Abstract In recent years, a number of costly and destabilizing sovereign debt crises – from Argentina and Greece to Ukraine – have served as a forceful reminder that the international community lacks an agreed-upon framework for resolving debt crises and, when necessary, restructuring sovereign debt in a timely, orderly, and equitable manner. To help address this apparent governance gap, the paper argues that there is an important but underutilized role for the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in governing sovereign debt restructuring. More specifically, in a governance domain that is relatively fragmented between uncoordinated, even sometimes competing, rules and rule-makers, the FSB could serve as the focal institution responsible for overseeing the coordination and further development of soft law regulatory standards for sovereign debt restructuring. The reasons for FSB governance in this domain are simple and compelling, relating to both the nature of the debt restructuring regime and its evolution to date, as well as the specific institutional features of the FSB and the core tasks it performs. Although there remains room for treaty-based organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) to develop a hard law approach to sovereign debt restructuring, the FSB, we argue, is best positioned to strengthen and oversee the existing soft law approach, which currently prevails as the modus operandi of the present debt restructuring framework.
{"title":"Governing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Through Regulatory Standards","authors":"Skylar J. Brooks, D. Lombardi","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2015-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2015-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, a number of costly and destabilizing sovereign debt crises – from Argentina and Greece to Ukraine – have served as a forceful reminder that the international community lacks an agreed-upon framework for resolving debt crises and, when necessary, restructuring sovereign debt in a timely, orderly, and equitable manner. To help address this apparent governance gap, the paper argues that there is an important but underutilized role for the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in governing sovereign debt restructuring. More specifically, in a governance domain that is relatively fragmented between uncoordinated, even sometimes competing, rules and rule-makers, the FSB could serve as the focal institution responsible for overseeing the coordination and further development of soft law regulatory standards for sovereign debt restructuring. The reasons for FSB governance in this domain are simple and compelling, relating to both the nature of the debt restructuring regime and its evolution to date, as well as the specific institutional features of the FSB and the core tasks it performs. Although there remains room for treaty-based organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) to develop a hard law approach to sovereign debt restructuring, the FSB, we argue, is best positioned to strengthen and oversee the existing soft law approach, which currently prevails as the modus operandi of the present debt restructuring framework.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"287 - 318"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2015-0024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper addresses two discrete but related and essential attributes of an SDRM. It first considers an SDRM that would provide a procedure for proposing and adopting a restructuring plan for a sovereign debtor’s debt which would not involve any tribunal or administrator (a No-Tribunal SDRM). The paper examines the merits and feasibility of a No-Tribunal SDRM. In particular, the No-Tribunal SDRM proposed here would undertake the restructuring as if the sovereign debtor and its creditors were subject to the International Capital Markets Association Model Collective Action Clause regime. Second, this paper addresses the means by which a sovereign debt restructuring plan may become legally binding on a sovereign debtor’s creditors. It focuses on the various legal structures that could be employed to cause a sovereign debtor’s creditors to be legally bound by a restructuring plan – the implementation of a restructuring plan under an SDRM. This matter of binding creditors is an area of legal analysis that is somewhat underdeveloped and neglected in the literature. The paper addresses on implementation of a restructuring plan under a statutory approach – an SDRM imposed by rule of law. The manner of implementing an SDRM may be significant in several contexts, including the acceptability of the SDRM to political actors and market participants, the effectiveness of the operation of an SDRM, and the costs of devising and adopting an SDRM.
{"title":"A No-Tribunal SDRM and the Means of Binding Creditors to the Terms of a Restructuring Plan","authors":"C. Mooney","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2015-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2015-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper addresses two discrete but related and essential attributes of an SDRM. It first considers an SDRM that would provide a procedure for proposing and adopting a restructuring plan for a sovereign debtor’s debt which would not involve any tribunal or administrator (a No-Tribunal SDRM). The paper examines the merits and feasibility of a No-Tribunal SDRM. In particular, the No-Tribunal SDRM proposed here would undertake the restructuring as if the sovereign debtor and its creditors were subject to the International Capital Markets Association Model Collective Action Clause regime. Second, this paper addresses the means by which a sovereign debt restructuring plan may become legally binding on a sovereign debtor’s creditors. It focuses on the various legal structures that could be employed to cause a sovereign debtor’s creditors to be legally bound by a restructuring plan – the implementation of a restructuring plan under an SDRM. This matter of binding creditors is an area of legal analysis that is somewhat underdeveloped and neglected in the literature. The paper addresses on implementation of a restructuring plan under a statutory approach – an SDRM imposed by rule of law. The manner of implementing an SDRM may be significant in several contexts, including the acceptability of the SDRM to political actors and market participants, the effectiveness of the operation of an SDRM, and the costs of devising and adopting an SDRM.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"10 1","pages":"215 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2015-0020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We consider convertible bonds that contractually stipulate payment standstill, contingent on a market indicator of a sovereign’s credit worthiness breaching a distress threshold. This financial innovation limits ex ante the likelihood of debt crises and imposes ex post risk sharing between creditors and the debtor. Drawing from literature on contingent contracts, neglected risks, and bank CoCo, we extend prevailing arguments in favor of sovereign CoCo (S-CoCo). We discuss issues relating to their design: which market trigger, market discipline and sovereign incentives, and errors of false alarms or missed crises, and provide supporting evidence with eurozone data and a simple simulation on the use of S-CoCo. We develop a risk management model using these instruments to trade off the expected cost for sovereign financing over a long horizon, with tail risk. The model shows how contingent bonds can improve a country’s debt risk profile. Using Greece as a case study the model illustrates improvements in expected cost vs. tail risk for the country when using contingent debt.
{"title":"Contingent Convertible Bonds for Sovereign Debt Risk Management","authors":"A. Consiglio, S. Zenios","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2017-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2017-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider convertible bonds that contractually stipulate payment standstill, contingent on a market indicator of a sovereign’s credit worthiness breaching a distress threshold. This financial innovation limits ex ante the likelihood of debt crises and imposes ex post risk sharing between creditors and the debtor. Drawing from literature on contingent contracts, neglected risks, and bank CoCo, we extend prevailing arguments in favor of sovereign CoCo (S-CoCo). We discuss issues relating to their design: which market trigger, market discipline and sovereign incentives, and errors of false alarms or missed crises, and provide supporting evidence with eurozone data and a simple simulation on the use of S-CoCo. We develop a risk management model using these instruments to trade off the expected cost for sovereign financing over a long horizon, with tail risk. The model shows how contingent bonds can improve a country’s debt risk profile. Using Greece as a case study the model illustrates improvements in expected cost vs. tail risk for the country when using contingent debt.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2017-0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66940455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper examines the redistributive impact of fiscal policy for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa using comparable fiscal incidence analysis with data from around 2010. The largest redistributive effect is in South Africa and the smallest in Indonesia. Success in fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by redistributive effort (share of social spending to GDP in each country) and the extent to which transfers/subsidies are targeted to the poor and direct taxes targeted to the rich. While fiscal policy always reduces inequality, this is not the case with poverty. When pensions are not considered a transfer, fiscal policy increases poverty in Brazil (over and above market income poverty) due to high consumption taxes on basic goods. Total spending on education is pro-poor except for Indonesia, where it is neutral in absolute terms. Health spending is pro-poor in Brazil, Chile and South Africa, roughly neutral in absolute terms in Mexico, and not pro-poor in Indonesia and Peru.
{"title":"Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in Middle Income Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa","authors":"N. Lustig","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2016-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2016-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the redistributive impact of fiscal policy for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa using comparable fiscal incidence analysis with data from around 2010. The largest redistributive effect is in South Africa and the smallest in Indonesia. Success in fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by redistributive effort (share of social spending to GDP in each country) and the extent to which transfers/subsidies are targeted to the poor and direct taxes targeted to the rich. While fiscal policy always reduces inequality, this is not the case with poverty. When pensions are not considered a transfer, fiscal policy increases poverty in Brazil (over and above market income poverty) due to high consumption taxes on basic goods. Total spending on education is pro-poor except for Indonesia, where it is neutral in absolute terms. Health spending is pro-poor in Brazil, Chile and South Africa, roughly neutral in absolute terms in Mexico, and not pro-poor in Indonesia and Peru.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"7 1","pages":"17 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2016-0015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66940181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Unlike individuals and corporations, countries indebted beyond their ability to pay cannot use bankruptcy laws to restructure unsustainable debt. The United Nations and the International Monetary Fund have attempted to propose treaties to enable that debt restructuring, but the political difficulties of reaching a worldwide consensus have stymied their efforts. This article argues that a model-law approach to restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt should be feasible and effective because the vast majority of sovereign debt contracts are governed by the laws of either the debtor-state or two other jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions individually could enact a model law to give struggling nations a real prospect of equitably restructuring their debt to sustainable levels. By enabling such debt restructuring, that enactment would also help to foster the norms required to facilitate the development of international treaties.
{"title":"Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach","authors":"S. Schwarcz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2634653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2634653","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Unlike individuals and corporations, countries indebted beyond their ability to pay cannot use bankruptcy laws to restructure unsustainable debt. The United Nations and the International Monetary Fund have attempted to propose treaties to enable that debt restructuring, but the political difficulties of reaching a worldwide consensus have stymied their efforts. This article argues that a model-law approach to restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt should be feasible and effective because the vast majority of sovereign debt contracts are governed by the laws of either the debtor-state or two other jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions individually could enact a model law to give struggling nations a real prospect of equitably restructuring their debt to sustainable levels. By enabling such debt restructuring, that enactment would also help to foster the norms required to facilitate the development of international treaties.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"343 - 385"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68233281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper surveys six widely-used non-experimental methods for estimating treatment effects (instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, direct matching, propensity score matching, linear regression and non-parametric methods, and difference-in-differences), and assesses their internal and external validity relative both to each other and to randomized controlled trials. While randomized controlled trials can achieve the highest degree of internal validity when cleanly implemented in the field, the availability of large, nationally representative data sets offers the opportunity for a high degree of external validity using non-experimental methods. We argue that each method has merits in some context and they are complements rather than substitutes.
{"title":"Experimental and Non-Experimental Methods in Development Economics: A Porous Dialectic","authors":"Rajeev Dehejia","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2014-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2014-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper surveys six widely-used non-experimental methods for estimating treatment effects (instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, direct matching, propensity score matching, linear regression and non-parametric methods, and difference-in-differences), and assesses their internal and external validity relative both to each other and to randomized controlled trials. While randomized controlled trials can achieve the highest degree of internal validity when cleanly implemented in the field, the availability of large, nationally representative data sets offers the opportunity for a high degree of external validity using non-experimental methods. We argue that each method has merits in some context and they are complements rather than substitutes.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"47 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2014-0005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract “Ancillary studies of experiments” are a technique whereby researchers use an experiment conducted by others to recover causal estimates of a randomized intervention on new outcomes. The method requires pairing randomized treatments the researchers did not oversee with data on outcomes that were not the focus of the original experiment. Since ancillary studies rely on interventions that have already been undertaken, oftentimes by governments, they can provide a low-cost method with which to identify effects on a wide variety of outcomes. We define this technique, identify the small but growing universe of papers that employ ancillary studies of experiments in political science and economics, and assess the benefits and limitations of the method.
{"title":"Ancillary Studies of Experiments: Opportunities and Challenges","authors":"Kate A. Baldwin, Rikhil R Bhavnani","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2014-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2014-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract “Ancillary studies of experiments” are a technique whereby researchers use an experiment conducted by others to recover causal estimates of a randomized intervention on new outcomes. The method requires pairing randomized treatments the researchers did not oversee with data on outcomes that were not the focus of the original experiment. Since ancillary studies rely on interventions that have already been undertaken, oftentimes by governments, they can provide a low-cost method with which to identify effects on a wide variety of outcomes. We define this technique, identify the small but growing universe of papers that employ ancillary studies of experiments in political science and economics, and assess the benefits and limitations of the method.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"113 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2014-0010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In recent years, experimental methods have been both highly celebrated, and roundly criticized, as a means of addressing core questions in the social sciences. They have received particular attention in the analysis of development interventions. This paper focuses on two key questions: (1) what have been the main contributions of RCTs to the study of government performance? and (2) what could be the contributions, and relatedly the limits? It draws inter alia on a new systematic review of experimental and quasi-experimental studies on governance to consider both the contributions and limits of RCTs in the extant literature. A final section introduces the studies included in this symposium in light of this discussion. Collectively, the studies push beyond polarized debates over experimental methods towards a new middle ground, considering both how experimental work can better address identified weaknesses and how experimental and non-experimental techniques can be combined most fruitfully.
{"title":"What Can Experiments Tell Us About How to Improve Government Performance?","authors":"Rachel M. Gisselquist, M. Niño-Zarazúa","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2014-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2014-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, experimental methods have been both highly celebrated, and roundly criticized, as a means of addressing core questions in the social sciences. They have received particular attention in the analysis of development interventions. This paper focuses on two key questions: (1) what have been the main contributions of RCTs to the study of government performance? and (2) what could be the contributions, and relatedly the limits? It draws inter alia on a new systematic review of experimental and quasi-experimental studies on governance to consider both the contributions and limits of RCTs in the extant literature. A final section introduces the studies included in this symposium in light of this discussion. Collectively, the studies push beyond polarized debates over experimental methods towards a new middle ground, considering both how experimental work can better address identified weaknesses and how experimental and non-experimental techniques can be combined most fruitfully.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"1 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2014-0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The fundamental problem of external validity is not to generalize from one experiment, so much as to experimentally test generalizable theories. That is, theories that explain the systematic variation of causal effects across contexts. Here we show how the graphical language of causal diagrams can be used in this endeavour. Specifically we show how generalization is a causal problem, how a causal approach is more robust than a purely predictive one, and how causal diagrams can be adapted to convey partial parametric information about interactions.
{"title":"A Graphical Approximation to Generalization: Definitions and Diagrams","authors":"Fernando Martel García, Léonard Wantchékon","doi":"10.1515/jgd-2014-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2014-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The fundamental problem of external validity is not to generalize from one experiment, so much as to experimentally test generalizable theories. That is, theories that explain the systematic variation of causal effects across contexts. Here we show how the graphical language of causal diagrams can be used in this endeavour. Specifically we show how generalization is a causal problem, how a causal approach is more robust than a purely predictive one, and how causal diagrams can be adapted to convey partial parametric information about interactions.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"71 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jgd-2014-0013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Social scientists are increasingly engaging in experimental research projects of importance for public policy in developing areas. While this research holds the possibility of producing major social benefits, it may also involve manipulating populations, often without consent, sometimes with potentially adverse effects, and often in settings with obvious power differentials between researcher and subject. Such research is currently conducted with few clear ethical guidelines. In this paper I discuss research ethics as currently understood in this field, highlighting the limitations of standard procedures and the need for the construction of appropriate ethics, focusing on the problems of determining responsibility for interventions and assessing appropriate forms of consent.
{"title":"Reflections on the Ethics of Social Experimentation","authors":"M. Humphreys","doi":"10.1515/JGD-2014-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JGD-2014-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social scientists are increasingly engaging in experimental research projects of importance for public policy in developing areas. While this research holds the possibility of producing major social benefits, it may also involve manipulating populations, often without consent, sometimes with potentially adverse effects, and often in settings with obvious power differentials between researcher and subject. Such research is currently conducted with few clear ethical guidelines. In this paper I discuss research ethics as currently understood in this field, highlighting the limitations of standard procedures and the need for the construction of appropriate ethics, focusing on the problems of determining responsibility for interventions and assessing appropriate forms of consent.","PeriodicalId":38929,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Globalization and Development","volume":"6 1","pages":"112 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JGD-2014-0016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66939811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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