Abstract How do courts root themselves in traditional tort principles and policies and also develop tort common law in ways that befit contemporary values? This essay argues that judges should weave classic tort aims of harm prevention and redress with contemporary norms of equality of persons, to provide a fuller accounting to people foreseeably risked and harmed by projects undertaken for financial gain. In essence, common law courts must re-ask the crucial question of who is a neighbor in a shrinking world in which risks and consequences can be traced somewhat farther. The article commends a few recent decisions that compel legal regard for a broader cohort of injured people and promote care for their wellbeing. It also encourages scholars to engage more deeply with the state court decisions that determine tort law’s reach.
{"title":"Tort Common Law Future: Preventing Harm and Providing Redress to the Uncounted Injured","authors":"Ellen M. Bublick","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2022-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2022-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do courts root themselves in traditional tort principles and policies and also develop tort common law in ways that befit contemporary values? This essay argues that judges should weave classic tort aims of harm prevention and redress with contemporary norms of equality of persons, to provide a fuller accounting to people foreseeably risked and harmed by projects undertaken for financial gain. In essence, common law courts must re-ask the crucial question of who is a neighbor in a shrinking world in which risks and consequences can be traced somewhat farther. The article commends a few recent decisions that compel legal regard for a broader cohort of injured people and promote care for their wellbeing. It also encourages scholars to engage more deeply with the state court decisions that determine tort law’s reach.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"279 - 308"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42046534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Alongside the dominant law and economics and corrective justice approaches to tort law, a new genre of tort theory based on principles and perspectives of social justice has come into its own and deserves recognition. Social justice tort theory starts from the premise that tort law reflects and reinforces systemic forms of injustice in the larger society and maintains that the compensatory ideal of tort law cannot be extricated from these larger systems. It is multi-dimensional and intersectional, recognizing that the impact of injury lands intersectionally, sometimes changing the intensity of the injury or distorting the nature of the injury. Social justice tort scholars have examined torts in gendered and racialized contexts, as well as in ordinary cases that seem to have little to do with systemic injury. In addition to feminist and critical race theory, they have borrowed from critical disability studies, queer theory and political economy. Their work demonstrates how tort law unfairly distributes damages, fails to provide adequate relief for victims of sexual assault or for people who suffer racial insult and discrimination, and erases maternal and reproductive harms. In their work, we can see common deconstructive moves (an emphasis on disparate impacts and devaluation; a teasing out of cognitive bias; and a critique of exceptionalism in tort doctrine) as well as guiding principles for reconstruction (incorporating victims’ perspectives; treating boundaries between civil rights law and tort law as permeable; and enhancing dignity and recognition).
{"title":"Social Justice Tort Theory","authors":"Martha Chamallas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3933027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3933027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Alongside the dominant law and economics and corrective justice approaches to tort law, a new genre of tort theory based on principles and perspectives of social justice has come into its own and deserves recognition. Social justice tort theory starts from the premise that tort law reflects and reinforces systemic forms of injustice in the larger society and maintains that the compensatory ideal of tort law cannot be extricated from these larger systems. It is multi-dimensional and intersectional, recognizing that the impact of injury lands intersectionally, sometimes changing the intensity of the injury or distorting the nature of the injury. Social justice tort scholars have examined torts in gendered and racialized contexts, as well as in ordinary cases that seem to have little to do with systemic injury. In addition to feminist and critical race theory, they have borrowed from critical disability studies, queer theory and political economy. Their work demonstrates how tort law unfairly distributes damages, fails to provide adequate relief for victims of sexual assault or for people who suffer racial insult and discrimination, and erases maternal and reproductive harms. In their work, we can see common deconstructive moves (an emphasis on disparate impacts and devaluation; a teasing out of cognitive bias; and a critique of exceptionalism in tort doctrine) as well as guiding principles for reconstruction (incorporating victims’ perspectives; treating boundaries between civil rights law and tort law as permeable; and enhancing dignity and recognition).","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"309 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43624055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Instrumentalist ideas have long been prominent in torts scholarship. Since the rise of legal realism, discussions of deterrence, compensation, the minimization of accident costs, and the distribution of losses have dominated scholarly discourse. In the past several decades, however, wholesale rejections of instrumentalist tort theory have arisen. The most uncompromising of these views rallies around the avowedly formalist battle cry that tort is “private law”. Ernest Weinrib’s elegant and influential book, The Idea of Private Law, declares its allegiance to that thesis in its title, and the idea figures almost as centrally in Arthur Ripstein’s recent and important Private Wrongs. Theorists who rally around the banner of “private law” claim that tort law’s governing principles of right and responsibility tumble out of the field’s characteristic legal form. Law, as they understand it, is constitutive of just relations among persons, not an instrument for the pursuit of independently valuable ends. For scholars like Weinrib and Ripstein, “private law” is the Kantian idea of reason that makes our actual law of torts intelligible. The claim that torts is a law of wrongs where persons bring claims in their own names for harms that they have wrongly suffered against those allegedly responsible for those wrongful harms is powerful and persuasive. The claim that the obligations persons owe one another in tort are obligations owed among equal and independent persons is likewise compelling. But theorists of tort as “private law” overshoot the mark by both asking and making too much of form. They ask too much of form when they attempt to make sense of the private law of torts solely in terms of form—eschewing all talk of interests. We cannot understand or justify the law of torts without attending to the interests that it protects. In tort, as elsewhere, rights and the duties they ground protect important individual interests. For example, it is our interest in the physical integrity of our persons that grounds the law of negligence. Theorist of tort as “private law” make too much of form when they present the legal category as its own private fiefdom walled off from surrounding legal fields. For Ripstein and Weinrib, “private law” is its own autonomous domain, sealed off against infection by any legal field whose form identifies it as “public law”. In our law, the private law of torts cooperates and competes with public law institutions as a response to the pervasiveness of accidental harm in an industrial and technological society. It is one way of institutionalizing our interest in safety. Establishing rightful relations among free and equal persons in civil society requires that institutions protect persons’ urgent interests, not just establish their formal independence. The theoretical understanding that we need will recognize that we misunderstand even the private law of torts itself if we sever it entirely from forms of collective responsibil
摘要工具主义思想在托茨的学术研究中一直很突出。自法律现实主义兴起以来，关于威慑、赔偿、事故成本最小化和损失分配的讨论一直主导着学术讨论。然而，在过去的几十年里，出现了对工具主义侵权理论的全盘否定。这些观点中最不妥协的一种是围绕着公然的形式主义斗争口号，即侵权行为是“私法”。欧内斯特·温里布（Ernest Weinrib）优雅而有影响力的著作《私法的理念》（The Idea of Private Law）在其标题中宣布了对这一论点的忠诚，而这一理念在阿瑟·里普斯坦（Arthur Ripstein）最近重要的《私人写作》（Private Wrongs）中几乎占据了核心地位。聚集在“私法”旗帜周围的理论家们声称，侵权法的权利和责任原则脱离了该领域特有的法律形式。他们认为，法律是人与人之间公正关系的组成部分，而不是追求独立有价值目的的工具。对于像Weinrib和Ripstein这样的学者来说，“私法”是康德的理性思想，它使我们的实际侵权法变得清晰易懂。侵权行为是一种错误的法律，即人们以自己的名义对他们所遭受的错误伤害向那些据称对这些错误伤害负有责任的人提出索赔，这种说法是有力和有说服力的。关于侵权行为中人与人之间的义务是平等和独立的人之间所应承担的义务的主张同样令人信服。但是，作为“私法”的侵权行为理论家过分强调了形式。当他们试图仅仅从形式上理解侵权行为的私法时，他们要求的形式太多了，而回避了所有关于利益的讨论。如果不考虑侵权法所保护的利益，我们就无法理解或证明侵权法的合理性。在侵权行为中，与其他地方一样，权利和义务保护重要的个人利益。例如，正是我们对个人身体完整性的利益才是过失法的依据。作为“私法”的侵权行为理论家在将法律范畴描述为与周围法律领域隔绝的私人领地时，过于注重形式。对Ripstein和Weinrib来说，“私法”是自己的自治领域，任何形式将其认定为“公法”的法律领域都将其封闭起来，以防感染。在我国法律中，侵权行为私法与公法机构合作和竞争，以应对工业和技术社会中普遍存在的意外伤害。这是将我们对安全的兴趣制度化的一种方式。在公民社会中建立自由和平等的人之间的合法关系需要机构保护人的迫切利益，而不仅仅是建立他们的正式独立性。我们需要的理论理解将认识到，如果我们将侵权行为私法与避免和修复与其竞争和合作的意外伤害的集体责任形式完全割裂开来，我们甚至会误解侵权行为私法本身。
{"title":"Form and Substance in the “Private Law” of Torts","authors":"Gregory C. Keating","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2020-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2020-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Instrumentalist ideas have long been prominent in torts scholarship. Since the rise of legal realism, discussions of deterrence, compensation, the minimization of accident costs, and the distribution of losses have dominated scholarly discourse. In the past several decades, however, wholesale rejections of instrumentalist tort theory have arisen. The most uncompromising of these views rallies around the avowedly formalist battle cry that tort is “private law”. Ernest Weinrib’s elegant and influential book, The Idea of Private Law, declares its allegiance to that thesis in its title, and the idea figures almost as centrally in Arthur Ripstein’s recent and important Private Wrongs. Theorists who rally around the banner of “private law” claim that tort law’s governing principles of right and responsibility tumble out of the field’s characteristic legal form. Law, as they understand it, is constitutive of just relations among persons, not an instrument for the pursuit of independently valuable ends. For scholars like Weinrib and Ripstein, “private law” is the Kantian idea of reason that makes our actual law of torts intelligible. The claim that torts is a law of wrongs where persons bring claims in their own names for harms that they have wrongly suffered against those allegedly responsible for those wrongful harms is powerful and persuasive. The claim that the obligations persons owe one another in tort are obligations owed among equal and independent persons is likewise compelling. But theorists of tort as “private law” overshoot the mark by both asking and making too much of form. They ask too much of form when they attempt to make sense of the private law of torts solely in terms of form—eschewing all talk of interests. We cannot understand or justify the law of torts without attending to the interests that it protects. In tort, as elsewhere, rights and the duties they ground protect important individual interests. For example, it is our interest in the physical integrity of our persons that grounds the law of negligence. Theorist of tort as “private law” make too much of form when they present the legal category as its own private fiefdom walled off from surrounding legal fields. For Ripstein and Weinrib, “private law” is its own autonomous domain, sealed off against infection by any legal field whose form identifies it as “public law”. In our law, the private law of torts cooperates and competes with public law institutions as a response to the pervasiveness of accidental harm in an industrial and technological society. It is one way of institutionalizing our interest in safety. Establishing rightful relations among free and equal persons in civil society requires that institutions protect persons’ urgent interests, not just establish their formal independence. The theoretical understanding that we need will recognize that we misunderstand even the private law of torts itself if we sever it entirely from forms of collective responsibil","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"45 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48683436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foreword: From Personal Life to Private Law: The Jurisprudence of John Gardner","authors":"Scott Hershovitz","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2021-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2021-0012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2021-0012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46737064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taking Responsibility Personally: On John Gardner’s From Personal Life to Private Law","authors":"John C. P. Goldberg","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2021-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2021-0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"3 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2021-0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46347230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In “The Opposite of Rape,” John Gardner defends two central claims. The first claim is that consent is not necessary for morally permissible sex and the second claim is that giving consent pride of place in sexual offence policy has the unwelcome consequence of reinforcing sexist ideology. Gardner’s arguments for both claims rely on what I call the “Passive Consent Thesis” which is the thesis that “if A gives consent to B in a sexual encounter, then A is passive and B is active in the encounter.” Gardner argues that if sex that is good in a key respect, then they engage in joint sexual activity that is free of this asymmetry of agency. Building on work by Karamvir Chadha, I respond that even if someone is passive with respect to the action to which they consent, they can still be active with respect to a different action that they perform themselves. Consequently, I maintain that two people can give each other consent while engaging in joint sexual activity.
{"title":"Sexual Consent without Passivity","authors":"T. Dougherty","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2021-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2021-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In “The Opposite of Rape,” John Gardner defends two central claims. The first claim is that consent is not necessary for morally permissible sex and the second claim is that giving consent pride of place in sexual offence policy has the unwelcome consequence of reinforcing sexist ideology. Gardner’s arguments for both claims rely on what I call the “Passive Consent Thesis” which is the thesis that “if A gives consent to B in a sexual encounter, then A is passive and B is active in the encounter.” Gardner argues that if sex that is good in a key respect, then they engage in joint sexual activity that is free of this asymmetry of agency. Building on work by Karamvir Chadha, I respond that even if someone is passive with respect to the action to which they consent, they can still be active with respect to a different action that they perform themselves. Consequently, I maintain that two people can give each other consent while engaging in joint sexual activity.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"27 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2021-0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46448165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Punitive damages present two related puzzles. One concerns their object. If they are punitive, their object is to punish tortfeasors. If they are damages, their object is to compensate tort victims. If they are both, the problem is to reconcile these different objects in applying them. A second puzzle involves their subject. Punitive damages are awarded for egregious wrongdoing. But the nature of that egregiousness is nebulous and contested, implicating many poorly understood terms. The two puzzles are connected, because the subject of punitive damages will inform their object. Once we know the type of wrongfulness that punitive damages deal with, we can understand better whether and how they are punishing, compensating, or both. This Article reconstructs one of punitive damages’ central subjects: malice. In so doing, it clarifies one key object of punitive damages: to offer redress to a victim of cruelty. Malice is a ubiquitous textual element in the state law of punitive damages. But there has been little scholarly commentary about what malice means for punitive damages. Drawing from the common history of tort and criminal law, this Article identifies two core meanings of malice: a desire or motive to do wrong, and a disposition of callous indifference to the wrong inflicted. Though distinct, these meanings broadly coalesce in the concept of cruelty. The Article argues that this reconstructed account of the wrong of malice represents a powerful justification for awarding punitive damages. Malice as cruelty as a justification for punitive damages also fits within a broader view of tort law as redress for specific private wrongs. But malice as a subject of punitive damages clarifies and enriches this account of their object. A victim of a tort done with malice, and who is aware of it, has been wronged more gravely than a victim of a tort done without malice and is, therefore, entitled to greater redress.
{"title":"Reconstructing Malice in the Law of Punitive Damages","authors":"Marc O Degirolami","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2020-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2020-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Punitive damages present two related puzzles. One concerns their object. If they are punitive, their object is to punish tortfeasors. If they are damages, their object is to compensate tort victims. If they are both, the problem is to reconcile these different objects in applying them. A second puzzle involves their subject. Punitive damages are awarded for egregious wrongdoing. But the nature of that egregiousness is nebulous and contested, implicating many poorly understood terms. The two puzzles are connected, because the subject of punitive damages will inform their object. Once we know the type of wrongfulness that punitive damages deal with, we can understand better whether and how they are punishing, compensating, or both. This Article reconstructs one of punitive damages’ central subjects: malice. In so doing, it clarifies one key object of punitive damages: to offer redress to a victim of cruelty. Malice is a ubiquitous textual element in the state law of punitive damages. But there has been little scholarly commentary about what malice means for punitive damages. Drawing from the common history of tort and criminal law, this Article identifies two core meanings of malice: a desire or motive to do wrong, and a disposition of callous indifference to the wrong inflicted. Though distinct, these meanings broadly coalesce in the concept of cruelty. The Article argues that this reconstructed account of the wrong of malice represents a powerful justification for awarding punitive damages. Malice as cruelty as a justification for punitive damages also fits within a broader view of tort law as redress for specific private wrongs. But malice as a subject of punitive damages clarifies and enriches this account of their object. A victim of a tort done with malice, and who is aware of it, has been wronged more gravely than a victim of a tort done without malice and is, therefore, entitled to greater redress.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"193 - 240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66902694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Litigation financing of plaintiffs by financiers other than the law firms representing the plaintiffs in the litigation is now a multi-billion-dollar industry. Contrary to assertions by advocates for such litigation financing, such litigation financing does not increase fairness and justice to poor and middle-class victims. Instead, it creates substantial problems beyond any associated with standard contingent-fee agreements between plaintiffs and the lawyers who represent them. This article describes the multiple ways in which the litigation-financing industry harms poor and middle-class tort plaintiffs and generates inefficient uses of judicial resources and jurors' time. It then recommends actions that courts can take to reduce those problems.
{"title":"Litigation Financing: Balancing Access with Fairness","authors":"M. E. Wheeler, Theresa Wardon Benz","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2020-2007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2020-2007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Litigation financing of plaintiffs by financiers other than the law firms representing the plaintiffs in the litigation is now a multi-billion-dollar industry. Contrary to assertions by advocates for such litigation financing, such litigation financing does not increase fairness and justice to poor and middle-class victims. Instead, it creates substantial problems beyond any associated with standard contingent-fee agreements between plaintiffs and the lawyers who represent them. This article describes the multiple ways in which the litigation-financing industry harms poor and middle-class tort plaintiffs and generates inefficient uses of judicial resources and jurors' time. It then recommends actions that courts can take to reduce those problems.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"13 1","pages":"281 - 301"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2020-2007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42220914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are likely to change a great deal about the practical workings of the liability system for auto accidents. However, we cannot know how just yet. Attempts to anticipate the future and preemptively redesign the liability system around its imagined contours are likely to invite error and frustration. Discretion often being the better part of valor, I suggest we muddle through a bit first.
{"title":"Not So Fast: A Brief Plea for Muddling Through the Problems of Autonomous Vehicle Liability","authors":"Adam F. Scales","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2020-2012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2020-2012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are likely to change a great deal about the practical workings of the liability system for auto accidents. However, we cannot know how just yet. Attempts to anticipate the future and preemptively redesign the liability system around its imagined contours are likely to invite error and frustration. Discretion often being the better part of valor, I suggest we muddle through a bit first.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"13 1","pages":"189 - 195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2020-2012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47099737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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