ABSTRACT: Humans have a proclivity for creating good-evil dualities. If accounting is fundamentally naming and counting and if these good-evil dualities are examples of naming (the two parts of the duality) and counting (one part counts more on a goodness scale than the other part), then this proclivity for creating good-evil dualities represents a proclivity for the practice of accounting. Through a chain of translations as described by Bruno Latour, the practice of accounting subsequently reproduces itself and infuses itself into more and more areas of daily life (Latour 1987, 1998). The consequence of these assumptions would be that accounting is an inherent characteristic of our humanity, and the expansion of accounting would be inevitable. To be human would be to account, and humanity would evolve to do more accounting. But is it?
{"title":"To Be Human Is To Account","authors":"A. Frandsen, E. McGoun","doi":"10.2308/API.2010.10.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2010.10.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Humans have a proclivity for creating good-evil dualities. If accounting is fundamentally naming and counting and if these good-evil dualities are examples of naming (the two parts of the duality) and counting (one part counts more on a goodness scale than the other part), then this proclivity for creating good-evil dualities represents a proclivity for the practice of accounting. Through a chain of translations as described by Bruno Latour, the practice of accounting subsequently reproduces itself and infuses itself into more and more areas of daily life (Latour 1987, 1998). The consequence of these assumptions would be that accounting is an inherent characteristic of our humanity, and the expansion of accounting would be inevitable. To be human would be to account, and humanity would evolve to do more accounting. But is it?","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"10 1","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2010.10.1.1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-01DOI: 10.2308/API.2010.10.1.105
Cecily A. Raiborn, Marc F. Massoud
ABSTRACT: This paper briefly describes cap and trade programs. Emission allowances in such programs can be used, sold, or retired by recipient companies. Such allowances provide value for the recipient organization and necessitate the determination of proper accounting for their receipt. The accounting suggested by IFRIC 3 is discussed and suggestions are made as to alternative methods to account for emission allowances. However, to truly provide companies with financial incentive to reduce emissions and to retire, rather than sell, their emission allowances, public policy needs to be changed to provide a tax incentive equivalent to the fair market value of retired allowances to compliant companies.
{"title":"Emissions Allowances: Accounting and Public Policy Issues","authors":"Cecily A. Raiborn, Marc F. Massoud","doi":"10.2308/API.2010.10.1.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2010.10.1.105","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This paper briefly describes cap and trade programs. Emission allowances in such programs can be used, sold, or retired by recipient companies. Such allowances provide value for the recipient organization and necessitate the determination of proper accounting for their receipt. The accounting suggested by IFRIC 3 is discussed and suggestions are made as to alternative methods to account for emission allowances. However, to truly provide companies with financial incentive to reduce emissions and to retire, rather than sell, their emission allowances, public policy needs to be changed to provide a tax incentive equivalent to the fair market value of retired allowances to compliant companies.","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"10 1","pages":"105-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2010.10.1.105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.2308/API.2009.9.1.100
Sharad Asthana
ABSTRACT: This paper examines if the management of qualified pension plans is affected by the mix of plan participants. Evidence is presented that defined‐benefit pension plans that are dominated by highly compensated employees tend to contribute beyond the minimum amount required under the Internal Revenue Code (flow effect), resulting in overfunded plans (stock effect), and then use of aggressive actuarial assumptions to disguise the overfunding to avoid visibility costs (reporting effect). These effects are less likely when the sponsoring firm has an active labor union (monitoring effect). These findings will be of interest to the federal government, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, employees, and labor unions.
{"title":"Participant-mix and management of qualified pension plans","authors":"Sharad Asthana","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.100","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This paper examines if the management of qualified pension plans is affected by the mix of plan participants. Evidence is presented that defined‐benefit pension plans that are dominated by highly compensated employees tend to contribute beyond the minimum amount required under the Internal Revenue Code (flow effect), resulting in overfunded plans (stock effect), and then use of aggressive actuarial assumptions to disguise the overfunding to avoid visibility costs (reporting effect). These effects are less likely when the sponsoring firm has an active labor union (monitoring effect). These findings will be of interest to the federal government, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, employees, and labor unions.","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"9 1","pages":"100-128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.2308/1530-9320-10.1.138
Paul F. Williams
Accounting and the Public Interest is a completely electronic journal published by the Public Interest Section of the AAA. There is one editor and two associate editors; the associate editors are selected by the editor as are the members of the editorial board. All submissions are electronic and go to the editor. The editor reads each submission to determine whether the paper is of sufficient substance to be sent to reviewers. It is the unusual case that the editor ends the process at this stage, but it has occurred during my tenure as editor. Based on the subject matter of the paper, the editor selects two reviewers based on their qualifications to review the paper. Each reviewer is sent a copy of the paper, a reviewer form for providing his or her recommendation and an email requesting the review (no paper copies of anything are exchanged among authors, editor or reviewers). When the reviews are returned, the editor considers the comments and recommendations and decides whether the review process should continue. If so, the editor provides an email to the author(s) describing the revisions that seem appropriate along with the comments of the reviewers. This process proceeds iteratively through successive revisions until either an acceptable paper is produced or the decision is made that progress toward producing a publishable paper is not occurring and the review process is ended. The role of the associate editors is twofold. The first responsibility of the associate editors is to advise the editor on problematic cases, which may include being a third reviewer. The second responsibility is to act as the editor in those cases where the editor deems it appropriate to recuse himself from the process, e.g., if the author is a close colleague. In this circumstance it is the associate editor that makes the decision regarding the disposition of the paper. This has been the process during my term as editor. Starting January 1, 2010, Professor Robin Roberts of the University of Central Florida assumed the editor position. He may very well make some changes to the process just described, particularly since he will be using the automated submission process recently made available to all AAA publications.
{"title":"Accounting and the Public Interest Editor's Report","authors":"Paul F. Williams","doi":"10.2308/1530-9320-10.1.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/1530-9320-10.1.138","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting and the Public Interest is a completely electronic journal published by the Public Interest Section of the AAA. There is one editor and two associate editors; the associate editors are selected by the editor as are the members of the editorial board. All submissions are electronic and go to the editor. The editor reads each submission to determine whether the paper is of sufficient substance to be sent to reviewers. It is the unusual case that the editor ends the process at this stage, but it has occurred during my tenure as editor. Based on the subject matter of the paper, the editor selects two reviewers based on their qualifications to review the paper. Each reviewer is sent a copy of the paper, a reviewer form for providing his or her recommendation and an email requesting the review (no paper copies of anything are exchanged among authors, editor or reviewers). When the reviews are returned, the editor considers the comments and recommendations and decides whether the review process should continue. If so, the editor provides an email to the author(s) describing the revisions that seem appropriate along with the comments of the reviewers. This process proceeds iteratively through successive revisions until either an acceptable paper is produced or the decision is made that progress toward producing a publishable paper is not occurring and the review process is ended. The role of the associate editors is twofold. The first responsibility of the associate editors is to advise the editor on problematic cases, which may include being a third reviewer. The second responsibility is to act as the editor in those cases where the editor deems it appropriate to recuse himself from the process, e.g., if the author is a close colleague. In this circumstance it is the associate editor that makes the decision regarding the disposition of the paper. This has been the process during my term as editor. Starting January 1, 2010, Professor Robin Roberts of the University of Central Florida assumed the editor position. He may very well make some changes to the process just described, particularly since he will be using the automated submission process recently made available to all AAA publications.","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"10 1","pages":"138-141"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/1530-9320-10.1.138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68929600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT: This paper follows up on the discussion on “advising” the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) about social and economic reality. It began with Lee (2006a), was commented upon in Macintosh (2006) and Williams (2006), and closed with a reply to both papers in Lee (2006b). All three authors criticized, in one way or another, the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the fashion in which it attempts to incorporate principle‐based accounting standards into its conceptual framework (CF). The main thrust of these four papers is a critique directed toward the FASB, which has been more concerned with “comparability and consistency” than with “identifying improved ways of recognizing and representing social‐constructed reality and truthful correspondence in the light of principle‐based accounting standards” (Lee 2006a, 1). Thereby, Lee promotes Searle's (1995) theory of constructing social reality. The primary purpose of the current paper is to show that the methodology of the “onion model of r...
{"title":"FASB and Social Reality—An Alternate Realist View","authors":"R. Mattessich","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.39","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This paper follows up on the discussion on “advising” the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) about social and economic reality. It began with Lee (2006a), was commented upon in Macintosh (2006) and Williams (2006), and closed with a reply to both papers in Lee (2006b). All three authors criticized, in one way or another, the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the fashion in which it attempts to incorporate principle‐based accounting standards into its conceptual framework (CF). The main thrust of these four papers is a critique directed toward the FASB, which has been more concerned with “comparability and consistency” than with “identifying improved ways of recognizing and representing social‐constructed reality and truthful correspondence in the light of principle‐based accounting standards” (Lee 2006a, 1). Thereby, Lee promotes Searle's (1995) theory of constructing social reality. The primary purpose of the current paper is to show that the methodology of the “onion model of r...","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"115 1","pages":"39-64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.39","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT: Accounting professionals, researchers, business leaders, and government officials have called for reform of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. Critics question both the substance of the law and the legislative process by which it was enacted. Criticism of the process challenges whether the congressional hearings and other legislative steps that led to enactment of the bill were balanced and thorough, or whether political drivers made quick passage an imperative for lawmakers regardless of the merits of the legislation. This paper examines the congressional hearings in the context of a single provision of the Act: the ban that prohibits accounting firms from providing internal audit services to their external audit clients. We identify the arguments for and against the ban, and we examine the role these arguments played in the testimony that witnesses provided to the House and Senate committees most responsible for the legislation. We find that witnesses offered strong arguments both for and against...
{"title":"The Congressional Ban on Nonaudit Services: “Reasoned and Reasonable” or “Quack Corporate Governance”","authors":"D. Caplan, Diane J. Janvrin, J. Kurtenbach","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.73","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Accounting professionals, researchers, business leaders, and government officials have called for reform of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. Critics question both the substance of the law and the legislative process by which it was enacted. Criticism of the process challenges whether the congressional hearings and other legislative steps that led to enactment of the bill were balanced and thorough, or whether political drivers made quick passage an imperative for lawmakers regardless of the merits of the legislation. This paper examines the congressional hearings in the context of a single provision of the Act: the ban that prohibits accounting firms from providing internal audit services to their external audit clients. We identify the arguments for and against the ban, and we examine the role these arguments played in the testimony that witnesses provided to the House and Senate committees most responsible for the legislation. We find that witnesses offered strong arguments both for and against...","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"117 1","pages":"73-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.2308/API.2009.9.1.191
M. Curtis, E. Taylor
ABSTRACT: Public accounting firms rely on effective reporting of unethical behavior (whistleblowing) as a form of corporate governance. This study presents results from a survey of 122 in‐charge level auditors, who indicated their likelihood of internal whistleblowing under three forms of identity disclosure for three independent scenarios. Reporting likelihood was significantly lower under a disclosed identity format, while there was no significant difference in likelihood between anonymous and protected identity formats. Contrasts reveal a significantly higher likelihood of reporting audit standards violations than a professional code violation. Likelihood was also positively related to measures of trust that the firm would investigate and act on the reported incident. Personal characteristics (i.e., locus of control and ethical style) were significant antecedents to whistleblowing intentions. Findings should aid public accounting firms and organizational governance researchers in their understanding of...
{"title":"Whistleblowing in Public Accounting: Influence of Identity Disclosure, Situational Context, and Personal Characteristics","authors":"M. Curtis, E. Taylor","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.191","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Public accounting firms rely on effective reporting of unethical behavior (whistleblowing) as a form of corporate governance. This study presents results from a survey of 122 in‐charge level auditors, who indicated their likelihood of internal whistleblowing under three forms of identity disclosure for three independent scenarios. Reporting likelihood was significantly lower under a disclosed identity format, while there was no significant difference in likelihood between anonymous and protected identity formats. Contrasts reveal a significantly higher likelihood of reporting audit standards violations than a professional code violation. Likelihood was also positively related to measures of trust that the firm would investigate and act on the reported incident. Personal characteristics (i.e., locus of control and ethical style) were significant antecedents to whistleblowing intentions. Findings should aid public accounting firms and organizational governance researchers in their understanding of...","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"9 1","pages":"191-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.191","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT: Mattessich (2009) is a response to a previous discussion on the ontology and epistemology of social reality in accounting by Lee (2006a, 2006b), Macintosh (2006), and Williams (2006). The original discussion was motivated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) (2002a) commitment to introduce principles‐based accounting standards (PBAS) based on its conceptual framework (CF). Lee (2006a, 2006b) argues that PBAS requires the FASB to recognize social reality in its CF. While agreeing with this argument generally, Mattessich (2009) states that, compared to the social reality construction model (SRCM) of Searle (1995) adopted by Lee (2006a), the onion model of reality (OMR) is more relevant to standard setters such as the FASB when they consider social reality in accounting. The purpose of this response to Mattessich (2009) is to contrast the SRCM and the OMR in the context of accounting for social reality, the FASB's ongoing revision of its CF, and recent accounting events in the globa...
{"title":"The Ontology and Epistemology of Social Reality in Accounting According to Mattessich","authors":"Thomas A. Lee","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.65","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Mattessich (2009) is a response to a previous discussion on the ontology and epistemology of social reality in accounting by Lee (2006a, 2006b), Macintosh (2006), and Williams (2006). The original discussion was motivated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) (2002a) commitment to introduce principles‐based accounting standards (PBAS) based on its conceptual framework (CF). Lee (2006a, 2006b) argues that PBAS requires the FASB to recognize social reality in its CF. While agreeing with this argument generally, Mattessich (2009) states that, compared to the social reality construction model (SRCM) of Searle (1995) adopted by Lee (2006a), the onion model of reality (OMR) is more relevant to standard setters such as the FASB when they consider social reality in accounting. The purpose of this response to Mattessich (2009) is to contrast the SRCM and the OMR in the context of accounting for social reality, the FASB's ongoing revision of its CF, and recent accounting events in the globa...","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"9 1","pages":"65-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.65","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.2308/API.2009.9.1.129
P. Kelly, Christine E. Earley
ABSTRACT: Leader actions are considered by many to be one of the major influences on an organization's culture. This paper examines actions taken by leaders at Arthur Andersen, driven by the emphasis on profit growth over audit proficiency beginning in the 1980s, that were not consistent with certain cultural features fundamental to the firm's value system in its early years. We examine the actions of Andersen's leaders in the context of Schein's (2004) theories of organizational culture, and conclude actions of the firm's leaders appear to have adversely affected the organizational culture and contributed to Andersen's eventual demise. The lessons learned from Arthur Andersen can benefit others in the profession, along with students who will be entering the profession and educators who are preparing them for future challenges.
{"title":"Leadership and Organizational Culture: Lessons Learned from Arthur Andersen","authors":"P. Kelly, Christine E. Earley","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.129","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Leader actions are considered by many to be one of the major influences on an organization's culture. This paper examines actions taken by leaders at Arthur Andersen, driven by the emphasis on profit growth over audit proficiency beginning in the 1980s, that were not consistent with certain cultural features fundamental to the firm's value system in its early years. We examine the actions of Andersen's leaders in the context of Schein's (2004) theories of organizational culture, and conclude actions of the firm's leaders appear to have adversely affected the organizational culture and contributed to Andersen's eventual demise. The lessons learned from Arthur Andersen can benefit others in the profession, along with students who will be entering the profession and educators who are preparing them for future challenges.","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"9 1","pages":"129-147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.129","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-01DOI: 10.2308/API.2009.9.1.166
Adam S. Maiga, F. Jacobs
ABSTRACT: For profit (FP) health care institutions are becoming more common, even dominant in many communities, and consumers and payers are demanding high‐quality services at reasonable and affordable costs. Hence, health care managers must find ways to provide services to meet these requirements. One of the motivations for conversions of health care institutions from not‐for‐profit (NFP) was the expectation that the profit motive would likely enhance the efficiency of the entire industry, because economic considerations suggest that market competition improves economic growth. This improvement comes from efficiency gains, lower prices, and enhanced quality. This study uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate the relationships among leadership, clinical quality, process quality, patient satisfaction, cost improvement, and hospital performance, using a 2006 survey sample of 313 for‐profit community hospitals. Results indicate significant positive impact of leadership on both clinical quality...
{"title":"Leadership, nonfinancial, and financial outcomes : The case of community hospitals","authors":"Adam S. Maiga, F. Jacobs","doi":"10.2308/API.2009.9.1.166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.166","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: For profit (FP) health care institutions are becoming more common, even dominant in many communities, and consumers and payers are demanding high‐quality services at reasonable and affordable costs. Hence, health care managers must find ways to provide services to meet these requirements. One of the motivations for conversions of health care institutions from not‐for‐profit (NFP) was the expectation that the profit motive would likely enhance the efficiency of the entire industry, because economic considerations suggest that market competition improves economic growth. This improvement comes from efficiency gains, lower prices, and enhanced quality. This study uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate the relationships among leadership, clinical quality, process quality, patient satisfaction, cost improvement, and hospital performance, using a 2006 survey sample of 313 for‐profit community hospitals. Results indicate significant positive impact of leadership on both clinical quality...","PeriodicalId":38883,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and the Public Interest","volume":"9 1","pages":"166-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2308/API.2009.9.1.166","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68953111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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