Abstract Synthetic biology promises to be one of the most exciting developments in bioengineering. Through synthetic biology, scientists can now recreate the genomes of extinct organisms, modify existing organism to give them functions that they previously never possessed, and eventually create novel organisms entirely. Synthetic biology has attracted the attention of both professional scientists as well as the attention of a growing movement of amateur biologists, a testament to the increasing democratization of previously rarefied science. As a result, while this powerful new technology, along with the increased dissemination of its techniques and methods, may lead to greater influence in the future and to substantial benefits for society, it also raises concerns for biosecurity. Consequently, scientists and policy makers have begun to seriously consider the issues posed by this developing science in the context of a world where such knowledge and technology is becoming widely accessible to the general population. Part one of the paper will provide background on synthetic biology and do-it-yourself biology, briefly describing their nature, prospects, and risks to biosecurity. Part two of the paper will shift the focus from description to evaluation. It will summarize some of the existing policy responses to this issue and legal infrastructure within the United States before arguing for a holistic approach to addressing this issue. Then the focus will be upon three separate areas of possible regulation while noting some of the interconnections between these areas.
{"title":"The Mad (and not so Mad) Scientist Next Door: A Holistic Approach to Addressing Do-it-Yourself Biology","authors":"Jared Burr","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Synthetic biology promises to be one of the most exciting developments in bioengineering. Through synthetic biology, scientists can now recreate the genomes of extinct organisms, modify existing organism to give them functions that they previously never possessed, and eventually create novel organisms entirely. Synthetic biology has attracted the attention of both professional scientists as well as the attention of a growing movement of amateur biologists, a testament to the increasing democratization of previously rarefied science. As a result, while this powerful new technology, along with the increased dissemination of its techniques and methods, may lead to greater influence in the future and to substantial benefits for society, it also raises concerns for biosecurity. Consequently, scientists and policy makers have begun to seriously consider the issues posed by this developing science in the context of a world where such knowledge and technology is becoming widely accessible to the general population. Part one of the paper will provide background on synthetic biology and do-it-yourself biology, briefly describing their nature, prospects, and risks to biosecurity. Part two of the paper will shift the focus from description to evaluation. It will summarize some of the existing policy responses to this issue and legal infrastructure within the United States before arguing for a holistic approach to addressing this issue. Then the focus will be upon three separate areas of possible regulation while noting some of the interconnections between these areas.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128127080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract One of the nation’s most complex investigations in its history stemmed from the 2001 anthrax attack letters. Filled with dead-ends, false leads, and flustered FBI and Postal Inspection officers trying to grapple with intricate scientific details, the Amerithrax investigation caused many to question the efforts of America's forefront investigative entity. The specialized American bioweapons community remained in a constant state of paranoia from late 2001 to 2008, and over 30,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology received a letter indicating the high probability “that one or more of you know” the anthrax killer. Finally, in 2007 the Amerithrax Task Force named Dr. Bruce Ivins, a civilian bioweapons specialist at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), who only a few years before helped the officers sort through the complicated task of studying the weaponized anthrax, as the prime suspect. Investigative efforts ratcheted up in fall of 2007 when a series of warrants were issued to search Dr. Ivins’ home, office, and vehicles.Since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the United States has recognized the importance of a system with laws designed to prohibit unfettered investigations by the leaders of our country. This paper analyzes the search warrants utilized in the Dr. Ivins’ investigation and discusses the Fourth Amendment implications. First, a brief review of the state of America in September 2001 is detailed. Next, the paper discusses the facts of the Amerithrax investigation, including the mishap involving Steven Hatfill. Section III explains some Fourth Amendment search warrant basics before getting to the meat of this analysis: the actual search warrants of the Amerithrax investigation.
美国历史上最复杂的调查之一源于2001年的炭疽攻击信。对Amerithrax的调查充满了死胡同、错误的线索，慌乱的联邦调查局和邮政检查官员试图与复杂的科学细节作斗争，这让许多人质疑美国前沿调查机构的努力。从2001年底到2008年，美国生物武器专业团体一直处于一种偏执的状态，美国微生物学会(American Society for Microbiology)的3万多名成员收到了一封信，信中指出，“你们中有一人或多人知道”炭疽杀手的可能性很大。最后，在2007年，Amerithrax特别工作组将布鲁斯·艾文斯(Bruce Ivins)博士列为头号嫌疑人。他是美国陆军传染病医学研究所(USAMRIID)的一名民用生物武器专家，几年前他还帮助军官们梳理了研究武器化炭疽的复杂任务。2007年秋天，调查力度加大，当局签发了一系列搜查令，搜查艾文斯的家、办公室和车辆。自1791年批准第四修正案以来，美国已经认识到一个旨在禁止我国领导人不受约束地进行调查的法律制度的重要性。本文分析了艾文斯博士调查中使用的搜查令，并讨论了第四修正案的含义。首先，简要回顾2001年9月美国的状况。接下来，本文讨论了美国石油公司调查的事实，包括涉及史蒂芬·哈特菲尔的事故。第三节解释了第四修正案的一些搜查令的基础知识，然后才进入分析的核心:Amerithrax调查的实际搜查令。
{"title":"A Legal Analysis of the Search Warrants of the Amerithrax Investigation","authors":"Courtney Grafft","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the nation’s most complex investigations in its history stemmed from the 2001 anthrax attack letters. Filled with dead-ends, false leads, and flustered FBI and Postal Inspection officers trying to grapple with intricate scientific details, the Amerithrax investigation caused many to question the efforts of America's forefront investigative entity. The specialized American bioweapons community remained in a constant state of paranoia from late 2001 to 2008, and over 30,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology received a letter indicating the high probability “that one or more of you know” the anthrax killer. Finally, in 2007 the Amerithrax Task Force named Dr. Bruce Ivins, a civilian bioweapons specialist at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), who only a few years before helped the officers sort through the complicated task of studying the weaponized anthrax, as the prime suspect. Investigative efforts ratcheted up in fall of 2007 when a series of warrants were issued to search Dr. Ivins’ home, office, and vehicles.Since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the United States has recognized the importance of a system with laws designed to prohibit unfettered investigations by the leaders of our country. This paper analyzes the search warrants utilized in the Dr. Ivins’ investigation and discusses the Fourth Amendment implications. First, a brief review of the state of America in September 2001 is detailed. Next, the paper discusses the facts of the Amerithrax investigation, including the mishap involving Steven Hatfill. Section III explains some Fourth Amendment search warrant basics before getting to the meat of this analysis: the actual search warrants of the Amerithrax investigation.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"316 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122783405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article seeks to answer the question: What would have changed, had the World Health Organization spearheaded the investigation of the Yellow Rain Incident instead of the U.S. State Department? This article will begin with a brief discussion of the Yellow Rain Incident. It will then describe the role and function of the World Health Organization. Next, it will begin analyzing ways in which the World Health Organization could have participated in the investigation of the Yellow Rain Incident. This discussion will also analyze the level at which the World Health Organization could participate in an investigation had the Yellow Rain Incident happened today. Finally, the discussion will return to the original question and attempt to offer an answer after having considered all of the facts and data.
{"title":"WHO's Got Yellow Rain: An Analysis of the Yellow Rain Incident and the Possible Involvement of the World Health Organization","authors":"Zack Allen","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article seeks to answer the question: What would have changed, had the World Health Organization spearheaded the investigation of the Yellow Rain Incident instead of the U.S. State Department? This article will begin with a brief discussion of the Yellow Rain Incident. It will then describe the role and function of the World Health Organization. Next, it will begin analyzing ways in which the World Health Organization could have participated in the investigation of the Yellow Rain Incident. This discussion will also analyze the level at which the World Health Organization could participate in an investigation had the Yellow Rain Incident happened today. Finally, the discussion will return to the original question and attempt to offer an answer after having considered all of the facts and data.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115081500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The majority of the bioterrorism articles and reports written since the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States have focused on the threat of biological weapons or biological agents directed towards human targets. Although this threat should not be diminished, it is only one aspect of the human environment that is susceptible to attack. Effective attacks could be mounted against the food chain outside the United States on imported food bound for the United States. These potential attacks bear the risk of going undetected until individuals or animals consume tainted products. This article focuses on the role that regulations play in protecting the food chain from these international attacks, and addresses some of the complications that arise from the current legal framework.
{"title":"The Role of Regulations in Minimizing the Bioterrorism Threat to Food Imports","authors":"B. Tate","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The majority of the bioterrorism articles and reports written since the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States have focused on the threat of biological weapons or biological agents directed towards human targets. Although this threat should not be diminished, it is only one aspect of the human environment that is susceptible to attack. Effective attacks could be mounted against the food chain outside the United States on imported food bound for the United States. These potential attacks bear the risk of going undetected until individuals or animals consume tainted products. This article focuses on the role that regulations play in protecting the food chain from these international attacks, and addresses some of the complications that arise from the current legal framework.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124552890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Biological warfare has been used longer than most conventional weapons, yet international and domestic response protocol and regulations designed to effectively manage, investigate, and prosecute biocrimes have only recently been implemented. Even with such protocol and regulations, significant difficulties arise in the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. This article will identify and describe many of these challenges, beginning with the scope of biocrimes, which can generally be defined as a malevolent use of pathogens or toxins to harm others. Other challenges surrounding the investigation of biocrimes which will be addressed within this article include: identifying what biological agent caused an illness or disease outbreak; characterizing the event as a deliberate attack or a naturally occurring outbreak; and balancing an infected person’s civil liberties with conducting a thorough and accurate investigation. The final significant challenge of investigation and prosecuting biocrimes is the extremely high cost of mistakes. Ultimately, this article recommends ways to remove some the challenges to investigating and prosecuting biocrimes through greater information sharing and standardized investigative and prosecutorial training.
{"title":"Duties and Difficulties of Investigating and Prosecuting Biocrimes","authors":"Lisa M. Danley","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Biological warfare has been used longer than most conventional weapons, yet international and domestic response protocol and regulations designed to effectively manage, investigate, and prosecute biocrimes have only recently been implemented. Even with such protocol and regulations, significant difficulties arise in the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. This article will identify and describe many of these challenges, beginning with the scope of biocrimes, which can generally be defined as a malevolent use of pathogens or toxins to harm others. Other challenges surrounding the investigation of biocrimes which will be addressed within this article include: identifying what biological agent caused an illness or disease outbreak; characterizing the event as a deliberate attack or a naturally occurring outbreak; and balancing an infected person’s civil liberties with conducting a thorough and accurate investigation. The final significant challenge of investigation and prosecuting biocrimes is the extremely high cost of mistakes. Ultimately, this article recommends ways to remove some the challenges to investigating and prosecuting biocrimes through greater information sharing and standardized investigative and prosecutorial training.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"493 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116534531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Identifying and assessing biological weapons (“BW”) programs has been a fatal flaw in the United States defense posture since the Cold War. From the time when the Berlin Wall was torn down and the technology used to build BW proliferated worldwide, the BW threat has become more immediate, however the ability to identify hostile BW programs and assess their capabilities has received little attention. This paper seeks to identify ways to leverage information that might prevent a BW attack on the United States. It begins by looking at historical trends in the failure to assess, continues with a brief analysis of the intelligence collection cycle, and then looks to tailor the cycle to meet this unique threat.
{"title":"BioIntel: Leveraging Information to Prevent Biological Weapons Attacks","authors":"Jeff Mustin","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1020","url":null,"abstract":"Identifying and assessing biological weapons (“BW”) programs has been a fatal flaw in the United States defense posture since the Cold War. From the time when the Berlin Wall was torn down and the technology used to build BW proliferated worldwide, the BW threat has become more immediate, however the ability to identify hostile BW programs and assess their capabilities has received little attention. This paper seeks to identify ways to leverage information that might prevent a BW attack on the United States. It begins by looking at historical trends in the failure to assess, continues with a brief analysis of the intelligence collection cycle, and then looks to tailor the cycle to meet this unique threat.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"333 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115978780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed in 1972, is the express sense of 162 nations that as a world community, we agree to the end of the use of biological weapons by state parties. However, the increasing numbers of biological, pharmaceutical and public health facilities, coupled with the biotechnology revolution in the latter part of the 20th century, made the development of preventative code of conduct a priority. Biosafety and biosecurity codes of conduct became a topic for consideration by the BTWC in 2005. To develop this new focus, the BTWC conference held a series of expert meetings culminating with the 2011 Review Conference.Codes of conduct encourage a community approach to formulate acceptable, effective, and reasonably related principles in order to achieve its goals. In order to achieve a collective definition of the priorities or impediments for a biosecurity code of conduct among the representatives of the States Parties, a survey was designed. The survey instrument was designed to be answered during one of the days of the regular intersessional Meetings of Experts of the BTWC on August 27, 2009. This article provides a review and assessment of results of this survey.
{"title":"A Survey of Priorities and Impediments for a Biosecurity Code of Conduct as a Confidence Building Measure for the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1038","url":null,"abstract":"The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed in 1972, is the express sense of 162 nations that as a world community, we agree to the end of the use of biological weapons by state parties. However, the increasing numbers of biological, pharmaceutical and public health facilities, coupled with the biotechnology revolution in the latter part of the 20th century, made the development of preventative code of conduct a priority. Biosafety and biosecurity codes of conduct became a topic for consideration by the BTWC in 2005. To develop this new focus, the BTWC conference held a series of expert meetings culminating with the 2011 Review Conference.Codes of conduct encourage a community approach to formulate acceptable, effective, and reasonably related principles in order to achieve its goals. In order to achieve a collective definition of the priorities or impediments for a biosecurity code of conduct among the representatives of the States Parties, a survey was designed. The survey instrument was designed to be answered during one of the days of the regular intersessional Meetings of Experts of the BTWC on August 27, 2009. This article provides a review and assessment of results of this survey.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131381901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian government has been involved in the development and weaponization of biological agents for offensive purposes. In 1972 the Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banning the use, development, and possession of offensive biological weapons. But soon the world learned that the Soviets continued developing biological weapons in violation of the BWC. There are still many questions concerning whether Russia continues to dishonor its obligations under the BWC. This paper uses Russia as a case study to show that something needs to be done to ensure all BWC subscribing nations’ compliance with the BWC and then proposes a combination of measures aimed at improving international compliance.
{"title":"Cold Cooperation: Biodevelopment and The Legal Landscape","authors":"Colby Rideout","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1016","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian government has been involved in the development and weaponization of biological agents for offensive purposes. In 1972 the Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banning the use, development, and possession of offensive biological weapons. But soon the world learned that the Soviets continued developing biological weapons in violation of the BWC. There are still many questions concerning whether Russia continues to dishonor its obligations under the BWC. This paper uses Russia as a case study to show that something needs to be done to ensure all BWC subscribing nations’ compliance with the BWC and then proposes a combination of measures aimed at improving international compliance.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127419426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article will focus on the Plague as a biological weapon to be used in a bioterrorism attack. Two different hypotheticals will be discussed in Part II regarding bioterrorism threats at airports in both the United States and France. Emerging technologies in biological warfare detection are discussed in Part III. United States search and seizure law will be discussed in Part IV, while French search and seizure law will be detailed in Part V. Part VI of this Article will analyze the differences between both country’s law enforcement agents and their ability to combat bioterrorism threats in their respective countries. Finally, this Article will discuss which country is better prepared to face a potential bioterrorism attack through its airport security procedures, anti-terrorism measures, biosecurity laws, and search and seizure laws and limitations.
{"title":"International Bioterrorism Search and Seizure Issues: A Comparative Analysis of American and French Search and Seizure Law as it Relates to the Global War on Terror","authors":"C. Jeansonne","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1014","url":null,"abstract":"This Article will focus on the Plague as a biological weapon to be used in a bioterrorism attack. Two different hypotheticals will be discussed in Part II regarding bioterrorism threats at airports in both the United States and France. Emerging technologies in biological warfare detection are discussed in Part III. United States search and seizure law will be discussed in Part IV, while French search and seizure law will be detailed in Part V. Part VI of this Article will analyze the differences between both country’s law enforcement agents and their ability to combat bioterrorism threats in their respective countries. Finally, this Article will discuss which country is better prepared to face a potential bioterrorism attack through its airport security procedures, anti-terrorism measures, biosecurity laws, and search and seizure laws and limitations.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"236 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116114736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper will consider a proposal for a new type of governmental agency to counter the threat of international public health concerns. Public health has increasingly become an international concern as a national security issue regardless of whether it involves an intentional release of a disease. September 11th and the Anthrax letters woke people up to the threat of bioterrorism. In addition, SARS, H1N1, and the Andrew Speaker incident have served to remind us that the threat of fatal disease occurs naturally and does not need to be turned into a weapon before it is a legitimate threat. The natural question that one must raise is whether existing government agencies are sufficiently equipped and prepared to deal with such challenges. The hypothetical government agency discussed in this paper will is one that combines aspects of a public health agency along with that of an intelligence organization. To begin the analysis of such a hypothetical agency, one must first consider where the world of public health intersects with espionage and law enforcement. Next, this paper will discuss the some of the government entities charged separately with different aspects of these duties. Finally, this paper will consider some of the legal limits of such a new agency.
{"title":"International Health and Intelligence Gathering: One in the Same or Rival Factions?","authors":"Jo-Anne Shelton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will consider a proposal for a new type of governmental agency to counter the threat of international public health concerns. Public health has increasingly become an international concern as a national security issue regardless of whether it involves an intentional release of a disease. September 11th and the Anthrax letters woke people up to the threat of bioterrorism. In addition, SARS, H1N1, and the Andrew Speaker incident have served to remind us that the threat of fatal disease occurs naturally and does not need to be turned into a weapon before it is a legitimate threat. The natural question that one must raise is whether existing government agencies are sufficiently equipped and prepared to deal with such challenges. The hypothetical government agency discussed in this paper will is one that combines aspects of a public health agency along with that of an intelligence organization. To begin the analysis of such a hypothetical agency, one must first consider where the world of public health intersects with espionage and law enforcement. Next, this paper will discuss the some of the government entities charged separately with different aspects of these duties. Finally, this paper will consider some of the legal limits of such a new agency.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134126372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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