Abstract When the COVID-19 pandemic added to already elevated debt vulnerabilities in low-income countries, the G20 launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI, which have provided limited relief so far. For several countries, deeper and more wide-ranging debt treatments will likely be needed to secure future debt sustainability. This paper looks at the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, the largest and most comprehensive debt relief effort for low-income countries to date, as a potential reference point for the 2020s. While the HIPC initiative appears to have been a qualified success, its replication in the current context would be infeasible and undesirable. Creditor base heterogeneity justifies a more flexible, differentiated approach to debt restructuring. Yet, the HIPC experience holds valuable lessons. “Delay and replay” tendencies should be avoided. Involving commercial creditors is a real challenge, requiring carrots and sticks. And imposing extra conditionality on debt relief proceeds could be helpful but should not be overdone. Even if the Common Framework is unlikely to suffice in case of a systemic debt crisis, its inter-creditor dialogue could perhaps serve as the basis for a more inclusive advisory body or forum for debt restructuring.
{"title":"Towards HIPC 2.0? Lessons from Past Debt Relief Initiatives for Addressing Current Debt Problems","authors":"D. Essers, D. Cassimon","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0051","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When the COVID-19 pandemic added to already elevated debt vulnerabilities in low-income countries, the G20 launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI, which have provided limited relief so far. For several countries, deeper and more wide-ranging debt treatments will likely be needed to secure future debt sustainability. This paper looks at the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, the largest and most comprehensive debt relief effort for low-income countries to date, as a potential reference point for the 2020s. While the HIPC initiative appears to have been a qualified success, its replication in the current context would be infeasible and undesirable. Creditor base heterogeneity justifies a more flexible, differentiated approach to debt restructuring. Yet, the HIPC experience holds valuable lessons. “Delay and replay” tendencies should be avoided. Involving commercial creditors is a real challenge, requiring carrots and sticks. And imposing extra conditionality on debt relief proceeds could be helpful but should not be overdone. Even if the Common Framework is unlikely to suffice in case of a systemic debt crisis, its inter-creditor dialogue could perhaps serve as the basis for a more inclusive advisory body or forum for debt restructuring.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"187 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43121745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis marked a turning point in the IMF’s previously negative views on the usefulness of capital account restrictions, culminating eventually in the publication of the Fund’s new Institutional View (IV) on the topic in 2012. The IV acknowledged that full capital account liberalization may not always be appropriate, accepted that new restrictions could at times have a useful role to play even in countries that had previously liberalized, and spelled out a specific set of circumstances under which the deploying of new restrictions could be justified as temporary measures in response to large capital flows. This paper documents the important role that empirical research, both by the profession at large as well as by the Fund’s own staff, played in supporting the first two components of the IV. It argues, however, that, empirical support is lacking with respect to the third component of the IV: the conditions under which the deployment of temporary capital account restrictions may be desirable. The conditions stipulated under the IV, which have the effect of considerably restricting the scope of circumstances in which the use of restrictions may be appropriate, are not fully justified by empirical evidence or recent experience and are best understood simply as a vestige of the institution’s pre-IV hostility to the use of restrictions.
{"title":"IMF Advice on Capital Flows: How Well is it Supported by Empirical Evidence?","authors":"P. Montiel","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis marked a turning point in the IMF’s previously negative views on the usefulness of capital account restrictions, culminating eventually in the publication of the Fund’s new Institutional View (IV) on the topic in 2012. The IV acknowledged that full capital account liberalization may not always be appropriate, accepted that new restrictions could at times have a useful role to play even in countries that had previously liberalized, and spelled out a specific set of circumstances under which the deploying of new restrictions could be justified as temporary measures in response to large capital flows. This paper documents the important role that empirical research, both by the profession at large as well as by the Fund’s own staff, played in supporting the first two components of the IV. It argues, however, that, empirical support is lacking with respect to the third component of the IV: the conditions under which the deployment of temporary capital account restrictions may be desirable. The conditions stipulated under the IV, which have the effect of considerably restricting the scope of circumstances in which the use of restrictions may be appropriate, are not fully justified by empirical evidence or recent experience and are best understood simply as a vestige of the institution’s pre-IV hostility to the use of restrictions.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"149 - 186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48807160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Although climate change poses a serious threat to macrofinancial stability and economic development, the global financial safety has so far failed to sufficiently address this challenge. This article reviews the extent to which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has started to integrate climate change in its analytical and operational frameworks, showing significant shortcomings in addressing the risks emanating from climate change. Regional financing arrangements (RFAs) have to date not engaged or only very little in addressing climate-related risks. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the IMF and also RFAs need to climate-proof their policies and frameworks and puts forward eight recommendations: (i) mainstream systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related financial risks in all operations; (ii) introduce consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and treatment of physical and transition risks in surveillance and monitoring for all countries; (iii) ensure that all policy recommendations are aligned with the Paris climate goals; (iv) advance disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promote sustainable finance and investment practices; (v) support member countries in mainstreaming climate risk analysis in public financial management; (vi) support climate-vulnerable countries in dealing with debt sustainability problems; (vii) develop lending instruments for climate emergency financing; and (viii) in the case of the IMF, explore options to use SDRs to support climate-vulnerable countries.
{"title":"Climate-Proofing the Global Financial Safety Net","authors":"Ulrich Volz","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2020-0085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2020-0085","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although climate change poses a serious threat to macrofinancial stability and economic development, the global financial safety has so far failed to sufficiently address this challenge. This article reviews the extent to which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has started to integrate climate change in its analytical and operational frameworks, showing significant shortcomings in addressing the risks emanating from climate change. Regional financing arrangements (RFAs) have to date not engaged or only very little in addressing climate-related risks. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the IMF and also RFAs need to climate-proof their policies and frameworks and puts forward eight recommendations: (i) mainstream systematic and transparent assessments of climate-related financial risks in all operations; (ii) introduce consistent, systematic, and universal appraisal and treatment of physical and transition risks in surveillance and monitoring for all countries; (iii) ensure that all policy recommendations are aligned with the Paris climate goals; (iv) advance disclosure of climate-related financial risks and promote sustainable finance and investment practices; (v) support member countries in mainstreaming climate risk analysis in public financial management; (vi) support climate-vulnerable countries in dealing with debt sustainability problems; (vii) develop lending instruments for climate emergency financing; and (viii) in the case of the IMF, explore options to use SDRs to support climate-vulnerable countries.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45162842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The global financial safety net (GFSN) has become increasingly voluminous and complex. The ever-increasing capacity for crisis prevention and liquidity support of emergency financing institutions and arrangements at the bilateral, regional, and global level sums up to a total lending capacity of at least US$ 3.5 trillion (Mühlich, L., B. Fritz, W. N. Kring, and K. P. Gallagher. 2020. The Global Financial Safety Net Tracker: Lessons for the COVID-19 Crisis from a New Interactive Dataset. GEGI Policy Brief 10. Boston: Global Development Policy Center. Also available at:www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/04/GEGI-GDP_PolicyBrief_FInal.pdf). This represents a more than tenfold increase to available short-term liquidity compared to before the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Yet despite this tremendous increase in resources, the GFSN remains scarcely utilized throughout the COVID-19 crisis. This article develops a framework, that builds upon concepts in economics and international political economy, to analyze GFSN inefficiencies and to evaluate the utilization of the GFSN. Combining balance of payments models with the concept of regime complexity, we analyze and compare patterns of GFSN utilization in response to COVID-19 with past usage. We ask if the current GFSN is adequately built to efficiently respond to such a crisis. We are especially interested in examining the role that the six existing RFAs between EMDEs play in the GFSN.
{"title":"No One Left Behind? Assessing the Global Financial Safety Net Performance During COVID-19","authors":"Laurissa Mühlich, B. Fritz, William Kring","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The global financial safety net (GFSN) has become increasingly voluminous and complex. The ever-increasing capacity for crisis prevention and liquidity support of emergency financing institutions and arrangements at the bilateral, regional, and global level sums up to a total lending capacity of at least US$ 3.5 trillion (Mühlich, L., B. Fritz, W. N. Kring, and K. P. Gallagher. 2020. The Global Financial Safety Net Tracker: Lessons for the COVID-19 Crisis from a New Interactive Dataset. GEGI Policy Brief 10. Boston: Global Development Policy Center. Also available at:www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/04/GEGI-GDP_PolicyBrief_FInal.pdf). This represents a more than tenfold increase to available short-term liquidity compared to before the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Yet despite this tremendous increase in resources, the GFSN remains scarcely utilized throughout the COVID-19 crisis. This article develops a framework, that builds upon concepts in economics and international political economy, to analyze GFSN inefficiencies and to evaluate the utilization of the GFSN. Combining balance of payments models with the concept of regime complexity, we analyze and compare patterns of GFSN utilization in response to COVID-19 with past usage. We ask if the current GFSN is adequately built to efficiently respond to such a crisis. We are especially interested in examining the role that the six existing RFAs between EMDEs play in the GFSN.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"123 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43236378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reformed its lending arrangements and conditionality. Thereafter, it has pursued “parsimony,” emphasizing headline fiscal adjustments rather than detailed budgetary changes. This paper analyzes the extent to which these reforms have resulted in changes to the overall austerity required by IMF agreements. We create a new variable measuring the level of fiscal consolidation required in each IMF program from 2001 through 2021 the IMF Fiscal Adjustment Indicator (IMF FAI). We explore whether IMF austerity eased after the financial crisis and the later COVID-19 pandemic. We also estimate the economic and political determinants that help explain varying levels of IMF austerity across IMF programs during this period. We find that IMF conditions were less austere for the years of 2009 and 2020, but quickly returned to their previous levels, echoing the IMF’s advice to “keep the receipts” during crises. However, these temporary relaxations were not statistically significant, pointing to overarching continuity. We find that countries that were granted relatively more lenient conditionality were found to be those with closer relations with major shareholders of the IMF: Western Europe and the United States. In contrast, countries with close diplomatic relations with China face higher IMF austerity.
{"title":"“Keep the Receipts:” The Political Economy of IMF Austerity During and After the Crisis Years of 2009 and 2020","authors":"Rebecca Ray, K. Gallagher, William Kring","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reformed its lending arrangements and conditionality. Thereafter, it has pursued “parsimony,” emphasizing headline fiscal adjustments rather than detailed budgetary changes. This paper analyzes the extent to which these reforms have resulted in changes to the overall austerity required by IMF agreements. We create a new variable measuring the level of fiscal consolidation required in each IMF program from 2001 through 2021 the IMF Fiscal Adjustment Indicator (IMF FAI). We explore whether IMF austerity eased after the financial crisis and the later COVID-19 pandemic. We also estimate the economic and political determinants that help explain varying levels of IMF austerity across IMF programs during this period. We find that IMF conditions were less austere for the years of 2009 and 2020, but quickly returned to their previous levels, echoing the IMF’s advice to “keep the receipts” during crises. However, these temporary relaxations were not statistically significant, pointing to overarching continuity. We find that countries that were granted relatively more lenient conditionality were found to be those with closer relations with major shareholders of the IMF: Western Europe and the United States. In contrast, countries with close diplomatic relations with China face higher IMF austerity.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"31 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41809499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We analyze recent theoretical advances in the area of capital flow management and compare them with the IMF’s policy frameworks in the area, as laid out in the IMF’s Institutional View and related documents. Although the Institutional View represented an important leap forward, we discuss several tensions with the academic literature. We also emphasize the important role that the IMF guidance could play in building a better set of policy instruments to deal with volatile capital flows. More broadly, individual countries need sufficient policy space to pursue their individual welfare objectives. Finally, we propose how to strengthen the IMF’s analytical framework for international spillovers.
{"title":"Managing Capital Flows: Theoretical Advances and IMF Policy Frameworks","authors":"Anton Korinek","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze recent theoretical advances in the area of capital flow management and compare them with the IMF’s policy frameworks in the area, as laid out in the IMF’s Institutional View and related documents. Although the Institutional View represented an important leap forward, we discuss several tensions with the academic literature. We also emphasize the important role that the IMF guidance could play in building a better set of policy instruments to deal with volatile capital flows. More broadly, individual countries need sufficient policy space to pursue their individual welfare objectives. Finally, we propose how to strengthen the IMF’s analytical framework for international spillovers.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"91 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45712413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Stubbs, Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Rebecca Ray, K. Gallagher
Abstract Among the drivers of socio-economic development, this article focuses on an important yet insufficiently understood international-level determinant: the spread of austerity policies to the developing world by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In offering loans to developing countries in exchange for policy reforms, the IMF typically sets the fiscal parameters within which development occurs. Using an original dataset of IMF-mandated austerity targets, we examine how policy reforms prescribed in IMF programs affect inequality and poverty. Our empirical analyses span a panel of up to 79 countries for the period 2002–2018. Using instrumentation techniques, we control for the possibility that these relationships are driven by the IMF imposing harsher austerity measures precisely in countries with more problematic economies. Our findings show that stricter austerity is associated with greater income inequality for up to two years, and that this effect is driven by concentrating income to the top 10% of earners while all other deciles lose out. We also find that stricter austerity is associated with higher poverty headcounts and poverty gaps. Taken together, our findings suggest that the IMF neglects the multiple ways its own policy advice contributed to social inequity in the developing world.
{"title":"Poverty, Inequality, and the International Monetary Fund: How Austerity Hurts the Poor and Widens Inequality","authors":"Thomas Stubbs, Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Rebecca Ray, K. Gallagher","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Among the drivers of socio-economic development, this article focuses on an important yet insufficiently understood international-level determinant: the spread of austerity policies to the developing world by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In offering loans to developing countries in exchange for policy reforms, the IMF typically sets the fiscal parameters within which development occurs. Using an original dataset of IMF-mandated austerity targets, we examine how policy reforms prescribed in IMF programs affect inequality and poverty. Our empirical analyses span a panel of up to 79 countries for the period 2002–2018. Using instrumentation techniques, we control for the possibility that these relationships are driven by the IMF imposing harsher austerity measures precisely in countries with more problematic economies. Our findings show that stricter austerity is associated with greater income inequality for up to two years, and that this effect is driven by concentrating income to the top 10% of earners while all other deciles lose out. We also find that stricter austerity is associated with higher poverty headcounts and poverty gaps. Taken together, our findings suggest that the IMF neglects the multiple ways its own policy advice contributed to social inequity in the developing world.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"13 1","pages":"61 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41936767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mustafiz Rahman, V. Wirtz, W. Kaplan, R. Thrasher, K. Gallagher
Abstract Over the past four decades Bangladesh has built enough domestic productive capacity in the pharmaceuticals and related industries to generate manufacturing capacity and employment to provide access to medicines in the country and to become a modest exporter of medicines as well. This paper traces the role played by government policy in fostering Bangladesh’s burgeoning pharmaceuticals sector and then examines the extent to which such policies would have been permissible under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and the rules of recent trade and investment treaties. Bangladesh has not had to adhere to such rules given its status as a Least Developed Country (LDC) but will face those rules as it may graduate from LDC status in the coming years. We find that a significant amount of Bangladesh’s policies would not have been permitted under the WTO, and even more policy space would be constrained under other regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties. These findings reveal that Bangladesh will face a series of challenges as it graduates from LDC status in its efforts to build its domestic pharmaceutical industry moving forward. Our findings also pinpoint challenges for current WTO and other trade and investment treaty members who now seek to build domestic productive capacity in this sector in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
{"title":"Policy Space for Building Production Capabilities in the Pharmaceuticals Sector in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Evidence from Bangladesh","authors":"Mustafiz Rahman, V. Wirtz, W. Kaplan, R. Thrasher, K. Gallagher","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the past four decades Bangladesh has built enough domestic productive capacity in the pharmaceuticals and related industries to generate manufacturing capacity and employment to provide access to medicines in the country and to become a modest exporter of medicines as well. This paper traces the role played by government policy in fostering Bangladesh’s burgeoning pharmaceuticals sector and then examines the extent to which such policies would have been permissible under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and the rules of recent trade and investment treaties. Bangladesh has not had to adhere to such rules given its status as a Least Developed Country (LDC) but will face those rules as it may graduate from LDC status in the coming years. We find that a significant amount of Bangladesh’s policies would not have been permitted under the WTO, and even more policy space would be constrained under other regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties. These findings reveal that Bangladesh will face a series of challenges as it graduates from LDC status in its efforts to build its domestic pharmaceutical industry moving forward. Our findings also pinpoint challenges for current WTO and other trade and investment treaty members who now seek to build domestic productive capacity in this sector in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"12 1","pages":"221 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42430985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the context of a managed float regime, we adopt the portfolio balance view to show the effects of the net foreign assets of an economy and its gross international reserves level on interest rate differentials. We argue that the interest rate differential can be explained by three components, where the components are the expected depreciation of the domestic currency, a default risk premium, and a portfolio balance premium. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the interest differential is a convex function of the level of gross international reserves. In particular, the differential and gross reserves are inversely related at low levels of reserves, but positively at higher levels. We evaluate our framework for the case of Lebanon. We find that the differential is inversely related to both net foreign assets and gross international reserves. These findings are then confirmed with data from Indonesia and Mexico.
{"title":"Emerging Markets Interest Rates, International Reserves and Net Foreign Assets","authors":"Joseph Bitar, Martin Boileau","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2020-0079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2020-0079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the context of a managed float regime, we adopt the portfolio balance view to show the effects of the net foreign assets of an economy and its gross international reserves level on interest rate differentials. We argue that the interest rate differential can be explained by three components, where the components are the expected depreciation of the domestic currency, a default risk premium, and a portfolio balance premium. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the interest differential is a convex function of the level of gross international reserves. In particular, the differential and gross reserves are inversely related at low levels of reserves, but positively at higher levels. We evaluate our framework for the case of Lebanon. We find that the differential is inversely related to both net foreign assets and gross international reserves. These findings are then confirmed with data from Indonesia and Mexico.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"12 1","pages":"145 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42393491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper discusses some of the intertemporal political economy issues that arise in the pursuit of real undervaluation to achieve more rapid development. Policy makers face a trade-off between achieving a capital stock target in a given amount of time on the one hand and boosting real wages in the short-run, on the other. This generates a trilemma whereby development-focused policy makers can choose to pursue two out of three desirables: (1) use the real exchange rate as an instrument of development policy, (2) meet the development target within a politically relevant time frame, and (3) maintain political stability. The optimal path under a policy with “unambitious” aims will resemble the typical electoral business cycle trajectory whereby policy makers maintain real overvaluation over much of the cycle. By contrast, achieving ambitious capital stock/development targets within a relatively short time requires the potentially unpopular strategy of choosing a highly undervalued real exchange rate at the beginning of the planning horizon and gradually increasing the degree of undervaluation thereafter as wages rise. Relevant structural differences between countries imply different initial levels of real undervaluation, distinct optimal trajectories over time, and hence, varying degrees of trade-offs.
{"title":"The Real Exchange Rate Policy Trilemma in Surplus-Labor Developing Economies","authors":"A. Razmi","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2021-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2021-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper discusses some of the intertemporal political economy issues that arise in the pursuit of real undervaluation to achieve more rapid development. Policy makers face a trade-off between achieving a capital stock target in a given amount of time on the one hand and boosting real wages in the short-run, on the other. This generates a trilemma whereby development-focused policy makers can choose to pursue two out of three desirables: (1) use the real exchange rate as an instrument of development policy, (2) meet the development target within a politically relevant time frame, and (3) maintain political stability. The optimal path under a policy with “unambitious” aims will resemble the typical electoral business cycle trajectory whereby policy makers maintain real overvaluation over much of the cycle. By contrast, achieving ambitious capital stock/development targets within a relatively short time requires the potentially unpopular strategy of choosing a highly undervalued real exchange rate at the beginning of the planning horizon and gradually increasing the degree of undervaluation thereafter as wages rise. Relevant structural differences between countries imply different initial levels of real undervaluation, distinct optimal trajectories over time, and hence, varying degrees of trade-offs.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"12 1","pages":"263 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48680901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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