Italian Abstract: Ricerca sulla situazione economica italiana basata sui dati economici ufficiali; vengono analizzati e confrontati con il passato il debito pubblico, le riserve ufficiali, il PIL, l'inflazione e la disoccupazione. English Abstract: Research into the state of the Italian economy based on official economic data; the current Sovereign Debt, Official Reserves, GDP, Inflation and Unemployment situation is presented and and compared with the past.
{"title":"Italia 1 Trim 2017: Pil, Debito & Co (Italy 1q 2017: GDP, Debt & Co.)","authors":"Maurizio Mazziero, Andrew Lawford, G. Serafini","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2973756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2973756","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Italian Abstract:</b> Ricerca sulla situazione economica italiana basata sui dati economici ufficiali; vengono analizzati e confrontati con il passato il debito pubblico, le riserve ufficiali, il PIL, l'inflazione e la disoccupazione. <b>English Abstract:</b> Research into the state of the Italian economy based on official economic data; the current Sovereign Debt, Official Reserves, GDP, Inflation and Unemployment situation is presented and and compared with the past.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132650090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper compares the CSR profiles of companies operating under the same macroeconomic institutions but with different levels of union density. Drawing from stakeholder and neo-institutional theories that distinguish between internal and external actions, this paper finds that companies initially have to substitute internal for external CSR. After some experience dealing with unions, companies can complement both actions. There is perhaps a reinforcement of mutual trust and loyalty, and has implications for managerial prerogatives.
{"title":"The Influence of Unions on Companies’ CSR Profiles: More Internal Policies and Programs, But Not Always at the Expense of External Endeavors","authors":"Muhammad Umar Boodoo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2823954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2823954","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares the CSR profiles of companies operating under the same macroeconomic institutions but with different levels of union density. Drawing from stakeholder and neo-institutional theories that distinguish between internal and external actions, this paper finds that companies initially have to substitute internal for external CSR. After some experience dealing with unions, companies can complement both actions. There is perhaps a reinforcement of mutual trust and loyalty, and has implications for managerial prerogatives.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134122824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Globalization leveraged pressure on contemporary society. Today's most pressing social dilemmas regarding climate change, overindebtedness and aging Western world populations demand rethinking capitalism. Understanding the bounds of capitalism to avoid ethical downfalls beyond the control of singular nation states infringing on intergenerational equity – the fairness to provide an at least as favorable standard of living to future generations as enjoyed today – has become a blatant demand. In a history of turning to natural law as a human-imbued moral compass for solving societal downfalls on a global scale in times of crises; we may capture the human natural drive towards intergenerational fairness in order to retrieve information on how to implement intergenerational justice. Based on the idea of intergenerational equity as a natural behavioral law, the following paper theoretically outlines the current societal demand for eternal equity and proposes intergenerational justice implementation strategies. Intertemporal connectedness and interaction of overlapping generations enables intergenerational benefits transfers and burden sharing. Intergenerational mobility within intertemporal networks is enhanced through intertemporal opportunities as well as meritocracy alleviating intergenerational inequality. Overall, portraying intergenerational equity as a natural behavioral law strengthens the legal case for codifying intergenerational fairness on a global basis and contributes to interdisciplinary behavioral law and economic models on contemporary intertemporal predicaments. Exploring intergenerational constraints prepares to innovatively guide the implementation of eternal equity and intergenerational justice in overlapping generations’ intertemporal networks. Strengthening financial social responsibility, social welfare and environmental protection through future-oriented and socially responsible economic market approaches of capitalism in the 21st century is aimed at alleviating predictable economic, social and environmental crises to ensure a future sustainable mankind for this generation and the following.
{"title":"We – Today's and Tomorrow's – People of the United World: Rethinking Capitalism for Intergenerational Justice in the Fin-de-Millénaire","authors":"Julia M. Puaschunder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2641451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2641451","url":null,"abstract":"Globalization leveraged pressure on contemporary society. Today's most pressing social dilemmas regarding climate change, overindebtedness and aging Western world populations demand rethinking capitalism. Understanding the bounds of capitalism to avoid ethical downfalls beyond the control of singular nation states infringing on intergenerational equity – the fairness to provide an at least as favorable standard of living to future generations as enjoyed today – has become a blatant demand. In a history of turning to natural law as a human-imbued moral compass for solving societal downfalls on a global scale in times of crises; we may capture the human natural drive towards intergenerational fairness in order to retrieve information on how to implement intergenerational justice. Based on the idea of intergenerational equity as a natural behavioral law, the following paper theoretically outlines the current societal demand for eternal equity and proposes intergenerational justice implementation strategies. Intertemporal connectedness and interaction of overlapping generations enables intergenerational benefits transfers and burden sharing. Intergenerational mobility within intertemporal networks is enhanced through intertemporal opportunities as well as meritocracy alleviating intergenerational inequality. Overall, portraying intergenerational equity as a natural behavioral law strengthens the legal case for codifying intergenerational fairness on a global basis and contributes to interdisciplinary behavioral law and economic models on contemporary intertemporal predicaments. Exploring intergenerational constraints prepares to innovatively guide the implementation of eternal equity and intergenerational justice in overlapping generations’ intertemporal networks. Strengthening financial social responsibility, social welfare and environmental protection through future-oriented and socially responsible economic market approaches of capitalism in the 21st century is aimed at alleviating predictable economic, social and environmental crises to ensure a future sustainable mankind for this generation and the following.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126559669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the relation between variety, market concentration, and economic growth, along different phases of economic development which entail a number of changes to the structure of production and consumption in the economy. We focus on three aspects of structural change, which are connected and are correlated to variety, market concentration, and economic growth: (i) product quality; (ii) firms’ mark-ups; and (iii) imitation of consumer preferences for price and quality. We model the interactions among several aspects of structural change such as firm size and hierarchical structure, innovation in capital vintages, the emergence of social classes, income distribution, and consumer preferences across and within classes. We find that market concentration has a significant and positive impact on economic growth only in the presence of sufficiently large demand. The strongest effects emerge in the presence of a more skewed firm size distribution and firms producing higher priced and higher quality goods. We find also that this effect is influenced strongly by different aspects of structural change. Changes in the behaviour (or income) of the less wealthy income classes is crucial as is investment in new capital vintages, and the emergence of diverse income classes with heterogeneous consumption preferences. In contrast, we find that supply side product variety, cœteris paribus, has no significant effect on growth.
{"title":"The Complex Interactions between Economic Growth and Market Concentration in a Model of Structural Change","authors":"Tommaso Ciarli, M. Valente","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2756901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2756901","url":null,"abstract":"We study the relation between variety, market concentration, and economic growth, along different phases of economic development which entail a number of changes to the structure of production and consumption in the economy. We focus on three aspects of structural change, which are connected and are correlated to variety, market concentration, and economic growth: (i) product quality; (ii) firms’ mark-ups; and (iii) imitation of consumer preferences for price and quality. We model the interactions among several aspects of structural change such as firm size and hierarchical structure, innovation in capital vintages, the emergence of social classes, income distribution, and consumer preferences across and within classes. We find that market concentration has a significant and positive impact on economic growth only in the presence of sufficiently large demand. The strongest effects emerge in the presence of a more skewed firm size distribution and firms producing higher priced and higher quality goods. We find also that this effect is influenced strongly by different aspects of structural change. Changes in the behaviour (or income) of the less wealthy income classes is crucial as is investment in new capital vintages, and the emergence of diverse income classes with heterogeneous consumption preferences. In contrast, we find that supply side product variety, cœteris paribus, has no significant effect on growth.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125587332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This review essay of the two-volume Cambridge History of Capitalism (2014), edited by Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, is divided into three parts. First, I describe three chapters from the second volume that I recommend for all economists to add depth to their understanding of the world economy today. Robert C. Allen analyzes the world distribution of income; Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung discuss the history of business groups; and Peter Lindert surveys private and public programs to help the poor. In each case, they analyze historical backgrounds that illuminate current issues. Second, I criticize the definition of capitalism used in these volumes as too expansive to be useful. I argue that this definition mars the essays in first volume by stimulating a fruitless search for capitalism in the millennium before the Industrial Revolution. Third, I describe the essays in this reference work starting from the most recent and ending with those about antiquity.
{"title":"The Cambridge History of \"Capitalism\"","authors":"P. Temin","doi":"10.1257/JEL.53.4.996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/JEL.53.4.996","url":null,"abstract":"This review essay of the two-volume Cambridge History of Capitalism (2014), edited by Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, is divided into three parts. First, I describe three chapters from the second volume that I recommend for all economists to add depth to their understanding of the world economy today. Robert C. Allen analyzes the world distribution of income; Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung discuss the history of business groups; and Peter Lindert surveys private and public programs to help the poor. In each case, they analyze historical backgrounds that illuminate current issues. Second, I criticize the definition of capitalism used in these volumes as too expansive to be useful. I argue that this definition mars the essays in first volume by stimulating a fruitless search for capitalism in the millennium before the Industrial Revolution. Third, I describe the essays in this reference work starting from the most recent and ending with those about antiquity.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125898620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The West usually portrays Thailand?s coup negatively. Middle class Thai generally regard it as last-chance attempt to save Thailand from becoming a failed state. Middle class Bangkok originally supported Thaksin, but turned against him in late 2005. Middle class support originally was essentially based on three key premises:1. Thailand can put up with certain levels of corruption, 2. provided the government delivers a strong economy. Government has always been corrupt, so continued corruption was not useful for determining how to vote.3. Thailand needs to do more to address inequality. The middle class was not originally against Thaksin?s populist policies ? early on, the policies seemed financially sustainable and gained support.The data show that none of these hopes actually worked out.Corruption: using Transparency International?s Corruption Perception Index, percentiles can control for changes in number of countries from 1995 to 2013. Previous governments slowly improved Thailand?s standing, but Thaksin made more rapid progress during his first term. Thailand reached the 33rd percentile in 2001 (from 17th in 1995), but reached the 61st percentile in 2005 and 2006. However, since 2007 Thailand has declined, and in 2013 it stood at 102 out of 175 countries, the 41st percentile. The drop was particularly rapid in 2012 and 2013.Economic competitiveness: according to World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Reports, Thailand declined in competitiveness from 2006 to 2014. It was ranked 35th in 2006-2007, and 37th in 2013-2014. This slight overall decline masks serious problems on most indicators ? Thailand showed strong improvement on ?financial market development?, but declined on nine out of twelve indicators. The largest decline was 51 ranks on ?labor market efficiency?, but ?institutions?, ?higher education and training?, ?technological readiness?, and ?innovation? all showed declines of 25 ranks or more.Inequality: World Bank data shows that Thailand made modest improvements in income distribution since 1992. The top 10 percent?s share of income declined from 39% to about 31%. However, Thaksin?s governments from 2001 substantially slowed the long-term trend toward more equitable income. Concentration of wealth at the top increased substantially the past few years, after little change from 2000 to 2010. Credit Suisse figures show that the top 10 percent increased their share from 66.7% to 75% over 2011-2013. The top 1% increased their share from 38.5% to 50.6%.Thus, the international indices show that Thaksinomics has resulted in a more corrupt, less competitive, and more unequal Thailand.
{"title":"By the Numbers: Thailand's Performance on International Indices Under Thaksin.","authors":"M. Speece","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2523359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2523359","url":null,"abstract":"The West usually portrays Thailand?s coup negatively. Middle class Thai generally regard it as last-chance attempt to save Thailand from becoming a failed state. Middle class Bangkok originally supported Thaksin, but turned against him in late 2005. Middle class support originally was essentially based on three key premises:1. Thailand can put up with certain levels of corruption, 2. provided the government delivers a strong economy. Government has always been corrupt, so continued corruption was not useful for determining how to vote.3. Thailand needs to do more to address inequality. The middle class was not originally against Thaksin?s populist policies ? early on, the policies seemed financially sustainable and gained support.The data show that none of these hopes actually worked out.Corruption: using Transparency International?s Corruption Perception Index, percentiles can control for changes in number of countries from 1995 to 2013. Previous governments slowly improved Thailand?s standing, but Thaksin made more rapid progress during his first term. Thailand reached the 33rd percentile in 2001 (from 17th in 1995), but reached the 61st percentile in 2005 and 2006. However, since 2007 Thailand has declined, and in 2013 it stood at 102 out of 175 countries, the 41st percentile. The drop was particularly rapid in 2012 and 2013.Economic competitiveness: according to World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Reports, Thailand declined in competitiveness from 2006 to 2014. It was ranked 35th in 2006-2007, and 37th in 2013-2014. This slight overall decline masks serious problems on most indicators ? Thailand showed strong improvement on ?financial market development?, but declined on nine out of twelve indicators. The largest decline was 51 ranks on ?labor market efficiency?, but ?institutions?, ?higher education and training?, ?technological readiness?, and ?innovation? all showed declines of 25 ranks or more.Inequality: World Bank data shows that Thailand made modest improvements in income distribution since 1992. The top 10 percent?s share of income declined from 39% to about 31%. However, Thaksin?s governments from 2001 substantially slowed the long-term trend toward more equitable income. Concentration of wealth at the top increased substantially the past few years, after little change from 2000 to 2010. Credit Suisse figures show that the top 10 percent increased their share from 66.7% to 75% over 2011-2013. The top 1% increased their share from 38.5% to 50.6%.Thus, the international indices show that Thaksinomics has resulted in a more corrupt, less competitive, and more unequal Thailand.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129522481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-03-31DOI: 10.5709/CE.1897-9254.133
K. Sokołowska
The purpose of this article is to analyse the factors affecting social mobility in Poland, based on results obtained from the estimation of logit models for the years 1992-2008 as well as from interviews asking about the necessary conditions to achieve success in life. Data used in this work come from the Polish General Social Survey carried out by the Institute of Social Studies of the University of Warsaw on a representative sample of adult household members. This set contains interviews conducted in the years 1992-2008 and includes 16,234 respondents. Studies using logit models to answer the question posed in the present study show that the probability of success in life in Poland is determined by both ability and level of education; interview responses to the same question, however, show that family origins, parents’ level of education and connections are just as important. Most interestingly, the percentage of people indicating the importance of these factors was higher in 2002 than it was in 1992.
{"title":"Determinants and Perceptions of Social Mobility in Poland, 1992-2008","authors":"K. Sokołowska","doi":"10.5709/CE.1897-9254.133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5709/CE.1897-9254.133","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to analyse the factors affecting social mobility in Poland, based on results obtained from the estimation of logit models for the years 1992-2008 as well as from interviews asking about the necessary conditions to achieve success in life. Data used in this work come from the Polish General Social Survey carried out by the Institute of Social Studies of the University of Warsaw on a representative sample of adult household members. This set contains interviews conducted in the years 1992-2008 and includes 16,234 respondents. Studies using logit models to answer the question posed in the present study show that the probability of success in life in Poland is determined by both ability and level of education; interview responses to the same question, however, show that family origins, parents’ level of education and connections are just as important. Most interestingly, the percentage of people indicating the importance of these factors was higher in 2002 than it was in 1992.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123282012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this paper is to examine the transition of ten sub-indexes of economic freedom among 130 countries in the world. The three central questions of this study are: do economic freedom sub-indexes converge? Do some sub-indexes of economic freedom display more clear-cut convergence when their index points are increasing over time? Which clusters of economic sub-indexes display faster rate of convergence? Analyses of sub-indexes of economic freedom are critical because each of these individual sub-indexes independently determines final value of the overall index. The answer to the first question varies by each specific sub-index. The answer to the second question is that countries with increasing index points display much more clear-cut convergence. As for the third question, those sub-indexes receiving high index points from large number of countries exhibit faster rate of convergence. Several policy implications are discussed in conclusion.
{"title":"Convergence Analysis on Ten Sub-Indexes of Economic Freedom","authors":"Yu Sang Chang, Young-Sub Kim, JiHye Anna Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2413367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2413367","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to examine the transition of ten sub-indexes of economic freedom among 130 countries in the world. The three central questions of this study are: do economic freedom sub-indexes converge? Do some sub-indexes of economic freedom display more clear-cut convergence when their index points are increasing over time? Which clusters of economic sub-indexes display faster rate of convergence? Analyses of sub-indexes of economic freedom are critical because each of these individual sub-indexes independently determines final value of the overall index. The answer to the first question varies by each specific sub-index. The answer to the second question is that countries with increasing index points display much more clear-cut convergence. As for the third question, those sub-indexes receiving high index points from large number of countries exhibit faster rate of convergence. Several policy implications are discussed in conclusion.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114594344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tiago C. Berriel, Marco Bonomo, Carlos M. Carvalho
We derive a measure of the degree of inefficiency of the production structure of an economy by casting its optimal sectoral composition as the outcome of a portfolio allocation problem, in the spirit of Koren and Tenreyro (2004). We use the framework to construct measures of inefficiency using sectoral data for 194 countries, document the patterns of inefficiency by region, income group etc., and investigate which countries might have reasons to pursue "industrial policies" to improve on the allocation of economic activity across sectors. We then undertake an exploratory analysis of the empirical content of our measure of inefficiency, and find that it correlates negatively with measures of good institutions and governance, broadly in line with the evidence in Hall and Jones (1999).
{"title":"Deindustrialization and Economic Diversification","authors":"Tiago C. Berriel, Marco Bonomo, Carlos M. Carvalho","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2385735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2385735","url":null,"abstract":"We derive a measure of the degree of inefficiency of the production structure of an economy by casting its optimal sectoral composition as the outcome of a portfolio allocation problem, in the spirit of Koren and Tenreyro (2004). We use the framework to construct measures of inefficiency using sectoral data for 194 countries, document the patterns of inefficiency by region, income group etc., and investigate which countries might have reasons to pursue \"industrial policies\" to improve on the allocation of economic activity across sectors. We then undertake an exploratory analysis of the empirical content of our measure of inefficiency, and find that it correlates negatively with measures of good institutions and governance, broadly in line with the evidence in Hall and Jones (1999).","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128046583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social models. It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attributes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom. First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explanations wanting. Italy and Spain s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro- zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model features playing, at most, an ancillary role. More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs. The comparison of the two countries thus suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dictates may have had perverse effects.
{"title":"Eurozone Crisis and Social Models: What We Can Learn from Italy and Spain","authors":"Sofía A. Pérez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2724707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2724707","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social models. It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attributes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom. First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explanations wanting. Italy and Spain s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro- zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model features playing, at most, an ancillary role. More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs. The comparison of the two countries thus suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dictates may have had perverse effects.","PeriodicalId":378721,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Comparative Capitalism (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123901501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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