The Harvard Law Review recently, for the first time, published Hart’s essay titled “Discretion”. It is a carefully arranged version of the lecture which he gave at Harvard in 1956. This essay fills significant gap in Hart's work concerning judicial reasoning. In my paper attention is devoted to his conception of judicial discretion, its two main types (express and tacit), and his understanding of interpretation and rationality related to Hartian discretion. According to Hart, discretion is a form of decision-making in hard cases, which is rational and to some extent constrained by law. However, because no combination of legal rules and principles, properly interpreted, will always give only one legally right answer, the judge in some cases must resort to non-legal reasons, i.e. exercise discretion. Hart’s insight that the law is not the sole ground for (judicial) decisions suggests that there is something “out there” (in our “practical universe”) that plays a role in the legal “earthly” world, and consequently, in the judicial world as well.
{"title":"Hartʼs judicial discretion revisited","authors":"Goran Dajović","doi":"10.4000/revus.9735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9735","url":null,"abstract":"The Harvard Law Review recently, for the first time, published Hart’s essay titled “Discretion”. It is a carefully arranged version of the lecture which he gave at Harvard in 1956. This essay fills significant gap in Hart's work concerning judicial reasoning. In my paper attention is devoted to his conception of judicial discretion, its two main types (express and tacit), and his understanding of interpretation and rationality related to Hartian discretion. According to Hart, discretion is a form of decision-making in hard cases, which is rational and to some extent constrained by law. However, because no combination of legal rules and principles, properly interpreted, will always give only one legally right answer, the judge in some cases must resort to non-legal reasons, i.e. exercise discretion. Hart’s insight that the law is not the sole ground for (judicial) decisions suggests that there is something “out there” (in our “practical universe”) that plays a role in the legal “earthly” world, and consequently, in the judicial world as well.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135753135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"De medios “adecuados” a fines anhelados","authors":"Alejo Joaquín Giles","doi":"10.4000/revus.9509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9509","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43565032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El constitucionalismo deliberativo es una teoría que en las últimas décadas ha adquirido un lugar en el centro de la discusión académica. Su novedad e interés radica en que ofrece una salida a las objeciones al control judicial mediante el compromiso con las premisas de la democracia deliberativa. Ahora bien, en este contexto hay una cuestión que requiere ser aclarada: ¿quiénes pueden participar legítimamente en ese diálogo constitucional para ofrecer una salida efectiva a las objeciones al control judicial? El argumento del presente artículo es que, si bien el constitucionalismo deliberativo es una alternativa promisoria que toma nota de las objeciones al control judicial, así como también del giro deliberativo de la democracia, no todas sus variantes toman realmente en serio ambos aspectos. Para matizar las objeciones al control judicial es necesaria una variante del constitucionalismo deliberativo que se oriente al servicio del diálogo inclusivo y que atienda a todo el sistema constitucional, en vez de solamente al diálogo intrajudicial, transjudicial e interinstitucional.
{"title":"Ampliando las fronteras del constitucionalismo deliberativo","authors":"C Ignacio Giuffré","doi":"10.4000/revus.9793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9793","url":null,"abstract":"El constitucionalismo deliberativo es una teoría que en las últimas décadas ha adquirido un lugar en el centro de la discusión académica. Su novedad e interés radica en que ofrece una salida a las objeciones al control judicial mediante el compromiso con las premisas de la democracia deliberativa. Ahora bien, en este contexto hay una cuestión que requiere ser aclarada: ¿quiénes pueden participar legítimamente en ese diálogo constitucional para ofrecer una salida efectiva a las objeciones al control judicial? El argumento del presente artículo es que, si bien el constitucionalismo deliberativo es una alternativa promisoria que toma nota de las objeciones al control judicial, así como también del giro deliberativo de la democracia, no todas sus variantes toman realmente en serio ambos aspectos. Para matizar las objeciones al control judicial es necesaria una variante del constitucionalismo deliberativo que se oriente al servicio del diálogo inclusivo y que atienda a todo el sistema constitucional, en vez de solamente al diálogo intrajudicial, transjudicial e interinstitucional.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135753255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deliberative constitutionalism is a theory that has arrived at the centre of the academic debate in recent decades. Its novelty and interest lie in the fact that it offers a way to escape the objections to judicial review through a commitment to the premises of deliberative democracy. In this context, however, a question needs to be clarified: who can legitimately participate in this constitutional dialogue, in order for the objections to judicial review to be avoided? The argument of this article is that, while deliberative constitutionalism is a promising alternative that takes note of the objections to judicial review as well as the deliberative turn in democratic theory, not all of its variants take both of these aspects seriously. To assuage the objections to judicial review, we need a variant of deliberative constitutionalism that is oriented towards inclusive dialogue, and which addresses the whole constitutional system, rather than only intrajudicial, transjudicial and interinstitutional dialogue.
{"title":"Pushing the boundaries of deliberative constitutionalism","authors":"C Ignacio Giuffré","doi":"10.4000/revus.9695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9695","url":null,"abstract":"Deliberative constitutionalism is a theory that has arrived at the centre of the academic debate in recent decades. Its novelty and interest lie in the fact that it offers a way to escape the objections to judicial review through a commitment to the premises of deliberative democracy. In this context, however, a question needs to be clarified: who can legitimately participate in this constitutional dialogue, in order for the objections to judicial review to be avoided? The argument of this article is that, while deliberative constitutionalism is a promising alternative that takes note of the objections to judicial review as well as the deliberative turn in democratic theory, not all of its variants take both of these aspects seriously. To assuage the objections to judicial review, we need a variant of deliberative constitutionalism that is oriented towards inclusive dialogue, and which addresses the whole constitutional system, rather than only intrajudicial, transjudicial and interinstitutional dialogue.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135753121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sentencias judiciales con premisas fácticas falsas","authors":"Diego Dei Vecchi","doi":"10.4000/revus.9406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9406","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41957032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judicial rulings with false factual premises","authors":"Diego Dei Vecchi","doi":"10.4000/revus.9655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9655","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43453582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are there any elements of juridicity beyond positive law in Robert Alexy’s non-positivism?","authors":"P. Popović","doi":"10.4000/revus.9460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9460","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41355027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Una teoría conjuntista de la derogación: sistemas y conjuntos","authors":"Sebastián Agüero-SanJuan","doi":"10.4000/revus.9589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9589","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44436461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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