This paper will focus on the potential threats to nations’ public water supplies and what actions the United States and the European Union have taken to reduce their vulnerability to those threats. The dangers, vulnerabilities, and regulations analyzed will be primarily those that pertain to the contamination of water supplies by biological agents. Water is crucial to public health and human survival. A nation’s water supply structure is one of the primary structures on which its overall prosperity is contingent. A country must not only have the means to supply water to its citizens for consumption, but also to support agriculture and industry. Over the past decade, many countries have determined that an attack on their water supply is not only likely, but, if accomplished, would have detrimental consequences. As a result, nations have begun to implement procedures for preventing biological attacks to their public water supply, detecting attacks, and responding to biological attacks.
{"title":"Public Water Supplies in the United States and the European Union: International Security Procedures and Vulnerabilities","authors":"Benjamin Palisano","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1023","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will focus on the potential threats to nations’ public water supplies and what actions the United States and the European Union have taken to reduce their vulnerability to those threats. The dangers, vulnerabilities, and regulations analyzed will be primarily those that pertain to the contamination of water supplies by biological agents. Water is crucial to public health and human survival. A nation’s water supply structure is one of the primary structures on which its overall prosperity is contingent. A country must not only have the means to supply water to its citizens for consumption, but also to support agriculture and industry. Over the past decade, many countries have determined that an attack on their water supply is not only likely, but, if accomplished, would have detrimental consequences. As a result, nations have begun to implement procedures for preventing biological attacks to their public water supply, detecting attacks, and responding to biological attacks.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129316585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The perceived threat of biological weapons and biological warfare is growing. The increase in terrorist activity, coupled with the ease of development of biological weapons, is one of the main driving factors of this shift. Several factors support that idea that a deliberate contamination could potentially produce far more devastation than a natural outbreak. This paper analyzes part of the current structure of international food regulation to determine its susceptibility to a deliberate contamination. The analysis focuses on the affects food regulation organizations have on the ability of members to create and implement a security measure to address the threat of deliberate contamination. I have focused on two organizations: the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade Organization, specifically the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Sections 2 and 3 of this paper provide an overview of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures under the World Trade Organization. Section 4 lays out the hypothetical scenario in which we will analyze the issues throughout the paper. Sections 5 and 6 are the analysis of the issues that affect susceptibility to a deliberate contamination.
{"title":"International Food Regulations: Susceptibility to Deliberate Contamination","authors":"Bradley Anderle","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1018","url":null,"abstract":"The perceived threat of biological weapons and biological warfare is growing. The increase in terrorist activity, coupled with the ease of development of biological weapons, is one of the main driving factors of this shift. Several factors support that idea that a deliberate contamination could potentially produce far more devastation than a natural outbreak. This paper analyzes part of the current structure of international food regulation to determine its susceptibility to a deliberate contamination. The analysis focuses on the affects food regulation organizations have on the ability of members to create and implement a security measure to address the threat of deliberate contamination. I have focused on two organizations: the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade Organization, specifically the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Sections 2 and 3 of this paper provide an overview of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures under the World Trade Organization. Section 4 lays out the hypothetical scenario in which we will analyze the issues throughout the paper. Sections 5 and 6 are the analysis of the issues that affect susceptibility to a deliberate contamination.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"83 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126073244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As it is currently structured, Afghanistans biosecurity framework is weak and offers little to no protection to US troops against the threat of either infectious disease outbreaks or a biological weapons attack by terrorists. If fact, the only legitimate biosecurity practice of the Afghanistan government is to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Such responses are debilitated by a devastated infrastructure, harsh and often times impassable landscape, and non-compliance by Afghan citizens.5 As such, US troops (and, indeed, Afghan citizens) are left susceptible to these endemic diseases to a degree beyond their own control. I believe an alternative biosecurity framework could be implemented that would alleviate this threat.6 Because Afghanistan remains a decentralized and tribal society, the crux of this proposal is that biosecurity measures are to be reallocated to the local, tribal level. I will further expound in greater detail on the reasons for this proposal in section four below.
{"title":"Endemic Disease in Afghanistan: How an Improved Biosecurity Framework Could Alleviate the Threat to U.S. Troops","authors":"Andrew Hefferly","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1021","url":null,"abstract":"As it is currently structured, Afghanistans biosecurity framework is weak and offers little to no protection to US troops against the threat of either infectious disease outbreaks or a biological weapons attack by terrorists. If fact, the only legitimate biosecurity practice of the Afghanistan government is to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Such responses are debilitated by a devastated infrastructure, harsh and often times impassable landscape, and non-compliance by Afghan citizens.5 As such, US troops (and, indeed, Afghan citizens) are left susceptible to these endemic diseases to a degree beyond their own control. I believe an alternative biosecurity framework could be implemented that would alleviate this threat.6 Because Afghanistan remains a decentralized and tribal society, the crux of this proposal is that biosecurity measures are to be reallocated to the local, tribal level. I will further expound in greater detail on the reasons for this proposal in section four below.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123012127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In January 2007, Andrew Speaker (Speaker) underwent a chest X-ray and CT scan, which revealed an abnormality in his lungs. However, tests results indicated that he did not have tuberculosis (TB). In March 2007, Fulton County officials informed Andrew Speaker that he was diagnosed with a form of non-infectious form of tuberculosis. He was prescribed a regimen of first-line anti-TB drugs. Fulton County officials confirmed the positive TB result, and further tests were ordered. These tests indicated that Speaker had MDR-TB. Fulton County officials told Speaker not to travel abroad for his upcoming wedding in Europe; however, he ignored them. Unbeknownst to any health official, Speaker departed Atlanta for Europe on May 12, 2007. Two weeks later, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) informed him that his diagnosis had changed and that he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis named XDR-TB. Speaker was in Rome at the time. CDC officials directed him to turn himself into Italian authorities for isolation and asked that he not return home on commercial airlines. Speaker was even placed on a no fly list by the CDC. Again, Speaker ignored CDC officials and returned to the United States via Canada. From Prague, Speaker flew back to Montreal on two commercial aircrafts, and on May 25, 2007, Speaker entered the United States from Canada by car. Despite being aware of the border alert, the border guard allowed Speaker into the United States. Once in the United States, CDC officials served Speaker with an isolation order and hospitalized him at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. CDC officials placed him in a secure part of the hospital, where he underwent a medical evaluation to determine the status of his TB. Speaker was then allowed to return to Atlanta, where he faced intense media scrutiny. He then was transferred to the National Jewish Medical Center in Denver for further treatment of his XDR-TB. Eventually, however, officials downgraded his diagnosis to MDR-TB as they had originally. Speaker had surgery to remove the lung infected with MDR-TB at the end of July, and he was declared non-contagious.Clearly, Speaker sparked significant interest in public health on both the national and international levels. Speakers initial disregard for United States authority created an opportunity for criticism of local, state, and federal public health laws, while Speakers subsequent disregard of authorities while abroad allowed for questioning of international public health law and in particular, the effectiveness of the International Health Regulations. This overview explains certain areas of national and international public health law, and Speakers impact on these areas.
{"title":"Quarantine Powers, Biodefense, and Andrew Speaker","authors":"Brad Kvinta","doi":"10.2202/2154-3186.1002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-3186.1002","url":null,"abstract":"In January 2007, Andrew Speaker (Speaker) underwent a chest X-ray and CT scan, which revealed an abnormality in his lungs. However, tests results indicated that he did not have tuberculosis (TB). In March 2007, Fulton County officials informed Andrew Speaker that he was diagnosed with a form of non-infectious form of tuberculosis. He was prescribed a regimen of first-line anti-TB drugs. Fulton County officials confirmed the positive TB result, and further tests were ordered. These tests indicated that Speaker had MDR-TB. Fulton County officials told Speaker not to travel abroad for his upcoming wedding in Europe; however, he ignored them. Unbeknownst to any health official, Speaker departed Atlanta for Europe on May 12, 2007. Two weeks later, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) informed him that his diagnosis had changed and that he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis named XDR-TB. Speaker was in Rome at the time. CDC officials directed him to turn himself into Italian authorities for isolation and asked that he not return home on commercial airlines. Speaker was even placed on a no fly list by the CDC. Again, Speaker ignored CDC officials and returned to the United States via Canada. From Prague, Speaker flew back to Montreal on two commercial aircrafts, and on May 25, 2007, Speaker entered the United States from Canada by car. Despite being aware of the border alert, the border guard allowed Speaker into the United States. Once in the United States, CDC officials served Speaker with an isolation order and hospitalized him at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. CDC officials placed him in a secure part of the hospital, where he underwent a medical evaluation to determine the status of his TB. Speaker was then allowed to return to Atlanta, where he faced intense media scrutiny. He then was transferred to the National Jewish Medical Center in Denver for further treatment of his XDR-TB. Eventually, however, officials downgraded his diagnosis to MDR-TB as they had originally. Speaker had surgery to remove the lung infected with MDR-TB at the end of July, and he was declared non-contagious.Clearly, Speaker sparked significant interest in public health on both the national and international levels. Speakers initial disregard for United States authority created an opportunity for criticism of local, state, and federal public health laws, while Speakers subsequent disregard of authorities while abroad allowed for questioning of international public health law and in particular, the effectiveness of the International Health Regulations. This overview explains certain areas of national and international public health law, and Speakers impact on these areas.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129939702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In late 1949, vulnerability tests with simulants were started in response to the Report on Special [Biological Warfare (BW)] Operations which pointed out the U.S. susceptibility to [biological warfare] BW attack. The army considered these tests to be a necessary as a part of the research arm of the biological warfare program. This paper provides an overview and legal perspective regarding historical population testing in the United States.
{"title":"The Unknowing Volunteers: Population Testing in the United States","authors":"Kate J. DuBois","doi":"10.2202/2154-3186.1004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-3186.1004","url":null,"abstract":"In late 1949, vulnerability tests with simulants were started in response to the Report on Special [Biological Warfare (BW)] Operations which pointed out the U.S. susceptibility to [biological warfare] BW attack. The army considered these tests to be a necessary as a part of the research arm of the biological warfare program. This paper provides an overview and legal perspective regarding historical population testing in the United States.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126555214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A governments primary duty is to protect its citizens. While there are many forms and means of protection, the health and safety of the citizens are two of the fundamental protections that Americans expect. Typically, vaccines have been used to protect the public health, and vaccines are considered one of the greatest accomplishments of the twentieth century. However, vaccines can also be used as a safety measure; the Smallpox vaccination program is an example of how a vaccine could be used to protect the public in the event of a bioterrorism attack. As with most things, there is a cost associated with vaccines; in order to address such costs, the government has created and implemented three vaccine liability and compensation plans: the National Swine Flu Immunization Program, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, and the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act. The government has also implemented a plan to compensate the victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks: the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. Although only the Victim Compensation Fund directly responded to a terrorist attack, all of these programs were meant to provide for the health and safety of American citizens. Of these four programs, only the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act is still operating. The remaining three have all ended, due to either problems associated with the programs or the expiration of the program. This paper will address each of the four programs in chronological order. Starting with the National Swine Flu Immunization Program, moving to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, followed by the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, and finally to the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Act. The purpose of this paper is to educate the reader about these programs, to present the positive and negative aspects of them, and to explain why some were failures and some were successes.
{"title":"From Swine Flu to Smallpox: Government Compensation Programs for Vaccines and Terrorism","authors":"J. Thomas","doi":"10.2202/2154-3186.1005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-3186.1005","url":null,"abstract":"A governments primary duty is to protect its citizens. While there are many forms and means of protection, the health and safety of the citizens are two of the fundamental protections that Americans expect. Typically, vaccines have been used to protect the public health, and vaccines are considered one of the greatest accomplishments of the twentieth century. However, vaccines can also be used as a safety measure; the Smallpox vaccination program is an example of how a vaccine could be used to protect the public in the event of a bioterrorism attack. As with most things, there is a cost associated with vaccines; in order to address such costs, the government has created and implemented three vaccine liability and compensation plans: the National Swine Flu Immunization Program, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, and the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act. The government has also implemented a plan to compensate the victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks: the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. Although only the Victim Compensation Fund directly responded to a terrorist attack, all of these programs were meant to provide for the health and safety of American citizens. Of these four programs, only the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act is still operating. The remaining three have all ended, due to either problems associated with the programs or the expiration of the program. This paper will address each of the four programs in chronological order. Starting with the National Swine Flu Immunization Program, moving to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, followed by the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, and finally to the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Act. The purpose of this paper is to educate the reader about these programs, to present the positive and negative aspects of them, and to explain why some were failures and some were successes.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116003476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The failed governmental response to Hurricane Katrina revealed that when it comes to catastrophic incidents, the United States lacks a defined command structure and adequate pre-disaster planning. This article focuses on the interplay between local, state, and federal governments when preparing for and responding to public health emergencies. Hurricane Katrina is an effective case study for this analysis because it illustrates where governmental powers succeed and where they fail. Also, the evolution of disaster preparation on a state and national level is demarcated by Katrina: one can better understand the strengths and flaws of the system when it is compared to the system pre-Katrina. The purpose of this overview is to discuss the legal issues and complication that arise in the face of a public health emergency. It is important to understand what went wrong so that we can learn how to respond to a future disaster.
{"title":"Law in Crisis: A Look at Governmental Powers in the Face of a Public Health Disaster","authors":"B. Gaines","doi":"10.2202/2154-3186.1000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-3186.1000","url":null,"abstract":"The failed governmental response to Hurricane Katrina revealed that when it comes to catastrophic incidents, the United States lacks a defined command structure and adequate pre-disaster planning. This article focuses on the interplay between local, state, and federal governments when preparing for and responding to public health emergencies. Hurricane Katrina is an effective case study for this analysis because it illustrates where governmental powers succeed and where they fail. Also, the evolution of disaster preparation on a state and national level is demarcated by Katrina: one can better understand the strengths and flaws of the system when it is compared to the system pre-Katrina. The purpose of this overview is to discuss the legal issues and complication that arise in the face of a public health emergency. It is important to understand what went wrong so that we can learn how to respond to a future disaster.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":" 40","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120832547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the application of the Bioterrorism Act through the regulations set by the FDA and looks at one of the numerous potential foods that could be utilized as a host for a bioterrorism agent.
{"title":"\"Now Serving 300 Million\": How the United States Government Plans to Stop Terrorists from Using U.S. Ports and Imported Food as Instruments of Terror","authors":"C. Gardner","doi":"10.2202/2154-3186.1001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-3186.1001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the application of the Bioterrorism Act through the regulations set by the FDA and looks at one of the numerous potential foods that could be utilized as a host for a bioterrorism agent.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124090380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduction and welcome to the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law
欢迎来到《生物安全、生物安全和生物防御法》杂志
{"title":"Introduction: The Launch of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.2202/2154-3186.1008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-3186.1008","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction and welcome to the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116065644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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