This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative way. In this Kelsenian approach, all normative systems are structurally and logically similar, but each normative system is independent of every other system – thus, law is, in this sense, conceptually separate from morality. Second, in Section 3, the author turns to Hart's theory, analyzing the extent to which his approach views legal normativity as sui generis. This approach raises questions regarding what has become a consensus view in contemporary jurisprudence: that law makes moral claims. The author shows how a more deflationary (and less morally-flavored) understanding of the nature of law is tenable, and may, in fact, work better than current conventional (morality-focused) understandings.
{"title":"Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity","authors":"B. Bix","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.3984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.3984","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative way. In this Kelsenian approach, all normative systems are structurally and logically similar, but each normative system is independent of every other system – thus, law is, in this sense, conceptually separate from morality. Second, in Section 3, the author turns to Hart's theory, analyzing the extent to which his approach views legal normativity as sui generis. This approach raises questions regarding what has become a consensus view in contemporary jurisprudence: that law makes moral claims. The author shows how a more deflationary (and less morally-flavored) understanding of the nature of law is tenable, and may, in fact, work better than current conventional (morality-focused) understandings.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42027198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces a non-linguistic theory of norms. The proposal is motivated jointly by Jorgensen’s dilemma and Black’s objection to the better-known linguistic theories of norms. The argument is structured as follows. The author starts by defining deontic sentence and deontic system. He then applies Kripke’s possible world semantics to the analysis of deontic language, before he presents the above-mentioned motivations for conceiving of norms as non-linguistic entities. One such conception is defended in the second half of the paper, where norms are identified with decisions of some normative authority. The author shows how this notion of norm serves both, an intuitive and a formal analysis of normative regulation. Together with the notion of normative function as its formal counterpart, this notion of norm permits one to explain logical relations between deontic sentences with no need to recur to any special semantics or logic of norms. | This is a corrected reprint of the text originally published in Reports on Philosophy 6 (1982): 65–73.
{"title":"Deontic sentences, possible worlds and norms","authors":"J. Woleński","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4179","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a non-linguistic theory of norms. The proposal is motivated jointly by Jorgensen’s dilemma and Black’s objection to the better-known linguistic theories of norms. The argument is structured as follows. The author starts by defining deontic sentence and deontic system. He then applies Kripke’s possible world semantics to the analysis of deontic language, before he presents the above-mentioned motivations for conceiving of norms as non-linguistic entities. One such conception is defended in the second half of the paper, where norms are identified with decisions of some normative authority. The author shows how this notion of norm serves both, an intuitive and a formal analysis of normative regulation. Together with the notion of normative function as its formal counterpart, this notion of norm permits one to explain logical relations between deontic sentences with no need to recur to any special semantics or logic of norms. | This is a corrected reprint of the text originally published in Reports on Philosophy 6 (1982): 65–73.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46964125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Este articulo introduce una teoria no linguistica de normas. La propuesta esta motivada conjuntamente por el dilema de Jorgensen y la objecion que Black dirigio a las mas conocidas teorias linguisticas de normas. El argumento del articulo esta estructurado de la siguiente manera. El autor comienza con las definiciones de los enunciados deonticos y el sistema deontico. Posteriormente aplica la semantica de mundos posibles de Kripke al analisis del lenguaje deontico, antes de presentar las motivaciones para concebir las normas como entidades no linguisticas. Una concepcion de este tipo se defiende en la segunda parte del articulo, donde se identifica a las normas como decisiones de alguna autoridad normativa. El autor demuestra como esta nocion de norma sirve a los analisis intuitivo y formal de la regulacion normativa. Junto con la nocion de funcion normativa como su contraparte formal, dicha nocion de norma nos permite explicar las relaciones logicas entre enunciados deonticos sin necesidad de recurir a una particular semantica o logica de normas.
{"title":"Enunciados deónticos, mundos posibles y normas","authors":"Jan Woleński","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4204","url":null,"abstract":"Este articulo introduce una teoria no linguistica de normas. La propuesta esta motivada conjuntamente por el dilema de Jorgensen y la objecion que Black dirigio a las mas conocidas teorias linguisticas de normas. El argumento del articulo esta estructurado de la siguiente manera. El autor comienza con las definiciones de los enunciados deonticos y el sistema deontico. Posteriormente aplica la semantica de mundos posibles de Kripke al analisis del lenguaje deontico, antes de presentar las motivaciones para concebir las normas como entidades no linguisticas. Una concepcion de este tipo se defiende en la segunda parte del articulo, donde se identifica a las normas como decisiones de alguna autoridad normativa. El autor demuestra como esta nocion de norma sirve a los analisis intuitivo y formal de la regulacion normativa. Junto con la nocion de funcion normativa como su contraparte formal, dicha nocion de norma nos permite explicar las relaciones logicas entre enunciados deonticos sin necesidad de recurir a una particular semantica o logica de normas.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43737260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My purpose in this paper is to make a case for the strictly philosophical nature of our discipline, legal philosophy. I first take a prior stance on the issue of what philosophy is in general and outline some premises for the definition of philosophical rationality. This then leads me to critically examine Bobbio’s dichotomy between jurists’ legal philosophy and philosophers’ legal philosophy. It is essential to reformulate the relationships between legal philosophy as a “special” or “regional” discipline as opposed to “general” philosophy. So thirdly, I re-examine this problem using the distinction between concepts of law and ideas in law. Fourthly, I defend the thesis that, when ascertaining the type of philosophy the philosophy of law is, the most decisive factor is not so much (or not only) the relationship between philosophy of law and philosophy in general as, more importantly, the relationship between it and law itself. I argue that the nature of law itself makes its practice inevitably and ineluctably associated with philosophical ideas and conceptions. This practical view of law is tightly bound with a view of legal philosophy as a practical philosophy, and this is the main thesis I shall defend here. Different expressions of this practical view of law can be found in prominent contemporary authors who go beyond the dichotomy of legal positivism-natural law (such as Nino, Alexy, Dworkin, Atienza). The essential feature which I regard ties philosophy of law to the condition of some “practical philosophy” is the role played by the concept of value, i.e. the centrality and pre-eminence of its evaluative dimension.
{"title":"Legal philosophy as practical philosophy","authors":"Jesús Vega","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.3859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.3859","url":null,"abstract":"My purpose in this paper is to make a case for the strictly philosophical nature of our discipline, legal philosophy. I first take a prior stance on the issue of what philosophy is in general and outline some premises for the definition of philosophical rationality. This then leads me to critically examine Bobbio’s dichotomy between jurists’ legal philosophy and philosophers’ legal philosophy. It is essential to reformulate the relationships between legal philosophy as a “special” or “regional” discipline as opposed to “general” philosophy. So thirdly, I re-examine this problem using the distinction between concepts of law and ideas in law. Fourthly, I defend the thesis that, when ascertaining the type of philosophy the philosophy of law is, the most decisive factor is not so much (or not only) the relationship between philosophy of law and philosophy in general as, more importantly, the relationship between it and law itself. I argue that the nature of law itself makes its practice inevitably and ineluctably associated with philosophical ideas and conceptions. This practical view of law is tightly bound with a view of legal philosophy as a practical philosophy, and this is the main thesis I shall defend here. Different expressions of this practical view of law can be found in prominent contemporary authors who go beyond the dichotomy of legal positivism-natural law (such as Nino, Alexy, Dworkin, Atienza). The essential feature which I regard ties philosophy of law to the condition of some “practical philosophy” is the role played by the concept of value, i.e. the centrality and pre-eminence of its evaluative dimension.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48814748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most philosophical theories generally accept a set of ideas concerning the nature of norms together with a certain conception of action that can be traced back to Hume. These ideas can be expressed clearly through several theses that are notoriously plausible. On the one hand, there is the thesis that norms, and the duties constituted by norms, are objective in a certain sense, while on the other hand, there is the thesis that the concept of “norm” implies the possibility of complying (or not complying) with the relevant normative requirements. The problem is that these theses cannot be held simultaneously, thus giving rise to a genuine dilemma. This paper explores several ways of avoiding the dilemma, and argues that they are all ultimately unsuccessful. | The Spanish original of this paper was published in Doxa. Cuadernos de filosofia del derecho (2008) 31: 91–104.
大多数哲学理论通常接受一套关于规范性质的思想，以及可以追溯到休谟的某种行动概念。这些观点可以通过几篇众所周知的似是而非的论文清楚地表达出来。一方面，有一种观点认为，规范及其构成的义务在某种意义上是客观的，而另一方面，“规范”的概念意味着遵守（或不遵守）相关规范要求的可能性。问题是，这些论点不能同时进行，从而导致了真正的困境。本文探讨了几种避免困境的方法，并认为它们最终都是不成功的这篇论文的西班牙语原文发表在Doxa上。Cuadernos de filosofia del derecho（2008）31:91-104。
{"title":"A dilemma regarding the nature of norms","authors":"Ricardo Caracciolo","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.4141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.4141","url":null,"abstract":"Most philosophical theories generally accept a set of ideas concerning the nature of norms together with a certain conception of action that can be traced back to Hume. These ideas can be expressed clearly through several theses that are notoriously plausible. On the one hand, there is the thesis that norms, and the duties constituted by norms, are objective in a certain sense, while on the other hand, there is the thesis that the concept of “norm” implies the possibility of complying (or not complying) with the relevant normative requirements. The problem is that these theses cannot be held simultaneously, thus giving rise to a genuine dilemma. This paper explores several ways of avoiding the dilemma, and argues that they are all ultimately unsuccessful. | The Spanish original of this paper was published in Doxa. Cuadernos de filosofia del derecho (2008) 31: 91–104.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46944713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El proposito del presente trabajo es argumentar a favor de la naturaleza estrictamente filosofica de nuestra disciplina, la filosofia del Derecho. Parto, para ello, de un planteamiento previo acerca de la cuestion de que es en general la filosofia, introduciendo unas premisas minimas para la definicion de la racionalidad filosofica. Esto me lleva a reconsiderar criticamente, en segundo lugar, la celebre dicotomia de Bobbio entre “filosofia del Derecho de los juristas” y “filosofia del Derecho de los filosofos”. El tercer punto que abordo es reconsiderar las relaciones existentes entre la filosofia juridica como disciplina “especial” o “regional” y la filosofia “general”, para lo cual utilizo la distincion entre conceptos e ideas del Derecho. En cuarto lugar, desarrollo la idea de que lo decisivo a la hora de entender que tipo de filosofia es la filosofia del Derecho no es tanto (o no solo) la relacion que media entre ella y la filosofia en general cuanto, sobre todo, la relacion que media entre ella y el propio Derecho. Sostengo asi, en quinto lugar, que es el tipo de practica que el Derecho constituye lo que convierte en necesaria su vinculacion interna e ineludible con ideas y concepciones de naturaleza filosofica. Esta vision practica del Derecho es intimamente solidaria de una vision de la filosofia juridica como filosofia practica, diferentes expresiones de la cual pueden hallarse en autores contemporaneos de gran relevancia que de distintos modos se han situado mas alla de la dicotomia iuspositivismo-iusnaturalismo (tales como Nino, Alexy, Dworkin o Atienza), y que seria entonces (sexto y ultimo punto) la tesis central que aqui defiendo. El rasgo esencial que considero unido a tal condicion —la de constituir un tipo de “filosofia practica”— es la centralidad y preeminencia que en ella adquiere la dimension valorativa.
{"title":"La filosofía del Derecho como filosofía práctica","authors":"Jesusa Vega","doi":"10.4000/revus.3990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3990","url":null,"abstract":"El proposito del presente trabajo es argumentar a favor de la naturaleza estrictamente filosofica de nuestra disciplina, la filosofia del Derecho. Parto, para ello, de un planteamiento previo acerca de la cuestion de que es en general la filosofia, introduciendo unas premisas minimas para la definicion de la racionalidad filosofica. Esto me lleva a reconsiderar criticamente, en segundo lugar, la celebre dicotomia de Bobbio entre “filosofia del Derecho de los juristas” y “filosofia del Derecho de los filosofos”. El tercer punto que abordo es reconsiderar las relaciones existentes entre la filosofia juridica como disciplina “especial” o “regional” y la filosofia “general”, para lo cual utilizo la distincion entre conceptos e ideas del Derecho. En cuarto lugar, desarrollo la idea de que lo decisivo a la hora de entender que tipo de filosofia es la filosofia del Derecho no es tanto (o no solo) la relacion que media entre ella y la filosofia en general cuanto, sobre todo, la relacion que media entre ella y el propio Derecho. Sostengo asi, en quinto lugar, que es el tipo de practica que el Derecho constituye lo que convierte en necesaria su vinculacion interna e ineludible con ideas y concepciones de naturaleza filosofica. Esta vision practica del Derecho es intimamente solidaria de una vision de la filosofia juridica como filosofia practica, diferentes expresiones de la cual pueden hallarse en autores contemporaneos de gran relevancia que de distintos modos se han situado mas alla de la dicotomia iuspositivismo-iusnaturalismo (tales como Nino, Alexy, Dworkin o Atienza), y que seria entonces (sexto y ultimo punto) la tesis central que aqui defiendo. El rasgo esencial que considero unido a tal condicion —la de constituir un tipo de “filosofia practica”— es la centralidad y preeminencia que en ella adquiere la dimension valorativa.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70593397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este trabajo el autor defiende la necesidad de completar la distincion entre permisos fuertes y debiles con otras dos distinciones: una de ellas relativa tambien al sistema juridico –la distincion entre permisos protegidos y permisos no protegidos– y la otra relativa al proceso de aplicacion del derecho: la distincion entre permisos prima facie y permisos concluyentes. El trabajo concluye con un cuadro en el que, sobre la base de estas tres distinciones, se recogen ocho combinaciones posibles a distinguir en materia de permisos.
{"title":"Diez observaciones y un cuadro final sobre permisos y normas permisivas","authors":"Juan Ruiz Manero","doi":"10.4000/revus.3728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3728","url":null,"abstract":"En este trabajo el autor defiende la necesidad de completar la distincion entre permisos fuertes y debiles con otras dos distinciones: una de ellas relativa tambien al sistema juridico –la distincion entre permisos protegidos y permisos no protegidos– y la otra relativa al proceso de aplicacion del derecho: la distincion entre permisos prima facie y permisos concluyentes. El trabajo concluye con un cuadro en el que, sobre la base de estas tres distinciones, se recogen ocho combinaciones posibles a distinguir en materia de permisos.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70593607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este articulo se analiza la famosa distincion entre las concepciones hiletica y expresiva de las normas. Su objetivo principal es rechazar la tesis de Alchourron y Bulygin segun la cual dichas concepciones ofrecen dos soluciones incompatibles a un mismo problema. Segun el autor, las dos concepciones responden a dos problemas distintos y parcialmente independientes: un «problema de la genesis» atinente al proceso de la produccion de las normas y un «problema de la naturaleza» atinente al producto del dicho proceso. Por ende, las dos concepciones de las normas no son necesariamente incompatibles, aunque la respuesta a uno de los dos problemas condiciona en alguna medida la respuesta al otro. | Una version previa de este texto fue publicada en Riccardo Guastini, Otras distinciones (Bogota: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2014).
{"title":"Dos concepciones de las normas","authors":"R. Guastini","doi":"10.4000/REVUS.3810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/REVUS.3810","url":null,"abstract":"En este articulo se analiza la famosa distincion entre las concepciones hiletica y expresiva de las normas. Su objetivo principal es rechazar la tesis de Alchourron y Bulygin segun la cual dichas concepciones ofrecen dos soluciones incompatibles a un mismo problema. Segun el autor, las dos concepciones responden a dos problemas distintos y parcialmente independientes: un «problema de la genesis» atinente al proceso de la produccion de las normas y un «problema de la naturaleza» atinente al producto del dicho proceso. Por ende, las dos concepciones de las normas no son necesariamente incompatibles, aunque la respuesta a uno de los dos problemas condiciona en alguna medida la respuesta al otro. | Una version previa de este texto fue publicada en Riccardo Guastini, Otras distinciones (Bogota: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2014).","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70593682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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