Pub Date : 2016-07-12DOI: 10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142
L. Indrusiak, J. Harbin, Martha Johanna Sepúlveda
Security can be seen as an optimization objective in NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper, we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it. We therefore propose packet route randomization as a mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital design requirement. Using an evolutionary optimization approach, we show how to effectively apply route randomization in such a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.
{"title":"Side-channel attack resilience through route randomisation in secure real-time Networks-on-Chip","authors":"L. Indrusiak, J. Harbin, Martha Johanna Sepúlveda","doi":"10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ReCoSoC.2017.8016142","url":null,"abstract":"Security can be seen as an optimization objective in NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper, we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it. We therefore propose packet route randomization as a mechanism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks, focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital design requirement. Using an evolutionary optimization approach, we show how to effectively apply route randomization in such a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models supports our findings.","PeriodicalId":393701,"journal":{"name":"2017 12th International Symposium on Reconfigurable Communication-centric Systems-on-Chip (ReCoSoC)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128966949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}