence of Australia’s offensive cyber capability. Said to constitute both a coordinating Information Warfare Division inside the Australian Army as well as dedicated cyberoffensive capability inside the Australian Signals Directorate, the unveiling of this capability was a watershed in Australian defence policy. Yet whilst the literature has briefly examined whether Australia’s cyberoffensive capability is congruous with international law, no such analysis under Australia’s domestic laws has been undertaken. This paper seeks to partially address this gap in the research by focusing on whether the Australian Defence Force could legally launch cyberattacks against domestic targets under Commonwealth call-out powers.
{"title":"White Hat, Black Hat, Slouch Hat: Could Australia’s Military Cyber Capability be Deployed Under Commonwealth Call-Out Powers?","authors":"Brendan Walker-Munro","doi":"10.1177/0067205x231166697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205x231166697","url":null,"abstract":"In April 2016, then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull confirmed the existence of Australia’s offensive cyber capability. Said to constitute both a coordinating Information Warfare Division inside the Australian Army as well as dedicated cyberoffensive capability inside the Australian Signals Directorate, the unveiling of this capability was a watershed in Australian defence policy. Yet whilst the literature has briefly examined whether Australia’s cyberoffensive capability is congruous with international law, no such analysis under Australia’s domestic laws has been undertaken. This paper seeks to partially address this gap in the research by focusing on whether the Australian Defence Force could legally launch cyberattacks against domestic targets under Commonwealth call-out powers.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"182 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46205326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-06DOI: 10.1177/0067205X231165872
F. McDonald, S. Duckett, Emma Campbell
Legal and political battles about health policy in the immediate post-war years have cast a long shadow in Australia. The ‘civil conscription’ sub-provision in s 51(xxiiiA) (health and welfare power) of the Australian Constitution is still cited as a major barrier to developing health policy. But long after the High Court moved on from a very restrictive interpretation of Commonwealth powers, policymakers appear to be cautious about testing whether the Commonwealth has power to make laws about medical services to pursue a bold agenda about access, quality, and efficiency of medical care. In this article we will first describe the origin and phrasing of s 51(xxiiiA), the main head of power, then trace the development of the interpretation of the civil conscription sub-provision, and finally discuss whether politically realistic policy options are likely to founder on the shoals of High Court interpretation. We argue that the civil conscription limitation in s 51 (xxiiiA) in the Constitution looms larger as a policy constraint on regulation of health care by the Commonwealth government in the minds of decision-makers, and as a weapon in the hands of stakeholders, than contemporary analysis of it warrants.
{"title":"Commonwealth Power to Improve Access, Quality, and Efficiency of Medical Care: Does section 51 (xxiiiA) of the Constitution Limit Politically Feasible Health Policy Options Today?","authors":"F. McDonald, S. Duckett, Emma Campbell","doi":"10.1177/0067205X231165872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X231165872","url":null,"abstract":"Legal and political battles about health policy in the immediate post-war years have cast a long shadow in Australia. The ‘civil conscription’ sub-provision in s 51(xxiiiA) (health and welfare power) of the Australian Constitution is still cited as a major barrier to developing health policy. But long after the High Court moved on from a very restrictive interpretation of Commonwealth powers, policymakers appear to be cautious about testing whether the Commonwealth has power to make laws about medical services to pursue a bold agenda about access, quality, and efficiency of medical care. In this article we will first describe the origin and phrasing of s 51(xxiiiA), the main head of power, then trace the development of the interpretation of the civil conscription sub-provision, and finally discuss whether politically realistic policy options are likely to founder on the shoals of High Court interpretation. We argue that the civil conscription limitation in s 51 (xxiiiA) in the Constitution looms larger as a policy constraint on regulation of health care by the Commonwealth government in the minds of decision-makers, and as a weapon in the hands of stakeholders, than contemporary analysis of it warrants.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"232 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47740170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-06DOI: 10.1177/0067205x231166158
Georgina Clough
This article examines the consequences of the Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 (Cth) (‘Foreign Relations Act’) for international law. It argues that the arrangements entered into by state, territory and local governments to which the Foreign Relations Act applies can be relevant to international law in three ways. First, they may relate indirectly to Australia’s international legal obligations. Second, they may be a means by which Australian subnational governments claim a role for themselves in governance on global issues. Third, as an exercise of diplomacy, they influence the relations Australia maintains with other nations and the way in which it participates in the international system. As the states and territories in particular become more assertive, including on international issues such as climate change, giving the Commonwealth complete control over such arrangements may impact Australia’s relationship with international law.
{"title":"The Australia’s Foreign Relations Act and Australia’s Relationship with International Law","authors":"Georgina Clough","doi":"10.1177/0067205x231166158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205x231166158","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the consequences of the Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 (Cth) (‘Foreign Relations Act’) for international law. It argues that the arrangements entered into by state, territory and local governments to which the Foreign Relations Act applies can be relevant to international law in three ways. First, they may relate indirectly to Australia’s international legal obligations. Second, they may be a means by which Australian subnational governments claim a role for themselves in governance on global issues. Third, as an exercise of diplomacy, they influence the relations Australia maintains with other nations and the way in which it participates in the international system. As the states and territories in particular become more assertive, including on international issues such as climate change, giving the Commonwealth complete control over such arrangements may impact Australia’s relationship with international law.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"257 - 281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42032758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-20DOI: 10.1177/0067205x221146334
J. Millbank
Each year approximately 60 registered health practitioners in Australia have their registration cancelled for reasons of serious misconduct or, less commonly, impairment or criminal conviction. Cancellation remains in force unless the practitioner successfully brings a later application to be restored to the register. While the decision to deregister takes place in a public tribunal process, with published reasons, throughout most of Australia determinations concerning reinstatement are undertaken by professional Boards in private. This research examines available reinstatement decisions concerning 86 health practitioners to analyse how the health regulatory system in Australia determines questions of public interest and public safety when deciding whether deregistered health practitioners who seek reinstatement are now ‘fit and proper’ to practise their profession again. There is a considerable body of case law on the meaning of fitness to practise for health professionals, and the process by which it can be assessed. However, there is remarkably little legislative content or administrative guidance to structure the reinstatement inquiry, assist applicants in the process or to ensure consistency of decision-making, in particular by drawing attention to broader public protection factors. Reinstatement determinations would be improved through the introduction of structured guidance on how to apply the paramount objective of public protection. The article also suggests that having all reinstatement determinations take place in public with published reasons would improve public understanding of, and confidence in, the reinstatement process.
{"title":"Reinstatement of Previously Deregistered Health Professionals in Australia: Legal Determinations of Risk, Patient Safety, and Public Interest","authors":"J. Millbank","doi":"10.1177/0067205x221146334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205x221146334","url":null,"abstract":"Each year approximately 60 registered health practitioners in Australia have their registration cancelled for reasons of serious misconduct or, less commonly, impairment or criminal conviction. Cancellation remains in force unless the practitioner successfully brings a later application to be restored to the register. While the decision to deregister takes place in a public tribunal process, with published reasons, throughout most of Australia determinations concerning reinstatement are undertaken by professional Boards in private. This research examines available reinstatement decisions concerning 86 health practitioners to analyse how the health regulatory system in Australia determines questions of public interest and public safety when deciding whether deregistered health practitioners who seek reinstatement are now ‘fit and proper’ to practise their profession again. There is a considerable body of case law on the meaning of fitness to practise for health professionals, and the process by which it can be assessed. However, there is remarkably little legislative content or administrative guidance to structure the reinstatement inquiry, assist applicants in the process or to ensure consistency of decision-making, in particular by drawing attention to broader public protection factors. Reinstatement determinations would be improved through the introduction of structured guidance on how to apply the paramount objective of public protection. The article also suggests that having all reinstatement determinations take place in public with published reasons would improve public understanding of, and confidence in, the reinstatement process.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"3 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47307313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-17DOI: 10.1177/0067205X221146330
N. Aroney
The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 and Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Regulation 2013 have established a comprehensive regulatory framework for the charities and not-for-profit sector at a federal level. When making the Act and Regulation the Commonwealth relied upon several heads of legislative power in section 51 of the Constitution, the most important of which is the taxation power. This article develops and assesses three arguments why the relevant provisions of the legislative scheme are not supported by the taxation power. These arguments are, firstly, that the Act and Regulations do not have a sufficient connection to the subject matter of taxation, secondly, that they are not reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate purpose or object that falls within the taxation power and, thirdly, that in combination with the Income Tax Act 1986 and Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, they impose an obligation to pay money in a manner that is so arbitrary that they cannot be characterised as laws with respect to the subject matter of taxation. It is concluded that these three lines of argument provide strong reasons why the Act and Regulations are not supported by the taxation power.
{"title":"Federal Charities Law and the Taxation Power: Three Constitutional Problems","authors":"N. Aroney","doi":"10.1177/0067205X221146330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X221146330","url":null,"abstract":"The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 and Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Regulation 2013 have established a comprehensive regulatory framework for the charities and not-for-profit sector at a federal level. When making the Act and Regulation the Commonwealth relied upon several heads of legislative power in section 51 of the Constitution, the most important of which is the taxation power. This article develops and assesses three arguments why the relevant provisions of the legislative scheme are not supported by the taxation power. These arguments are, firstly, that the Act and Regulations do not have a sufficient connection to the subject matter of taxation, secondly, that they are not reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate purpose or object that falls within the taxation power and, thirdly, that in combination with the Income Tax Act 1986 and Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, they impose an obligation to pay money in a manner that is so arbitrary that they cannot be characterised as laws with respect to the subject matter of taxation. It is concluded that these three lines of argument provide strong reasons why the Act and Regulations are not supported by the taxation power.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"78 - 101"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41750645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-17DOI: 10.1177/0067205X221146333
H. Hobbs
In resolving disputes, the High Court of Australia sometimes has cause to expound upon the relationship between the Australian State and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This article examines overblown and disingenuous New Right criticism directed towards the High Court in the aftermath of judgments deemed favourable to Indigenous Australians. It finds two themes recur in these attacks: that the High Court’s decision is undemocratic, or that the High Court has acted illegitimately. This article demonstrates that such claims are legally baseless. Drawing on quotes from major players in this debate, the article argues further that beneath this criticism lies a deeper angst over the sovereign foundations of Australia; an anxiety that reappears in arguments against contemporary calls for constitutional reform. As Australia nonetheless inches closer towards constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the ferocity of New Right censure suggests that the movement may fear the Australian people do not share their same suspicions.
{"title":"The New Right and Aboriginal Rights in the High Court of Australia","authors":"H. Hobbs","doi":"10.1177/0067205X221146333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X221146333","url":null,"abstract":"In resolving disputes, the High Court of Australia sometimes has cause to expound upon the relationship between the Australian State and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This article examines overblown and disingenuous New Right criticism directed towards the High Court in the aftermath of judgments deemed favourable to Indigenous Australians. It finds two themes recur in these attacks: that the High Court’s decision is undemocratic, or that the High Court has acted illegitimately. This article demonstrates that such claims are legally baseless. Drawing on quotes from major players in this debate, the article argues further that beneath this criticism lies a deeper angst over the sovereign foundations of Australia; an anxiety that reappears in arguments against contemporary calls for constitutional reform. As Australia nonetheless inches closer towards constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the ferocity of New Right censure suggests that the movement may fear the Australian people do not share their same suspicions.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"129 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43908584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-25DOI: 10.1177/0067205X221146332
D. Meagher
This article traces the manner in which the High Court’s recent legality jurisprudence has applied the ‘modern approach’ to interpretation in the context of fundamental rights. It is an approach which has exerted doctrinal pressure on the iconic and once authoritative conception of legality outlined in Coco v The Queen. Relevantly, the Court’s commitment to contextualism has extended to the interpretation of statutes which, on their ordinary meaning, implicate fundamental rights; and the important doctrinal shift which these cases seem to evidence is that the infringement of fundamental rights by necessary implication no longer has to satisfy the stringent — Coco — test. In Coco, the Court had stated that legality — the fundamental rights presumption — ‘may be displaced by an implication if it is necessary to prevent the statutory provisions from becoming inoperative or meaningless.’
{"title":"Fundamental Rights and Necessary Implication","authors":"D. Meagher","doi":"10.1177/0067205X221146332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X221146332","url":null,"abstract":"This article traces the manner in which the High Court’s recent legality jurisprudence has applied the ‘modern approach’ to interpretation in the context of fundamental rights. It is an approach which has exerted doctrinal pressure on the iconic and once authoritative conception of legality outlined in Coco v The Queen. Relevantly, the Court’s commitment to contextualism has extended to the interpretation of statutes which, on their ordinary meaning, implicate fundamental rights; and the important doctrinal shift which these cases seem to evidence is that the infringement of fundamental rights by necessary implication no longer has to satisfy the stringent — Coco — test. In Coco, the Court had stated that legality — the fundamental rights presumption — ‘may be displaced by an implication if it is necessary to prevent the statutory provisions from becoming inoperative or meaningless.’","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"102 - 128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42306980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-24DOI: 10.1177/0067205X221146336
C. Nagy
Three decades ago, in Cole v Whitfield, the High Court of Australia opted for a discrimination-based standard with the argument that s 92 of the Australian Constitution targets solely protectionist measures. This article demonstrates, with the use of comparative law analysis, that, in contrast with this teleology, the High Court has built a lacunose definition of discrimination that is incapable of covering the whole spectrum of protectionist measures. It argues that measures having an asymmetric impact should be considered discriminatory and countenanced only if they are justified by a local legitimate end and are proportionate, even if they rely on distinctions that are not based on out-of-state origin.
{"title":"Can a Protectionist Measure be Non-Discriminatory? Comparative Federal Markets and a Proposal for a Definition of Discrimination Under s 92 of the Australian Constitution","authors":"C. Nagy","doi":"10.1177/0067205X221146336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X221146336","url":null,"abstract":"Three decades ago, in Cole v Whitfield, the High Court of Australia opted for a discrimination-based standard with the argument that s 92 of the Australian Constitution targets solely protectionist measures. This article demonstrates, with the use of comparative law analysis, that, in contrast with this teleology, the High Court has built a lacunose definition of discrimination that is incapable of covering the whole spectrum of protectionist measures. It argues that measures having an asymmetric impact should be considered discriminatory and countenanced only if they are justified by a local legitimate end and are proportionate, even if they rely on distinctions that are not based on out-of-state origin.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"58 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44158985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-24DOI: 10.1177/0067205X221146335
S. Dam
Indian judges retire, but not into inactivity. Many pursue careers in government-appointed roles. Scaffolded around the concept of institutional corruption, this article interrogates the history, law and politics of the retirement careers of judges in India. Three questions take centre stage in this analysis: What types of careers do retired judges pursue? Why do they pursue them? How do judges’ post-retirement ambitions impact their pre-retirement decisions? The cumulative analysis suggests that the Supreme Court of India, not specific judges, benches or decisions, is institutionally corrupt. The system of post-retirement jobs cycles like an economy of influence that is weakening the institution’s effectiveness, especially its capacity for impartial adjudication in matters that involve governments. But the Indian court’s performance and its public reception also reveal unique attributes that can enrich our general understanding of institutional corruption and separate the concept’s essential features from its auxiliary ones.
{"title":"Active After Sunset: The Politics of Judicial Retirements in India*","authors":"S. Dam","doi":"10.1177/0067205X221146335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X221146335","url":null,"abstract":"Indian judges retire, but not into inactivity. Many pursue careers in government-appointed roles. Scaffolded around the concept of institutional corruption, this article interrogates the history, law and politics of the retirement careers of judges in India. Three questions take centre stage in this analysis: What types of careers do retired judges pursue? Why do they pursue them? How do judges’ post-retirement ambitions impact their pre-retirement decisions? The cumulative analysis suggests that the Supreme Court of India, not specific judges, benches or decisions, is institutionally corrupt. The system of post-retirement jobs cycles like an economy of influence that is weakening the institution’s effectiveness, especially its capacity for impartial adjudication in matters that involve governments. But the Indian court’s performance and its public reception also reveal unique attributes that can enrich our general understanding of institutional corruption and separate the concept’s essential features from its auxiliary ones.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"51 1","pages":"31 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47483476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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