The World Health Organization (WHO) is the premier global organization to monitor and protect global health, while the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) functions as an international nucleus for assistance in crime prevention and detection. In the event of a deliberate act of bioterrorism, the inevitable question is whether or not a jurisdictional “tug of war” would occur between WHO and Interpol. The following paper addresses the power, initiatives, and protocol regarding bioterrorism of both Interpol and WHO, recent collaborations between the two organizations, and a jurisdictional analysis of what may occur when the two organization work together in the aftermath of an act of bioterrorism.
{"title":"Tug of War? A Jurisdictional Analysis of WHO and Interpol","authors":"L. S. Lawrence","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1009","url":null,"abstract":"The World Health Organization (WHO) is the premier global organization to monitor and protect global health, while the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) functions as an international nucleus for assistance in crime prevention and detection. In the event of a deliberate act of bioterrorism, the inevitable question is whether or not a jurisdictional “tug of war” would occur between WHO and Interpol. The following paper addresses the power, initiatives, and protocol regarding bioterrorism of both Interpol and WHO, recent collaborations between the two organizations, and a jurisdictional analysis of what may occur when the two organization work together in the aftermath of an act of bioterrorism.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123435131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The American whistleblower protection scheme as applied to whistleblowers in the laboratory context is a complex patchwork of federal, state, and local laws. Substantial differences in whistleblower protection for laboratory employee whistleblowers depend on a number of factors, including whether the laboratory employee whistleblowers work for public or private institutions and the location of the whistleblower. This document provides a basic summary of the American whistleblower protection scheme applicable to workers employed in laboratories in the United States, with a focus on biological laboratories, and those working with select agents, which are highly infectious agents that warrant special regulations for public safety and national security reasons.
{"title":"Whistleblower and Liability Protections for Scientific Laboratory Employees","authors":"J. Gonzalez, V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The American whistleblower protection scheme as applied to whistleblowers in the laboratory context is a complex patchwork of federal, state, and local laws. Substantial differences in whistleblower protection for laboratory employee whistleblowers depend on a number of factors, including whether the laboratory employee whistleblowers work for public or private institutions and the location of the whistleblower. This document provides a basic summary of the American whistleblower protection scheme applicable to workers employed in laboratories in the United States, with a focus on biological laboratories, and those working with select agents, which are highly infectious agents that warrant special regulations for public safety and national security reasons.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128268051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Despite the attacks of September 11th and other subsequent terrorist attacks, the world community, as a whole, seemingly fails to comprehend the high risk of a biological health incident. Not only can an infectious disease cause significantly more damage than any number of physical terrorist attacks combined, but the relative ease with which an outbreak can occur is frightening. Such biological health threats are compounded by the possibility that such outbreaks may result from the lack of malicious intent. Thus, the question becomes more of a matter of when, not if, a major outbreak will occur. The global population needs to be aware of the imminent threat that a biological outbreak poses, especially during international travel. Because of the imminent nature of a likely biological disaster, countries need to be well prepared to handle such situations. History has shown that even the most developed and technologically advanced countries have failed at controlling extreme biological situations. The increasing charge of international flight travel further magnifies the fragile nature of global health. A small incident with a single patient can snowball quickly into a world-wide pandemic, well before anyone is even aware of a problem. As a result, countries have a vital interest in regulating international flight patterns and follow various rules and regulations in order to promote safe and efficient air travel. This paper examines the different legal issues and authorities that would come into play and then provides recommendations to address biologically threatening situations.
{"title":"Who has Jurisdiction of The Air During an International Health Crisis?","authors":"L. Sierra","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite the attacks of September 11th and other subsequent terrorist attacks, the world community, as a whole, seemingly fails to comprehend the high risk of a biological health incident. Not only can an infectious disease cause significantly more damage than any number of physical terrorist attacks combined, but the relative ease with which an outbreak can occur is frightening. Such biological health threats are compounded by the possibility that such outbreaks may result from the lack of malicious intent. Thus, the question becomes more of a matter of when, not if, a major outbreak will occur. The global population needs to be aware of the imminent threat that a biological outbreak poses, especially during international travel. Because of the imminent nature of a likely biological disaster, countries need to be well prepared to handle such situations. History has shown that even the most developed and technologically advanced countries have failed at controlling extreme biological situations. The increasing charge of international flight travel further magnifies the fragile nature of global health. A small incident with a single patient can snowball quickly into a world-wide pandemic, well before anyone is even aware of a problem. As a result, countries have a vital interest in regulating international flight patterns and follow various rules and regulations in order to promote safe and efficient air travel. This paper examines the different legal issues and authorities that would come into play and then provides recommendations to address biologically threatening situations.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125601581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The purpose of this document is to provide an introduction and overview regarding the substantive materials included in Volume 3 of the Journal for Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume raises new and important legal issues within the field of biosecurity, biosafety and biodefense law, both from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective.
{"title":"Introduction: Volume 3 of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this document is to provide an introduction and overview regarding the substantive materials included in Volume 3 of the Journal for Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume raises new and important legal issues within the field of biosecurity, biosafety and biodefense law, both from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132295918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The purpose of this Paper is to analyze the question of whether the Department of Health and Human Services should impose greater regulations restricting individuals from donating blood for transfusions in order to prevent transmission of diseases which blood donors may have unknowingly acquired abroad. Discussion of this question requires an analysis of: (1) what types of diseases can be transmitted via blood transfusion; (2) what tests are conducted on donated blood; (3) what is the balance between the desperate need for donated blood and the necessary precautions to be taken; and (4) what impact would regulations have on an individual’s willingness to donate.This Paper proposes implementing regulations and restrictions to act as safeguards against the spread of foreign acquired diseases. Part I discuses the current regulations of the blood donation process. Part II discusses diseases an individual can contract while traveling abroad. Part III proposes a policy that addresses the risk of foreign disease epidemics promulgated through the blood donation system. Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the implementation of such measures.
{"title":"Death Disguised as Life: Blood and Biosecurity","authors":"T. Floyd","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this Paper is to analyze the question of whether the Department of Health and Human Services should impose greater regulations restricting individuals from donating blood for transfusions in order to prevent transmission of diseases which blood donors may have unknowingly acquired abroad. Discussion of this question requires an analysis of: (1) what types of diseases can be transmitted via blood transfusion; (2) what tests are conducted on donated blood; (3) what is the balance between the desperate need for donated blood and the necessary precautions to be taken; and (4) what impact would regulations have on an individual’s willingness to donate.This Paper proposes implementing regulations and restrictions to act as safeguards against the spread of foreign acquired diseases. Part I discuses the current regulations of the blood donation process. Part II discusses diseases an individual can contract while traveling abroad. Part III proposes a policy that addresses the risk of foreign disease epidemics promulgated through the blood donation system. Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the implementation of such measures.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127452097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Foot-and-mouth Disease (FMD) is a devastating viral disease that affects all domesticated cloven-hoofed animals and over seventy species of wild cloven-hoofed animals. The virus is highly infectious and extremely communicable. There has been an outbreak in virtually every corner of the world, and it is currently present in every continent besides North America and Australia. FMD has the potential to cause severe economic losses resulting from poor animal yields, bans on livestock exportation, and expenses involved in eradication and control. FMD can also have a distressing social and psychological toll on those affected. This article will discuss the development of the disease, historical outbreaks and threats, and evaluate the infrastructure currently in place to prohibit future outbreaks.
{"title":"Foot and Mouth Disease: Then and Now","authors":"Evan L Jackson","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Foot-and-mouth Disease (FMD) is a devastating viral disease that affects all domesticated cloven-hoofed animals and over seventy species of wild cloven-hoofed animals. The virus is highly infectious and extremely communicable. There has been an outbreak in virtually every corner of the world, and it is currently present in every continent besides North America and Australia. FMD has the potential to cause severe economic losses resulting from poor animal yields, bans on livestock exportation, and expenses involved in eradication and control. FMD can also have a distressing social and psychological toll on those affected. This article will discuss the development of the disease, historical outbreaks and threats, and evaluate the infrastructure currently in place to prohibit future outbreaks.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121205520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article seeks to determine whether countries in the global community have governance systems or domestic laws that will enable them to be effective in their preparation and response to influenza pandemics. It begins by analyzing the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, discussing the events leading up to Mexico triggering the IHRs and determining which aspects of Mexico’s pandemic influenza preparedness and response should be used again in the future and which should be retired. It will then take a closer look at how six WHO member states—Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have or have not integrated lessons learned from the swine flu into their own plans for outbreaks of influenza, evaluating the plans from a comparative perspective in order to determine which plans provide the best guidance for the future.
{"title":"Preparing for Another Round of Swine Flu: Will the WHO's Plan Prove to be a Success for the Global Community and Will the U.S. Lead the Way?","authors":"Katie Maxwell","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article seeks to determine whether countries in the global community have governance systems or domestic laws that will enable them to be effective in their preparation and response to influenza pandemics. It begins by analyzing the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, discussing the events leading up to Mexico triggering the IHRs and determining which aspects of Mexico’s pandemic influenza preparedness and response should be used again in the future and which should be retired. It will then take a closer look at how six WHO member states—Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have or have not integrated lessons learned from the swine flu into their own plans for outbreaks of influenza, evaluating the plans from a comparative perspective in order to determine which plans provide the best guidance for the future.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130510195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We are pleased to publish Volume 2, of the Journal for Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume, like the first volume, continues to raise new and important legal issues in the emerging field of biosecurity, biosafety and biodefense law.
{"title":"Introduction: Volume 2 of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1039","url":null,"abstract":"We are pleased to publish Volume 2, of the Journal for Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume, like the first volume, continues to raise new and important legal issues in the emerging field of biosecurity, biosafety and biodefense law.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127593245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior to examining ways to prevent biological warfare, it is important to gain a clear understanding of what some of the most likely biological weapons are. Knowing the potential effect of a weapon is an important step as it will aid in laying down a basis for regulations. After understanding the types of weapons available, the conversation logically turns towards a question of preventative action that can be taken to avoid this potential catastrophe from taking place. Prevention is primarily attempted through the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It is through this convention that the majority of the world’s nations agreed to either cease or not begin a biological weapons program. However, as with many other treaties, the Biological Weapons Convention is left with several problems when it comes to its enforceability. This problem with the convention is serious enough to render the entire BWC ineffective. By considering these weapons, the measures to prevent their use, and the problems surrounding the BWC, it is possible to better understand the actual threat posed by biological warfare and the current state of measures being taken to ensure that such an attack cannot occur. While the potential list of biological weapons is numerous, there are a handful of weapons that are considered to be of particular concern. These have been termed as class A agents, which pose a high national security risk and will be the primary focus of this paper.
{"title":"The Biological Weapons Convention: Creation and Problems with Enforcement","authors":"A. Ayers","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1025","url":null,"abstract":"Prior to examining ways to prevent biological warfare, it is important to gain a clear understanding of what some of the most likely biological weapons are. Knowing the potential effect of a weapon is an important step as it will aid in laying down a basis for regulations. After understanding the types of weapons available, the conversation logically turns towards a question of preventative action that can be taken to avoid this potential catastrophe from taking place. Prevention is primarily attempted through the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It is through this convention that the majority of the world’s nations agreed to either cease or not begin a biological weapons program. However, as with many other treaties, the Biological Weapons Convention is left with several problems when it comes to its enforceability. This problem with the convention is serious enough to render the entire BWC ineffective. By considering these weapons, the measures to prevent their use, and the problems surrounding the BWC, it is possible to better understand the actual threat posed by biological warfare and the current state of measures being taken to ensure that such an attack cannot occur. While the potential list of biological weapons is numerous, there are a handful of weapons that are considered to be of particular concern. These have been termed as class A agents, which pose a high national security risk and will be the primary focus of this paper.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"1995 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131172577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to analyze and understand the role of law with regard to the plague in modern times with an international perspective. The paper will proceed by giving an overview of the different relevant legal regulations, studying the most recent significant cases of the plague, and considering how international law has dealt with them. Finally, this paper will attempt to address if the current international law system would be efficient in addressing the potential of massive plague outbreak and how it would be possible to improve it.
{"title":"The Plague in Modern Times and the Role of Law","authors":"Arthur Chaslot","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1022","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to analyze and understand the role of law with regard to the plague in modern times with an international perspective. The paper will proceed by giving an overview of the different relevant legal regulations, studying the most recent significant cases of the plague, and considering how international law has dealt with them. Finally, this paper will attempt to address if the current international law system would be efficient in addressing the potential of massive plague outbreak and how it would be possible to improve it.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128699396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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