{"title":"Carbon Offsets and Concerns about Shifting Harms: A Reply to Mintz-Woo","authors":"Luke Elson","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.882","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"3 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141796876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Stephen Engelmann’s Economic Rationality: What is Political Economy? Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2022, 144 pages.","authors":"Mark McAdam, Jan Robin Kleiner","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.883","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"108 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141812383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oftentimes many individual acts lead to a significantly (dis-)valuable outcome though the performance of each act makes no valuative difference to that outcome. Such cases give rise to a dilemma. For it seemingly doesn’t matter whether one performs an act (or not) if it doesn’t make a difference. Yet it matters a great deal when many of these acts are performed, provided they bring about a significant outcome. One might think, therefore, that at least some reason favours the performance of such acts. But in the absence of a valuative difference, it is difficult to say what that reason is, exactly. The above dilemma arises in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases. For instance, in the intrapersonal case, it seemingly makes little difference to my goal of running the marathon whether I skip a single workout. Yet it makes a significant difference to my goal of running the marathon if I skip all of my workouts. And, in the interpersonal case, it seemingly makes no difference to the bad effects of climate change if I choose to be a vegan or not. Yet it makes a significant difference to the bad effects of climate change if we all choose to be vegans. This dilemma has generated a substantial body of literature in both ethics and rational choice. Surprisingly, however, there has been little crossover between the two fields of study. The motivation for the special issue was to offer an avenue to explore new solutions or perspectives on the dilemma through the lens of one, or both of these fields.
{"title":"Editorial Note","authors":"Annalisa Costella, Benjamin Mullins","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.881","url":null,"abstract":"Oftentimes many individual acts lead to a significantly (dis-)valuable outcome though the performance of each act makes no valuative difference to that outcome. Such cases give rise to a dilemma. For it seemingly doesn’t matter whether one performs an act (or not) if it doesn’t make a difference. Yet it matters a great deal when many of these acts are performed, provided they bring about a significant outcome. One might think, therefore, that at least some reason favours the performance of such acts. But in the absence of a valuative difference, it is difficult to say what that reason is, exactly.\u0000The above dilemma arises in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases. For instance, in the intrapersonal case, it seemingly makes little difference to my goal of running the marathon whether I skip a single workout. Yet it makes a significant difference to my goal of running the marathon if I skip all of my workouts. And, in the interpersonal case, it seemingly makes no difference to the bad effects of climate change if I choose to be a vegan or not. Yet it makes a significant difference to the bad effects of climate change if we all choose to be vegans. This dilemma has generated a substantial body of literature in both ethics and rational choice. Surprisingly, however, there has been little crossover between the two fields of study. The motivation for the special issue was to offer an avenue to explore new solutions or perspectives on the dilemma through the lens of one, or both of these fields.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"42 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141815218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Nagel’s 2023 Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress comprises a collection of two closely related essays, both concerning moral intuitions and moral epistemology. This short, inviting book is accessible, yet rich in insights, and guides the reader through a contemplation of several important moral questions. Despite being only 70 pages in length, it offers the reader a clear and straightforward overview of different moral positions, whilst touching upon numerous profound themes and questions. Throughout this discussion and explanation, the author presents his own (current) approach to morality, which he describes as a local, pluralist species of moral realism
托马斯-纳格尔（Thomas Nagel）的《2023道德情感、道德现实与道德进步》（2023 Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress）由两篇密切相关的论文组成，均涉及道德直觉和道德认识论。这本短小精悍的书通俗易懂，却蕴含着丰富的见解，引导读者思考几个重要的道德问题。尽管篇幅只有 70 页，但它为读者提供了对不同道德立场的清晰而直接的概述，同时触及了众多深刻的主题和问题。在整个讨论和阐释过程中，作者提出了自己（当前）的道德观，并将其描述为一种本土的、多元的道德现实主义类型
{"title":"Review of Thomas Nagel’s Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2023, v + 70 pp.","authors":"J. R. De Vries","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.880","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Nagel’s 2023 Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress comprises a collection of two closely related essays, both concerning moral intuitions and moral epistemology. This short, inviting book is accessible, yet rich in insights, and guides the reader through a contemplation of several important moral questions. Despite being only 70 pages in length, it offers the reader a clear and straightforward overview of different moral positions, whilst touching upon numerous profound themes and questions. Throughout this discussion and explanation, the author presents his own (current) approach to morality, which he describes as a local, pluralist species of moral realism","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"31 15","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141816922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I bring together the problems of justice between age groups and intergenerational cooperation in light of real-life demographic trends. I begin by presenting a simple model of intergenerational cooperation based on indirect reciprocity and show how cooperation can break down due to exogenous factors, including demographic change. I use the model to make the argument that principles for justice between age groups must be sensitive to the stability of intergenerational cooperation. I illustrate my thesis by considering the debate between distributive and relational egalitarians on justice between age groups.
{"title":"Intergenerational Cooperation and Justice between Age Groups","authors":"Greg Bognar","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.764","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I bring together the problems of justice between age groups and intergenerational cooperation in light of real-life demographic trends. I begin by presenting a simple model of intergenerational cooperation based on indirect reciprocity and show how cooperation can break down due to exogenous factors, including demographic change. I use the model to make the argument that principles for justice between age groups must be sensitive to the stability of intergenerational cooperation. I illustrate my thesis by considering the debate between distributive and relational egalitarians on justice between age groups.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":" 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141822901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Timothy Luke Williamson’s commentary on my article “Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control,” Williamson casts my focus on managerial failures in certain cases of poor self-control “as an especially fruitful tool for addressing problems of poor self-control”; but he suggests that the cases of poor self-control that I view as cases of managerial failure also involve control by a foreign force, in accordance with the “foreign force paradigm,” which I claim is off base in the cases on which I focus. Although I cannot get into Williamson’s entire interesting and elaborate argument, I here question The Weak Planning Perspective, which plays a key role in Williamson’s critical response, with the aim of addressing the issues he raises and shedding some light on why and how our views diverge.
在蒂莫西-卢克-威廉姆森（Timothy Luke Williamson）对我的文章《微观管理与自控力差》（Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control）的评论中，威廉姆森将我对某些自控力差案例中管理者失误的关注 "视为解决自控力差问题的特别富有成效的工具"；但他认为，我认为是管理者失误的自控力差案例也涉及外来力量的控制，符合 "外来力量范式"，而我声称在我关注的案例中，这种范式是不正确的。虽然我无法深入探讨威廉姆森整个有趣而详尽的论证，但我在此对威廉姆森的批判性回应中起关键作用的 "弱规划视角 "提出质疑，目的是解决他提出的问题，并阐明我们的观点为何以及如何产生分歧。
{"title":"Self-Control and Planning: A Reply to Williamson","authors":"Chrisoula Andreou","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.877","url":null,"abstract":"In Timothy Luke Williamson’s commentary on my article “Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control,” Williamson casts my focus on managerial failures in certain cases of poor self-control “as an especially fruitful tool for addressing problems of poor self-control”; but he suggests that the cases of poor self-control that I view as cases of managerial failure also involve control by a foreign force, in accordance with the “foreign force paradigm,” which I claim is off base in the cases on which I focus. Although I cannot get into Williamson’s entire interesting and elaborate argument, I here question The Weak Planning Perspective, which plays a key role in Williamson’s critical response, with the aim of addressing the issues he raises and shedding some light on why and how our views diverge.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"124 29","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141656978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Incommensurability is often introduced with the small improvement argument. Options A and B are shown to be incommensurable when it is neither the case that A is preferred to (or better than) B nor that B is preferred to (or better than) A, but a slightly improved version of A (A+) is still not preferred to B. Since A+ is preferred to A, but not to B, we must also conclude that it is also true that A and B are not indifferent (or equally good). Such incommensurable options seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory (and various forms of value theory) but options that obey the pattern described by this argument seem ubiquitous: my choice between lemon tarts and eclairs at my favourite pastry shop might exhibit this pattern, but so could my choice between jobs or careers. In trying to accommodate incommensurable options within various frameworks, philosophers have argued that we must preserve certain central features of the phenomenon. Among them is the supposed “hardness” of at least some incommensurable options: even if perhaps one would need to be a rather anxious gourmet to describe the choice between lemon tarts and eclairs as hard, the choice among careers could potentially be agonizing. However, it is not clear in which way choices among incommensurable options are “hard,” nor how and whether such hardness poses problems for the various accounts of incommensurable choices. To complicate matters, the deontic verdicts for choices between incommensurable options seem to be relatively straightforward: one appealing view is that in such circumstances I am rationally permitted to choose any option that is not worse than another option. This paper aims to provide a sharper formulation of at least a version of the hardness problem, to argue that various theories of incommensurability fail to account for the hardness of some incommensurable choices, and to propose that the theory of instrumental rationality I develop in Rational Powers in Action, aided by a Kantian insight, promises to provide an adequate explanation of the hardness of choice among incommensurable options.
不可通约性通常是通过小改进论证引入的。当 A 既不优于（或好于）B，B 也不优于（或好于）A，但 A 的微小改进版本（A+）仍不优于 B 时，选项 A 和 B 就被证明是不可通约的。这种不可通约的选择似乎与正统的决策理论（以及各种形式的价值理论）格格不入，但符合这一论证所描述的模式的选择似乎无处不在：我在我最喜欢的糕点店中选择柠檬馅饼和杏仁饼时可能就会表现出这种模式，但我在选择工作或职业时也可能表现出这种模式。哲学家们试图在各种框架内容纳不可通约的选择，他们认为我们必须保留这种现象的某些核心特征。其中包括至少某些不可通约选择的所谓 "艰难性"：即使一个人可能需要是一个相当焦虑的美食家，才能把在柠檬馅饼和杏仁蛋糕之间的选择描述为艰难，但在职业之间的选择也可能是痛苦的。然而，我们并不清楚在不可通约的选择中如何选择才是 "艰难的"，也不清楚这种艰难性如何以及是否会给不可通约选择的各种论述带来问题。使问题更加复杂的是，在不可通约的选项之间做出选择的道义判断似乎相对简单：一种吸引人的观点是，在这种情况下，我被理性地允许选择任何不比另一个选项更糟的选项。本文旨在为至少一个版本的硬度问题提供更清晰的表述，论证各种不可通约性理论无法解释某些不可通约选择的硬度问题，并提出我在《行动中的理性力量》一书中提出的工具理性理论，在康德洞察力的帮助下，有望为不可通约选择之间的选择硬度问题提供充分的解释。
{"title":"The Hardness of the Practical Might","authors":"Sergio Tenenbaum","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.797","url":null,"abstract":"Incommensurability is often introduced with the small improvement argument. Options A and B are shown to be incommensurable when it is neither the case that A is preferred to (or better than) B nor that B is preferred to (or better than) A, but a slightly improved version of A (A+) is still not preferred to B. Since A+ is preferred to A, but not to B, we must also conclude that it is also true that A and B are not indifferent (or equally good). Such incommensurable options seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory (and various forms of value theory) but options that obey the pattern described by this argument seem ubiquitous: my choice between lemon tarts and eclairs at my favourite pastry shop might exhibit this pattern, but so could my choice between jobs or careers. In trying to accommodate incommensurable options within various frameworks, philosophers have argued that we must preserve certain central features of the phenomenon. Among them is the supposed “hardness” of at least some incommensurable options: even if perhaps one would need to be a rather anxious gourmet to describe the choice between lemon tarts and eclairs as hard, the choice among careers could potentially be agonizing. However, it is not clear in which way choices among incommensurable options are “hard,” nor how and whether such hardness poses problems for the various accounts of incommensurable choices. To complicate matters, the deontic verdicts for choices between incommensurable options seem to be relatively straightforward: one appealing view is that in such circumstances I am rationally permitted to choose any option that is not worse than another option. This paper aims to provide a sharper formulation of at least a version of the hardness problem, to argue that various theories of incommensurability fail to account for the hardness of some incommensurable choices, and to propose that the theory of instrumental rationality I develop in Rational Powers in Action, aided by a Kantian insight, promises to provide an adequate explanation of the hardness of choice among incommensurable options.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141657228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: In this paper, I reply to Ruth Chang’s ‘What is so Hard about Hard Choices’ .
:在本文中，我将回答 Ruth Chang 的 "艰难抉择难在何处"。
{"title":"The Hard Things about Hard Choices? A Reply to Chang","authors":"Sergio Tenenbaum","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.876","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper, I reply to Ruth Chang’s ‘What is so Hard about Hard Choices’ .","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"53 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141658292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What, exactly, is so hard about hard choices? I suggest that what is distinctively hard about hard choices is that they present us with the volitional difficulty of putting ourselves behind an alternative and thereby making it true of ourselves that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. Making it true through your commitments that, for instance, you have most reason to be a philosopher rather than a lawyer makes the choice between the careers hard. This answer is in contrast to that of Sergio Tenenbaum, who understands the hardness of a hard choice as a deliberative difficulty in specifying our alternatives and ends in ways that conform with certain proposed constraints of rationality. For Tenenbaum, the hardness of hard choices is not distinctive to such choices but is a general difficulty rational agents face when they need to further specify their alternatives and ends, even if the choice is easy.
{"title":"What’s so Hard about Hard Choices?","authors":"Ruth Chang","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.872","url":null,"abstract":"What, exactly, is so hard about hard choices? I suggest that what is distinctively hard about hard choices is that they present us with the volitional difficulty of putting ourselves behind an alternative and thereby making it true of ourselves that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. Making it true through your commitments that, for instance, you have most reason to be a philosopher rather than a lawyer makes the choice between the careers hard. This answer is in contrast to that of Sergio Tenenbaum, who understands the hardness of a hard choice as a deliberative difficulty in specifying our alternatives and ends in ways that conform with certain proposed constraints of rationality. For Tenenbaum, the hardness of hard choices is not distinctive to such choices but is a general difficulty rational agents face when they need to further specify their alternatives and ends, even if the choice is easy.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"129 37","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141656319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper makes two related points. First, as liberals have started to realize that the welfare state is unable to deliver on egalitarian theories of justice, they have increasingly tried to dissociate their theories from the welfare state. Second, dissociating from the welfare state type of thinking is difficult for some liberal egalitarian theories such as John Rawls's theory of justice as his theory shares some of the same underlying thinking as found in the welfare state. For example, Rawls's understanding of universal citizenship and the difference principle resembles some of the aspects of the welfare state on how social equality and citizenship are tied to productivity and society as a venture of mutual cooperation. Consequently, liberals are caught in a difficult relationship where they can only partially move beyond the welfare state. Because of this affinity liberals should move beyond a Rawlsian framework, as Rawls's theory is difficult to completely dissociate from the welfare state.
{"title":"Liberalism’s Difficult Relationship with the Welfare State","authors":"Harald Borgebund","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.778","url":null,"abstract":"This paper makes two related points. First, as liberals have started to realize that the welfare state is unable to deliver on egalitarian theories of justice, they have increasingly tried to dissociate their theories from the welfare state. Second, dissociating from the welfare state type of thinking is difficult for some liberal egalitarian theories such as John Rawls's theory of justice as his theory shares some of the same underlying thinking as found in the welfare state. For example, Rawls's understanding of universal citizenship and the difference principle resembles some of the aspects of the welfare state on how social equality and citizenship are tied to productivity and society as a venture of mutual cooperation. Consequently, liberals are caught in a difficult relationship where they can only partially move beyond the welfare state. Because of this affinity liberals should move beyond a Rawlsian framework, as Rawls's theory is difficult to completely dissociate from the welfare state.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":"93 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141664271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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